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ABSTRACT
Through a discussion of Marx in particular and an extended 
overview of social theory in general the central questions 
from which I start are posed:
Rejecting individualist models of the social (either 
positivist or hermeneutic) as also teleological accounts of 
it,structural/objectivist models such as early Parsons' or 
Althusser's are considered to be the most ad­
vanced. However, these approaches cannot theorise either the 
emergence of the new in history or the possibility of ac­
tive agency from the part of social actors.Both problems 
are closely interwoven with the conceptualisation of the 
social as closed and fully determinable structural en­
tities .
An alternative approach theorising social structural en­
tities as open,and thus avoiding these problems is iden­
tified. It can be seen as evolving from the general state­
ments of Derrida to the specific theorisations of the so­
cial presented by Laclau and Mouffe and,in a more developed 
way,by Castoriadis (who provides also a theorisation of 
"autonomy").
However,the way this "openness" should be theorised remains 
unclarified.To avoid conceiving it as operating on a
transcendental level,it has to be located within the
(re)production of the social through individual action,i.e. 
within a theory of "structuration".
Such theories of structuration have been presented by Gid- 
dens and Bourdieu,but in a partial and insufficient 
way.However,the connection between the openness of the so­
cial and the modality of the (individual) unconscious Cas­
toriadis refers to,indicates an alternative.
This alternative is explored through an analysis of Freud 
and psychoanalytic theory.It is argued that the
psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche provides a theory 
of the reproduction of the social through the in­
dividual. The necessary indeterminacy implied by the opera­
tion of this reproduction partly through the (individual) 
unconscious (a level with a specific modality),and the 
relative autonomy of the conscious/rational ego imply that 
this reproduction is never fully determined.Thus the 
"openness" of the social can be more precisely concep­
tualised and the questions of agency and history can be 
addressed in a more fruitful way.
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INTRODUCTION
The modern conception of the social,dating from around the 
end of the eighteenth century,introduces a level of 
phenomena relatively opaque to the participating in­
dividuals and yet with a certain cohesiveness and dynamic.
Attempts to account for these phenomena at a general 
theoretical level can be seen as dividing,broadly,to two 
categories:individualist and holistic ones.
Individualist approaches,either positivist or her­
meneutic, failed to ground their central assumption,that of 
conceiving the individual as definable independently of the 
social.Thus their assertion that the social can be seen as 
produced by individuals cannot be sustained.
On the other hand,holistic approaches of a positivist na­
ture failed to theorise the specificity of the social which 
they claimed to be an irreducible and sui generis level.
The ground was left open for holistic approaches falling 
broadly within the idealist tradition: For these,initially, 
society was seen as the subject of history in a path of 
general evolution.When the evolutionary perspective was 
abandoned,certain constant and transhistorical categories 
supposedly always ordering the social were retained.The 
rejection even of these constants marked a final phase 
within this tradition: what remained was the assertion of 
the possibility of objective and complete knowledge of the 
social,based on an ultimate accessibility of the social to 
reason.In general this last phase (which we can identify in 
the early Parsons and,in a more developed form,in Althusser 
if we discard his alliance to the predominance of 
production) was correlative to a conceptualisation of so­
cial structural entities as closed and fully definable 
ones.
The central problems these late objectivist approaches
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faced were the impossibility to theorise social actors as 
active (since they were considered as fully determined by 
the social) as also to theorise the emergence of the new in 
history (within fully closed structural entities change 
cannot be theorised except through a return to a predefined 
path of development,an assumption that was,however, 
rejected).
The starting point for the present study is an attempt to 
address these problems,without regressing to an
individualistic or evolutionist perspective.
An obvious way forward was to discard the assumption of 
fully closed structural entities and to introduce a certain 
"openness” within the conceptualisation of the social.
"Post structuralist" authors have moved,in general,towards 
such a direction.We can consider Derrida as the exemplary 
case introducing an openness (as "differance") alongside a 
differential notion of structure.However,Derrida's 
relevance to a theorisation of the social is far from evi­
dent .
A similar approach to Derrida1s,but specifically addressed 
to a theorisation of the social,is introduced by Laclau and 
Mouffe.They fail,however,to satisfactorily theorise how ex­
actly the openness they claim for the social can be concep­
tualised.
Castoriadis1 theorisation of the social as primarily 
"social imaginary significations",having the modality of 
"magma" and hence never being fully definable or closed,is 
more comprehensive.Castoriadis theorises the (individual) 
unconscious as also sharing this modality,and presents a 
comprehensive theory of autonomy at both individual and so­
cial levels.However,he does not clarify the level of exist­
ence of social significations,running the danger of con­
sidering them as operating at a transcendental level,as a 
kind of (negative) essence.
While,therefore,a general and abstract recognition of a 
certain openness of social structural entities -and of the
12
social in general- has been accepted by a number of 
theorists,this "openness” has not been theorised in a satis­
factory way.
To avoid any transcendentalism,a possible alternative 
would be to locate any "openness" within processes of 
(re)production of the social through (individual) social 
action,i.e. within a theory of "structuration".
A move from "structure" to "structuration",heralded by 
Chomskian linguistics,has been expanded on the level of a 
general social theory by -among others- Giddens and Bour-
dieu.Both are aiming at a transcendence of objectivism and
subjectivism and both emphasize a certain activeness from 
the part of the social actors.Giddens adopts a semi-
individualistic stand,while Bourdieu maintains the social 
construction of the individual.Since,however,the modality 
of the social is not explicitly theorised,even in the case 
of Bourdieu,these claims cannot be substantiated.
If,however,a connection was to be made between the type of 
structuration theory Giddens and Bourdieu propose and the 
theorisation of an open modality of the social Laclau and 
Castoriadis assert,a direction beyond subjectivism and ob­
jectivism could be indeed opened.
I propose that such a connection can be made through the 
psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche.A detailed ex­
amination of Freud in particular and psychoanalytic
theorisation in general indicates:
(i) the specificity of the level of the unconsious (a 
specificity indicated by Castoriadis) as a non fully deter­
minable and never directly approachable level of psychical 
operation,a level that is,moreover,always "represented";
(ii) the necessity of a social environment for the 
development of the psyche both at an unconscious and at a 
conscious level.The representations the psyche uses,as well 
as the "objects" internalised in the process of construc­
tion of endopsychic agencies,are inescapably social.
Hence the psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche allows
13
us to present a theory of the way in which the social in­
fluences the individual psyche.Moreover,since these in­
fluences are manifested in consciousness and action,we have 
also a theory of social reproductions theory of structura­
tion.
As part of this reproduction occurs within the level of 
the unconscious,the non determinable nature of this level 
implies a radical indeterminacy.Additionally,the relative 
autonomy of the conscious/rational ego indicates another 
degree of indeterminacy.Thus the impossibility of a full 
determination of social reproduction through the individual 
can be asserted.
We can indicate,therefore,precisely what was sought:an af­
firmation of a certain "openness" of the social inherent in 
the processes of social reproduction.
This theorisation of openness allows the affirmation both 
of a limited but always existent activeness from the part 
of the actor,due to the relative autonomy of the conscious 
ego; and the possibility of a higher level of autonomy,made 
possible by the necessary indeterminacy Social reproduction 
through the unconscious implies.
Moreover,the emergence of the new in history can be con­
ceptualised as always inherent in social reproduc­
tion, alongside and independently of intentional action 
specifically aiming at social transformation.
The two central problems of objectivist structural 
theories,the question of agency and the question of his­
tory, can thus be more satisfactorily approached.
The recognition of the social relevance of the level of 
the unconscious allows also the affirmation of the her­
meneutic nature of knowledge of the social (in so far as 
social structures that exist and are reproduced through the 
individual unconscious are concerned).Moreover,the 
theorisation of the always meaningful nature of social 
practice becomes possible.
Thus a more fruitful way of approaching -though,of
14
course,not of solving- certain central questions of social 
theory is indicated.
Although the above discussion is presented in a seemingly 
atemporal manner,it bears,naturally,the imprints of its 
age.
It marks,precisely,the gradual erosion of the belief in an 
ultimate (and absolute) rationality of society and his­
tory, that, in one form or another,had been a dominant (if 
not the dominant) view of social thought over the past two 
centuries.
The recognition and theorisation of the limits of such 
rationality is a central guiding line of the present 
study.However,unlike a certain "post-modernism",the indica­
tion of these limits is not seen as implying an all per­
vasive relativity.The aim is to retain the relevance and 
significance of conscious/rational thought and action 
alongside the elements that transcend and limit it.
A note on the level of abstraction may be added here.The 
present study is concerned with a theorisation of the so­
cial at a high level of abstraction,dealing as it does with 
"social" phenomena in general.
By necessity,what such a level of abstraction gains in 
generality,it loses in detail and specificity.For ex­
ample, what exactly social phenomena can be subsumed under 
the general theorisations advanced,is not discussed.
However,it has to be stressed that this theorisation is 
not to be seen as operating independently of and outside 
the concrete empirical material of social science.lt is not 
an a-prioristic speculation but a theoretical exer­
cise, feeding from and hoping to offer^to *n*more concrete 
studies.A division of labour within the field makes a 
theoretical inquiry,in which greater rigour can be applied 
to concepts and formulations,separate from studies dealing 
with empirical material as such.
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Moreover,the orientation of the present work is not 
towards a theoretically polished and simple answer.The 
abstract level at which the social is dealt with does not 
imply a "grand" and all encompassing theory.Indeed,a 
specific aim sought is to argue against any foundationalism 
and to provide a direction of approaching social phenomena 
that does not dissolve the multiplicity of concrete forms 
of the social into the manifestations of a single 
"essence".
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PART I: THE APORIAS OF SOCIAL THEORY
I. A RETURN TO MARX
Marx can be seen as a double landmark in the history of 
social thought.A landmark,naturally,of the beginnings of 
this thought -creating what Foucault called an entire 
"field of discursivity"x- and hence very much a repre­
sentative of his epoch.And yet,paradoxically,in his con­
tradictions and ambivalences,as also a landmark of impor­
tance in today's crossroads.
In a sense,therefore,a return to Marx is a paradigmatic 
way to pose certain themes of contemporary relevance while 
precisely indicating which theoretical assumptions are to 
be discarded and which to be retained.
Let us inquire,then,about the ontological status Marx at­
tributes to the social.
MARX AND THE DISJUNCTURE BETWEEN "MATERIAL" AND "IDEAL"
The "German Ideology" is the first,and in many cases the 
most consistent exposition of Marx and Engels's 
"materialism".This "materialism" is proposed as an alterna­
tive to the idealism of the Young Hegelians which "consider 
conceptions,thoughts,ideas,in fact all the products of con­
sciousness, to which they attribute an independent exist­
ence's the real chains of men"2 .
Marx and Engels deny this idealism.What is lacking,they 
claim,is an "inquiry into the connection of (German)
1. M.Foucault,"What is an author?" in P.Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault 
Reader.Harmondsvorth:Penguin.1986.p .114
2. K.Marx & F.Engels.The German Ideology (1846) (thereafter GI), 
London:Lawrence and Wishart,1974,p.41.
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philosophy with (German) reality,the relation of their 
criticism to their own material surroundings113.
In contrast,Marx and Engels want to begin from the 
premises "...of real individuals,their activity and the 
material conditions under which they live,both those which 
they find already existing and those produced by their 
activity"4 and they assert,in the famous passage,that "the 
production of ideas,of conceptions,of consciousnesses at 
first directly interwoven with the material activity and 
the material intercourse of men,the language of real 
life.Conceiving,thinking,the mental intercourse of 
men,appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their 
material behaviour"5.
We have,therefore,in opposition to the "mental 
intercourse","mental production", "consciousness",
"thinking", "ideas","conceptions",and so on,the "material 
intercourse","the activity of real individuals",the 
"material behaviour".What is the nature of this opposition?
Marx and Engels do not simply invert a causal 
chain,replacing the assertion that ideas determine people's 
"real life" as they see the Young Hegelians asserting,with 
the assertion that it is this "real life" that determines 
ideas and consciousness,while retaining a sort of equiv­
alence between the two levels.
If thoughts,ideas,consciousness and the like reflect,more 
or less accurately,the "materiality" of real life,Young
j
Hegelians claim has simply to be completed:It is not enough 
to change what people think,to combat their unhappi­
ness. People must also,and primarily,change their real 
life,their "actual material intercourse".
However,as long as the two levels are seen as two sides of
3. ibid.
4. GI,p.42
5. GI,p.47
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the same coin,it is not particularly relevant which of the 
two is considered as the determinant one.Since a change in 
material life implies a change of ideas,given an equiv­
alence between the two,a change in ideas implies -and ex­
presses, on the level of thought- a change in material 
life.The assertion that the real is reducible to the ideal 
is by no means affected by a reversion of the proposition 
while retaining an equivalential assertion.
As is well known,Marx and Engels do not retain this equiv- 
alential assertion.The repudiation of the mental inter­
course is made on the name of a material intercourse that 
precisely is not available to the participating in­
dividuals as an idea or consciousness,a "real life" that is 
in disjuncture with the thoughts the very persons they live 
it have.
For Marx and Engels "material intercourse" and "real life" 
are reflected in thought,consciousness or ideas only in
a distorted way (except in specific historical 
circumstances).The determining character of the material 
level cannot be deciphered through an analysis of the ideal 
one.What people think and what they do represent two dif­
ferent modalities,the truth of which cannot be deciphered 
reciprocally.
What is then the "truth" of the determinant level,the 
material one? What is the ontological status of the "real 
life of men" in contradistinction to the "mental" one and 
what access do we have to the former?
We can reconstruct Marx and Engels's answer in two con­
secutive steps:
The first,separating this "material level" not only from 
"ideas" but also from "nature" and considering it as in­
dicating what we may call a "social level".
The second,presenting this social level as emanating from 
and reducible to the rationality of labour as a transhis- 
torical human attribute reflected in the development of 
history.
19
THE "MATERIAL" AS "SOCIAL"
Marx and Engels make immediately clear that the "material 
intercourse",the "language of real life",corresponds to 
"production":
"(Men) begin to distinguish themselves from animals as 
soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistences 
step which is conditioned by their physical organisation."6
Yet the level of production is not seen as directly deter­
mined by this "physical organisation" within which produc­
tion is carried out:"By producing their means of subsis­
tence men are indirectly producing their actual material 
life. "'7
Production therefore is only indirectly reducible to the 
natural environment.Marx and Engels's analysis is focused 
on production while the natural environment -as also the 
biological nature of man- remain on the background as 
limits rather than as the actual determinants of produc­
tion, limits which are acknowledged but not discussed.While 
imposing "definite conditions"8 the material/natural en­
vironment is not determining,in a reductive way,the "real 
essence of man":
"We cannot go here either into the actual physical nature 
of man,or into the natural conditions in which man finds 
himself -geological,orohydrographical,climatic and so on."9 
The mode of production ("mode" referring simply to the form 
of production) is something more than a refection of these 
natural limits:
"The mode of production must not be considered simply as 
being the production of the physical existence of the in-
6. GI,p.42
7. ibid..emphasis added
8. GI,p.47
9. GI,p.42
20
dividuals.Rather it is a definite form of activity of these 
individuals,a definite form of expressing their life,a 
definite mode of life on their part.As individuals express 
their life,so they are."10
Thus production as "a definite mode of life",is precisely 
a characteristically human activity,not a reflection of na­
ture. The counterposition of production,therefore,as 
"material activity and material intercourse of men",to 
"forms of consciousness",is not a distinction between na­
ture and thought.
"Matter" in this case retains the traditional philosophi­
cal denotation of the term:it is the outside,the negation 
of thought,what is either opaque to it or only partially 
penetrable.But unlike this definition,"material" for Marx 
and Engels,while still the outside of thought,is not 
reducible to a closed,mute and determinant nature.It refers 
rather to a level of activity specifically human: produc­
tion.
Hence we have a threefold distinction:
nature   production  thought
(natural environment, 
biological
human nature)
a distinction in which a discontinuity is implied between 
each of the three terms.We could indicate as "social" the 
level that production defines,while recognising that 
"thought" is also social but of a modality somehow 
"different" from that of "production".11
10. ibid.
11. Traditional references to Marx and Engels' materialism tend to 
concentrate on the irreducibility of nature to thought,thus obscuring 
the specificity of the level of production that is the primary aim of
21
In Marx's later writings the distinction between nature 
and production becomes more explicit and clear.Instead of 
the variations of the term "intercourse"12 which we have in 
"German Ideology",the term "relations of production" is in­
troduced, in opposition to the "forces of production" which 
-the forces- refer precisely to the actual 
natural/environmental/technological elements.In the famous 
words of the 1857 Preface:
"In the social production of their life,men enter into 
definite relations,that are indispensable and independent 
of their will,relations of production which correspond to a 
definite stage in the development of their material produc­
tive forces.The sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society,the real 
foundation,on which rises a legal and political superstruc­
ture and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness"13 
This passage is revealing.lt clearly dissociates the ac­
tual productive "forces" from the "relations" of produc­
tion, the superstructure,and the latter from the "forms of 
social consciousness".Thus the three levels can be 
presented as:
Marx and Engels's discussion and which,as we argued,while differen­
tiated from thought,is equally differentiated from nature.Such inter­
pretations effect a naturalistic reduction that is in no way present 
in Marx and Engels.(For a relatively recent example see S.Timpanaro.On 
Materialism.London:New Left Books,1975)
12. "Verkehr" which was rendered as "intercourse",and 
Verkehrsform,form of intercourse,Verkehrsweise,mode of inter­
course, Verkehrsverhaltnisse, relations or conditions of inter­
course, see editors' note in GI,p.42.
13. K.Marx,Preface to "A contribution to a critique of political 
economy"(1859).usually referred to as the "1859 Preface".The transla­
tion used in K.Marx & F.Engels.Selected Works V.I.London:Lawrence and 
Wishart,1953,p.329
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forces of 
production
n ature relations ----political------- thoughts,
(natural of production and legal ideas
environment, superstructure
biological 
human nature)
Natural
level /-------- Social level I --------- / Social
level II 
(level of consciousness)
The forces of production are the mediating element between 
the level of nature and the relations of production.These 
relations,together with the "political and legal 
superstructure" are in turn separate from the "forms of 
consciousness".It is this intermediate level that can be 
termed the "social level I" as distinct from and ir­
reducible to the -also social- level of consciousness 
(which can be designated as social level II).
Once a specificity is assigned to this "first" level of 
the social,however,the question of how is to be analysed 
arises.Since the mode of production is the determinant in­
stance of this level,it is on the analysis of this mode 
that the modality of the social has to be sought.We can see 
Marx's subsequent work as precisely an attempt to define 
this modality of production.
The rejection of individualism
and the structural character of the level of production
Early on,however,a possibility is ruled out:that of con­
ceiving production as the result of interaction between in­
dividuals, in the manner,for ex.,of classical political 
economy.
The repeated attacks of Marx against Robinsonades are well
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known:"The solitary and isolated hunter or fisherman,who 
serves A.Smith and Ricardo as a starting point,is one of 
the unimaginative fantasies of the 18th century 
romances...no more is Rousseau's social contract,which by 
means of a contract establishes a relationship and connec­
tion between subjects that are by nature independent...The 
prophets of 18th century saw the individual not as a his­
torical result but as the starting point of history;not as 
something evolving in the course of history but posited by 
nature."14
The historicity of the individual is continuously 
stressed.Not only individuals do not determine produc­
tion through their interaction,but their very individuality 
is a historical product: "Man is only individualised
through the process of history.He originally appears as a 
generic being,a herd animal -though by no means a 
"political animal" in the political sense."15
And this individuality is again,to a great ex­
tent , determined by production:"their personality (of the 
rentier,the capitalist,etc.) is conditioned and determined 
by the quite definite class relationships"16.
However,Marx does not simply reject individualism as an 
explanatory device for the specificity of the social.In his 
analysis of the capitalist relations of production in 
"Capital" he specifically sees the individual as part of 
the greater structural whole of production.17
14. K.Marx,"General introduction to Grundrisse" (1857).usually
referred to as the "1857 Introduction".The text used as appendix in 
GI.op.cit.,p.l23
15. K.Marx.Grundrisse(1857-58).D.Mclellan (ed.),London:Macmillan,1980, 
p.96
16. GI,p.84
17. It is the important contribution of L.Althusser to emphasise this 
structural character of the analysis in "Capital".The acceptance of 
this assertion,though,does not need to imply the acceptance of 
Althusser's whole theoretical edifice.For more discussion of Althus­
ser, see below and in the following chapter.
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In "Capital" capitalist production is seen as a structured 
whole that incorporates commodities,money and capital as 
well as capitalists and workers,all connected together in a 
circular relationship,and in a continuous process of flux.
While commodities,money and capital are material 
things,their interconnection within the nexus of capitalist 
relations of production refers to their specific function 
and role within these relations.
"Capital" does not represent only "machines" or "forces of 
production" but the whole of the system of capitalist 
production."Capital" is not,thus,a thing,but a specific 
relationship implying a series of other elements within an 
interconnected whole:
"Capital is not a thing,but rather a definite social 
production relation,belonging to a definite historical for­
mation of society,which is manifested in a thing and which 
lends this thing a specific social character.Capital is not 
the sum of material and produced means of produc­
tion. Capital is rather the means of production transformed 
into capital which in themselves are no more capital than 
gold or silver in itself is money."18
The elements of the system acquire their significance 
within the totality of the system,and are not disparate 
unities brought together in an interelationship,until,that 
is,money and commodities become capital:
"In themselves money and commodities are no more capital 
than are the means of production and of subsistence.They 
want transforming into capital.But this transformation it­
self can only take place under certain circumstances that 
centre in this,viz,that two very different kinds of 
commodity-possessors must come face to face and into 
contact;on the one hand,the owners of money,means of
18. K.Marx.C a p itaK1867).London:Lawrence and Wishart,1954,Volume III, 
p.794.Thereafter the three volumes of Capital will be denoted as 
C1,C2,C3 respectively.
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production,means of subsistence,who are to increase the sum 
of values they posses,by buying other people's labour- 
power;on the other hand,free labourers,the sellers of their 
own labour-power,and therefore the sellers of labour."19
Capitalist relations of production,apart from com­
modities, money and capital in specific forms,performing 
specific functions and being related in determinate rela­
tions, also require the agents of production,the capitalist 
and the worker.These agents exist within the relations of 
production in exactly the same way as do the com­
modities, money, or capital:as nodes in a network,determined 
in their specific function and with given relationships 
with the whole:
"Capitalist production...produces not only commodities,not 
only surplus-value,but it also produces and reproduces the 
capitalist relation;on the one side the capitalist,on the 
other,the wage-labourer20...The functions fulfilled by the 
capitalist are no more than the functions of capital ex­
ecuted continuously and willingly.The capitalist functions 
only as personified capital,capital as a person,just as the 
worker is no more than labour personified."21
Moreover,the nexus of relationships which determines them 
is not presented as such to the individuals.They are not 
consciously creating or reproducing the capitalist rela­
tions of production.The famous "commodity fetihism" is a 
case of the misrecognition of the social relations that ex­
ists behind and determine commodities as commodities.
Finally,the "whole",the totality of capitalist production 
relations,is not static.Rather it is in a continuous flux 
in which it reproduces itself in an always expanded
19. Cl,p.668
20. Cl,p.578
21. Unpublished chapter of Capital,Vol.I,in the Penguin edition.
(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1976),p .989
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form.The direction of this flux Marx defines as the primary 
law of increasing capital accumulation.
How can,however,this structured whole operate "behind 
people's back" while these very people are parts of that 
whole? How can people "produce materially" not only "under 
definite material limits,presuppositions and conditions in­
dependent of their will",but also being in the dark about 
these limits and conditions that are inherent in their 
actions? What anthropological model can be used to conceive 
such a disjuncture?
Moreover,in what sense can we conceive of this whole as 
following "laws" in an abstract way,laws independent from 
persons' volition? What,in other words,is the ontological 
status of the "material" -i.e social- level of production?
THE SOCIAL AS RATIONAL
Marx's answer to the above questions is not a direct 
one,but it is implied in his further analysis of 
capitalism.We can trace it in the basic assumptions under­
lying the analysis in "Capital".The same assump­
tions, though, are present in Marx's earlier work.
Establishing that capitalist relations of production form 
a structured whole in flux is only the first step.The 
second,and pivotal one,is the definition of value.
By defining value as corresponding to "simple average 
labour",i.e by postulating a measure of value that is con­
stant, the further definition of "surplus value" becomes 
possible.Capital can be seen as nothing more than accumu­
lated surplus value and the primary law of capital ac­
cumulation as reflecting the accumulation of surplus value:
"It should never be forgotten that the production of this 
surplus value is the immediate purpose and the determining 
motive of capitalist production.1122
What the labour definition of value does,is to effect a
22. C3,p.352
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connection between the structured whole of the capitalist 
mode of production and a fundamental human ac­
tivity, labour .The law of accumulation,the guiding force of 
capitalist production appears thus as a form of surplus 
value accumulation,i.e as the exploitation of this labour.
Thus capitalist relations may be "fetishised" and people 
may not recognise their role either as exploited or as ex­
ploiters, but the moving force behind all,the thread that 
holds all the elements of the mode of production 
together,is nothing more (or less) than the fundamental 
human attribute of labour.
However,the labour definition of value requires the pos­
sibility of defining a constant and given measure of 
"simple average labour".Marx considers "simple average 
labour" to vary in different countries and at different 
times,but in a particular society to be given23.Closer ex­
amination, however, reveals that only in single commodity 
production with no technological change can we indeed have 
such a constant measure.24.But capitalism,in Marx's own ac­
count's obviously not such a case.Therefore a major and 
fundamental assumption cannot be sustained.
Moreover,the labour theory of value cannot provide Marx 
-as indeed classical economics in general- with a measure 
of value independent of prices and wages.As Morishima 
remarks,"as soon as the heterogeneity of labour is allowed 
for,the theory of value is seen to conflict with Marx's own 
law of equalisation of the rate of exploitation through 
society,unless the different sorts of labour are reduced to
23. Cl,p.51
24. see the detailed analysis in A.Cutler,B.Hindess,P.Hirst,A.Hussain, 
Marx's Capital and Capitalism today V.I.London:Routledge.1977.pp.30-
37.
Also the analysis of C.Castoriadis in "Value,Equality,Justice, 
Politics:From Marx to Aristotle and from Aristotle to ourselves"(1975) 
in Crossroads in the Labyrinth.Sussex:The Harvester Press,1984,pp.266- 
273.
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the homogeneous abstract human labour in proportion to 
their wage rates.But in such a case,the resulted value sys­
tem depends on relative wages and hence Marx's intention of 
obtaining an intrinsic value system completely independent 
of markets is not fulfilled."25
Hence,as marginalist economists have rightfully pointed 
out ,on a "strictly analytical ground,there is no jus­
tification whatever for giving any sort of logical priority 
to either "values" over prices or to prices over 
"values".Each of them can be derived from the other;and 
both of them can be obtained from the interindustry rela­
tions expressed in terms of physical quantities of com­
modities . (Critics of Marx) go on to point out that the only 
system of exchange ratios which can be observed empirically 
is the system of prices.The "value" system is therefore 
regarded as something which belongs to Marxist ideology and 
has no empirical correlate.1126
Marx's next step,the calculation of surplus value requires 
an additional assumption: that the "necessary labour" for 
the worker to survive is a given and constant quantity.Yet 
it is obvious that this bare minimum is by no means his­
torically constant,even within a given mode of produc­
tion, especially within capitalism.Therefore this additional 
assumption is equally unsustainable.
Thus Marx's labour theory of value is revealed to be 
severely flawed:it is not in accord with his own analysis 
of the capitalist mode of production,regarding the neces­
sary technological change,the continuous expan­
sion, etc .Moreover, it cannot provide a measure of value in­
dependent of the market.As for the definition of surplus 
value,it is not only based on the dubious foundation of
25. M .Morishima.Marx1s Economics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 
1973,p.180-1
26. L.Passineti.Lectures on the theory of Production.London:Macmillan. 
1977,p.149
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this labour theory of value,it requires an additional as­
sumption that is equally dubious.
The elements of Marx's theoretical edifice we are refer­
ring to,the homogeneity of labour,the existence of 
"simple,average labour" and even more the definition of 
"surplus value" are not simple postulates.They are the 
corner-stones upon which the analysis in "Capital" is 
based.We cannot replace them and still retain the analysis.
Thus the whole analysis in "Capital" is based on an asser­
tion which contradicts Marx's explicit rejection of a tran- 
shistorical human nature: that labour can be seen as "a
substance/essence,which can appear under a given form or 
take a given expression,but which,in itself,does not modify 
itself,does not alter,and subsists as the immutable founda­
tion of changing attributes and determinations"2,7.
The basis of "Capital" is,therefore,metaphysical.The pos­
tulation of labour as the missing link between the mode of 
production and its abstract laws and the people that par­
ticipate in it,rests on an ultimate rationality of the mode 
of production,a rationality expressed through the founda­
tional "essence" of labour.
If we can identify such an -implicit- essentialism in 
"Capital",it is all the more explicit in Marx's earlier 
work:
The very centrality attributed to production,requires an 
assumption of labour as a transhistorical essence.As argued 
above,"production" is not introduced by Marx as the mirror 
of nature but as a social category,i.e as a level distinct 
from both nature and thought.Yet production is considered 
as determining the whole social level.In the classic words 
of the 1859 Preface:
"The sum total of these relations of production con­
stitutes the economic structure of society,the real founda­
tion, on which rises a legal and political superstructure
27. Castoriadis,op.cit.,p.274
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and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness.1128
This determinacy seems to be based on a convincing 
argument:since production is necessary for the existence 
and continuity of any social formation,the "organisation of 
production" -the relations of production,the mode of 
production,the economy- is also necessary and therefore 
determinant.
However,there is here a logical gap :the necessity of the 
function of production does not imply,ipso facto,that the 
mode of production will be a determinant social in­
stance. Precisely because production for Marx is a social 
and not a natural instance,the necessity of production by 
itself only poses a barrier,a natural given,a limit to what 
is at any moment possible.But this necessity does not imply 
anything at all about the social organisation of produc­
tion. To argue anything about this level -or organisation- a 
further assumption is needed.And this assumption is made by 
Marx and Engels,though in a subtle way:it is the assumption 
of man as a homo faber and of labour as the underlying es­
sence of man.
In "German Ideology" we read:"Men begin to distinguish them­
selves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their 
means of subsistence...As men express their life so they 
are.What they are,therefore,coincides with their
product i on."2 9
Quite revealing:Production,is the dividing line between 
men and animals;it is the primary human attribute.Hence the 
second part of the assertion (what they are...) comes as a 
natural argument.Men's life does not coincide with their 
production because the latter is necessary,but because it 
is the attribute par excellence of man.Man does not simply
28. "1859 Preface",op.cit.,p.389
29. GI,p.42
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have to produce.Man is man in so far as he produces,in so 
far as he is a homo laborans.Once again,labour appears as 
the essence/substance of man.
The centrality and determinant role of production 
rests,therefore,on a philosophico-anthropological assump­
tion. This assumption appears in the 1844 Manuscripts and 
traverses the whole of Marx's work up to,as we saw, 
"Capital" and beyond (e.g. the reference to "needs" in the 
famous phrase of the "Critique of the Gotha 
programme":"from each according to his ability,to each ac­
cording to his needs!"30).
In the 1844 manuscripts we read:"Productive life is the 
life of the species.lt is life engendering life...The 
animal is immediately one with its life activity...man 
makes his life activity itself the object of his will and 
his consciousness.He has conscious life activity."31The 
consciousness man brings to his life activity does not im­
pede this life to continue to be equated with "productive 
life".
In "German Ideology" this "productive life" becomes the 
"material intercourse" to become in turn the "relations of 
production" in the 1859 Preface.
In the "Preface",the forces of production are not,in their 
determinant role,a chance residue of the successive modes 
of production,but precisely the reflection of the most im­
portant attainment of man:the gradual increase in 
-technological- mastery over nature,the continuously as­
cending curve of technology,a mastery that is the effect of 
man as homo laborans over history.Thus in the "Preface",to 
the assumption of labour as the predominant human ac­
tivity^ notion of historical progress is added:The
30. K.Marx.Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875).Moscow:Progress pub­
lishers ,1978,p.18
31. "Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844" in K.Marx & 
F.Engels.Collected Works V.3 .London:Lawrence and Wishart,1975,p.276
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rationality that,by definition,characterises production,can 
only be reflected in a continuous development of the 
productive forces.The weight of this development transcends 
the inertia of any particular mode and forms the visible 
side of the invisible motor of history:the increasing 
rationality,that through a period of alienation of man from 
his work,lead him,but in an immensely advanced form,in its 
beginning:in the mastery and self-consciousness of produc­
tion. From primitive communism to communism via the dif­
ferent historical modes of production,the human essence 
realises itself in a series of dialectical turns.
The argument of the "Preface",therefore,is not so much 
based on an autonomous development of the productive 
forces,as on human labour as the characteristically human 
activity.Productive forces are the residue of this ac­
tivity. They represent the accumulation,over history,of 
man's labour.Thus their determinant role is another way of 
expressing the ultimately rational character of this 
labour,a rationality that is reflected in their 
unidimensional,evolutive,path.32
The primacy of the productive forces,therefore,is simply 
a way of bringing onto the surface what remains implicit in 
the whole of Marx's work,namely human labour as the essence 
of man.(It has to be remarked that the argument of the 
""Preface" appears,in a less polished form,already in Ger­
man Ideology).This assumption,already embodied in the
32. This is clearly recognised by G.A.Cohen in his "defence" of the 
1859 Preface argument.The underlying assumption about human nature 
is,for Cohen,that:
"- Men are,in a respect to be specified,somewhat rational
- The historical situation of men is one of scarcity
- Men posses intelligence of a kind and degree which enables them to 
improve their situation"
(G .A .Cohen,K.Marx's theory of history: a Defence,Oxford:Clarendon 
Press,1978,p.152)
Cohen simply makes explicit a version of the essentialism that neces­
sarily has to be assumed alongside any argument about the primacy of 
the productive forces.
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determinant role assigned to production,remains central in 
the analysis of "Capital".
In his more mature writings,Marx does not deny his pre­
vious work,he builds upon it.The transhistorical constant 
of labour becomes,for the first time of history,the moving 
force of the totality of production.In pre-capitalist 
societies the (economic) surplus is appropriated by
non-economic means,while in capitalist production it ap­
pears for what it really is:pure economic exploitation.By 
appearing as such,by realising itself in the principle of 
the whole,the exploitation of labour opens also,for the 
first time,the possibility of its transcendence in what 
Lukacs called "the objective possibility of class 
consciousness"33,i.e the possibility of the proletariat to 
assert itself by abolishing,at the same time,exploitation 
in general.The (pre)history of mankind,based upon exploita­
tion, can thus be ended,and a new chapter can begin in which 
production is socially and consciously controlled.
One can only marvel at this magisterial synthesis that 
combines a philosophy of history,an analysis of capitalism 
and a political/social ideal in a most fascinating way.It 
is precisely the grandeur of this synthesis that still ap­
peals.
However,the underlying foundation of this synthesis 
remains,as argued,a metaphysical one of labour as an essen­
tial, and historically unchangeable,attribute of man.
Thus the second step of Marx's -and Engels's- analysis of 
the social level introduced as "material" in "German 
Ideology" and identified with production is completed: the
specificity of production,discernible from both nature and 
thought in its materiality and,as a consequence,the 
specificity of the whole of the social that production 
determines,rests on the assumption of a transhistorical
33. G.Lukacs,"Class Consciousness" (1920) in History and Class Con­
sciousness . LondonrMerlin Press,1971,p.79
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human essence.
Marx's Hegelianism and his theory of knowledge
Evidently,therefore,in the very core of his thought,Marx 
remains a Hegelian.lt may not be "thinking" that "causes 
its own synthesis,its own deepening and its own movement"34 
as Marx accuses Hegel to do,but it is human labour and 
production that does so.Marx's scheme provides a most 
elaborate and subtle illustration of Hegelian thought.The 
transgression of exploitation becomes possible because of 
its -unique in history- appearance of economic exploitation 
as such in the very driving principle of the capitalist 
mode.
Society may not be,therefore,a reflection of nature or the 
product of people's thoughts,but it remains,in its histori­
cal unfolding,the development of an essence through a 
series of reductions:--man as homo laborans ---- develop­
ment of production   history as the realisation of this
essence.In its innermost core,therefore,Marxist thought 
remains firmly Hegelian.
It is this Hegelianism that also provides Marx with a 
theory of his own discourse.The distinction between the 
"truth" of Marx's analyses in "Capital" and the "errors of 
bourgeois economists",is based on the possibility of 
production of becoming self-transparent to thought at a 
particular historical circumstance and for a particular 
historical agent.
The proletariat is this privileged agent that becomes,by 
virtue of its position,capable of touching the true kernel 
of man's historical existence.Through the historically 
unique feature of capitalist relations of production,namely 
to posit the extraction and accumulation of surplus value 
as the motor of the mode of production,this process can 
indeed be conceived for what it really is,i.e exploita­
tion, from the part of the agent that is exploited :the
34. "1857 Introduction",op.cit,p.141
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proletariat.
It is only in this way that Marx (and Engels) can present 
a theory of their own discourse consistent with their 
denunciation of thought and "forms of consciousness" as 
mere epiphenomena.The social -as production- determines 
thought, but since this social is the expression of a human 
essence,and hence ultimately rational,at the appropriate 
moment in the movement of history this rationality can 
reveal itself directly to thought.35
MARX1S POLITICAL PROJECT
Marx's theoretical work stems very much from a political 
project of emancipation that draws from the Enlightenment's 
ideas and has the French revolution as a reference point.We 
can distinguish three elements in this project:
Marx accepts the importance of the nation state as op-
ot
possed to the monarchy it replaces and the sovereignty it 
allows man;the possibility to determine the affairs of the 
state allows an autonomy compared with the heteronomy of 
earlier times:
"That which is a creation of fantasy,a dream, a postulate 
of Christianity,i.e the sovereighty of man -but man as an 
alien being different from the real man- becomes in
35. Thus a "Hegelian" interpretation of Marx,as G.A.Cohen’s ,is a 
perfectly legitimate one.Moreover,it can be claimed not only for the 
"Preface" but for the whole of Marx’s work.
The same cannot be said,however,for similar but less sophisticated 
attempts to provide a "rational choice" model of action as the ap­
propriate foundation for Marx's more substantive assertions and 
analyses.Writers such as J.Elster,J.Roemer, and others (see,for ex­
ample, J.Elster Making sense of Marx.Cambridge:Cambridge University 
press,1985,J.Roemer.A General theory of Exploitation and Class. 
Cambridge,Mass:Harvard University Press,1982) disregard not only 
Marx's explicit anti-individualism but also the subtle -"hegelian"- 
way he retains a certain essentialism that cannot be captured by crude 
rational choice models.These authors are absolutely blind to whatever 
differentiates Marx from,say,J.S.Mill.It is therefore misleading to 
consider Cohen as arguing the same as Elster or Roemer under the label 
of "Analytical Marxism" (As for example in J.Roemer (Ed.).Analytical 
Marxism. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1986).
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democracy tangible reality,present existence,and secular 
principle.1,36
But,and this is the first element,this autonomy is not 
enough for Marx.It does not affect men's life outside the 
sphere of the citizen:"The perfect political state is,by 
its nature,man’s species-life as oppossed to his material 
life.All the preconditions of this egoistic life continue 
to exist in civil society outside the sphere of the 
state,but as qualities of civil society."3V
In order to be really able to speak about autonomy,this 
"civil society" has also to come under the sovereignty of 
man.It is the social existence as a whole that has to be­
come autonomous and not only a superficial,"political" 
sphere.
What is considered as the "natural" basis of the existence 
of man,i.e "civil society,the world of needs,labour,private 
interest,civil law"38 is far from being indeed "natural" 
but instead are part of the field that man can -and must- 
control,the social field:
"Political emancipation itself is not human emancipation39 
...only when man has recognised and organised his "forces 
propres" as social forces,and consequently no longer 
separates social power from himself in the shape of politi­
cal power,only then will human emancipation have been 
accomplished.1,40
Since social existence is for Marx primarily produc­
tion, these "forces propres" refer to the production 
sphere.Their social organisation,i.e their subsumption un­
36. K.Marx,”0n the Jewish Question” (1843) in K.Marx & F.Engels 
"Collected Works V.3",op.cit.,p.159,thereafter JQ.
37. JQ,p.153
38. JQ,p.167
39. JQ,p.160
40. JQ,p.168
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der social control is impossible as long as there exists 
"the fixation of social activity,the consolidation of what 
we ourselves produce into an objective power above 
us,growing out of our control..."4:L.It is only through con­
trolling the "multiplied productive force",i.e by estab­
lishing the sovereignty of man on the field of production 
that the "social being" of man can be said to be really 
autonomous.
This autonomy,is at the same time social and personal.As 
with political autonomy,personal emancipation is possible 
only through the establishment of an autonomous community:
"Only in the community is personal freedom possible... the 
illusory community in which individuals have up till now 
combined,always took an independent existence in relation 
to them...in a real community the individuals obtain their 
freedom in and through their association."42
This rejection of the possibility of a purely personal 
emancipation -as in traditional ethics and in the Christian 
dogma- constitutes the second element Marx's political 
ideal comprises of.
The possibility of a "real" community,an autonomous com­
munity, however, is for Marx,historically specific:It comes 
about,as a possibility,with the individuation the rise of 
the bourgeoisie brought about and the separation between 
man and his labour capitalist relations of production en­
tailed.This individuation is,for Marx,a positive step.But 
is not enough.As long as production relations remain beyond 
man's social control,a "real" community is impossible.Marx 
sees the political ideal as historically specific in its 
possibility.And this historisation is the third element of 
his political project.
Thus Marx,while accepting the political ideal of emancipa­
41. GI,p. 54
42. GI,p.83
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tion and the importance of (political) democracy, recognis­
ing that individual emancipation is possible only in and 
through an autonomous community,he goes beyond these asser­
tions which had already been pioneered by Enlightenment 
thought.He wants to widen the field of autonomy to include 
the whole of man's social life and he recognises the his­
torical specificity of this quest for autonomy.
Marx's intervention constitutes therefore a broadening of 
the political ideal of 18th century,bringing in a concep­
tion of the social as something more than the political and 
a historisation of the whole possibility of emancipation.
One cannot avoid noticing,however,that the whole political 
project outlined above rests on the assumption of the ex­
istence of the possibility for actual political action.This 
possibility,though,is not theorised as such.Moreover,Marx's 
account of the individual as a product of the social and as 
simply an element in the structural whole of the capitalist 
production does not readily allow us to locate such a pos­
sibility.
The very reference to a political project implies that a 
social class -and correspondingly,the individual- can never 
be fully determined by the relations of production.In par­
ticular it implies that the proletariat has -at least 
potentially- the ability to conceive its "objective 
possibilities" and to fight for their realisation.Therefore 
something "more" than what a full determinacy allows has to 
exist.Social class -and the individual- cannot be seen as 
infinitely plastic.
But where does this "more" come about? A hidden element of 
human nature striving to liberate man? An imperfection in 
the determinacy of the production relations that induces 
struggle as well as subvidience? Within the theoretical 
framework provided by Marx we cannot readily tell.
Up to this point,we have outlined Marx's political project 
independently,as it were,from the underlying assumption of 
labour as the essence of man,i.e. from the essentialist
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framework that underpins Marx's theoretical edifice.Once we 
recognise this framework,however,we cannot avoid noticing 
the consequences it has for Marx's politics.
If labour is seen as the historical "essence" of man,the 
control of the economic activity is not simply a broadening 
of the political project.lt is the "liberation" of man's 
ultimate essence,a liberation which can only lead to a full 
self-transparency of society in an almost automatic way.
Since the field of political intervention ceases to be 
just the political and it comes to include what was 
hitherto considered as the "private" sphere,the relative 
self-transparency that the democratic state introduced in 
the political field is seen as attainable for the whole of 
social life.
The ideal society of Marx's political project -the com­
munist society- is a society transparent to itself.Since 
man's "forces propres" are to be consciously controlled 
and since these forces represent the innermost kernel of 
man,their social control implies a self-transparency of 
each individual vis-a-vis him/herself and of the social 
vis-a-vis each of its members,a transparency inconceivable 
within the framework of the public/private dichotomy.(The 
close connection between this ideal of self-transparency 
and totalitarianism in the political practice of 
"socialist" countries has been emphasised by C.Lefort.43)
Moreover,since production determines the whole of social 
life,the establishment of social control of production 
necessarily implies the autonomy of the whole of 
society,including the political sphere.The fact that Marx 
did not particularly deal with the political forms of a 
communist society, e.g. with the implications of the 
"withering away of the state",is indicative of his con­
sidering these forms as necessarily following the social
43. see for example C.Lefort,"The Logic of Totalitarianism"(1980) in 
The political forms of Modern society.Cambridge:Polity Press,1986
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control of production.
We can also venture the suggestion that,if labour is seen 
as an essence of man historically realised then the 
realisation of the political project,the transition to a 
communist society,does not so much depend on a certain 
-political- activeness of the proletariat beyond its deter­
minacy by production relations.
The proletariat,if it is to struggle at all,can only 
struggle "to abolish the very condition of its existence 
hitherto,namely labour".Thus the political ideal of a com­
munist society becomes the final link in a given develop­
ment of history,requiring a minimum of self-consciousness 
from the part of the proletariat,and a simple -but 
fundamental- change in the relations of production from 
which all the requirements of the ideal will naturally fol­
low.
Within this context,the historical specificity of the 
political ideal is closely linked with the assumption of 
its historical necessity.A necessity not in the sense that 
it will necessarily happen (although even this can be in­
ferred from the more evolutionist writings of Marx as the 
"1859 Preface"),but in the sense that it is the only pos­
sibility of action open to the proletariat.Thus the "more" 
we have been referring to in respect to a full determinacy 
of a class by the relations of production exists only as 
the realisation of the transhistorical essence at a given 
point of historical development.
Therefore the "essentialist" assumptions of Marx 
neutralise to some extent the radicalness of his 
politics,significantly reducing the degree of autonomy of 
the classes as political actors,implying an automatic 
transformation of society once economy has been changed and 
in the ideal of a self-transparent society easily leading 
to totalitarian consequences.
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MARX AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE
The above discussion,however cursory,brings into relief 
certain elements of Marx's account of the social,certain 
contradictions between these elements and opens up a number 
of questions.
Marx is definitely arguing for
-the existence of a social level irreducible to both na­
ture and "consciousness" which,moreover,determines thought 
-the denial of any transhistorical human nature as a foun­
dational moment for this level 
-an analysis of production as determinant of this level 
and as non reducible to individual interaction but rather 
as a structured whole that determines its ele­
ments, including persons 
-the possibility of active political action in the broader 
sense aiming at the conscious social control of society at 
large and not only of the political.
However,when Marx is to provide a foundation for the 
specificity of the social level within which production is 
determinants specificity that differentiates this level 
from the -also social- "level of consciousness",it is to 
labour and production as a transhistorical essence of man 
that he resorts. Production is seen as the deter­
minant instance of the social and the development of 
production provides an evolutionary theory of his­
tory . Finally, the analysis of capitalist production is 
founded on the existence of a measure of "pure" labour 
reflecting this "essence" and the passage to the highest 
stage of developments communist society,depends precisely 
on the appearance of this essence as such,for the first 
time in history.
The assumption of transhistorically constant elements of 
human nature is not necessarily rejectable.lt can be seen 
in a positive light and espoused either as a theoretical
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principle or as an empirical generalisation or as both.44
It is,however,evidently contradicting Marx's own denial of 
transhistorical human attributes.
It neutralises Marx's critique of philosophy since it af­
firms that the social level that is presented as outside of 
and determining thought is itself ultimately rational 
-reducible to a rational essence.
It is not theoretically defensible as a foundation of 
Marx's own analysis of the capitalist mode of production in 
"Capital",as we saw above.
In so far as it supports a theory of history,as in the 
1859 Preface,it presents a view of historical evolution 
based on a necessary and unidimensional development of 
productive forces that cannot be sustained in the light of 
empirical material.45
In so far as it implies a transhistorical determinancy of 
production as a specific social instance it simply projects 
to the past a situation valid only for capitalism.A close 
inspection of empirical material reveals it,therefore,to be 
also unacceptable.46
Finally it has consequences for the political project Marx 
advances,neutralising any real autonomy from the part of
44. A recent example is G.A.Cohen’s "defence" of Marx’s theory of 
history as it is presented primarily in the 1859 Preface.
45. One has to distinguish between a certain development of produc­
tive forces throughout history and the necessary and unidimensional 
nature of this development Marx’s argument requires.For comments see 
D.Dickson.Alternative Technology and the politics of Technical 
Change.London:Fontana-Collins.1974.Also C.Castoriadis "Marxism and 
Revolutionary Theory" (1965) in The Imaginary Institution of 
society.Cambridge:Polity Press,1987,pp.18-20.
46. The importance of production could be saved if we see it as a 
function operating within diverse institutional forms,intermingled 
with political or ideological operations.This is M.Godelier’s argument 
who presents it as an empirically testable hypothesis.(M.Godelier,The 
Mental and the Material (1984).London;Verso.1986).In this formula­
tion, however , the significance that Marx attributes to production dis­
appears and the affirmation of its determinance becomes indifferent.
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political actors and having possible totalitarian con­
sequences .
For all the above reasons we have to reject the 
"essentialist" elements in Marx's thought.Indeed it is easy 
to see this essentialism as reflecting dominant 
philosophico-anthropological assumptions of the 19th cen­
tury regarding the attitude of man towards nature,the ul­
timate rationality of history,the positive role of technol­
ogy, etc. As J.Baudrillard remarks:
"Radical in its logical analysis of capital,Marxist theory 
nonetheless is sustained by an anthropological consensus 
with the options of Western rationalism,in the definite 
form it acquired in eighteenth century bourgeois 
thought."47
Marx's work continues to be important precisely because of 
his efforts to break with these assumptions and to in­
augurate novel ways of conceiving social phenomena.One has 
to admit,though,that these efforts,precisely because of 
their originality,remained partial and incomplete within 
Marx's work.
Marx insists on the historicity of human needs and 
values,rejects Hegel's idealism and advocates the 
"materiality" of the social.Yet when he is to provide a 
foundation of these assertions he reverts to labour as 
human essence and to an ultimate rationality of the social.
In so far as the coherence and foundation of his work is 
concerned, Marx cannot avoid being a Hegelian.He breaches 
new paths but he can not follow them sufficiently far.We 
cannot,therefore,simply reject the "essentialist" elements 
in his thought and "take out",as it were,the elements that 
break with this essentialism.Because of the foundational 
role of the former,the later -the elements that break with 
19th century rationalism- cannot stand alone.They cannot be
47. J.Baudrillard.The Mirror of Production (1968).St.Luis:Telos Press,
1975,p.32
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simply "taken out" from the the framework that supports 
them.
The example of Althusser's interpretation of Marx is in­
structive in this respect.Althusser explicitly wants to
reject all the historicist and essentialist elements in 
Marx.To do so he discards the whole of early works and con­
centrates primarily on "Capital" which he considers as
denying any "homogeneous space of given (economic) 
phenomena" defined by an "ideological anthropology" as in
Classical Economics.Yet he retains the relevance of surplus 
value as the element that ties the capitalist mode of 
production together,as a structural causality "visible and 
measurable only in its effects".4®
Althusser does not recognise that to define value -and 
consequently surplus-value - through labour necessitates a 
homogeneous,simple,abstract labour which can be introduced 
in Marx's description of the capitalist mode of production 
only as a Hegelian "inner essence",reproducing the 
"homogeneous space" of classical economists.Thus the ele­
ments Althusser wants to avoid creep up by the back door.A 
Marx "purified" of all essentialism seems an impossible 
project.
If certain elements of Marx's theoretical edifice are to 
be retained,therefore,while a stand is taken against the 
essentialist elements,an alternative theoretical grounding 
for the former has to be provided.Only thus can they ac­
quire a theoretical significance.49
We can consider as the starting point of the present en-
48. L.Althusser & E.Balibar.Reading Capital (1968).London:New Left 
Books,1970.For a more detailed reference to Althusser see the follow­
ing chapter.
49. The above critique of Marx concerns his general theorisation of 
the social.The rejection of central elements of this theorisation does 
not,however, necessarily invalidate Marx's more substantive 
analyses,for example parts of his analysis of capitalism,class 
struggle,etc.These theses have to be separately addressed and 
evaluated.
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quiry,the examination of such alternative frameworks:50
How can we retain the specificity Marx assigns to a level 
of the social as distinct from both "nature" and "forms of 
consciousness" without seeing this specificity as the 
reflection of a transhistorical essence of man developing 
throughout history?
Are we obliged to choose between a transhistorical human 
nature realised in history but independent of particular 
men's thoughts or ideas and a subjectivist account of the 
social? How can we conceive,on what anthropological model 
can we base ourselves to accept that human action can be 
separated from actor's own thoughts if it is not the ex­
pression of a more fundamental human essence?
How can we,in other words,retain the specificity Marx 
proposes,while adhering to his own denial of transhistori­
cal human nature and his anti-individualism?
And if so,what kind of theory of history can we then 
propose?
Moreover,could such an alternative framework allow us to 
reconcile a structural determination of the individual with 
the necessary autonomy a political project requires?
These are the questions we start from.
50. Unlike Althusser,we do not want to engage in some form of Marxian 
exegetics in order to retain a ’’Marxist" theory.We do want.however,to 
explore the questions opened.
II. A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
We can attempt now to situate our inquiry with respect to 
different approaches that have been developed to account 
for the social,as far as its foundational moment is con­
cerned.
By necessity such an attempt will be very superficial 
regarding the discussion of the authors mentioned:its ob­
ject is rather to delineate the broad lines of different 
approaches than to discuss in depth these authors,the 
diversity or the contradictions within their work.It is a 
sketch rather then a detailed map,providing simple bearings 
on a landscape of extreme variety and complexity.
1.THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL 
Pre-enlightenment thought
The conception of the social -of "society11- upon which the 
social sciences are based,is a relatively recent one.Up to 
the 18th century,the social is seen as transparent and 
self-evident:It is relations between men,men in the given 
positions they occupy by birth and which are little ex­
pected to change in the course of their life: The serf
is the serf and the lord the lord.Their relationship, in 
its asymmetry,its distribution of power and exploitation is 
known to both and accepted as natural.
The social is nothing more (or less) than what people do 
in their everyday action:exchange,fight,worship,etc.The 
actors' positions are fixed and so is the stage.As for his­
torical time it is the circular time of the same, 
homocentric cycles around a fixed centre.
The etymology of the Latin "societas",corresponding to the 
Greek "koinonia", is revealing.The Greek "koino" (s)1 and 
its Latin translation "socius" denote the fellow, the 
sharer, the partner, the comrade, the companion, the as­
sociate, a person in short that shares a common element or
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project. Correspondingly the nouns "Koinonia" and 
"societas" denote a fellowship, an association, a union, a 
community, a "society" implying union for a common 
purpose.1
Enlightenment thought
The Enlightenment subverts not the transparency of social 
relations,but the naturality that legitimised them.This 
subversion operates on the level of the individual, which 
is portrayed not any more as a function of the social posi­
tion he occupies,but as a transhistorical, immutable es­
sence, a human nature upon which the different social posi­
tions are engraved.All persons partake of this nature, 
hence all persons are primarily the same .It is only as a 
result of differential social conditions that we have serfs 
and lords.
Thus for the 18th century the question of the social 
circles around the problem of order:since the individuals 
can exist as isolated,autonomous monads the question of how 
and why is their co-existence in society possible 
arises.The two poles of the spectrum was to consider this 
co-existence as necessary for the protection of all 
(Hobbes,Locke) or as a burden that prevents the happiness 
inherent in men's natural condition (Rousseau2).
For Rousseau the whole of "society" is a burden to man, 
introducing inequality, divisions and unhappiness to a 
natural state of much greater freedom and happiness.lt is 
therefore through the restriction of power to the general 
will manifested in the "social contract", through the 
development of men's own inherent nature that the social
1. See for example Lewis and Short.A Latin dictionary.Oxford:Clarendon 
Press,1945.
2. The classic text being Rousseau's "Discourse on the origin of 
inequality"(1755) as also his "Social Contract" (1762).Both in The So­
cial Contract,London:Eve ryman's ,19 7 3.
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institutions suffocate (as his "Emile" for example 
indicates), that the inequalities of civilisation can be 
tackled.
The Enlightenment reactivates the Christian dogma of an 
equality of all men at birth -a dogma that has been 
neutralised by the role assigned to the Church in Medieval 
times- secularises it, and combines it with a political 
philosophy drawn from Classical Athens.
An ontological position - that of the Christian dogma- is 
added to a theory of politics that did not presuppose it. 
(Aristotle's Politics , for ex, nowhere evokes a natural 
equality of men). Thus the political project is reinforced 
and the personal ethics of Christianity (also going back to 
the Stoics) are broadened to political ones.
The individual assumes therefore a fundamental position: 
he becomes, as embodying a transhistorical,unitary, 
autonomous and self-sufficient human nature,the foundation 
of the social relations he partakes into.In addition,for 
the critical approach exemplified by Rousseau, since these 
relations are ones of inequality,in contrast with the 
equality of "the state of nature",this human nature becomes 
the basis of a critique of society.
The legacy of the Enlightenment is still with us,in both 
its ontological assumptions and its critical function. But 
what mediates it is the emergence of a conceptualisation of 
the social that departs from the assumption of transparency 
of social relations Enlightenment thought shares with the 
earlier one.3
3. There are approaches in social science and philosophy that go 
directly back to the Enlightenment's notion of individual. Ethical & 
Political Philosophy is often such a case.In his "Theory of justice",
for ex, Rawls remarks "I have attempted to carry to a higher order of 
abstraction the traditional theory of the social contact as repre­
sented by Locke, Rousseau and Kant" (J.Rawls, A Theory of justice. 
Oxford:Oxford University Press,1972,p.viii).
These approaches disregard precisely the modern conception of the 
social and the body of though it has given rise to.Whether such a 
neglect is permissible is -at least- highly doubtful.
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The emergence of the m o d e m  conception of the social
As with Enlightenment thought which was closely linked 
with the ascendance of the bourgeoisie,the emergence of the 
modern notion of the social is closely linked with the 
gradual but obvious increase in national wealth (linked to 
what was to be later termed the capitalist mode of 
production).4
From the middle of the 18th century already an "Inquiry 
into the causes of the Wealth of Nations" becomes necessary 
since this wealth appears as visibly accumulating5.The cru­
cial point was, however, that this accumulation was not an 
expected consequence of planned actions. It appeared as an 
unexpected result of actions seemingly unrelated and 
definitely having personal gain rather than any aggregate 
increase of wealth as their immediate aim.
In contrast to the transparency of social relations up to 
that point, a new phenomenon, obviously a social product 
but equally obviously not an anticipated one, appeared.6
Breaking with the Physiocrats, A.Smith inaugurates classi­
cal economics, seeing the increase in productivity as the 
result of the division of labour,in turn correlative to the 
extension of the market. The resulting accumulation of
4. The ’’linkage" with changes on the sphere of the economy is not the 
only one.There are relevant changes also in the political field with 
the emergence of the modern nation-state as an entity founded on it­
self and not on some ’’external’’ source of legitimation as the Medieval 
and Renaissance kingdoms were.
Undoubtedly changes of a related nature can be located on other 
levels of social life as well.
Our only objective at this point is to establish the change in the 
conception of the social.Linkages as the above do not concern us 
directly.Even less can the formidable problem of directions of deter- 
minacy within these linkages be addressed.
5. A.Smith.An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of na­
tions (1784).Indianapolis:Liberty Press,1976
6. This is evident also in the meaning of the term "society".By the 
18th century,the previous primary meaning of companionship or fellow­
ship gives its place to a more general and abstract sense 
(R.Williams.Keywords.London:Fontana Press,1988,p.293)
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capital is seen as the reason for the wealth of England and 
Europe.
Instead of exchange between classes, exchanges visible and 
known (in the Physiocrats),the internal coherence of a sys­
tem that appeared without planning, that functions without 
the actual knowledge of the whole,by the participants and 
that, moreover, contributes to an increasingly accumulating 
wealth,comes into being.
Two of the central underlying assumptions of earlier 
thought are thus undermined:the transparency of social 
relations, and the circularity of time. In their place a 
systemic whole guided by an invisible hand and history as a 
cumulative development and progress emerge.
As M.Foucault remarks:"From Smith onward,the time of 
economics...was to be the interior time of an organic 
structure which grows in accordance with its own necessity 
and develops in accordance with autochtonous laws- the time 
of capital and production.117
A.Smith refers only to the economy and indeed it is the 
analysis of the economy that constitutes, for the better 
part of the 19th century -at least until Walras & the 
Marginalists- the most developed area of theorisation of 
the social. (Ricardo and Marx being the primary examples).
Soon however, the modality of systemness and internal
7. M.Foucault.The Order of Things (Les Mots et les Choses.1966). 
London:Tavistoe,1974,p.226
Foucault sees the change in the conception of the time of economics 
as representing a general paradigmatic shift in the whole field of the 
Western conception of the world,a shift that replaced the taxonomic 
mode of conceiving of the classical era with a "modern” one.This 
"modern" structuring of knowledge is characterised by the postulation 
of autonomous entities with an internal time and dynamic:the time of 
capital in the economy,the concept of life in biology,the concept of 
language as a system.
Our presentation of the modern notion of the social owes much to 
Foucault.However it refers to the "social" in a more general 
sense,encompassing for example both "economics" and the study of lan­
guage. It does not follow,moreover,Foucault's strange taxonomy of the 
"human sciences"(ibid,p.344ff.).
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dynamic attributed to the economy, as well as its relative 
opaqueness in relation to the participating actors, were to 
be transported to a greater system, "society", of which 
economy was merely a subsystem.
Thus a certain rupture is introduced regarding both Pre- 
Enlightenment and Enlightenment thought. Society, unlike 
pre-Enlightenment conceptions, is not the visible and 
natural association of men in their different functions,but 
it displays a certain opaqueness as well as a systemness 
and internal dynamic.
At the same time,unlike Enlightenment thought,society ap­
pears as something not directly based on the individual as 
a foundational autonomous entity predating it.
We can consider that the above constitute the two central 
assumptions that mark a new "object" of study,society in 
its modern meaning.These assumptions can be expressed as: 
(1) "Society" as a structured whole is assumed to have 
an internal coherence and dynamic 
& (2) This whole is seen as independent to what people
consciously aim and thus a certain opaqueness of society 
exists towards its participating actors.
This formulation is a provisional one, serving as a guide 
to what follows from which it sought to be reinforced or
modified. Yet the fact remains that it delineates the
semantic borders of a "novel" object of study, covering
phenomena which are either equally "novel" or hitherto went 
unnoticed.
THE SEARCH FOR A FOUNDATION
Evidently such a "strange" object of study,"society" or 
the "social" as the semantic area delimited by these two 
assumptions,created obvious questions regarding the 
theoretical foundation of its specificity.The questions 
concerned both the scientific status of such a study and 
the theoretical model that would account for the "modality" 
of this social.
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We can say that,broadly speaking,epistemological 
claims,following already established currents of Western 
thought,alternated between an alliance to the methodology 
of (positive) natural science and an idealist tradition in 
which society appeared as the subject of history.Later,a 
hermeneutic approach was added and a rationalism/ objec­
tivism replaced the early idealist approaches.
Parallely,accounts of what the social "is",primarily in 
relation to the individual (the concept of the person as an 
autonomous and in-dividual entity being a central and fun­
damental one in the up to then Western thought),took two 
main lines of differentiation: on the one hand different 
variants of individualism saw the social as produced by 
individuals; on the other, "holistic" approaches asserted 
the sui-generis and irreducible nature of the social.
In fact,epistemological and ontological claims were 
usually inextricably intermeshed,the ones seeking to rein­
force the others and vise versa.Nevertheless the distinc­
tion can be seen as providing a convenient system of co­
ordinates along the axes of which we can attempt to situate 
some of the main thinkers of the social.
2.POSITIVISM AND ITS VARIATIONS
INDIVIDUALISTIC POSITIVISM 
We can thus define a first approach,aspiring to the 
methods and form of the already established natural 
sciences as a guarantee of scientificity,while at the same 
time seeing the individual as the foundational point of the 
social.Drawing upon the Enlightenment's assumptions in a 
diluted form,it presented society as a kind of emergent 
property of individuals put together,a system of relations 
between individuals,or the result of actions by individuals 
that had a bearing towards the others.
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J.S.Mill
J.S.Mi11 can be considered as one of the earliest and yet 
most consistent and lucid exponents of this approach.
For Mill,there are certain given unalterable "laws of 
mind, whether ultimate or derivative,according to which one 
mental state succeeds another118 .These general
laws,considered to be constant,independent of society and 
determinable,produce,operating in different external cir­
cumstances, through "character formation",different in­
dividuals. (And it is "ethology" the science that examines 
this character formation).
Given these laws and the situations an individual faces in 
his development,we can deduce the character of persons.The 
aggregate of these results would give the laws of social 
phenomena:
"Society is ...the actions of collective masses of 
mankind...All phenomena of society are phenomena of human 
nature,generated by the action of outward circumstances 
upon masses of human beings:and if therefore,the phenomena 
of human thought,feeling,and action,are subject to given 
laws,the phenomena of society cannot but conform to fixed 
laws,the consequence of the preceding."9
However,given the enormous data necessary to make accurate 
predictions,it is impossible to expect from these laws the 
accuracy that is possible in natural sciences:"There 
is,indeed,no hope that these laws,though our knowledge of 
them were as certain and as complete as it is in 
astronomy,would enable us to predict the history of society 
like that of the celestial appearances,for the years to 
come."1°
Mill draws the analogy between the sciences of society and
8. J .S.Mill.A System of logic (1843).London:Longmans,1967,p.557
9. ibid.,p.572
10. ibid.
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the "inexact" sciences as meteorology.Indeed,Statistical 
Mechanics and the Kinetic theory of gases which were 
developed at around the same time,provide a pertinent 
example: though the molecules of a gas have determinate 
qualities and follow fixed and known laws,it is only ap­
proximately, and in a statistical way,that we can describe 
the gas as a whole.
However,Mi11 does not actually develop the theory he 
proposes.He only indicates a direction towards which such a 
theory may be possible.His project is constructed around 
two hypotheses:
(i)that there are "laws of the mind" that have the 
modality of natural laws,i.e that they are constant and 
-given the same conditions- produce the same results,and 
which,moreover,are part of a human nature outside any 
"social" influence.
& (ii) that we can infer from these laws,in a suitable 
manner,laws for the whole of society,while acknowledging 
that the number of facts and conditions makes any accurate 
prediction,in the manner of natural sciences,impossible.
The internal coherence of these laws would account for the 
internal coherence the social exhibits.And their non- 
evident nature,plus the number of facts needed to infer any 
result,would account for the individuals' ignorance of the 
effects of their own actions on a societal level,i.e for 
the opaqueness of the social.
Thus the social can exhibit both an internal dynamic and 
opaqueness vis-a-vis the individual actors comprising it 
and be seen as ultimately reducible to these in­
dividuals .Mill 1 s is an attempt to retain the individual as 
the foundation but,unlike Rousseau,Hobbes or Locke,also to 
account for the features of the novel notion of the social 
(while also drawing from the methodology of the natural 
sciences).
The above assumptions are implied in Mill precisely as 
hypotheses to be verified and corroborated by further
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evidence and theoretical elaboration.However,Mi11 provides 
neither any real "laws of the mind" except some vague ex­
amples nor,more importantly,any connection between such 
laws and societal laws.In so far as he proposes any of the 
later,he more or less accepts Comte's scheme and a progress 
though stages,as self-evident:"It is easily seen,for in­
stance, that as society advances,mental tend more and more 
to prevail over bodily qualities and masses over in­
dividuals. . .the military spirit gradually gives way to the 
industrial."11
Thus Mill stands at a crossroads.He wants to affirm a con­
nection with both Enlightenment and Natural science and yet 
to theorise the social as a distinct level.He indicates 
what has to be assumed to do so.And he leaves the matter at 
that point.
His position,which can be called with justification 
"positivistic individualism",remains a well thought and 
plausible one.However,more than a century later,the two 
central assumptions on which it is based have not been 
reinforced or,even less,"verified".
Thus,proponents of individualism have either remained 
faithful to an insufficiently theorised "methodological 
individualism"12,in fact an impoverished version of Mill's 
position,or they have turned to a kind of "interpretive 
individualism" which departs from Mill's positivistic as­
sumptions (and which we shall discuss below under the head­
ing of hermeneutic approaches), or,finally,they have put 
emphasis on the epistemological argument rather than on the 
actual explanatory one as in neoclassical
economics,rational choice theory,etc. to which we turn.
11. ibid.,p.603
12. see for example J.Watkins,"Ideal types and historical explanation" 
(1952) / ’Historical explanation in the social sciences" (1957) and 
"Methodological individualism:a reply" (1955) in J.O'Neil (ed.).Modes 
of Individualism and collectivism.London:Heinemann,1973.
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Neoclassical Economics,Rational Choice Theory,etc.
Behaviourism and "experimental" methods in psychol­
ogy, rational choice theories,game theory,marginalist 
-neoclassical- economics and other approaches,all share a 
turn to a positivist epistemology -or even to an ultra­
positivist one- as their justification.
They claim an absolute similarity of method with that of 
natural sciences (having in mind classical mechanics rather 
than quantum physics).Thus they present their assumptions 
as strictly of a hypothetical nature,not claiming any ex­
planatory value as such,but leading to results which are 
empirical regularities,in the manner of physical laws,or to 
correlations between facts,and possibly even to predictions 
as to the future state of events.Because of these results a 
wider validity of the approach is claimed.
Marginalist economics,in particular,can be considered as 
the paradigmatic form of this kind of approach.Starting 
with Walras, Wicksell, Bohm-Bawerk, etc., marginalist 
economists abandon any inquiry into an ultimate measure of 
value,a concern that has occupied classical economists,as 
also any inquiry into the causes of wealth,and concentrate 
on short term analysis,mathematisation and definition of 
conditions of equilibrium.While they self-knowingly reject 
any "metaphysical" inquiry such as the question on the 
foundation of value that occupied their predecessors,at the 
same time they limit the scope of economics into providing 
managementx3 tools for an economy whose emergence,long-term 
prospects,internal dynamic,etc. are taken for granted and 
as outside the purpose of their inquiries.
Given the specific nature of the capitalist economy a cer­
tain degree of success in describing micro-economic be­
haviour, making short-term predictions and an overall
13. As S.Amin remarks in Accumulation on a World scale.Sussex:The Har­
vester Press,1974
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management of the economy was generally possible.Hence mar­
ginalist economics came to be considered as economics tout 
court and any deeper inquiry as irrelevant.
Similarly,game theoretic or rational choice action models 
could also claim a certain suitability at describing 
specific -and limited- social and political phenomena.14
However,it is evident that the relative success of these 
approaches was possible only in limited and highly sys- 
tematised systems (as,for example,the economy of advanced 
capitalist countries) and this only in periods of rela­
tively little structural change.Resuits were not obtainable 
in long term predictions or in broader systems and no 
"laws" of any kind were actually established.
Hence the methodological stand could not validate the 
theoretical assumptions which remained operative only in 
small areas of the social nexus with specific characteris­
tics and for limited time periods.
HOLISTIC POSITIVISM 
While the individualistic approach to which Mill wants to 
base a positivist theory of the social has not been satis­
factory, another type of approach towards a science of the 
social, still drawing from the example of (positive) 
natural science was also proposed.
The crucial difference was that the social is not seen any 
more as reducible to the individual,but is
posited as a sui generis reality which can be studied in a 
manner similar to natural science.
We can consider V.Pareto and E.Durkheim as typifying this 
kind of approach.
14. The work of J.Elster is a prime example of rational choice ap­
proach. For example.J.Elster.Nuts and bolts for the social 
sciences,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1989.See also note 33 of 
the previous chapter on "rational choice" Marxism.
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V .Pareto
Pareto accepts the validity of 1 logico-experimental method" 
for the study of society,a method which is subject to 
"proof or disproof from the facts".He considers that 
"economic and social laws as well as the laws of the other 
sciences never suffer any genuine exception"15,thus pos­
tulating an identity in the method of inquiry of natural 
and social sciences.Uniike Mill,though,he does not at­
tribute these "laws" to the individual in order to 
reconstruct society out of these "laws".
For Pareto,leaving aside external elements (such as 
soil,climate,etc. as well as other societies),a society is 
to be studied based chiefly on "residues",which are 
"manifestations of sentiments or instincts".What people 
think -what Pareto calls "derivations"- is only secon­
dary, since "human beings are persuaded in the main by sen­
timents (residues)".
These residues,however,are not individual ones.They are 
rather broad social orientations of action which are 
relevant only,and intelligible only,at the level of 
society.They are propensities to act in a certain way,but 
they are manifested only in actual social settings.Thus 
they are not autonomously observable,but have to be 
derived,post factum,from these settings.
By classifying the residues into five classes,Pareto can 
present historical development as the growing or diminish­
ing importance of each class,concentrating mainly on the 
first two (the one referring to "instincts for 
combinations" and covering the ability for knowledge- 
including scientific knowledge- ,the other referring to 
"group persistence" and covering mainly relations between 
people).He does not adopt an evolutionary or even a 
developmental view;rather,at least in principle,he advances
15. V.Pareto.The Mind and societv:A treatise on general sociology 
(1916).New York:Dover,1963,V.1,p.101
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a circular one.For example,Pareto takes account of modern­
ity by affirming that "class I residues and the conclusions 
of logico-experimental science have enlarged the field of 
their dominion" but he never implies any necessity or even 
irreversibility in this fact.
It is consequently on the level of residues that Pareto 
tries to establish uniformities or laws that would provide 
a theory of the social.But as the level of intelligibility 
of these residues is that of society,Pareto's "laws" have 
to appear directly on the social level.
However,Pareto is unable to establish any "uniformities of 
social facts",let alone "laws" in the manner of natural 
sciences.He simply presents,in his "classes of residues", a 
number of descriptive elements that can be distinguished in 
different societies as well as certain remarks on the 
variation of these elements in the development of history 
or between different social classes.
Since Pareto's own methodological aim -the establishment 
of social laws- is not fulfilled,his "positive" method that 
claims a methodological identity with natural science can 
be considered as inadequate for the social domain in the 
context of a non individualistic approach (just as in the 
context of individualist ones,as the case of Mill and his 
followers indicates).
What remains is Pareto's account of "residues" as being 
the primary "social" level,distinct from thought and yet 
influencing (individual) behaviour.But what is the modality 
of these residues? How can this level be approached if not 
through the establishment of laws as Pareto had hoped?
The questions remain open.
E.Durkheim
Durkheim follows,to an extent,a similar path to 
Pareto's.He wants to adhere to the maxims of positive 
natural science while approaching the social as an ir­
reducible whole.
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Durkheim considers that what he calls the "comparative 
method" and particularly its form of "concomitant 
variations" which is the most suitable to the study of so­
cial phenomena,is a kind of "indirect experimentation".16 
Moreover,he claims that as far as social phenomena are con­
cerned, "to the same effect there always corresponds the 
same cause",thus considering that a strict line of 
causality can always be established.
However,he is forced to concede that even the method of 
concomitant variations gives results that always have to be 
interpreted,for example to establish whether two phenomena 
that correlate to each other are both caused by a third,or 
it is one of them that causes the other.Thus Durkheim does 
not claim,as Pareto,the possibility of establishment of 
fixed laws or uniformities.His positive method rests con­
tent with the possibility of simple inferences from cor­
relative phenomena.
At the same time,Durkheim strongly stresses -much more 
than Pareto- the sui-generis character of the social,its 
irreducibility,its exteriority to the individual which it 
confronts as coercive (e.g.,the first of his
"rules").Indeed,his whole work can be seen as first and 
foremost an attempt to establish this irreducibility.
Durkheim knows that to actually establish this ir­
reducibility and specificity of the social his "positive" 
method is not enough,providing as it does a loose methodol­
ogy.He attempts,therefore,to provide a theorisation of the 
social specific to this irreducibility.
Since the moral dimension of society has always been a 
point of departure for Durkheim,his first attempt for such 
a theorisation -in "The Division of Labour"- is to see 
society as the "conscience collective"17.The "conscience
16. E.Durkheim.The rules of sociological method (1901).London:The Mac­
millan Press,1982,p.147ff
17. On the translation of the terms as "conscience" rather than as 
"consciousness", see Parsons’s remark,in T.Parsons.The Structure of
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collective" is "the totality of beliefs and sentiments com­
mon to the average members of a society that forms a deter­
minate system of life of its own"1®.
In later work,instead of this "conscience", the term 
"representations collectives" is employed and a distinction 
between "individual" and "collective" representations is 
established,in a manner similar to the distinction between 
"mi nd" and "body"19.
As with the "conscience" which refers not only to beliefs 
but also to sentiments,the "representations" are not seen 
as necessarily conscious or ideal;their collective charac­
ter refers to the fact that they are "produced by the ac­
tion and reaction between individual minds that form the 
society,though they do not derive directly from the latter 
and consequently surpass them."20
Durkheim does not deny the specificity of the individual 
-either as "conscience" or as "representations"- nor does 
he attempt to subsume the individual to "society".But he 
considers that there is a region of phenomena,both 
"conscious" and "unconscious",both "beliefs" and 
"emotions",that are the product of,and are intelligible 
only,on a "collective" level.The individual mind remains 
Durkheim1s model for society,which -society- he sees as a 
kind of collective mind,as a "psychological type" similar 
to,but distinct from the individual one.21
social action New York:The Free press,1968,p.309
18. E.Durkheim.The division of labour in society (1893).London: Mac­
millan, 1984 , p. 39
19. E.Durkheim,"Individual and collective representations"(1898),in 
E.Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy.London:Cohen and West,1953
20. ibid.,p.24
21. At certain points Durkheim considers that there is also a qualita­
tive difference between individual and collective: "the states of 
"conscience collective" are of a different nature from the status of 
the "conscience individuelle" ("Rules",op.cit.,Preface 2nd edition, 
p.40).In general, however,at this stage he does not amplify on any
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Thus society emerges as a super-individual entity,sharing 
in broad the modality of individual minds but existing at a 
superior level than these.Society is thus neither a 
"natural" level,nor the product of individuals,but a kind 
of human mind writ large.22
However,in his last major work23,Durkheim develops his 
theorisation in a different direction.He establishes a dis­
tinction between concepts and categories of thought and the 
level of society.Concepts and categories are generated by 
society,by social "things" ("choses sociales") and they 
express them on the level of thought.Ideas have a social 
origin,they are "a natural product of social life".At the 
same time,social practice -as for example religious rites- 
is seen as embodying "meaning",a "meaning" that can be lat­
ter transferred to explicit "ideas" and "categories".
Thus "social life" appears as something meaningful and yet 
as not reducible to ideas,concepts,categories,which it gen­
erates. Hence social phenomena appear both as expressible on 
the level of ideas,as categories socially produced,and as 
determining this level.Since also "social life" is not 
reducible to "nature",a level specific to the social is im­
plied.
The similarity to Pareto's "residues" is,at this 
stage,evident.A certain parallel with Marx can also be 
drawnrthe social is neither nature,nor ideas,it determines 
categories of the mind and yet it is irreducible to 
"nature".Durkheim does not proceed further,like Marx,to 
reduce this specificity of the social to a transhistorical
difference of this kind.
22. It is from this stage of Durkheim’s work that Parsons draws,in or­
der to present Durkheim in his ’’Structure” as a precursor of his own 
view of the social as a system of normative elements.
23. E.Durkheim.Elementary forms of religious life (1912).London:Allen 
and Unwin,1961.
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essence,but he does not develop further his theorisa­
tion,either .
In the final moment,Marx has resource to a Hegelian essen­
tial ism to provide a foundation for both its object of 
study -production,economy and the whole of the social- and 
for his methodology.
Durkheim advocates a positive study,without resource to 
any foundational essence.Since,however,no strict
regularities or laws can be established (as Pareto had 
hoped but as Durkheim himself had ruled out),the actual 
scientific approach depends on the elucidation of the 
modality of the object of study.
Precisely this modality,though,remains problematic.How can 
"social life" be neither "ideas",nor "nature"? What is the 
relation of this "social" to the individual?
We face,therefore,the same kind of questions that we en­
countered in Pareto,questions remaining open.
Positivism and Holism: some remarks
Pareto and Durkheim are unable to fulfil their promise of 
a positive study of society as a sui generis reality based 
on methodological grounds alone,because none of the robust 
methods of natural sciences seem to be applicable on the 
social field (uniformities,laws,strict causal in­
ferences, etc. ).
They indicate therefore,by default,that such a positive 
study has necessarily,to proceed,to clarify -besides its 
specific methodology which cannot be identical to that of 
the natural sciences- the specificity of its object 
-society- as a separate object of study.Far from being 
"metaphysical", such a theorisation is required if the pos­
sibility of any positive study is to be established.
Towards this direction,both Durkheim and Pareto offer a 
number of elements,with Durkheim making a more extensive 
attempt.These theorisations remain,however,tentative and 
incomplete.
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3.THE IDEALIST TRADITION Is FROM VICO TO MARX
The positivist attempts to provide a foundation for the 
study of the social in either individualist or holist 
variants,have been conceived always as an answer to the im­
plicit alternative,that which followed the idealist current 
of Western thought.
This current sees the social not as the domain of 
regularities or laws but rather as the domain of manifesta­
tion of a (hidden) transhistorical essence(s).
Man as the embodiment of such an essence,man as a neces­
sary "becoming" towards the realisation of this essence,is 
a common element from the Stoics on to the Christian view 
of the person.
It is to such a -natural- essence of man that Enlighten­
ment can base its critique of the social relations impeding 
and hindering (or,for some,advancing) its development.
The end of the 18th and the 19th centuries saw the emer­
gence of a notion of progressive historical development.The 
circular notion of time of the Middle Ages,still surviving 
in the Renaissance,fades away,giving its place to a view of 
history as developing in a unidimensional line,history as 
irrevocable progress.
Such a notion of history required a subject that could not 
any longer be the individual.The emergence of the concept 
of society,in its modern meaning,provided precisely 
that:society became the subject of history,developing it­
self trough historical time in a line of progress.Thus the 
approaches to the social that operate within this tradition 
are necessarily holistic rather than individualistic.
To the internal coherence and dynamic and to the indepen­
dence of the social of what individuals consciously aim,the 
two central assumptions marking the modern conception of 
the social,as far as the idealist tradition is concerned,a 
third has to be added:history as a progressive development 
and society as the subject of history.
All the early accounts of society partake of this view of
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history.Even before the modern notion of society emerged 
-in A.Smith's theorisation of the economy- Vico based his 
"science of history" on such a developmental scheme (age of 
Gods,of heroes and of men,succeeding one another24).Comte's 
three stages of human mind and the corresponding types of 
society (theological-metaphysical-positive/theological-
military-industrial ,respectively25) is a similar case,as 
also Spencer's principles of evolution26.
What is not immediately apparent is that a notion of his­
tory as a progress necessarily implies a homogeneous plane 
upon which this progress can be charted,a plane in itself 
before and after history.A transhistorical constant is 
necessary to account for historical developments constant 
that can be nothing else than a hidden essence providing 
the arche and/or the telos of history.
Thus Vico's,Comte's,Spencer's projects,necessarily require 
such a constant.lt is the -fixed- laws of development of 
the human mind (and correspondingly of society) that 
provide it for Vico and Comte and it is the necessary at­
tributes of evolutionary development that provide it for 
Spencer.These elements are not deduced from any facts,but 
they are posited in an a-priori way,even when,as in Comte,a 
"positivism" is advocated.They bear therefore the imprint 
of the idealist tradition.
Hegel and Marx
It is with Hegel,however,that the full philosophical im­
plications of a move from the Kantian transcendental sub-
24. G.Vico.The new science (1744).Ithaca.N.Y.:Cornell University 
Press, 1948
25. A.Comte.Physique sociale.(lessons 46-60 of Cours de philosophle 
Positive (1830-42).Paris:Hermann.1975
26. cf. H.Spencer.First Principles (1862) and Principles of Sociol­
ogy.V.l (1876) in Structure.function and evolution.ed. by S.Adreski, 
London:M.Joseph,1971 and in Principles of sociology.ed. by S.Adreski, 
London: Macmillan,1969.
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ject to society as the subject of history are 
presented.Becoming,the realisation of man's inner essence 
is seen as operating simultaneously on the domain of the 
individual and that of history.A name is given to this 
essence: Universal Spirit.The process of history is seen as 
dialectical;and the end of history is explicitly posed as 
the self-realisation of this essence: Absolute
knowledge,the Spirit reunited with itself.
With Hegel the fundamental assumption of idealism is ex­
plicitly presented:the invariable presence that has to 
support any evolutionary trajectory appears as having the 
form of ideal entities,as pure form or idea.It is precisely 
because of this that knowledge can discover it:it has the 
modality of man's own mind,it is a reflection of the same 
forms reason has.
Marx powerfully transfers the Hegelian approach to the 
study of society.As argued above,despite his denunciation 
of Hegel he remaihed,at the core of his theoretical en­
terprise, very much a Hegelian.
Society is determined by the economy within which it is 
the instance of production that is dominant.At the same 
time historical development is based on the accumulation of 
the results of man's productive labour (the forces of 
production).It is man's fundamental essence,therefore,man 
as a producer,that is both realised in history and deter­
mines society (which is the subject of this history).In ad­
dition, this determinant instance is a rational one since 
production is for Marx the rational activity of man par ex­
cellence.
The seeming denial of the individual,therefore,in favour 
of a "whole" that is the social,conceals nothing more than 
the rediscovery of the human essence of "production" 
-individual as well as collective- as the foundational mo­
ment of this "whole",and as the driving force of its 
(historical) development.
Of course,as argued in Chapter I above,Marx is by no means
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only a Hegelian.He marks precisely an attempt to break with 
Hegel.But in so far as he proposes a coherent scheme,it is 
along the above lines that the scheme can function.
In general,the central assumption of the idealist tradi­
tion, that of an invariable essence behind the multiplicity 
of phenomena,guiding their development being the end and/or 
the beginning (the arche or the telos) of this development 
and being accessible to the rational mind,thus sharing the 
modality of ideas,found fertile ground in the sciences of 
the social.
Being rejected from the realm of natural science,it seemed 
that society,in the modern meaning of the term,was nothing 
more than the domain par excellence of the idealist tradi­
tion. This dominance was reinforced by the fact that the 
"positivist" method,which was conceived precisely as an 
answer to idealism,has been unable,in both its holistic and 
individualistic variants,to offer an alternative suffi­
ciently solid to counteract it.
However,the earlier,most historicist forms of this tradi­
tion were to give their place to less extreme ap­
proaches. The overall historical pattern of societal evolu­
tion became a less pronounced feature while the 
reducibility of society and history to transhistorical,a- 
priori categories remained.We shall return to these ap­
proaches after an examination of the other major epis­
temological paradigm for the human sciences,that of her­
meneutics .
4.THE HERMENEUTIC APPROACH 
W.Dilthey
Dilthey is the principal pioneer of an attempt to estab­
lish a foundation of the possibility of social study dif­
ferent from both positivism and from the idealist tradi­
tion.
As Gadamer remarks,Dilthey1s work can be seen as an im­
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plicit response to book VI -"On the logic of the moral 
sciences"- of J.S.Mill's "Logic";Dilthey wants to disavow 
Mill's positivism and individualism,to reject the causal 
relationships of an empiricist positivism,while at the same 
time taking his distance from Hegel and idealism ("Hegel 
constructs metaphysically .We analyse the given."2"7).
Dilthey's approach,in contradistinction to the above,is 
based on the "objectifications of life"."Life" is for Dil­
they not a realisation of spirit as in Hegel,but the 
primary and irreducible creative reality that replaces the 
notion of spirit:"life contains the sum of all mental 
activities".
The objectifications of life,which are the "subject-matter 
of human studies",cover "from the distribution of trees in 
a park,the arrangement of houses in a street,the functional 
tool of the artisan,to the sentence pronounced in the 
courtroom28... the objective mind embraces language,custom 
and every form or style of life, as well as the 
family,society,the state and the law29".
All these "objectifications of life" have a structural 
form which has to be constructed from the given historical 
reality in the process of "understanding":
"We cannot understand the objective mind through 
reason,but must go to the structural connections of per­
sons,and by extension,of communities".30
27. W.Dilthey.Selected Writings.ed. by H.Rickman (thereafter SW), 
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1976,p.194
Dilthey's account of his "hermeneutic" approach to the sciences of 
the mind -Geisteswissenschaften,itself a translation of Mill's "moral 
sciences"- has to be reconstructed from his many works and frag­
ments.More suggestive are the fragments collected in Vol.VII of his 
collected works,partly translated in English.Being not a systematic 
whole,they contain contradictions and unfinished arguments.They indi­
cate,however,sufficiently clear,an overall direction.
28. SW,p.192
29. SW,p.194
30. ibid.
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The understanding of these "structural connections" is 
coextensive with the establishment of a "meaning" to them: 
"The totality of a life,or any section of the life of 
mankind can only be grasped in terms of the category of the 
meaning which the individual parts have for the understand­
ing of the whole...the category of meaning designates the 
relationship inherent in life,of parts of a life to the 
whole"31.
Thus Dilthey distances himself from the tradition of 
Romantic hermeneutics that had been primarily subjectivis- 
tic.As far as the social is concerned it is a structural 
hermeneutics that Dilthey advocates.
The structural wholes which can be seen as meaningful, 
are both individuals,as historical beings,but also 
relationships between individuals,referring to cultural and 
generally social products:
"It would be very wrong to confine history to the co­
operation of human beings for common purposes.The in­
dividual person in his independent existence is a histori­
cal being.He is determined by his position in time and 
space and in the interaction of cultural systems and com­
munities. It is the whole web of relationships which 
stretches from individuals furthering their own exist­
ence, to the cultural systems and communities,and,finally,to 
the whole of mankind,which makes up the character of 
society and history.Individuals,as much as communities and 
contexts,are the logical subjects of history."32
An individual life,a cultural system,a community,are all 
to be seen,for Dilthey,as structural wholes through the as­
signment of meaning to their constituent parts,a meaning 
that connects them and fuses them into a whole.The process 
of "understanding",that attributes this meaning, is the
31. SW,p.235
32. SW,p.181
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distinguishing element of a hermeneutic approach.33
However,while the hermeneutic procedure seems to imply an 
inescapably relativity,since the process of interpretation 
is a relative one ,in fact Dilthey wants to claim the pos­
sibility of a final objectivity.The final aim of her­
meneutics remains the objective and absolute knowledge of 
history:
"Our task today is to recognise the actual historical ex­
pression as the true foundation of historical knowledge and 
to find a method of answering the question how universally 
valid knowledge of the historical world can be based on 
what is thus given."34
"Life" is seen as "ordered towards reflection" and its ob­
jectifications as fully analysable by reason.The only
residue of uncertainty in the understanding of history 
comes not from the modality of the "objectifications of 
life" but from the incompleteness of history.Just as "one 
has to wait for the end of a life",equally one would have
to wait until "the end of history to have all the material
necessary to determine its meaning"35.Therefore the goal of 
objective and valid knowledge remains always a relatively 
incomplete one,but one in principle attainable.
Thus,while Dilthey rejects an empiricist positivism and 
its causal relationships,recognising a specificity in
society and history,while also rejecting any a-priori 
definition of this specificity in the Hegelian fashion,he 
continues to consider a universally valid,an objective 
knowledge of society and history as possible and as the ul­
33. It has to be remarked that despite his overall structural orienta­
tion, the model for this understanding remains for Dilthey the under­
standing of our own life,i.e autobiography:"the reflection of a person 
about himself remains the standard and basis for understanding 
history"(SW,p.218)
34. SW,p.195
35. SW,p.236
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timate goal of the "Geisteswissenschaften".
Therefore,although he recognises a difference in the mode 
of knowledge of human sciences from the natural 
ones,Dilthey still holds a belief in an identity of aim be­
tween the two in the possibility of certainty,objectivity 
and universality.As Gadamer remarks,for Dilthey "historical 
consciousness was supposed to rise above its own relativity 
in a way that made objectivity in the human sciences 
possible"36.And although Hegel's a-prioristic metaphysics 
is rejected,society and history continue to be seen as 
primarily rational:not as the expression of an essence but 
as fully accessible and analysable by reason.Moreover,the 
only kind of ontology of the social that could support his 
scheme seems to be an objectivist one,like ,say,Parsons1s 
or Althusser's.
Thus Dilthey's intended break with both positivism and 
Hegelianism remains a partial one.However,his initial ex­
position of the "objectifications of life",as structural 
wholes constructed in the process of understanding,implies 
a constant relativity in this "construction",rather than a 
final "objectivity".Such a relativity,implying in turn a 
radical historicity,would require the social to be seen as 
always amenable to such constructions,i.e as a "field" em­
bodying meaning,and yet as never fully reducible to 
them,i.e as not being of the same order as rational 
thought.If so,Dilthey can be seen as indeed opening a novel 
path,only that it remains an undeveloped possibility.
E.Husserl
Husserl did not explicitly concern himself with the 
problems of social science,nor did he s ee k a foundation 
for the social.Yet,within our context of inquiry, his work 
is of importance both directly and as interpreted by 
A.Schutz.
36. H.G.Gadamer.Truth and Method.London:Sheed and Ward,1979,p.207
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Husserl wants to transcend both empiricism and idealistic 
objectivism as a foundation for the possibility of 
(scientific) knowledge.To that aim,he posits an "ego 
cogito" as the "ultimate and apodictically certain basis 
for judgements,the basis on which any radical philosophy 
must be grounded."37
This ego cogito,this primary consciousness,however,is not 
a return to subjectivism and psychologism.lt refers to a 
transcendental ego and to a primary level of intentionality 
which forms experience instead of being a residue of ex­
perience.
It is the "intentional morphe" that forms the material of 
the senses ("hyle") and that creates a "meaning of some 
sort"38 that characterises this primary level,a meaning 
manifested in a paradigmatic form in the synthesis of in­
ternal time consciousness.
What Husserl posits is a level that precedes experiences,a 
level of intentionality that gives form and meaning to ex­
periences and that can be used as the ultimate basis for a 
philosophy of knowledge.
(i) This level appears as having a similar modality to 
that of concepts and ideas to which it gives birth and of 
which it is the supporting substratum.lt is,nevertheless, 
distinct from them, referring to a "meaning" of some 
sort,though not necessarily to the explicit meaning of 
logos.
(ii) This level appears initially in Husserl as generated 
in each individual,though in a transcendental way. 
Gradually,however,this assertion is seen as untenable.In 
the 5th "Cartesian Meditation" the notion of 
"transcendental intersubjectivity" appears,to give its
37. E .Husserl.Cartesian Meditations.Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff,1960,
p.18
38. E.Husserl.Ideas:Introduction to pure phenomenology (1913).London: 
Allen and Unwin,1931,p.257
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place,in Husserl's later work,to the notion of "lifeworld" 
(lebenswelt).Thus Husserl moves from "consciousness" and 
"subjectivity" to "life" as the foundation of his 
phenomeno1ogy.
It is the lifeworld that becomes the "grounding soil of 
the scientifically true world".The lifeworld exists as the 
"horizon of all actual and possible praxis",as the pre­
given and necessary "universal field"39.
Husserl does not explicitly incorporate into the concept 
of lifeworld the totality of attributes of intentionality 
and primary "meaning" he earlier attributed to the 
transcendental ego.The lifeworld appears as a rather 
unspecified substratum out of which knowledge springs.There 
are,however,all the indications that the lifeworld can be 
seen as the origin of this meaning and intentionality as 
they are manifested in particular egos.
At this point Husserl's possible relevance to a theorisa­
tion of the social becomes obvious:
The level of intentionality and meaning that serves as the 
"apodictically certain basis for judgements" for Husserl 
can be seen as providing a theorisation of the primary 
level of the social,as that which transcends individual 
consciousness and action and yet is the origin of it.
The difference between what people think or consciously 
aim and the direction of social totalities can be seen as 
similar to the difference between this level and that of 
full consciousness and knowledge,thus satisfying the second 
assertion of the modern conception of the social.
If this level is seen,however,as originating from the in­
dividual and if the ambivalent status of Husserl's 
"transcendental ego" is seen as referring to more or less 
concrete individuals,then there is a problem in satisfying 
the first assumption,that of an internal coherence and
39. E.Husserl.The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology.Evans ton:Northwes tern University Press,1970,p.142
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dynamic.How are we to pass from the individual monads to 
the whole that is society? How are we to account for the 
necessary coherence the social assumes, if we have only in­
dependent individuals? The appropriation of Husserl in a 
theory of the social faces at this point the traditional 
problem of a strict individualism.
If,though,we take late Husserl’s notion of Lebenswelt into 
account,this problem does not exist any more:The lifeworld 
is by definition non individual and hence it can be cer­
tainly seen as the basis of a social theory satisfying both 
assumptions.
A.Schutz
The most important appropriation of Husserl's phenomenology 
in order to construct a theory of the social can be found 
in A.Schutz's work.
In his early "Sinnhafte Aufbau der socialen Welt" 
(translated as "The Phenomenology of social world"),Schutz 
distinguishes a primary,unmediated experience (which he 
calls "prephenomena1"),from "phenomenal" experience result­
ing if meaning is endowed upon a past experience through a 
retrospective glance thrown to it.For Schutz,"meaning is 
the way in which the Ego regards its experience".Thus 
Schutz interprets Husserl's primary level of intentionality 
and meaning as a primary level of experience.
To construct a theory of the social,Schutz uses only the 
second level of "phenomenal" experience as relevant:"Our 
starting point is intentional conscious experiences 
directed toward the other self"40.He uses Weber's typology 
of social behaviour,social action,social relation­
ship, etc. , but , unlike Weber,he does not accord any position 
to non-intentional experiences (like Weber's traditional or 
affective action,for ex.).These experiences can have no
40. A.Shutz.The phenomenology of the social World (1932).London: 
Heinemann,1972,p.144
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meaning for Schutz and thus they are of no significance 
towards his theory of the social.
Social behaviour is thus seen as conscious and transparent 
to the actor.In order,however,for a social knowledge,i.e a 
social science to exist,the other's behaviour has to be un­
derstood,!^ the meaning the other ascribes to it.This can 
be done by postulating "ideal types" as the "existence of a 
person whose actual living motive could be the objective 
content of meaning already chosen to define a typical 
action"41.Thus the social has a certain opaqueness,not 
towards the actor himself,but towards the social scientist 
trying to account for the others' actions.The understanding 
of the other is necessarily limited;the actor's understand­
ing of his own social actions -as intentional conscious 
experiences-,however,is full and unproblematic.
Thus Schutz advocates,at this stage,a king of hermeneutic 
individualism,without any overall structuring categories as 
in Weber.In doing so,inevitably,he faces the traditional 
problem of individualism:The very existence of the social 
comes into question because there is no explanation as to 
why seemingly unconnected behaviour simply oriented towards 
the other would produce any structured society at 
all.Schutz finds himself facing the same problem as Hobbes 
or Locke:the question of an apparent order out of ap­
parently unconnected individual activities.In fact,Schutz's 
theoretical scheme in "Aufbau" cannot account for either of 
the two central defining assumptions we attributed to the 
modern conception of the social,its structurality and its 
opaqueness.
As we will see,for Weber reason and rational action serve 
as a vehicle to reintroduce social structures to his ini­
tially individualistic scheme.Schutz is not willing to do 
so,and is left with no possibility of connecting individual 
action to a structured outcome.
41. ibid.,p.189
76
Up to this stage,Schutz operates primarily within early 
Husserl's work (before even the "Cartesian meditations" 
which were published almost simultaneously with the 
"Aufbau") and therefore he is not yet concerned with the 
concept of lifeworld.Perhaps as an answer to the above 
problems,however,in his later work he uses the notion of 
lifeworld,prefiguring indeed Husserl's own use of it (which 
becomes known only after the posthumous publication of the 
"Crisis").
The concept of lifeworld provides Schutz with the oppor­
tunity to affirm the cohesiveness and structurality of the 
social which could not be deduced from his earlier 
scheme,without,at the same time,departing much from this 
scheme.
"Lifeworld" for Schutz represents "the natural attitude in 
which we,as human beings among fellow beings experience 
culture and society,take a stand with regard to their ob­
jects, are influenced by them and act upon them"42.The 
"lifeworld" is not any more the grounding base for cer­
tainty in knowledge as in Husserl,but rather a first 
level,"common sense" interpretation of human action43.It 
refers to a primary knowledge of the social 
world,necessarily existing in everyday action.This 
knowledge conditions the "subjective stock of knowledge" 
and determines,to a degree,the orientation of individual 
social action.
The social is not any more seen as the creation of in­
dividual action through isolated "intentional conscious 
experiences",but as already there,endowed with a cohesive­
ness and wholeness in the form of "lifeworld" which guides
42. A.Schutz,"Some structures of the life-world",in Collected Papers
III.The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1970,p.116
43. as is evident in A.Schutz,"Common-sense and scientific interpreta­
tion of human action" (1953),in Collected Papers I.The Hague:Martinus 
Nijhoff,1962
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this individual action.The social is still seen,however,as 
pertaining to intentional and conscious experiences of in­
dividuals existing independently of this social which they 
"employ",as a system of concepts,only at the moment of ac­
tion.
At this point Schutz faces a dilemma:
Since he considers that the primary lifeworld is a "stock 
of knowledge" and hence a system of concepts and ideal ele­
ments guiding action -however imperfectly conceived by the 
actor- the social scientific knowledge can claim the pos­
sibility of "objectivity":it can aim at "discovering" the 
central elements of this stock of knowledge in a total and 
unbiased manner,without being constrained by the creation 
of "ideal types" based on typifications of individual ex­
periences .
If so,however,any "interpretive" claim,other than the al­
ways incomplete knowledge of this lifeworld due to its com­
plexity's abandoned and Schutz1s scheme becomes very 
similar to Parson's in "Structure".The "lifeworld" closely 
resembles the "systems of norms",while the actor is by both 
writers seen as independent and outside these systems.44
Apart from the abandonment of an interpretive 
stance,another central problem facing the scheme is the 
possibility of conceiving individuals as definable 
"outside" the social,as also the limited sense in which in­
dividuals are portrayed as primarily cognitive 
beings,"cognizing" the "norms" or the "lifeworld".
As we will see,Parsons,in response to these 
problems,develops his own theory incorporating a social 
formation of the individual,including the motivational 
sphere.But in such a line of development any interpretive 
element,even that based on an incompleteness of scientific
44. The few letters exchanged between Schutz and Parsons indicate that 
Schutz was aware of this similarity.See A.Schutz.The theory of social 
action:the correspondence of A.Schutz and T.Parsons.Bloomington: In­
diana University Press,1978
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knowledge of first-order concepts,cannot survive.
If Schutz wants to escape this objectivism and to retain a 
relativity in social knowledge -and hence a necessarily 
hermeneutic position-,as his original project were and as 
both his reservations for Parsons's unconditional 
objectivism45 and his few late comments on social scien­
tific knowledge indicate46,he has no other way out than to 
return to his initial position in "Aufbau".But this in turn 
implies,as we saw,abandoning any pre-existing structurality 
of the social world and facing the Enlightenment's problem 
of order.
Schutz's dilemma indicates that if an interpretive ap­
proach is to be developed starting from 
"conscious,meaningful action",then the only way to retain 
its hermeneutic character is to remain within a 
-problematic- individualism.If this individualism is aban­
doned, as with Schutz's concept of lifeworld,the cognitive 
level of action involved necessarily leads to an objec­
tivism, however qualified.
Thus Schutz's interpretation of Husserl is revealed to be 
a problematic one.If,however,Husserl's "lifeworld" is seen 
as referring to a level of intentionality and primary 
"meaning" which does not correspond to
"intentional,conscious action",a level not coextensive with 
ideas,norms,or concepts,then Schutz's dilemma disappears.
The transportation of the concept of lifeworld to the 
field of social theory could retain and expand this dif­
ference between a primary level of meaning and the level of 
thought and ideas,rather than dissolving it in an sequen­
tial "order of concepts" as Schutz does.Of course,in this 
case,the question of actually accounting of the social as 
such a field,a formidable question,opens up.
45. ibid.
46. "Common sense ...",op.cit.,p.34ff
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\However,it is towards this direction, -a direction that we 
argued is also indicated,though not developed by Dilthey 
that Husserl's "phenomenology",in so far as it has any 
relevance to a theorisation of the social,should be seen as 
indicating the way.
G.H.Mead
An approach that runs a parallel course to phenomenol­
ogy, even though it starts from a different tradition (that 
of pragmatism) is presented by G.H.Mead1s theoretical work.
Mead wanted to accept the epistemological strictness of 
behaviourism while taking into account the peculiarity of 
the human world.To that aim he adopted as necessary the 
level of consciousness and of meaning.
The category of "meaning" has for Mead similar connota­
tions with Husserl's original references.A series of impor­
tant statements locate the notion of "meaning" Mead 
embraced:
"Meaning is thus a development of something objectively 
there as a relation between certain phases of the social 
act;it is not a physical addition to that act and it is not 
an "idea" as traditionally conceived47...The mechanism of 
meaning is thus present in the social act before the emer­
gence of consciousness or awareness of meaning occurs48 
...Meaning is thus not to be conceived fundamentally as a 
state of consciousness,or as a set of organised relations 
existing or subsisting mentally outside the field of ex­
perience into which they enter49...Meaning can be 
described,accounted for or stated in terms of symbols or 
language at its highest and most complex stage of develop­
47. G.H.Mead.Mind.Self and Society.ed. by C.Morris (thereafter MSS), 
Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1962
48. MSS,p.77
49. MSS,p.78
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\ment (the stage it reaches in human experience),but lan­
guage simply lifts out of the social process a situation 
which is logically or implicitly there already50."
"Meaning" is therefore for Mead the grounding soil of lan­
guage and ideas.This meaning,moreover,is decisively and 
primarily embedded on social processes and does not exist 
"outside" them.
Out of this field of meaning in social experience arises 
the "self" as distinct from the biological organism:"The 
self ...is essentially a social structure,and it arises in 
social experience51...There are all sorts of different 
selves answering to all sorts of different social reac­
tions. It is the social process itself that is responsible 
for the appearance of the self;it is not there as a self 
apart from this type of experience"52.
The self,however,cannot be reduced to the social reaction 
in which it originates,it has a certain autonomy ,which for 
Mead is encapsulated in the concept of the "I" (as opposed 
to the "Me" representing the "generalised social 
other").The self interprets situations in which he exists 
and acts accordingly.Hence this action cannot be reduced to 
mechanical models of causality.
However,when Mead addresses the question of the social,he 
locates this social not on the whole of this "field of 
meaning" in which selves originate,but on the higher 
echelons of it,that of language and conscious communication 
between selves,seen as autonomous and independent actors.
In this way he produces a scheme similar to early 
Schutz1s,and,he faces necessarily the same problem,that of 
accounting for the structurality of the social.
Mead himself implicitly recognises this problem and in his
50. MSS,p.79,emphasis added.
51. MSS,p.140
52. MSS,p.142
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\brief statements on society at large,he introduces the ex­
istence of certain fundamental "socio-physiological 
impulses" as the "reproductive,the parental,the impulse of 
neighbourliness"53 to provide a basis for society,which is 
seen as thus exhibiting certain "universals",as 
religion,economy,etc.54
These "impulses" and these "universals" are presented as 
scarcely connected to "conscious communication",rather as 
pre-ordaining the lines of this communication.Thus im­
plicitly Mead recognises the insufficiency of this 
"conscious communication" as a foundation of the social.
However,his own formulations of meaning and the self,point 
towards a field of meaning that precedes conscious com­
munication and even language,a field that participates in 
the formation of the "self" and yet is not necessarily con­
scious^ field that necessarily exists in every (social) 
interaction.
To see this theorisation of meaning as the primary basis 
for the social itself and to draw the consequences it would 
entail,remains thus the implicit alternative Mead of­
fers, though, once again,this alternative remains un­
developed.
"Micro" sociologies of interaction
If the social is seen as the product of con­
scious, intentional , meaningful action as in early Schutz and 
Mead,and the hermeneutic element located on inter- 
subjective understanding,no account of the structurality of 
the social out of individual,independent actions can be ad­
vanced. The problem of order that Enlightenment pre- 
sociological thought faced reappears.Moreover,the relative 
opaqueness of the social in relation to participating in­
53. MSS,p.228
54. MSS,p.258
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\dividuals,which we identified as a constitutive element of 
the modern notion of the social cannot be taken into ac­
count at all.
Possibly because of this cul-de-sac,a number of approaches 
emerged,still broadly within the subjectivist hermeneutic 
tradition,but emphasising not any more individual action 
but interaction of individuals.
A substantial body of primarily empirically oriented 
work,within the broad labels of "symbolic interactionism", 
"phenomenology", "ethnomethodology",etc.,has been gradually 
accumulated,including the work of leading figures as 
E.Goffman and H.Garfinkel.
These studies in general focused on the active role the 
individual plays in contexts of everyday ("micro") interac­
tion, "interpreting each other's actions instead of merely 
reacting to each other's actions"55 and/or actively or­
ganising "indexical expressions and indexical actions"56 
and/or "presenting" himself in a performance like 
("dramatourgical") way5V.In many cases it could be claimed 
that these individuals,in contexts of interaction,actually 
"produced" "patterned sequences of interactive relations" 
as social "structures"58.
Though in principle the major researchers on the field 
have avoided general theoretical claims,it has been 
nevertheless claimed that these studies introduce a major 
theoretical paradigm:that the social at large can be seen 
as created by individuals -as critical,interpretive beings-
55. H.Blumer,"Society as Symbolic interaction" in A.M.Rose (ed.).Human 
behaviour and social processes.London:Routledge.1962
56. H.Garfinkel,"What is ethnomethodology?"(1967) in Studies in eth- 
nomethodology (1968).Cambridge:Polity Press,1984
57. E.Goffman.The presentation of self in everyday life.New York: 
Doubleday,1959
58. J.Turner.A Theory of social interaction.Oxford:Polity Press,1988,
p.149
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acting in contexts of interaction.
Thus "macro events can be seen as made up of aggregations 
and repetitions of many similar micro events"59 and social 
structure is "nothing other than large numbers of micro en­
counters repeated over time and actors1 space"60.
We are faced here with a variant on individualism based on 
a subjectivist hermeneutics.The individuals appear as rela­
tively autonomous and self-supporting entities interacting 
in an interpretive way with others.The social at large is 
produced out of these processes of interaction.As for the 
(social scientific) knowledge of these processes,it has to 
be a hermeneutic one,necessitating the deciphering of in­
dividual interpretations.
In so far as the social can indeed be produced of interac­
tion, the "problem of order" traditional individualism faces 
is overcome.As for the opaqueness the social may exhibit,it 
can also be accommodated within this account since the 
"emergent properties of interaction" are not immediately 
apparent to actors.The only problem the approach seemingly 
faces is its inability to account successfully for "macro" 
structures out of "micro" interaction.
This inability,though,is not accidental.In fact it points 
to the weak link in the chain of the above claims: the ap­
proach is based on a non legitimate generalisation.While it 
is true that the "micro" studies referred to indicate that 
certain micro situations can be successfully analysed 
through the assumptions of autonomous and actively 
functioning individuals in interaction,it is a false claim 
that all micro situations can be so analysed.
The types of micro situations these empirical studies
59. R.Collins,"On the micro-foundations of macro-sociology"(1981), 
American Journal of Sociology.V.86.p.988
60. R.Collins,"Interaction ritual chains,power and property:the micro­
macro connection as an empirically based theoretical problem",in
J.Alexander (ed.) The Micro-Macro Link.Berkeley:University of Califor­
nia Press,1987
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focus on are primarily ones separated from institutional 
restraints and concern action having no bearing on macro 
issues.Alternatively,the type of questions asked by the re­
searcher is such that only elements of interaction not im­
mediately related to "macro" structures are taken into ac­
count .
Even micro situations which can be successfully analysed 
through the assumptions of interacting autonomous in­
dividuals always operate within greater structural con­
straints which have to be taken into account before any 
theorisation of society in general is attempted.
In addition,however,many "micro" events cannot be analysed 
through these assumptions at all.They necessitate the in­
troduction of "stocks of knowledge",of "lifeworld",or of 
some sort of "norms" guiding the individuals1 behaviour,of 
a level,that is,beyond the immediate consciousness of the 
individuals and directly connected to greater ("macro") 
structural wholes.Certain "micro" studies have recognised 
it,and the late Schutz's introduction of the lifeworld is 
indicative in this respect.61
In both cases,Bourdieu1s remark is valid:""interpersonal" 
relations are never,except in appearance,individual-to- 
individual relationships and the truth of interaction is 
never entirely contained in the interaction"62
And as Mouzelis remarks:"Face-to-face interactions by or 
with actors who have privileged access to the means of 
economic,political or cultural production may have intended 
or unintended consequences affecting a large number of
61. D.Layder names structures within which interpretation and nego­
tiations are important,"interaction" structures and distinguishes them 
from "contextual" structures which are pre-constituted and constrain­
ing. (D.Layder.Structure.interaction and Social Theory.London: Rout - 
ledge,1981).
He neglects.however,the second type of micro events which cannot be 
analysed through these assumptions at all.
62. P.Bourdieu.Outline of a theory of Practice.Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1977,p.81
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people...Such encounters,even if they involve two persons 
only, are clearly macro-encounters1163
Therefore,despite a certain limited applicability,the so­
cial at large cannot be explained through the 
"interactional" individualism "micro" approaches advo­
cate. Moreover, the appropriation of the term "micro" by 
these approaches is definitely unjustifiable since there 
are not the only ones trying to account for micro 
phenomena.
Consequently,the subjectivist hermeneutics that goes with 
them offers no viable epistemological foundation for the 
study of the social.
Hermeneutics and Interpretation 
Hermeneutics,from Dilthey onwards,have been advanced as a 
mainly epistemological alternative to both positivism and 
idealism on the theorisation of the social.
However,they have not fared better than these approaches 
in providing a foundation for such a theorisation.
(a)In their subjectivist variant,when the hermeneutic ele­
ment is located in inter-subjective understanding,the 
problem that individualism has traditionally faced 
reappears:the social in general cannot be seen as produced 
out of the action of autonomous individuals and this is not 
altered by a change of emphasis from "action" to 
"interaction".
The only way to avoid this problem is to introduce a sys­
tem of social "knowledge",as "norms" guiding individual ac­
tion, as Schutz does.But if so,the hermeneutic element also 
disappears,as necessarily this system of norms can be seen 
as a conceptual one,"objectively" knowable (as Schutz 
scheme's identity with Parsons's reveals).
(b) On the other hand,if a structural view of the social 
is retained, as in Dilthey's "objectifications of life"
63. N.Mouzelis.Back to sociological theory.London:Macmillan.1991.p.83
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without, however,according to this social field any 
specific modality that would differentiate it from concep­
tual thought,once more the social can only be seen as ul­
timately objectively knowable,refuting thus any nominal 
hermeneutic claim.
In a structural approach,it is only if a degree of non­
correspondence and a differential modality between the in­
terpreted element and its interpretation are assumed,with 
the corresponding necessary relativity,only in such a case 
can a "real" hermeneutic approach be claimed.
Plainly the authors discussed failed to offer the desired 
alternative foundation for a theorisation of the social.
Yet we saw that all three,Dilthey,Husserl and Mead, are 
suggestive towards a theorisation of the social as a struc­
tured field of meaning of a structural character,not coex­
tensive with conceptual thought,though partially accessible 
to it.Such a conceptualisation would allow for a difference 
of modalities that could in turn account for an interpre­
tive procedure really offering an alternative to objec­
tivism.
However,since these remain precisely suggestions rather 
than a developed scheme,a question mark hovers above them.
5.THE IDEALIST TRADITION II:
OBJECTIVISM AND RATIONALISM
While initial approaches to the study of the social within 
the idealist tradition have originally seen society as the 
subject of history in an evolutionary perspec­
tive, subsequent theorists were less inclined to do so.What 
remained,though,in these theorists and what connected them 
with the idealist tradition,was the acceptance of certain 
constant and transhistorical categories which supposedly 
order the social.Although these categories were not always 
introduced in an axiomatic way and they were instead 
presented as empirical generalisations,in fact they were 
always a-priori ones.We can consider Weber,the late Parsons
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and Levi-Strauss as falling within this category.
However,even the assumption of the existence of these 
categories was abandoned in certain cases,retaining only an 
assertion of the possibility of an objective and complete 
knowledge of the social,based on an ultimate accessibility 
of the social to reason.We can consider the early Parsons 
and Althusser as representing this case.
M .Weber
Weber remains a rich source of material for both theoreti­
cal and more substantive researches and,as with all great 
thinkers,is difficult to be neatly classified into a 
specific category.
His theoretical account of the social is in itself 
intriguing.Weber starts from individual action and an in­
terpretative viewpoint.Yet,in fact,his theorisation can be 
seen as neither an individualistic nor as a hermeneutic 
one.
Weber constructs a typology of social actions,two forms of 
rational action (1 Zweckrational" -instrumentally rational 
and "weltrational"-value rational) and two other forms 
(affective/traditional action)64.He considers that the 
first two types of action can form the basis of an under­
standing of the social through the construction of a 
"purely rational course of action",an ideal type.
Weber introduces rational action,therefore,seemingly only 
as a methodological device,not considered as covering the 
whole of the social but as offering the only possibility of 
understanding social action in general.The social as a 
whole is not primarily rational but it is amenable to an 
analysis as if it were.Thus,in a neo-Kantian fashion,a dis­
tance is introduced between what the social is and its 
yielding to an analysis according to the laws of the
64. M.Weber.Economy and Society (thereafter ES),Berkeley:University of 
California Press,1978,p.24
88
intellect.65
But for this possibility to exist -the social to be 
amenable to rational analysis- either rational action 
covers the majority of social action,or other types of ac­
tion are also amenable to a rational analysis.
Since Weber recognises that the "ideal type" can only be a 
marginal case,it is not the widespread nature or rational 
action that supports this assertion.lt is rather the pos­
sibility of analysing non-rational action as if it were 
so.For Weber other types of action are to be treated as 
"factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of ra­
tional action".
Therefore rational action and the ideal type ceases to be 
a simple methodological device;it becomes the basis upon 
which the whole of the social action can be constructed,as 
deviations from it.For Weber's notion of ideal types to be 
operative,the social has to be seen not only as amenable to 
rational analysis,but as primarily rational.
Thus a tension is introduced in Weber's account:on the one 
hand he explicitly recognises the existence and even the 
importance of affective and traditional action,i.e. of non- 
rational forms of action (his theorisation of charisma can 
be seen as an example of the importance non-rational fea­
tures have for Weber).On the other,he introduces the notion 
of ideal type that in fact reduces all types of action to 
deviations of the rational type.
However,since Weber starts from individual (social) ac­
tion, even the rational types of action do not necessarily 
imply a systematic character of the result of action,i.e of 
the social.
Weber proceeds by introducing broad social categories 
which are presented as produced by the aggregation of in­
65. It is not.therefore,the understanding (Verstehen) that provides 
the basis of Weber's methodology,despite him claiming so.It is the 
amenability of the social to a rational analysis.
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dividual actions.
For example,the economy is defined through "economically 
oriented" action which, "according to its subjective mean­
ing is concerned with the satisfaction of a desire for 
"utilities"66.But utilities are the "specific and con­
crete, real or imagined advantages of opportunities for 
present or future use as they are estimated and made an ob­
ject of specific provision by one or more economically ac­
ting individuals"67.
The definition of utilities,then,presupposses
"economically acting individuals",and hence the economy, 
while they are were supposedly used to define it the 
later.Weber cannot escape from the fact that the existence 
of an economy is presupposed by the type of action it seem­
ingly provides a foundation for.
A similar argument can be made for the other categories,of 
authority,of religion,of law,etc.These categories are not 
produced by any aggregation of individual social action,the 
attributes of which can be captured through "ideal 
types".Rather they are introduced in an ad hoc way,as the 
axes along which historical data can be ordered,axes tran- 
shistorically constant and immutable.
These categories could of course be presented indepen­
dently of a theorisation of individual action,as empirical 
generalisations.However,the problem is that they are not in 
any way "empirically" deductible out of a mass of empirical 
material.In fact these categories are constructed through 
an extrapolation to the past of features of modern 
society,and in particular of the seemingly autonomous sys­
temic function of the economy and the polity.
Consequently,since the past is seen through the categories 
of the present,the present appears as the culmination of
66. ES,p.63
67. ES,p.68
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the past.Thus when Weber refers to modern bureaucratic 
authority and of capitalist economy as the most rational 
forms of these categories,this is a necessary result of 
the way authority and economy are in fact defined.68
Thus a notion of the social as primarily rational,implicit 
in Weber's "ideal type",is reinforced by the introduction 
of transhistorical categories that can be neither deduced 
from individual social action,nor derived from empirical 
generalisations.
Despite,therefore,his many contradictions and the alterna­
tive directions Weber simultaneously points to,if we are to 
give a cohesiveness in his theorisation of the social we 
can only consider it as a rationalist one.
Hence Weber shares a fundamental similarity with 
Marx.While for Marx there is a single dominant human ele­
ment, that of production,an element that is the guiding line 
to the development of history and the analysis of the so­
cial, for Weber there are several such lines: the economy,
authority, legitimation,etc. Marx's argument is therefore 
generalised,his more extreme evolutionism is abandoned,but 
the nature of it remains unchanged:the social is ultimately 
founded on constant - rational- attributes of man 
manifested and realised in history.69
As with Marx,however,we have to reject Weber's scheme.We 
cannot theoretically justify his a-priori assumptions -of 
"ideal types" as well as of the existence of the
68. This is not to imply that Weber unequivocally and unambivalently 
considers "modernisation" as positive.His notion of disenchantment of 
the world and his account of the limits of formal rationality -loss of 
freedom and meaning- indicate his reservations for the "modern".
However,within Weber*s theoretical scheme it is difficult -if not 
impossible- to see the present in any other way than as a culmination 
of the past.
69. For any categories to transhistorically exist,they can only refer 
to some transhistorically constant elements of human nature or intel­
lect,certain constant needs that have to be satisfied,some facets,in 
general,of a human essence.lt is these elements that pre-ordain his­
tory since they form the lines history and society follow.
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categories- nor are these assumptions supported by concrete 
empirical material.70
T .Parsons
Parsons follows a path much influenced by Weber,while at 
the same time trying to generalise Weber's argument and to 
provide a more cohesive theory.
His first major work,"The Structure of social action" can 
be seen as roughly corresponding to chapter one of Weber's 
"Economy and Society".Parsons starts from a unit 
act,involving an agent(actor),an end,condition and
means,and a normative orientation that allows choice be­
tween means.This classic means-end scheme is developed into 
what Parsons calls the "voluntarist theory of action" by
making all parameters dependent upon a system of norms.
Thus it is not only the choice of means as in the tradi­
tional model that is a function of social values or 
norms,but also the "end" as well as the situation itself.In 
this way Parsons avoids the problems the individualist 
theories that employed the model had faced,in particular 
the problem of societal "order" if individuals are seen as 
independent entities posing disparate "ends".
While Parson's scheme allows also the actor's rational 
knowledge into the account,the social is for him primarily 
represented by the system of norms.Thus he is able to
derive the level of society from individual action,not 
facing the difficulties Weber does being based exclusively 
on rational action.
Within this context,a norm is defined as "a verbal 
description of the concrete course of action thus regarded
70. It is not a question of accumulated data disproving the transhis­
toricity of categories in a positivist manner.Since the central as­
sumption is a metaphysical and an a-priori one,it is not subjectible 
to empirical testing and it cannot be falsified in the strict 
sense.However,a certain tension is introduced by this concrete
material, since its assimilation to these categories was not as easy 
as would be hoped.
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as desirable,combined with an injunction to make certain 
future actions conform to this course"7X.This "concrete 
course of action" is clearly distinguished from "non- 
subjective elements of action",such as heredity and en­
vironment, which are located on the level of biology and 
physical nature respectively.
There is no separation,though,for Parsons,between the 
"desirability and injunction" of the course of action,and 
the "verbal description" of it.Nor is there one between the 
latter and "symbolic expressions of it"'72.Thus the "norm" 
can be objectively -scientifically- known.
Therefore for Parsons the order of action,as norm 
oriented,is directly expressible by symbolic and scientific 
language.There is no "interpretation" to take place,as 
Weber holds;rather an unproblematic access -from the part 
of the observer- to the norms guiding action is assumed.
Since the level of norms defines also the result of social 
action -the level of "society"- Parsons's formulation poses 
society not any more as primarily rational as in Weber, but 
rather as fully describable through a system of normative 
elements which can be seen as coextensive with the ideal 
concepts referring to them.
There is no proper distinction,therefore,between the so­
cial and the ideal (although there is one between the so­
cial and cultural "systems").Society can be fully and com­
prehensively analysed through the systems of norms that 
guide the action of its composite members."73
71. T.Parsons.The structure of social action (1937).New York:Free 
Press, 1968,p.75
72. ibid.,p.78
73. That Parsons refuses to admit that there is any level of the so­
cial,except externally defined factors such as heredity and natural 
environment,not reducible to the systems of norms and values an actor 
uses in the process of action,is evident also in the way he incor­
porates Pareto and Durkheim into his scheme:
In order to incorporate Pareto in the face of the latter’s explicit 
distinction between "residues” and "derivations" (the second referring
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The fact that the social is reducible to a system of norms 
does not necessarily imply that the actor fully "knows" 
these norms in a conscious way.The actor's knowledge of the 
norms may be partial74,without this altering the pos­
sibility of a full knowledge,especially by an outside 
scientific observer.However,in Parsons's "Structure", the 
actors themselves appear as defined outside and indepen­
dently of any system of norms,i.e. outside any social in­
fluence and as predominantly acting in a con­
scious, cognitive way.Parsons retains this element of tradi­
tional individualism,a tradition from which his means-end 
scheme also comes from.
However,the cohesiveness of Parson's theory does not 
require positing the actor as a cognitive being,so far as 
the objectivism of the scientific observer is not ques­
tioned. Given this,and the difficulties inherent in assuming 
individuals formed outside society (especially in the light 
of psychoanalytic theories) Parsons gradually conceives of
to the actor's thoughts while the first,distinct from and determining 
these thoughts,are for Pareto the subject matter of an analysis of 
action),Parsons transforms this distinction into one between symbols 
referring to statements of sentiments (subjective) and statements of 
facts (objective) (Structure,p.214-216).Since it is the sentiment that 
determines the ultimate end,it is the residue that is dominant and not 
the derivation (thought).Thus a difference in modality between the 
two,as posed by Pareto,is transformed to a difference in degree.
Similarly.Parsons appropriates Durkheim's late writings -principally 
the "Elementary forms of religious life"- in which Durkheim considers 
ideas.values.categories as social products.Parsons considers this sig­
nals that the "social factor becomes a normative one" and that the 
only way Durkheim can avoid a full blown idealism is the 
"voluntaristic scheme of action" .which takes into account external 
conditions in addition to the systems of norms and values.The fact 
that Durkheim also tries to distinguish the social which "produces" 
these categories,values,norms,etc.from the categories themselves,is 
not given any attention.
Finally.Parsons considers Weber's concept of "traditional action" as 
indicating a close connection with the "normative aspect of action" 
and not as referring to action not describable through the means-end 
scheme.
74. ibid.,p.75
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the individual as formed within society.
In particular,the motivational sphere of the individual 
which was not discussed in "Structure" is analysed.An un­
differentiated system of needs that are formed into "need- 
dispositions" by the social environment is posited:
"The child's development of a "personality"(or an "ego 
structure") is to be viewed as the establishment of a rela­
tively specific,definite and consistent system of need dis­
positions operating as selective reactions to the alterna­
tives which are presented to him by his object 
situation.. . "75
These need-dispositions are,in the process of socialisa­
tion, organised around role-expectations which the alter 
confronts the developing ego with.76.The role-expectations 
are relative "to a particular interaction context,that is 
integrated with a particular set of value standards which 
govern interaction with one or more alters in the ap­
propriate complementary roles".77Constellations of "roles" 
or "role-expectations",constitute "social systems".
The Freudian concept of the unconscious is also incor­
porated into this theorisation.Initially the "ego" is seen 
by Parsons as structured through a cognitive reference sys­
t e m ^  common moral standards and expressive symbolism78,i.e 
as primarily cognitive and as separated from an "id" repre­
senting the biological organism.Later,though,the ego is 
seen as the "precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes"79
75. T.Parsons et al,"Some fundamental categories in the theory of 
action" in T.Parsons & E.Shills (eds).Towards a general theory of ac­
tion (1951).New York:Harper and Row,1962,p.18
76. ibid.,p.154
77. T .Parsons.The social system.London:Routhledge,1951,p .38
78. T.Parsons,"Superego and the theory of social systems"(1952),in 
T.Parsons.Social structure and personality. London:Macmillan,1964,p.32
79. T.Parsons,"Social structure and the development of personality" 
(1958),in ibid.,p.109
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and is recognised that "the categories of instinctual and 
learned components cut across the id,the ego and the 
superego"80.It remained,however,the case,that these 
"instinctual and learned components" were directly and 
unproblematically knowable through their normative/ideal 
expressions.
In conjunction with the theory of role-expectations,this 
theorisation of the unconscious succeeds in incorporating 
the motivational sphere within the context of the so­
cial, without implying any alteration in Parsons's fundamen­
tal thesis in "Structure": that social systems can be con­
ceived as coextensive with a system of concepts/ideal ele­
ments which fully describe them and which are amenable to 
objective knowledge.
We can consider Parsons's theorisation at this stage as 
representing the first phase of his theoretical trajec­
tory. It represents an account of the social seen as 
reducible to and producible by systems of norms.Parsons 
provides a ("micro") theorisation of action that can satis­
factorily take account of both the structurality and the 
opaqueness of the social.
This theorisation does not imply any transhistorically 
constant elements or any human "essence".Thus Parsons can­
not be subjected to the criticisms addressed to Marx or 
Weber.However,the theorisation remains an objectivistic 
one.Implicit in the conception of the social as fully 
describable through -scientific- knowledge is the assump­
tion of one transhistorical space:that of the rational 
human mind,expressions of which are both the social itself 
-as a system of norms- and rational knowledge.Thus the so­
cial may not be an expression of an essence,but it springs 
from a transhistorically present human mind.
In Parsons this rationalism is openly accepted and is not 
contradicting any other assumptions (unlike,for
80. ibid.,p.110
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ex.,Althusser).Yet it indicates his close links with the 
idealist tradition and it is open to a criticism from a 
hermeneutic standpoint.The more central criticisms Parsons 
is open to,though,are of a different nature:
Parsons considers the motivational level as fully deter­
minable along role-expectations,as also the cognitive 
level.The individual is thus seen as fully determined by 
the social and as a harmonious "construction" with no in­
ternal conflict between the different roles involved (for 
Parsons there are only two alternatives:the "normal" in­
dividual or the "deviant" one).Thus any "voluntarism" that 
the earlier exposition in "Structure" may have en­
tailed, disappears .Any activeness and independence from the 
part of the actor dissolves into an all determinant 
"social" system.
While for Parsons this passivity of the individual may not 
necessarily be seen as a problem,the second one is:Once 
fully closed "systems of norms" are assumed,no possibility 
to account for history,that is for change of these sys­
tems, exists.Since the individual is also incorporated 
within them,any change cannot come from the actors.But 
since these systems are fully closed,no internal reason for 
change exists.In "Social system" Parsons remarks that his 
theorisation cannot as yet account for change,but that fu­
ture developments could allow that.The fact is that no 
theorisation of change is possible within the parameters of 
his scheme.81
Perhaps as a response to the impossibility to account for 
history within this scheme (but also possibly for other 
reasons),an important shift in Parsons's theoretical work 
occurs.Instead of simply exploring the nature of "systems 
of action",Parsons wants,in this new phase,to present fixed
81. These problems we are going to encounter again and discuss at
greater length in the analysis of Althusser that follows.The points
made there are valid for Parsons as well.
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patterns of systemic structuring and development.In his 
books and articles this phase runs parallel with the incor­
poration of the individual within the earlier scheme.In 
fact/however,it marks a new phase,analytically distinct 
from the first,and as such it is presented here.
In "Social System" these fixed patterns appear as the 
positing of "foci of crystallisation for social structure" 
and a classification of institutions into rela­
tional , regulative and cultural depending on their respec­
tive "function" is presented.
Later,this classification is expanded into the AGIL scheme 
which includes four phases "in the relationship of any sys­
tem of action to its situation"82.The phases are Adapta­
tion,Goal attainment,Integration,Latent pattern main­
tenance.The scheme is initially derived from empirical ob­
servations in interaction contexts and Parsons considers 
that it reflects four fundamental functions of action sys­
tems in general.
The scheme is applied to the formation of personality and 
its subsystems83 and replaces the older classification of 
social institutions.In later papers its four functional 
lines are taken to define also the direction of any socie­
tal development and indeed the development of any action 
system:"Action systems,like other living systems,tend to 
differentiate along functional lines"84.
Finally the AGIL scheme is seen as also describing the 
relation of action systems to psycho-chemical and biologi­
cal systems85.
82. Parsons et al..Working Papers in the theory of action.New 
York:Free Press,1953,p.182
83. T.Parsons,R.Bales et al..Family.Socialisation and interaction 
process. London:Routledge,1956,p.172ff
84. T.Parsons,"Some problems of general theory in Sociology" (1970),in 
Social systems and the evolution of action theory.New York:Free 
Press,1977,p.238
85. for example in T.Parsons,"A paradigm of the human condition",in
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Thus Parsons substitutes a functional systemic theory in­
cluding an evolutionary claim,for his earlier theory.The 
scheme covers the main lines of development of systems as 
well as the actual classification of subsystems in any 
given system.
Parsons tried to justify the AGIL scheme in a two-fold 
way:firstly by connecting it to his earlier action scheme 
and considering as deducible out of a fixed number of 
dichotomous choices any process of action involves,either 
in the development of personality,or in social action.These 
choices were limited to five,the famous "pattern 
variables".
However,despite many classification efforts by himself and 
associates,Parsons has not been able to actually establish 
either that the pattern variables cover the entire field of 
orientation of human action or that the AGIL system can be 
indeed deduced by them.86
The second way Parsons supported the introduction of the 
AGIL scheme was a functional argument:the scheme was 
presented as covering the fundamental functions any system 
of action must perform in order to be self-sustainable.This 
assertion marks Parsons's "structural-functional" ap­
proach. (Initially the approach is introduced,for the social 
system,in a modest way as the "need for a motivational in­
tegration of individuals to society"87and no explicit sys­
temic needs are posed.As the scope of the AGIL scheme is 
expanded,however,the four functions it covers come to be 
considered as self-evidently and unquestionably central and 
determinant in any kind of system).
However,in order to sustain a functional argument of this
Action theory and the Human condition.New York:Free Press,1978,p.382
86. for an extended argumentation see S.Savage.The theories of 
T.Parsons. London:Macmillan,1981,p.162 ff.
87. T.Parsons,The social system,op.cit.,p.30
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kind,the borders of the "system" under question with its 
environment towards which the functions of the system are 
addressed,have to be clearly drawn.
In the case of the social system,which is Parsons's 
central concern,neither the borders of the system nor the 
environment towards which its functions are performed,is 
ever clearly defined.What instead happens is that modern 
society is taken as the model of both these necessary func­
tions and their differentiation,projecting into the past an 
incomplete image of the present and into the future a mul­
tiplied image of the present.The AGIL system can be sup­
ported by a structural-functional argument only by accept­
ing that the present form of the social transhistorically 
defines the limits and functions of any social "system".
A similar case can be made for Parsons's account of 
character formation in terms of the AGIL scheme.
The AGIL system cannot therefore be justified by any of 
the two arguments Parsons advances.In fact,what the scheme 
does,is to pose a number of categories as central and 
determinant in an a-priori and axiomatic way.This kind of 
functionalism or systems theory88 is only a more modern and 
sophisticated version of idealism's attempt to ground the 
social (and the individual) to a hidden essence manifested 
and developing in history.The AGIL scheme is no less 
metaphysical than Weber's categories or Marx's economism 
(or,of course,Hegel's universal spirit).As for the 
generality Parsons attributes to the scheme in his late 
writings,is indeed very reminiscent of the axiomatic 
generality Spencer attributed to his own scheme of evolu­
88. Other functionalist arguments such as Merton's and other,open 
variants of systems theory such as Buckley's or Luhmann's are not 
subject to such a criticism.(R.Merton,"Manifest and Latent 
functions"(1948) in Social theory and social structure.Glencoe 
Illinois:Social Press,1963 W.Buckley.Sociology and modern systems 
theory (1967). New Jersey:Prentice Hall/ N.Luhmann,"The differentia­
tion of society"(1977) in The differentiation of society.New 
York:Columbia University Press,1982)
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tion (it is ironic to remember that Parsons begins his 
"Structure" with the question:"Who reads Spencer today"?). 
Thus Parson's second phase marks a regression to an as­
sumption of given categories determining both the struc­
tural make-up and the direction of development of the so­
cial.This phase is not incompatible with the earlier 
one,although it is not deducible from it.But if we consider 
this phase as an attempt by Parsons to account for his­
tory, something his earlier scheme alone was incapable 
of,the attempt is revealing:
It indicates that within a rationalistic objectivism only 
by the assumption of transhistorically constant categories 
can history be taken account of.
French Structuralism 
Paradoxically, an approach that has many common elements 
with Parson's first phase can be found in 50's and 60's 
French structuralism and particularly in the work of Al­
thusser.
It was the work of linguists,however, particularly of 
Saussure, that brought into attention a significantly novel 
notion of "structure". Saussure's "Course", recognised as 
the landmark of the movement, distinguishes language 
("langue") from speech ("langage",parole) and makes the 
first its object: language is conceived as a structure,
i.e. as "a system of interdependent terms in which the 
value of each term results solely from the simultaneous 
presence of the other terms"89 .
This system of terms that is language could be objectively 
attained and studied in contrast to speech which is "many- 
sided and heterogeneous" and of which the "unity cannot be 
discovered".
89. F.de Saussure.Course in General linguistics.London:Fontana 1974,
p.114
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C .Levi-Strauss
In parallel to such a view of language as a distinct and 
knowable system behind the multifacity of speech, a notion 
of the social in general as similarly reducible, in prin­
ciple, to such systems was developed.
It was C. Levi-Strauss who inaugurates this type of ap­
proach. As he recognises, he takes more from Troubetzkoy 
than from Saussure, seeking to establish relations between 
terms leading to the discovery of general and unconscious 
laws that guide social phenomena90.
Levi-Strauss claims a general applicability of the ap­
proach and introduces it by a study of elementary struc­
tures of kinship. Kinship is seen as a definable social 
construction, in no way reducible to biology.The different 
types of kinship, however, are reducible to the combination 
of three "elementary structures" which as such "are always 
present to the human mind, at least in an unconscious 
form"91.
The multiplicity of kinship structures is intelligible 
through the different combinations (the structuralist 
"combinatory") of these constant,invariable,elementary 
structures. Science's role is precisely to discover these 
"elementary structures" as well as the "laws of 
combination"92.
The structures arising out of these combinations are by no 
means a product of the individual actor who is himself "a 
translation, on the plane of individual psyche, of a 
properly sociological structure"93.Moreover, these struc-
90. C.Levi-Strauss,"Structural analysis in Linguistics and 
Anthropology" (1945) in Structural Anthropology I (thereafter SA), 
London: Penguin,1968,p.33
91. C.Levi-Strauss.The elementary structures of kinship (1949).Boston: 
Beacon Press,1969,p.464
92. SA,p.40
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tures are, like language, "built by the mind on the level 
of unconscious thought"94.
They can,however,be objectively known since,like the laws 
of language,"the observer cannot modify the phenomenon 
merely by becoming conscious of it"95, due to the capacity 
of the subject, even when studying itself,to "indefinitely 
objectify itself"96.
Levi-Strauss does not provide any other analysis of a so­
cial structure similar to that of kinship.In later works he 
turns his attention to the modality of the "savage mind",to 
an analysis of myths,etc.,and he partly regresses from the 
most extreme formulation of this early (roughly up to the 
1950's) period.
Yet,these early formulations are substantial enough to 
delineate a specific approach (that could termed 
"structuralist" in a strict sense):
This approach emphasises the structure over the in­
dividual, the unconscious over the conscious,the social over 
the "natural", while retaining the assertion of a pos­
sibility of full objective knowledge of these struc­
tures, through a knowledge of their constituent,invariant
"elementary structures".
We have here a variation of the rationalism of 
Marx,Weber,Parsons.We don't have a single essence 
(Marx),nor a given set of categories (Weber) nor a univer­
sal scheme (Parsons' second phase),but invariable 
"elementary structures" accessible to human knowledge.
93. C.Levi-Strauss,"Introduction to the work of M.Mauss" in M.Mauss, 
Sociologie et anthropologie. Paris:Presses Universitaires de 
France,1950,p .xvi
94. SA,p.34
95. C.Levi-Strauss,"Language and the analysis of Social Laws" 
(1951),in SA,p.57
96. "Introduction",op.cit.,p.xxix
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As with all these approaches,the invariant elements are 
not and cannot be properly deduced from empirical 
material,despite Levi-Strauss' assertions.9^The "elementary 
structures" can be superimposed to such a material,for bet­
ter or worse,but they are not empirical generalisa­
tions. They are a-priori categories which order the material 
in same way as Marx's labour,Weber's economic, politi­
cal, etc. categories, or Parson's AGIL scheme.
Moreover,their knowledge is possible precisely because 
they have the modality of human mind,that of concepts,ideas 
and thought.98
The existence of a "combinatory" is possible only though 
the assumption of a transcendental subject,the "unconscious 
human mind" in which the different combinatories can 
operate and which is their linking element.99
What Levi-Strauss' structuralism presents,within such a 
rationalist/objectivist account,is a different way of con­
ceptualising history,different,that is,from the
evolutionist or teleological ones previous theorists of­
fered. History appears as the play of the indefinite pos­
sibilities of combination of the invariable "elementary 
structures".Invariable elements and transhistorical 
categories are not seen as necessary lines of differentia­
tion but rather as the stuff of innumerable 
combinations:there is no necessary teleology, no implied
97. See the important criticism of E.Leach in chapter six of his Levi- 
Strauss .London: Fontana. 1970
98. Levi-Strauss recognises that "the term social structure has noth­
ing to do with empirical reality,but with models which are built up 
after it" ("Social Structure" (1952) in SA,p.279), but he does not 
consider that there is any residue between these "models" and the 
modality of the (social) empirical reality that would deny any ab­
solute identity.
99. Ricoeur has characterised the Levi-Straussian project as 
"Kantianism without the transcendental subject"(P.Ricoeur,"Structure 
and Hermeneutics"(1963) in The conflict of interpretations.Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press,1974). Yet this subject does exist,only 
it is not any more an individual,but a social one (the "human group")".
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evolutionism in the structuralist scheme. A linear view of 
history is replaced by a combinatorial view of history.
Thus Levi-Strauss1s structuralism represents the other 
possibility to an evolutionism within an objectivist con­
text.He himself admits it:science,he writes,"can be either 
reductionist or structuralist"100.
However,the fundamental assumption remains the 
same:history is predetermined,if only in potentiality.All 
the possibilities of history are already enclosed in the 
"elementary structures" of the -unconscious- human
mind.(And these elementary elements are ultimately acces­
sible to human knowledge).We may escape from a teleological 
view of history but not from determinism.
Once again,this kind of approach has to be rejected both 
for its implied theoretical presuppositions and necessary 
determinism but also,from another angle,for its inability 
to take account of empirical material in a non reductionist 
way.
L.Althusser
The initial definition of structure by Saussure,stressed 
its differential character,i.e. the inability to define its 
elements outside itself.Levi-Strauss's notion of 
"elementary structures" clearly violated this principle in­
troducing transhistorical constants that could be defined 
outside and independently of any particular structure.
To reject any such transhistoricity was the stated purpose 
of L.Althusser.
Althusser positions himself against the Hegelian totality 
which is also a structure,but a structure with a centre 
that transcends the structure itself,that provides an 
"original essence" which "will produce the whole complexity 
of the process later in its autodevelopment,but without 
ever getting lost in its complexity itself,without ever
100. C .Levi-Strauss,Myth and meaning,London:Rout1edge,1978,p .9
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losing in it either its simplicity or its unity -since the
plurality and the complexity will never be more than its
own "phenomenon", entrusted with the manifestation of its 
own essence"1°1.
Althusser wants to deny precisely any such "original 
essence" governing the unity and development of (social) 
structures.The negation of any such essence is also the
negation of a homogeneous and contemporaneous historical 
time,time as the continuum in which "the dialectical con­
tinuity of the process of the development of the Idea is 
manifest102... a homogeneity Levi-Strauss1s use of
synchrony and diachrony in fact replicates103".
Instead of this unitary time,it is in fact a variety of 
times that we observe in history (as historians like 
Braudel have showed). And this variety of times refers to a 
variety of structures,structures which are not reducible to 
an "essence" beyond them, but which would "give its meaning 
to any simple category within them".Each "structure" is a 
structured unity not referring outside of it­
self , differentially defining all its elements,and exhibit­
ing its own internal time.It is this notion of structure 
Althusser wants to establish as the basic theoretical con­
cept for the social.
For Althusser this structured unity is the product of 
"theoretical practice" (of "true" science) and not the dis­
covery of the "real part of the real object"104 or of the 
"essential" as opposed to the "inessential" that the em­
piricist problematic poses.
101. L.Althusser,"On the Materialist Dialectic" (1963) (thereafter 
MD),in For Marx.Harmondsworth:Penguin.1969.p.198
102. L.Althusser,"The object of Capital" (1968) in L.Althusser & 
E.Balibar, Reading Capital.London:New Left Books,1970,p.94 (thereafter 
RC)
103. RC,p.96
104. L.Althusser,"From Capital to Marx's philosophy",in RC,p.38
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A "theoretical practice" combines "the type of object (raw 
material) on which it labours,the theoretical means of 
production available (its theory,its method and its tech­
nique, experimental or otherwise) and the historical rela­
tions (theoretical, ideological and social) in which it 
produces"105.
However, once this theoretical practice involves a break 
with its raw material (mainly,in the case of social 
knowledge,ideology) and a rigorous (rational) procedure,it 
seems that for Althusser it can adequately describe the 
"real".Thus he embraces an objectivism incarnated in "true" 
science versus the fallacies of "ideological 
constructions".
Althusser and Marx
Althusser presents all the above as an interpretation of 
Marx. For him it is Marx that proposes,avant la lettre,the 
differential notion of structure: Marx does not simply in­
vert the Hegelian dialectic while retaining its principle, 
"deriving successive moments not from the Idea,but from the 
Economy"106 , but departs radically from this dialectic.
Althusser distinguishes between the young and the mature 
Marx,considering that it is the in the later phase in which 
Marx actually dissociates himself from Hegel.In his 
"mature" works, and especially in "Capital", Marx im­
plicitly analyses precisely the kind of structure Althusser 
explicitly develops. The "capitalist and every mode of 
production" can be seen as such a structure, incorporating 
production and the economy as well as the
superstructure.107
105. RC,p.41
106. L.Althusser,"Contradiction and overdetermination" (1962) in "For 
Marx",op.cit.,p.108
107. This is the broad sense of the term "mode of production" used by 
Althusser in "Reading Capital".Balibar and Althusser in other writings 
use instead the term "social formation" retaining the term "mode" for 
production itself.
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Althusser wants also to retain,alongside his definition of 
structure and his radical anti-historicism,the determinant 
role Marx assigns to the economy and particularly to 
production,as well as the transhistorical constancy of this 
determinancy.However,this task proves an impossible one:
(l)To support the argument that the economy remains deter­
minant in historically distinct structural wholes -modes of 
production- which are differentially defined,the concept of 
the economic is considered by Althusser as not having the 
"qualities of a given and as having to be constructed for 
each mode of production"losi.e. as being the specific 
"structured whole which gives its meaning to the simple 
category (of the economy)".109Thus the economy can remain 
determinant, even if it is "determinant in that it deter­
mines which of the instances of the social structure oc­
cupies the determinant place"110.
But how can a "category" or "instance" be considered as 
always determinant if each time has to be constructed anew 
for every structural whole? The very assertion of transhis­
torical determinancy requires certain constant and invari­
able elements (for ex a necessary function,man as homo 
laborans,certain categories,etc.) that would support this 
always existing determinancy? If the category of the 
economic has indeed to be constructed for every structural 
whole, then no a-priori determinancy can be assumed.
It is evident that no transhistorically constant 
categories or assertions can be assumed simultaneously with 
a rejection of any transhistorically homogeneous essence or 
time.Once Levi-Strauss1s combinatory and any Hegelian type 
of essence is rejected,a transhistorical determinancy of 
the economy cannot be sustained.Althusser1s formulations
108. RC,p.183
109. MD,p.196
110. E.Balibar "The basic concepts of historical materialism" in 
RC,p.224
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are simply an attempt for a verbal reconciliation between 
these contradictory elements,a reconciliation that does not 
stand up to close scrutiny.
Correspondingly,no general theory of production (of modes 
of production in the limited sense) can exist without a 
prior assumption of certain transhistorically invariable 
elements. Balibar's attempt to do so (in "Reading Capital") 
leads him back to a version of the structuralist com­
binatory of constant elements.111
(2)The same cul-de-sac is reached regarding a possible 
determinant instance within a given structured whole.In or­
der to retain such a determinancy,Althusser introduces a 
number of terms: structure in dominance,principal con­
tradiction, overdetermination.
The "principal contradiction" (that "of the forces of 
production and the relations of production,essentially em­
bodied in the contradiction between two antagonistic 
classes") is,within a concrete structured whole (a "mode of 
production"),"overdetermined in its principle by the 
various other levels and instances of the social formation 
it animates"112,producing thus a structure in dominance. 
Thus the economy is determinant "only in the last instance" 
while the "superstructure and other circumstances retain a 
specific effectivity"113.
Althusser here wants again to reconcile two irreconcilable 
assertions: that of the "specific effectivity" of the su­
perstructure's well as that of the determinancy of the 
economy. It is once more obvious,however,that either the
111. In a less strict reading, these elements can be taken to be each 
time determined by their specific relation, and hence as not invari­
able. But if so,Balibar can provide no theory at all since no specific 
meaning can be assigned to these elements outside the capitalist mode 
of production.(In this respect see A.Glucksmann,"A ventriloquist 
structuralism" (1967).New Left Review.72.1972).
112. "Contradiction and overdetermination",p.101
113. ibid.,p.113
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economy defines a whole which includes the 
"superstructure",in which case the determinancy is assumed 
and the "relative autonomy" is meaningless,or that the two 
are distinct structures,relatively autonomous to each 
other.To assume that both a determinancy and a "relative 
autonomy" simultaneously exist,is logically unacceptable114
As we noted in Chapter one,Althusser1s reading of 
"Capital" is also problematic:the "determination of either 
an element or a structure by a structure"115,encountered in 
Marx's "Capital" in the form of the determinant role the 
notion of "surplus value" has,is seen by Althusser as 
reflecting not an essentialism but a "structural 
causality",in which the structure determines its elements 
because "its whole existence consists of its effects"116.
Althusser considers that classical economics are based on 
"a homogeneous space of given phenomena and an ideological 
anthropology which bases the economic character of the 
phenomena and its space on man as the subject of needs -the 
giveness of homo oeconomicous"117.
Marx rejects both the homogeneous space and the 
philosophical anthropology supporting it.But how can this 
rejection be reconciled with the essence-like notion of 
"surplus-value" which cannot be measured or "seen"? For Al­
thusser it is because "the fact that surplus value is not a 
measurable reality arises from the fact that it is not a 
thing,but the concept of a relationship,the concept of an 
existing social structure of production,of an existence 
visible and measurable only in its effects"118.
114. See E.Laclau and C.Mouffe,"Post Marxism without apologies".New 
Left Review. 166,p.93
115. RC,p.188
116. RC,p.189
117. RC,p.162
118. RC,p.180
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However,the fact is that surplus-value,in Marx's own ex­
position, can only be defined if there exists 
"homogeneous,simple,abstract labour" which in turn is pos­
sible only in simple commodity production with no tech­
nological change,and if there is a given "necessary labour" 
for the workers to survive on119.These conditions cannot be 
satisfied within Marx's own description of the capitalist 
mode of production and can only be sustained if human 
labour is assumed as a transhistorical human essence.
Therefore to consider that "surplus-value" corresponds to 
"structural causality" cannot make this underlying essen- 
tialism disappear.
Within a strict structural scheme in which structures are 
differentially defined and not reducible to a homogeneous 
"outside",none of the notions Althusser proposes in his 
reading of Marx's work -overdetermination,determination in 
the last instance,structural causality- are necessary.Their 
need arises only if the structural scheme is to be made 
compatible with a theorisation that denies it,as Marx's no­
tion of determinancy of production and economy does.
Even so,these notions cannot really reconcile the two 
theorisations.Althusser's attempt to retain the deter­
minancy of the economy both within a social whole including 
other elements and as transhistorically existing,in other 
words his appropriation of Marx,can be seen as a failure in 
terms of his own declared objectives.
Althusser's "structure"
However,Althusser's own project,that of distinct 
"structures",differentially defined,not subject to an over­
all homogeneity and directly accessible to 
knowledge,remains a possible,alternative,approach,which 
retains some common elements with Marx's work.
Critics of Althusser have indicated this pos­
sibility .Hindess and Hirst,in particular,rejected any
119. see the previous chapter on Marx.
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general theory of modes of production which "can be 
realised only by reproducing the essential structures of 
the idealist philosophies of history"120.They proceeded 
further to consider "social formations" as differentially 
definable structures,not as "totalities governed by an or­
ganising principle",but as a "definite set of relations of 
production together with the economic,political and cul­
tural forms in which their condition of existence are 
secured".121
They have been in turn criticised that they still retain 
the "relations of production" along with the other "forms" 
as identifiable in general,irrespective of their specific 
structural whole122.However,any such general definition of 
"forms" can be rejected and the theorisation being 
presented as referring to differentially defined structures 
only.
If so,Althusser1s intention of a non essentialist 
theorisation seems to be realised.A theoretical possibility 
explicitly rejecting transhistorical invariables such as a 
human essence or a homogeneous historical time arises.
Such a possibility is not entirely without precedent:it 
bears a certain resemblance to Parsons's first phase.By 
employing,however,(Saussure's) notion of structure as a 
differential one,this theorisation marks a specific advance 
over Parsons1s .Instead of systems of norms,roles,and role- 
expectations,systems comprising of elements that could ex­
ist independently of the system,the elements of a 
"structure" do not have any meaning outside the specific 
differential relation within the structure.Hence an anti-
120. B.Hindess & P.Hirst.Pre-capitalist modes of production.London: 
Routledge,1975,p.7
121. A.Cutler,B.Hindess,P.Hirst.A.Hussain.Marx1 s______ Capital_______and
capitalism today V.I.London:Routledge.1977.p.222
122. E.Laclau & C.Mouffe.Hegemony and socialist strategy.London:
Verso,1985,pp.101-104
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historicism,which is possible in Parson's scheme,becomes 
now necessary.
However,if Althusser's objectivism is retained,the two
theorisations share a common belief in the possibility of
an ultimate full and objective "knowledge" of the social, 
regarding
As we argued /^Parsons,the only way such an objectivism 
can be grounded is by assuming a transhistorical 
constant:in Althusser's theorisation what is implied is a 
rational kernel in human mind,always there,but obscured by 
"ideological" constructions.This rational kernel is acces­
sible to a scientific "theoretical practice" but not to 
ideology.Thus a transhistorical invariant still remains:it 
is human rationality manifested in "objective social 
structures" and accessible as such through "science".
Althusser in his late work123 denounces the science- 
ideology distinction as "theoreticism" and considers his 
project as still "objectively true" but as representing the 
-historically specific- position of the proletariat.In 
doing so,however,he faces a dilemma:
Either to see this position (and hence the corresponding 
theory) as historically privileged and correspondingly the 
theory as "true".But if so an evolutionary scheme of his­
tory into which such a privileged position can be grounded 
has to be again accepted.
Or to see it as one possible position of a specific class 
in a specific social conjuncture.But if so,a radical 
relativity denying any ultimate objectivity is intro­
duced, thus subverting any "objectivism".
Althusser's objectivism therefore necessarily negates his 
anti-historicism either directly (by returning to an evolu­
tionary view of history) or indirectly (by necessarily as­
suming a transhistorical terrain,a terrain on which
123. cf."Lenin and philosophy" (1968),"Lenin before Hegel" (1969),in 
Lenin and Philosophy.London:New Left Books,1977 / ’Elements 
d'autocritique" (1974) in Essays in self-criticism.London:Nev Left 
Books,1976
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"structures" are deployed and of which "science" is also a 
manifestation).
In addition to this contradiction,and perhaps more impor­
tantly, Althusser faces the two problems we encountered in 
Parson's first scheme:the impossibility to conceptualise 
change and active agency.
(i) Once a multiplicity of self-enclosed "structures" is 
assumed,no principle or indeed possibility of change can be 
seen to exist.
Since any homogeneity of historical time is denied along 
with any transhistorical "essence" and the subject -the 
individual- is also seen as the "product" of the struc­
ture, there is no "outside" which could force a change.At 
the same time,the Saussurian notion of structure as a dif­
ferential entity is by definition a static,a synchronic one 
(to which diachrony is opposed).But since no outside 
"space" for the effects of diachrony exists any more,the 
structure can only be seen as necessarily being in equi­
librium, reproducing itself and its elements.
The alternative would have been for change to be already 
implicit in the structure,not as an actuality but as poten­
tiality, e.g in the existence of internal contradictions.If 
so,however,a transhistorical constant would have to be as­
sumed, in the form of the unfolding of the kernel of initial 
potentialities already contained in that kernel in the mo­
ment of the beginning (as in Levi-Strauss1 "elementary 
structures").
The dilemma -the assumption of an invariable "outside" and 
the possibility of a theory of history,of change,of transi­
tion from one structure to another versus the rejection of 
any such "outside"- is inescapable.Althusser recognises the 
problem but wishes it away124 while Balibar invokes neces­
sary "transition periods","modes of transition",etc., 
without however being able to justify their necessity and
124. RC,pp.196-198
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their coming about in respect to the "mode" itself.In 
fact,in a strict differential definition of structures,it 
is impossible to account for history at all.125
(ii)The second problem concerns the autonomy of social 
actor(s).
Unlike Marx or Levi-Strauss,Althusser recognises a field 
specific to the "construction" of individuals:it is that of 
ideology which operates an imaginary "interpellation" of 
the subject.In this one area -that of a theory of ideology- 
Althusser sees himself not merely as interpreting Marx but 
as advancing on him.
Ideology is seen as necessary,since it is the "lived rela­
tion between man and their world",a relation that does not 
operate on the field of consciousness but it is "imaginary" 
and "it appears as conscious on the condition that it is 
unconsc i ous"12 6 .
The actual function of ideology is to constitute,to 
"interpellate","concrete individuals as subjects:127... the 
existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of 
individuals as subjects are one and the same thing"128.
Moreover (i) ideology exists "materially".i.e embedded in 
apparatuses and practices,not as abstract ideas cognised by 
the subject and (ii) it necessarily involves a misrecogni- 
tion (meconnaissance) "in the very form of recognition"129 
it produces.
125. The similar problem Parsons faced in his first phase perhaps 
promted him to invoke the generality of the AGIL system.With Althusser 
it is the inverse:Having rejected the Marxian model of the "Preface” 
he is left with no theoretical means to account for transitional 
periods or change.
126. FM,p.233
127. L.Althusser,"Ideology and ideological state apparatuses"(1970),in 
"Lenin and philosophy",op.cit.,p.160
128. ibid.,p.163
129. ibid.,p.170
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Although,therefore,for Althusser the agent is nothing more 
than a support (trager) of the structure,it is not simply 
as a reflection of the structure that the individual is 
constituted as a subject.lt is the imaginary field of 
ideology,embedded on material practices,that forms the link 
between the "structure" and the individual.The 
"construction" of the individual involves a specific field 
-of ideology- with a specific modality -of the imaginary- 
and a specific function -recognition/misrecognition.
However,despite this specificity Althusser attributes to 
the field of ideology,he ultimately reduces it to the un­
derlying structure:ideology remains the main mechanism for 
the reproduction of the structure (the "mode of 
production") and thus its specificity is determined by this 
structure.
The "subject",therefore,remains a passive one,denied any 
activeness vis-a-vis the "structure".This conceptualisation 
of the subject,presented as it is within a theory claiming 
to be leading to political action (Marxism) was definitely 
problematic and fiercely attacked130.Asserting simul­
taneously a (full) structural determination of the subject 
and the possibility of political action is obviously impos­
sible.
If a certain autonomy/activeness of the subject could be 
asserted alongside the assertion of a structural determina­
tion of the subject,a possible way out of the dilemma might 
exist.But the definition of the structure as a fully closed 
and determined entity implies a full determination of the 
subject as well.
Indeed such a definition of structure does not even allow 
the possibility of theorising a determination of the sub­
ject by different structures,independent of one another.If
130. see for example L.Goldmann, "Structuralisme,Marxisme, 
Existentialisme".Praxis.8/66 or E.P.Thompson,"The poverty of theory"
in The poverty of theory and other essays.London:Merlin Press,1978
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social structures are seen as fully closed entities then
they can coexist only if they are compatible with and rein­
force each other within a totality.Thus the subject has 
also to be seen as unitary and as been subjected,if not to 
one determinant structural whole,at least to a series of 
determinations compatible with and reinforcing each other.
It is not only,therefore,the question of historical change 
but also the question of the possibility of active agency 
that is closely linked with the modality attributed to so­
cial structures,as fully determinable and closed entities.
Thus attempts to provide a theorisation of historical 
change through "class struggle" while the modality is still 
considered the same131 are self-contradictory.If classes 
are fully determined the outcome of class struggle is also 
determined.On the other hand,for classes to be not fully 
determined and hence for class struggle to be significant,a 
different conception of "structure" is required.
The limits of rationalism 
Althusser's work can be considered as the most advanced
and sophisticated version of an objectivism and
rationalism132 that,having abandoned attempts to provide 
transhistorical constants for the social,retained however
131. For example Balibar in a later text argues that it is class 
struggle commands the reproduction of tendencies within a ’’mode of 
production".Hence,it is through class struggle that a non­
reproduct ion, hence a transformation,can come about.(E.Balibar,"Sur la 
dialectique historique" in Cinq etudes du materialisme his- 
torique,Paris:Francois Maspero,1974,p.245)
A similar thesis is advanced by Hindess and Hirst: "We must insist 
that transition (and non-transition) can only be understood in terms 
of certain determinate conditions of the class struggle and as a pos­
sible outcome of that struggle."Transitional conjuncture" refers to a 
condition of the social formation such that the transformation of the 
dominant mode of production is a possible outcome of the class 
struggle."("Pre capitalist modes of production",op.cit.,p.278)
132. Along,it has to be added,with the early Parsons who provides in 
addition a "micro" theory of action much more developed than 
Althusser's comments on ideology and subjectivity.
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the assumption of a fundamental identity between the social 
and the rational human mind.
For Althusser this attempt marks an impossibility:the 
desire of conceiving the social as a rational order,as 
fully determined,fully knowable structural wholes,while at 
the same time asserting the negation of any homogeneous 
"outside" (time,essence) upon which these wholes could be 
engraved and from which they could be determined.
The main problems this rationalism faces are the impos­
sibility to conceptualise history and the impossibility to 
account for any form of active agency from the part of the 
individual.Both are closely related to the modality of so­
cial structures assumed.
A solution to the question of history may be the readop­
tion of transhistorical constants,a way that Parsons fol­
lows in his later work,or Levi-Strauss1s earlier work indi­
cates. But this would be a regression to a much more 
problematic position,the problems of which we have noted.
In all probability,therefore,these problems indicate the 
limits of a rationalist,objectivist account of the so­
cial. The way forward,then,would be the rejection of the 
central assumption that supports such theorisations,that of 
the social being definable as fully determined and closed 
entities (and hence,also,as ultimately rational).133
133. Althusser does provide a tentative step in this direc­
tion,although it is not presented as such,in his theorisation of 
ideology.
In this theorisation,an "imaginary" field existing "materially",that 
is embedded in social practice,and "constructing" individuals as sub­
jects, is introduced.Althusser does not elaborate on the modality of 
this field,which he borrows from psychoanalysis,and he reduces it to 
an epiphenomenon in which men live their "real" conditions of exist­
ence. In so far as Althusser comments on psychoanalysis, the latter is 
seen as having a a specific object,the unconscious,that 
is,however,subjected to the "law of the symbolic",the "Symbolic 
order",i.e a fully and objectively definable order.(for example in 
"Freud and Lacan"(1969) in "Lenin and Philosophy",op.cit.).
If,however,the postulation of the "real" behind the field in which 
men live their conditions of existence is seen -as it is- as 
metaphysical and is rejected,i.e if a rationalism of this kind is 
rejected,then this "imaginary" field itself comes to the
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6.THE POSING OF A "PROBLEMATIC*UE"
From the above it is evident that attempts to provide 
answers to the questions the modern notion of the social 
has opened up' have been diverse in direction and rich in 
insight.However,none of them offers a fully satisfactory 
account of the social,either from an epistemological or 
from an ontological point of view.
Individualism,in bo t h  its positivistic and hermeneutic 
forms, failed to produce what it sought :a
theoretical account of how the social can be seen as 
"produced" out of the action or interaction of self­
enclosed, autonomous individuals definable prior to and out­
side this "social".
As for holistic approaches,they fared no better in 
general:having to assert the specificity and sui-generis 
nature of the social they had to base this assertion either 
on a methodological/epistemological basis or on a theorisa­
tion of the specificity of the "modality" of the social.
Positivism,an epistemology that could,through the estab­
lishment of causal inferences and invariable laws,allow a 
methodologically secure basis for the theorisation of the 
social without immediate concern for its actual 
modality,manifestly failed due to the "openness11 of the so­
cial field that does not appear as amenable to any "laws" 
or even "regularities".
Another possible contender,idealism or  rationalism that 
tried to impose one or more transhistorically constant or­
ganising categories to the social field and that claimed 
hence an ultimate assimilability of this field to the ra­
tional human mind,fared no better.The a-priori nature of 
these categories was questionable and their success in or-
foreground.Could it be that it is itself the "real"? And if so,could 
this assumption allow us to overcome the problem of conceptualisation 
of history and of active agency? Althusser of course does not pursue 
the matter that far.But to his credit,he does open the way.
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ganising the accumulated historicoempirical material 
limited.134
The main alternative was a structural objectivism con­
tinuing to assert the possibility of a full,objective and 
final "knowledge" of the social,without proposing any tran­
shistorical categories but through the reduction of the so­
cial to fully definable structural entities.Yet this ap­
proach suffered from two major drawbacks:the inability to 
conceptualise change and the inability to take into account 
some form of active agency from the part of social 
agent(s),both closely connected with the way "social 
structure" was conceptualised.
Thus,after this summary theoretical overview,we are still 
faced with similar questions to the ones we posed after our 
reading of Marx.Starting from the objectivist theories we 
referred to as the most promising -though not,of 
course,satisfactory as they stand- we can enquire:
How can we offer an alternative to objectivism,avoiding 
its epistemological and concrete problems it faces if a 
return to individualism,positivism or evolutionism is ruled 
out?
134. One has to be careful when dismissing specific approaches to the 
study of the social.Not only they explore possible alternative direc­
tions of theorisation,but they may be fruitful in particular cases 
even though they have to be rejected as general approaches.
For example,as we noted earlier there do exist "micro" social 
phenomena in which the individuals appear as consciously manipulating 
rules,norms or patterns of behaviour in order to achieve aims related 
to a social setting.Many everyday contexts,including micro-economic 
behaviour in capitalist societies,exhibit this character.
To analyse these phenomena certain micro approaches are perfectly 
suitable,however inadequate they may be for the study of "micro" 
phenomena in general or of the social at large.
In the present analysis,however,we are interested in "this social at 
large" which,in the context of this study,is defined by the opaqueness 
it exhibits towards its participating individuals (and correspondingly 
its non intentional character),as well as its internally structured 
form.These assumptions,marking the modern notion of the 
"social",remain the corner-stones delimiting the semantic borders of 
the field.And it is for this field that a theoretical foundation is 
sought.
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More specifically,how can we account for the social in a 
way that supports its sui generis nature and yet can allow 
also a conceptualisation of history as a field of change 
and of the individual as "something" more than a "bearer" 
of this social?
Our inquiry,therefore,focuses upon three central and in­
terrelated questions:the question of conceptualising the 
social in such a manner that (the question of) active in­
dividual agency and (the question of) historical change can 
be also adequately addressed.135
Of course,the opening lines of an alternative answer to 
these questions have been repeatedly written.Marx1s rejec­
tion of both idealism and individualism,Durkheim's late 
scheme in "Religion" and Pareto's "residues",Dilthey1s
135. While the question on the modality of the social and that of his­
tory can be seen as emerging in an almost contemporaneous fashion and 
relatively recently,,the question about the limits of autonomous 
(individual but also collective) action,the question of morality and 
of politics in the broadest sense,long predates the modern notion of 
the social.
It goes back -at least- to the problematic on the limits of "free 
will" from the Stoics to Christianity as well as to the question of 
politics the Enlightenment produced.
The notion of the social,with its necessary opaqueness,seemed at first 
as reducing the limits of autonomous action as it introduced a sphere 
of ’’social" phenomena apparently outside the control of man and even 
determining him.In this sense,the real prehistory of the modern notion 
of the social lies in the theorisation of all these elements within 
’’man** that were seen to escape his knowledge and will and to determine 
him.
Individualistic approaches within social theory sought to reinstate a 
sovereign individual by seeing the social as produced by individual 
action.However,as we saw,these approaches in general proved unsatis­
factory.
Thus we were left with the other type of approaches,those of a struc­
tural or holistic orientation.Within these theories autonomous social 
action seemed at best very limited,at worst impossible.
To overcome the problem,the possibility of completely ignoring the so­
cial and returning to an Enlightenment view of the individual 
remains,of course,open.So called "political theory".especially in its 
Anglo-Saxon variants have usually followed this way.
However,it is obvious that the social as a range of phenomena cannot 
de simply ignored.If a satisfactory account of agency is to be 
produced,it has to start from a theorisation of the social.In a 
sense,it has to be internal to a theory of the social.
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Husserl's and Mead's treatment of meaning,Althusser's 
"imaginary",all indicate,alongside or even in contradiction 
to these authors' dominant themes,another possibility of 
conceptualising the social,namely as embodying meaning and 
yet as distinct from ideas,categories or norms -as also 
from nature.
Possibly such a direction of theorisation,if sufficiently 
developed,can allow also the theorisation of the emergence 
of the new in history and of a certain autonomy/activeness 
of social actor(s).
To further explore such an alternative is the aim of what 
follows.136
136. It will be noted that an important figure in modern social theory 
is not explicitly discussed.We refer to J.Habermas whose work,of an 
amazing breadth,is of an undeniable importance to social theory. 
However,within the context of the analysis that follows,the discussion 
of Habermas' work is not,strictly speaking,necessary.This is so 
because: (i) As far as Habermas' actual social theory is concerned
-as expanded in "The theory of communicative action"- it does not of­
fer anything new.On the contrary,it very precariously tries to balance 
an action theory with a systems theory without addressing the problems 
each of the two approaches faces.
(ii) Habermas' main interest and focus is not so much in this theory 
of the social (which also appears relatively late in his work) as on a 
theorisation of rationality and of modernity.Without a detailed 
reference to both these subjects,any discussion of Habermas is bound 
to be deficient.However,neither the question of rationality nor that 
of modernity are directly addressed in the present study.Our concern 
is more with an underlying theorisation of the social that does have a 
connection to these questions but a connection that can not be made 
explicit without further expansion and amplification.Thus Habermas' 
theorisations exceed the limits of the present work.
122
PART II; STRUCTURATION.OPENNESS
AND THE MODALITY OF THE SOCIAL
(A). FROM "STRUCTURE" TO "STRUCTURATION"
Structural accounts of the social tended to neglect the 
theorisation of the individual,except to affirm his/her 
determined role in respect to the different structural 
wholes (apart from the early Parsons,this is evident in all 
such approaches discussed above).
However,it was obvious that any kind of social "structure" 
could only exist through the individual(s).How was,then,this 
"through" to be conceptualised?
It was in linguistic theory that the question was ini­
tially and most seriously posed just as it was from lin­
guistics that the notion of "structure" was borrowed in a 
structuralist context.
Chomsky's work can be considered as marking the turn from 
structure to "rules" governing its emergence and reproduc­
tion, in other words the transition from a theorisation of 
the structure to a theory of "structuration".In respect to 
structuralist linguistics Chomsky had remarked:
"The real richness of phonological systems lies not in the 
structural patterns of phonemes but rather in the intricate 
system of rules by which these patterns are formed,modified 
and elaborated.The structural patterns that arise at 
various stages of derivation are a kind of 
epiphenomenon...It is the properties of the systems of 
rules,it seems to me,that really shed light on the specific 
nature of the organisation of language"1 
Chomsky provided such sets of rules in his 
"transformational" grammar,rules that he considered given
1. N.Chomsky.Language and Mind.New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1972,p.75
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in an innate and predetermined way.
The question,however,of the transition from structure to 
the modalities of its existence and reproduction,was to be 
posed in the more general context of social theory.Already 
in 1967 Ricoeur,noting the shift Chomsky's direction of 
theorisation entailed for linguistics,had remarked:
"The philosophical interest of this new phase of linguis­
tic theory is evident:a new relation,of a nonantinomic 
character,is in process of being instituted between struc­
ture and event,between rule and invention,between con­
straint and choice,thanks to dynamic concepts of the type 
structuring operation and no longer structured inventory.
I hope that anthropology and the other human sciences will 
know how to draw the consequences of this,as they are doing 
now with the original structuralism at the moment when its 
decline is beginning in linguistics".2
The very manner the question was posed indicated an al­
legiance to structural as opposed to individualist accounts 
and yet an attempt to provide a bridge between these two 
poles -the "structure" and the "individual"- that struc­
tural theories lacked.
It is in the writings of A.Giddens and P.Bourdieu,two 
theorisations that can justifiably be considered to belong 
to this type of approach,that we will turn to evaluate such 
"structuration" theories.
2. P.Ricoeur,"Structure,word,event" (1967) in The conflict of inter­
pretations .Evans ton: Northwestern University Press,1974,p.91
(III). A .GIDDENS1S THEORY OF STRUCTURATION
A.Giddens terms his theorisation a theory of 
"structuration".1 Within it he wants to provide mechanisms 
of production and reproduction of the structure within the 
individual: "Structures have at every moment to be sus­
tained and reproduced in the flow of social encounters"2 .
Giddens aims,through his structuration theory,to overcome 
the inability of structural approaches such as Parson's and 
Althusser's to present an account of active agency.He 
states: "A de-centering of the subject must at the same 
time recover that subject,as a reasoning,acting being".3
At the same time he wants to avoid a lapse to 
subjectivism:
"In working out the theory of structuration I attempt to 
meet several desiderata:First,the demand for a " theory of 
the subject" ...(which) involves a defined break with 
positivistic standpoints in philosophy,and with the Car­
tesian cogito...Second,the demand that a theory of the sub­
ject which avoids objectivism should not slide into 
subjectivism."4
1. Giddens's "theory of structuration" appears in 1976 in his "New 
rules of sociological method" to be further developed in "Central 
problems of social theory" in 1978 and finally in the "Constitution of 
society" in 1984.More recent books ("Modernity and self- 
identity" , 1991 , "The transformations of intimacy",1992) built upon this 
theory to provide a theorisation of modernity.In our analysis we will 
focus mainly on the "Central problems" and on the "Constitution".
It must be noted that the theory of structuration represents part 
only of an extensive work,from theoretical critiques to substantive 
studies on capitalism and the nation-state.
2. A.Giddens.Central Problems in Social Theory. London:Macmillan,1979, 
p.86.Thereafter CPST.
3. A.Giddens.Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory.London:Macmillan. 
1982,p.8.Thereafter PCST.
4. ibid.
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To this end Giddens proposes a series of definitions for 
the structural side of the social,as well as a theorisation 
of the individual.He considers that these formulations al­
low a "duality of structure" to "transcend the dualism of 
individual and society or subject and object"5.
The "duality of structure" refers to structure as being 
"both the medium and the outcome of the conduct it recur­
sively organises:the structural properties of social sys­
tems do not exist outside action but are chronically impli­
cated in its production and reproduction"6.
To evaluate whether Giddens1 actual theorisation supports 
his aims and claims,we focus on the central concepts of 
Giddens1 theory:his definition of structure and his theory 
of the subject.
THE DEFINITION OF STRUCTURE
Giddens defines structure as "rules and
resources,recursively implicated in the reproduction of so­
cial systems.Structure exists only as memory traces,the or­
ganic basis of human knowledgeability,and as instantiated 
in action."7Rules are seen as "techniques or generilisable 
procedures applied in the enactment /reproduction of social 
practices".8Rules do not have to be formulated:"Formulated 
rules,those that are given verbal expression as canons of 
law,bureaucratic rules,rules of games and so on,are 
codified interpretations of rules rather than rules as 
such".9
While in the definition of structure rules are accompanied
5. CPST,p.5
6. A.Giddens.The constitution of society.Cambridge:Polity Press,1984, 
p.374.Thereafter CS.
7. CS,p.377
8. CS,p.21
9. ibid.
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by resources it is the concept of rules that primarily 
describes structure for Giddens.The concept of resources is 
introduced to emphasise the enabling aspects of struc­
ture. Giddens further elaborates the concept by introducing 
"allocative resources" referring to "forms of transforma­
tive capacity generating command over objects,goods,or 
material phenomena" and "authoritative resources" referring 
to "types of transformative capacity generating command 
over persons or actors"10,a distinction he uses for his 
discussion of power.
However resources only operate within systems of rules and 
not independently of them.Giddens emphasises this point:
"Resources might seem to exist in a temporal-spatial sense 
in a way in which rules do not.But I want to say that the 
material existents involved in resources (a) are the con­
tent, or the "vehicles" of resources in a parallel manner to 
the "substance" of codes and norms and (b) as instantiated 
in power relations in social systems,only operate in con­
junction with codes and norms."11
Therefore resources have to be conceptualised in a manner 
similar to rules and/or seen as operating within a system 
of rules.Consequently,in what follows we will mainly refer 
to rules as the defining element of the concept of struc­
ture.
In addition to "structures",Giddens introduces also the 
notion of (social) system,defined as "the patterning of so­
cial relations across time-space,understood as reproduced 
practices.Social systems should be regarded as widely vari­
able in terms of the degree of "systemness" they 
display".12
At an intermediate level,between "structure" and
10. CS,p.33
11. CS,p.104
12. CS,p.377
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"system",Giddens considers "structures" in the plural to 
indicate the more enduring sets of structures:"rule- 
resource sets,implicated in the institutional articulation 
of social systems".13Correlatively,institutions are sub 
divisions of social systems created by structural sets.
The concept of rules
The concept of rules,a master concept for Giddens,being an 
ambiguous one14,we may inquire about the precise meaning it 
has within Giddens1 theorisation.
Giddens,in his discussion of different examples of 
rules,15considers that "the most germane of all (the 
examples) as a way of conceptualising "rule" is the ex­
ample of a mathematical formula like a(n)=nexp2+(n-l).The 
example is pertinent for Giddens not because of its mathe­
matical character,but because "to understand the formula is 
not to utter it.For someone could utter it and not under­
stand the series;alternatively,it is possible to understand 
the series without being able to give verbal expression to 
the formula"16.The formula,therefore,is for Giddens an ex­
ample of a "generalisable procedure" and he considers that 
linguistic rules are also like this.
This example reveals what Giddens has in mind when he 
refers to rule as techniques and generalisable 
procedures:while a rule can be understood without being 
formulated,it remains,as a rule,perfectly definable and 
determinable.The fact that the actor can perhaps "use" the 
series 1,5,11,19,29,... without knowing the formula behind
13. CS,p.377
14. see for example the criticism on the concept of "rules" by 
J.Thompson in Studies in the theory of ideology.Cambridge:Polity 
press,1984,p.156 ff.In the next chapter we shall refer to Bourdieu's 
criticisms of the notion.
15. CS,p.17-25
16. CS,p.20
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them does not change the fact that such a formula does 
exist and can be clearly formulated.
Thus a rule can be formally formulated and described in­
dependently of the particular context to which it applies.
THE THEORISATION OF THE ACTOR
Giddens*s conceptualisation of rules is not independent of 
his theory of the actor,the two being complementary.Giddens 
distinguishes three levels in the actor:17
* discursive consciousness
* practical consciousness
* the "basic security system" (unconscious motivation) 
These three levels are intended to replace the traditional
psychoanalytic triad of ego,super-ego and id,and his model 
is described by Giddens as a stratification model. 
Discursive consciousness corresponds to "awareness which 
has a discursive form"18 while practical consciousness con­
sists of "all the things actors know tacitly how to go on 
in the contexts of social life without being able to give 
them discursive expression"19.No bar or repression protects 
practical consciousness,unlike the unconscious.20
The two levels of consciousness refer to the "cognitive" 
side of the actor.It is the "basic security system" that 
corresponds to the motivational level.
The "basic security system"
The moving force within this "system" is the estab­
lishment and preservation of "ontological security".This 
latter,a term Giddens borrows from R.Laing,corresponds to 
"confidence and trust that the natural and social worlds
17. CS,p.7 & p.40
18. CS,p.374
19. CS,p.xxiii
20. CS,p.5
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are as they appear to be"21.
Giddens does not deny that this "ontological security" 
refers to a "social" setting,i.e. that the constitution of 
the subject is effected,in a spatial sense,within society 
:"...the generation of feelings of trust in others as the 
deepest lying element of the basic security system,depends 
substantially upon predictable and caring routines estab­
lished by parental figures".22
But he argues that its establishment corresponds mainly to 
biological,and hence trans-social needs:
"I think it is important to affirm...(that)...the early 
period of the development of the child involves the forma­
tion of what Gardiner calls a basic security 
system:capacities of tension management in relation to or­
ganic wants,that form the first and most all-encompassing 
accommodations the child makes to the social and material 
worlds.1123
This "basic security system" developed early in 
life,includes the "basic existential parameters of the self 
and social identity"24,while it develops as "basic anxiety 
controlling mechanisms hierarchically ordered as components 
of personality".25
The basic security system is unconscious and,uni ike prac­
tical consciousness,it is separated by bars and repressions 
from the conscious level discursive consciousness repre­
sents .
The quest for ontological security and the basic security 
system,operating on a deep unconscious level,provide the
21. CS,p.375
22. CS,p.50
23. CPST,p.122
24. ibid.
25. CS,p.50
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\general motivation for the monitoring of action that is 
performed by practical and discursive consciousness.
It is obvious that the "basic security system" is
presented by Giddens as a mainly biological mechanism of 
homoeostatic adjustment.lt indicates a central core of sub­
jectivity that is independent of any "social" influence.
Giddens1 appropriation of psychoanalysis is indicative in 
this respect.lt is to the justification of his view of a 
socially independent and "given" level of subjectivity that 
Giddens uses ego-psychology,Freud and psychoanalysis in 
general.For example,Giddens accepts Lacan's "mirror stage" 
which provides a biologically determined model of primary 
subjectivity,while discarding the other elements of Lacan's 
theory:"I want to claim only that in respect of interpret­
ing the emergence of subjectivity,Lacan's Freud can be 
drawn upon with profit.26M.Gane's remark seems justified: 
"Giddens is attracted to elements of the analysis of Freud 
and Lacan only in so far as something can be taken in or­
der to justify the primacy of the subject and the primacy 
for the subject of his "ontological security".27
Practical and discursive consciousness 
If the "basic security system" is primarily non-social,the 
levels of discursive and practical consciousness correspond 
to the internalisation of the "social" by the individual.
For Giddens "memory" is the common origin of the two 
levels of consciousness:
"If memory refers to this temporal mastery so inherent in 
human experience,then discursive and practical conscious­
ness refer to psychological mechanisms of recall,as 
utilised in contexts of action.Discursive consciousness 
connotes those forms of recall which the actor is able to
26. CPST,p.121,emphasis added
27. M.Gane,"Giddens and the crisis of social theory".Economy and 
Society.V.12.N.3 (1983),p.379
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express verbally.Practical consciousness involves recall to 
which the agent has access in the duree of action without 
being able to express what he or she thereby knows.1128
What is the nature of the common origin of both forms of 
consciousness,of the "memory traces"? They are formed by 
perceptual residues,perception being understood as "a set 
of temporal ordering devices".In respect to the social what 
is perceived are the structural "rules".
As what* 3Jfhe rules perceived? We saw that despite the 
definition of rules as "techniques and procedures" it is a 
formal and abstract model that Giddens has in mind for the 
social "rules".Consequently for Giddens the rules can only 
be perceived as formal and abstract entities of an ideal 
nature which subsequently become memory traces.
Giddens makes no distinction between perception cor­
responding to practical consciousness and perception cor­
responding to discursive consciousness.lt is the mechanisms 
of recall that differentiate the two levels of conscious­
ness.
Consequently,a change of mode of recall,i.e. a transition 
from practical to discursive consciousness does not imply 
any change in the context (the "rules") recalled.Between 
the practical and the discursive level exists only a 
threshold of (higher) awareness.By becoming "discursive" 
the rules do not "change".Hence practical consciousness is 
only a less complete,an impoverished variant of the dis­
cursive consciousness.
Thus the notion of practical consciousness does not intro­
duce a level of theorisation of the actor that has its own 
specificity or modality,different from that of discursive 
consciousness.Practical consciousness is simply an 
"incomplete" discursive one.
For the notion of practical consciousness to really in­
troduce a new level of theorisation of the actor,a new
28. CS,p.49
132
modality of operation of this "consciousness",distinct from 
the one discursive consciousness refers to,would have to be 
presented.In other words, a level of "practical" knowledge 
of rules would be significant only if to know "practically" 
means something different than to know "discursively".
This in turn would require a different modality of the 
"rules" which are practically and not discursively used and 
reproduced.The "rules" of practical consciousness would 
have to exist in consciousness differently than the "rules" 
of discursive consciousness.
The transition between the two would then involve a 
"translation" or an "interpretation".Giddens in fact recog­
nises this when he writes:"The discursive formulation of a 
rule is already an interpretation of it."29Yet his defini­
tions of the two levels of consciousness and of memory do 
not allow any disjuncture between the two levels that would 
justify such an "interpretation".
Thus Giddens' theorisation of the actor introduces 
primarily two -rather than three- levels:
a biologically determined "basic security system" in 
the mechanisms of which the social has no influence or 
relevance
and - a level of primarily cognitive "memory traces" ex­
pressible either in practical or discursive conscious­
ness, the difference between the two being one of degree 
rather than one of modality.The structural "rules" can be 
inscribed as such memory traces and be expressed in either 
mode of consciousness.
Structure and the autonomy of the actor 
Giddens1 theorisation of the actor poses the question of 
the relationship between this actor and the structure,as 
"rules" internalised in memory traces and recallable in 
either "discursive" or "practical" consciousness.Do these
29. CS,p.23
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rules form part of the make up of the actor,an inseparable 
element of the "self"? Or are they external to the in­
dividual , being manipulated at will by a subject definable 
independently of them?
Since the rules exist as "memory traces",they are in a 
sense internal to the actor.However,the central core of 
subjectivity lies beyond these rules,in the "basic security 
system",which as we saw develops independently of the so­
cial. The "deep" unconscious,as well as all motivation 
processes lie within this basic security system.Thus Gid­
dens retains,in a modified form,one of the basic postulates 
of traditional individualism: a unitary,primary subject ir­
reducible to any "social" determinations.30
However,since the structural "rules" do exist within the 
individual,the possibility remains that his/her behaviour 
is indeed determined -to a significant extent- by these 
rules.The actor can be,in other words,relatively less 
autonomous from the structure than individualist theories 
assert.
The theorisation of the actor as presented above does not 
allow us to judge the extent of this autonomy.Giddens him­
self , however, provides a direct and unambiguous answer on 
this matter.The actors are both "knowledgeable" about these 
rules and "capable" of using them in an active way:
The "knowledgeability" is defined as "everything the ac­
tors know (believe) about the circumstances of their action 
and that of others... including tacit as well as discur­
sively available knowledge"31.The practical knowledge that
30. Giddens is not entirely consistent at this point.For example in a 
later work he does consider ’’ontological anxiety" as produced by lack 
of supporting (social) frames of reference.Yet,a few pages further,he 
refers to this anxiety as the expression of a purely subjec­
tive, irreducible, "existential" feeling in the manner of Heidegger or 
Sartre.(A.Giddens.Modernity and self-identitv.Cambridge:Politv Press, 
1991,Chapter two)
31. CS,p.90
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operates along the discursive one consists of "knowing the 
rules and the tactics whereby daily social life is con­
stituted and reconstituted across time and space"32 
How extensive is this "knowledgeability"? Giddens admits 
that "social actors can be wrong some of the time about 
what these rules and tactics might be",but he stresses that 
"if there is any continuity to social life at all,most ac­
tors must be right most of the time"33.
Moreover,this "knowledgeability" is supported by the 
"capability" of actors "of doing otherwise,generally exer­
cised as a routine,tacit feature of everyday behaviour".34 
It is this "capability" that "marks the conceptual boundary 
of action".35Giddens insists that the actor's possibility 
to have acted otherwise exists even when "constrains so 
narrow the range of (feasible) alternatives that only one 
option or type of option is open to the actor"36 
Therefore the actors not only "know" the rules,they are 
capable of either following them or ignoring them at 
will,of using them,that is,in an non restrained,active 
way.3 7
Hence the fact that "rules" are internalised as memory 
traces does not make them less external to the primal core
32. ibid.
33. ibid.
34. PCST,p.9
35. CS,p.69
36. CS,p.309
37. This has been remarked by many commentators of Giddens.
For example,J.Thompson:"Giddens manages to preserve the complemen­
tarity between structure and agency only by defining agency in such a 
way that any individual in any situation could not not be an 
agent."(Thompson,op.cit,p.169)
and M.Archer:"The systematic underplaying of constrains artificially 
inflates the degrees of freedom for action" (M.Arc^IerV^Morfogenesis 
vs. Structuration".British Journal of Sociology.V.33.N.4 (1982),p.464)
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of subjectivity of the individual actor.Giddens,in his 
desire to stress the autonomy and activeness of the in­
dividual, in fact reproduces almost intact the traditional 
individualistic account of the actor.
A THEORY OF STRUCTURATION? A CRITIQUE.
Giddens superimposes to a theory of social structure as 
"rules",a theory of the actor in which,for all important 
purposes,the individual is independent of the social and 
can use these rules at will.
Giddens can thus with justification claim that he provides 
a theorisation of the subject as a "reasoning,acting 
being".He does so,however,by abandoning basic premises of 
structural approaches and by swinging too far into the as­
sumptions of individualistic ones.
Thus he is open to the criticisms individualistic theories 
have faced:
First,can we indeed sustain that the social does not enter 
in the very constitution of the individual psyche in both a 
cognitive and a motivational way? Can we consider in­
dividuals as not influenced in a profound and permanent way 
from their social surroundings?
Second and more important,given the possibility of in­
dividuals always to "have acted otherwise",how can we ac­
count for the structurality and the relative permanence of 
the social? The question,the traditional "problem of order" 
is one that Giddens cannot avoid.
Giddens1 theorisation represents in fact a regression to 
Enlightenment conceptions of man and society,conceptions 
that do not take into account the two fundamental defining 
elements of the modern conception of the social,its struc­
tural ity and opaqueness.While Giddens can take into account 
a partial opaqueness with his notion of practical con­
sciousness, he cannot do the same with the structural nature 
of the social.His attempt to go beyond the problems of 
structural approaches goes so far on the other side that
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Giddens faces the same questions as Hobbes.33
Of course Giddens is too much of a sociologist to fully 
accept the implications of his theorisation of the ac­
tor. When he refers to society he does present certain "axes 
of structuration" through which he can produce constant 
categories of social structures and institutions (in a man­
ner reminiscent of Weber).
These "axes of structuration" are considered to be sig­
nification, domination and legitimation.Through "modalities" 
of structuration upon which actors draw in the reproduction 
of systems of interaction,these basic structures appear on 
the level of interaction as communication,power and sanc­
tion as in the following figure:39
structure signification —  domination —  legitima­
tion
I I I
(modality) interpretive facility norm
scheme | I
I I I
interaction communication ----  power   sanction
These three axes can be combined in different ways to 
produce the actual institutions of a society:40 
S-D-L Symbolic orders/modes of discourse
D(auth)-S-L Political institutions
38. We saw that properly "sociological" individualistic accounts such 
as Mill’s do not consider the individual as "independent" of the so­
cial.Mill simply refers to given "laws" of character formation 
which,however,operate within a social environment.
Indicatively also,Parsons,who in his "Structure" presents a theorisa­
tion similar to Giddens' with "norms" instead of "rules",tried 
specifically to avoid a relapse to individualism by asserting that the 
actors necessarily have to use the social norms in order to act.
39. CS,p.29
40. CS,p.33
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D(alloc)-S-L Economic institutions
L-D-S Legal institutions
Thus Giddens presents a theorisation of constant types of 
structures and institutions at a social level.But are these 
"axes" a structural/societal property,pertaining to struc­
ture or is it a necessary result of certain types of inter­
action (communication,power,sanction) ? In what sens^/%hese 
"axes" always present?
Giddens does not provide any direct answers.lt is evi­
dent , though, that the reference to axes of structuration and 
to institutions is not connected to his theorisation of the 
actor.The former are simply introduced to provide some 
"structural" account of the social in an otherwise in­
dividualistic theorisation.
Similarly,in his more concrete studies -as his study of 
the nation-state41- Giddens uses neither these "axes of 
structuration" nor his theory of the actor.Structural 
wholes (the nation-state,capitalism,etc.) are treated in a 
conventional way,as sui generis entities not necessarily 
traceable to actors.Indeed Giddens asserts that an 
"institutional analysis",placing "in suspension the skills 
and awareness of actors,treating institutions as chroni­
cally reproduced rules and resources"42 is possible!
Of course the lack of connection between the two levels of 
analysis cannot simply be wished away through the introduc­
tion of new terms.Giddens' uneasiness on the matter is in­
dicative, however,of the impossibility of deriving a 
plausible theorisation of the social from an account of the 
actor such as his.
We can justifiably assert,therefore,that,the kind of 
"theory of structuration" Giddens provides,despite his
41. A.Giddens.The nation-state and violence.Cambridge:Polity Press, 
1985
42. CS,p.375
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claims,does not advance over structural theories nor does 
it provide a bridge between "action" and
"structure","subject" and the "social",etc.It can take ac­
count of the subject as "reasoning and active" only by 
neglecting any deep,enduring determination from the part of 
the "structure".
In Giddens' theorisation the structure's reproduction 
rests entirely at the whim of the individual actor,an actor 
presented as independent of this structure.Far from intro­
ducing any "duality",Giddens' theory mirrors the tradi­
tional dualism of subject and structure.43
RULES,OBJECTIVITY AND DOUBLE HERMENEUTICS
Though the weight of Giddens' theory rests on his 
theorisation of the actor and structure,an examination of 
his epistemological approach in relation to his definition 
of structure is also instructive.
Giddens considers that the epistemological approach proper 
to the human sciences is what he calls "double 
hermeneutics".
He remarks that hermeneutics have tended to equate 
positivism with natural sciences.Newer developments in the 
philosophy of science,however,"have made it plain that 
(natural) science is as much about "interpreting" the world 
as about "explaining" it.44
Therefore Giddens does not consider hermeneutics as such
43. Giddens could have followed the other path open to him and have 
asserted that the internalised rules do limit the actors’ active­
ness. In other words to assert that,in most cases,the actor ’’could have 
not acted otherwise".
He would then of course have to indicate when,how and to what extent 
the actor is indeed active.But at least he would have retained a real 
structural determination of the actor and he would avoid the problem 
of order.(In fact he would be in the same position as Parsons after 
the "Structure".Parsons' subsequent theorisation could then be an in­
dication of a possible development of the theory as well of the 
problems it would face.)
44. PCST,p.12
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to be limited to the "human" sciences.To indicate the 
specific nature of the hermeneutics of these sciences Gid­
dens uses the concept of "double hermeneutic".Unlike the 
hermeneutics of natural science which "has to do only with 
the theories and discourse of scientists analysing an ob­
ject which does not answer back"45,"double hermeneutics" 
refer to "the intersection of two frames of meaning as a 
logically necessary part of social science,the meaningful 
social world as constituted by lay actors and the metalan­
guages invented by social scientists".46
There is a constant "slippage from one frame of meaning to 
another involved in the practice of the social sciences".47 
The logical tie between first and second order concepts 
"depends upon the social scientific observer accurately un­
derstanding the concepts whereby the actors' conduct is 
oriented"48."Second-order concepts can become "first-order" 
by being appropriated within social life itself".49
The main emphasis in the concept of double hermeneutic is 
therefore the rejection of the positivistic method as 
describing natural sciences in general.Otherwise the rela­
tion between metalanguages and first order concepts is for 
Giddens identical to that proposed by Schutz and other 
"phenomenologists" under the name of (simple) 
"hermeneutics".
Therefore the concept of "double hermeneutics" does not 
introduce anything new regarding the epistemological claims 
of the hermeneutic tradition.
In relation to these claims,we have remarked that the type
45. ibid.
46. CS,p.374
47. ibid.
48. PCST,p.13
49. CS,p.284
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of non subjectivist hermeneutics -like the late Schutz's- 
if they refer simply to systems of concepts and ideal ele­
ments guiding action,they do not indicate any real discon­
tinuity between these elements and their "scientific" 
knowledge.
Since these elements are coextensive with the concepts 
science uses,there is,in principle,no obstacle in their ul­
timate full and "objective" knowledge.Hence such approaches 
are not,except in name,different from "objectivist" ones.
Giddens adheres to such a structural her­
meneutics, rejecting "to represent verstehen as a 
"psychological phenomenon"50.However,in his theorisation we 
can distinguish,along the level of "discursive 
consciousness" which would correspond to Schutz's "first 
order concepts" (social science introducing "second order" 
ones),the level of "practical consciousness",a new pos­
sibility is introduced: If the level of "practical
consciousness" has a modality different from that of dis­
cursive consciousness and of science,a hermeneutic proce­
dure in the proper sense would have been required to have 
access to this level of "rule" knowledge.
However,although Giddens recognises that "the discursive 
formulation of a rule is already an interpretation of 
it",5:Lwe saw that his conceptualisation of practical and 
discursive consciousness recognises no "bar" between 
them.There is no real discontinuity between the two levels 
of consciousness,hence no necessity for any real 
"interpretation" between the two.
Giddens1 three levels are simply divisions along a con­
tinuum, at the one end of which is the concept of rules and 
at the other end of which is their "accurate" knowledge.The 
intermediate levels are then simply imperfect modes of cog­
50. POST,p.7
51. CS,p.23
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nition of the rules.
The introduction of the level of practical conscious­
ness, therefore, does not imply any real differentiation with 
the traditional structural hermeneutic approaches.Hence the 
same criticism applies:this type of hermeneutics cannot 
avoid falling into an ultimate objectivism.
This is further reinforced by the way Giddens uses the 
concept of "rules".We saw that the structural rules,for 
Giddens,can be always formally and discursively formu­
lated, irrespective of the specific content they refer 
to.Giddens in his very use of the notion of 
rules,therefore,anticipates a complete,formal and objective 
knowledge of them.
In fact Giddens explicitly recognises the possibility of 
such an objective knowledge:that "the sociologist has a 
field of study phenomena which are already constituted as 
meaningful"52,does not inhibit him/her from "accurately un­
derstanding the concepts whereby the actors1 conduct is 
oriented"53.An "accurate" understanding,hence,is both pos­
sible and desirable.54
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Giddens1 intentions and criticisms of structural and sub­
jectivist theories indicate a possible new path that would 
allow an escape of their impasses,as does the type of con­
cepts he proposes,like the "duality of structure" or 
"practical consciousness".
52. CS,p.284
53. PCST,p.13
54. Giddens’ ultimate alliance to an objectivism is also demonstrated 
in his discussion of structuralism and functionalism: Giddens focuses 
almost exclusively on the neglect of the active role of the subject by 
these approaches (see for example CPST,pp.9-49 and A.Giddens.Studies 
in Social and Political Theory.London:Hutchinson.1979.pp.96-129),while 
he does not indicate that he considers their epistemological position 
as problematic.
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However,Giddens,in his willingness to provide an account 
of the active role the individual actor plays,he simply 
regresses to a thinly veiled individualistic theory in 
which the actor is presented both as definable outside any 
structural/social influences and as capable of "always ac­
ting otherwise" than his structural position would im­
pose. As for the "practical consciousness" it is nothing more 
than an incomplete version of full,discursive conscious­
ness .
Thus the real question,namely the question of locating the 
level of the actor's "activeness" while accepting that this 
actor remains to a great extent socially constructed and 
constrained,is avoided.
The discussion of Giddens is useful both for the clarity 
with which he poses the aims of a theory of structuration 
and for the exhaustiveness of his theorisation which 
-unlike other authors- allows us to identify his actual as­
sumptions in a precise way.We have to indicate,however,that 
Giddens1 direction of theorisation does not offer a real 
alternative towards his aims.
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(IV). P.BOURDIEU'S THEORY OF PRACTICE
P.Bourdieu has a similar starting point to Giddens1.He 
wants to go beyond the reification and objectification of 
the social that structural approaches usually imply,without 
accepting subjectivist assumptions.1
What objectivistic approaches do,for Bourdieu,is to equate 
the model an observer constructs to theoretically represent 
the social with the social itself.They transpose,in other 
words,"the reality of the model for the model of the 
reality":
"The "knowing subject"... in taking up a point of view of 
the action,withdrawing from it in order to observe it from 
above and from a distance,he constitutes practical activity 
as an object of observation and analysis,a 
representation.1,2
This withdrawal from social practice,however,inhibits one 
fromseizingthe specific modality of practice,a modality that 
is different from that of an ideal model.The result is the 
reification of the social,a reification which treats 
"objects constructed by science,whether "culture", 
"structures" or "modes of production" as realities endowed 
with a social efficacy"3
1. Bourdieu's first statement of a "theory of practice" appears in 
1972 in the "Esquisse d'une theorie de pratique" and further expanded 
in the 1977 English edition as "Outline of a theory of practice".The 
final development appears in 1980 as "Le sens pratique",translated as 
"The logic of practice" (sometimes the translation used below from the 
"Sens" is slightly modified than the english edition's).
Bourdieu's work covers an extensive field of studies,from analyses of 
education to the state,art.culture,etc.Indeed it is for his more sub­
stantive studies that Bourdieu is most well known.
Although we shall occasionally refer to some of these empirical 
studies.it is on Bourdieu's theoretical statements.primarily the 
"Outline" and the "Logic" that we shall focus.
2. P.Bourdieu.Outline of a theory of practice.Cambridge;Cambridge 
University Press,1977,p.2.Thereafter OTP.
3. OTP,p.27
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On the other hand,subjectivist approaches are equally 
unsatisfactory:
"To describe the process of objectification and orchestra­
tion in the language of interaction and mutual adjustment 
is to forget that the interaction itself owes its form to 
the objective structures which have produced the disposi­
tions of the interacting agents and which allot them their 
relative positions in the interaction and elsewhere.Every 
confrontation between agents in fact brings together,in an 
interaction defined by the objective structure of the rela­
tion between the groups they belong to,systems of disposi­
tions carried by "natural persons"..."4
Therefore,writes Bourdieu,"our approach is radically op­
posed to the interactionism which reduces the constructions 
of social science to "constructs of the second degree" as 
Schutz does,or like Garfinkel,to accounts of the accounts 
which agents produce.The opposition to subjectivism stems 
from the same route as that to objectivism:"second order" 
concepts or "accounts of accounts" already transpose a mode 
of being of scientific accounts,of social science,to the 
"first order" concepts of the actors.It replaces a 
causal. link between hypostasized entities and prac­
tice's in objectivism,by the supposition that these en­
tities exist already within practice."5
To go beyond the "objective limits of objectivism" while 
avoiding the "imaginary anthropology of subjectivism",a 
theory of practice is required:
"We shall escape,writes Bourdieu,from the ritual either/or 
choice between objectivism and subjectivism...only if we 
are prepared to inquire into the mode of production and 
functioning of the practical mastery which makes possible 
both an objectively intelligible practice and also an ob­
4. OTP,p.81
5. OTP,p.21
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jectively enchanted experience of that practice."6
It is this "theory of practice" -that to a large extent 
seems to have similar aims than Giddens1 "structuration 
theory"- that we shall analyse.
THE NOTION OF "HABITUS" AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 
Central among the concepts Bourdieu introduces is the no­
tion of habitus which is proposed in order to account for 
the production of social agents by social structures:
"The structures constitutive of a particular type of en­
vironment (e.g the material conditions of existence charac­
teristic of a class condition) produce habitus,systems of 
durable,transposable dispositions,structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures,that is, 
as principles of the generation and structuring of prac­
tices and representations which can be objectively 
"regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the 
product of obedience to rules,objectively adapted to their 
goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them 
and,being all this,collectively orchestrated without being 
the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor".7
"...the habitus could be considered as a subjective but 
not individual system of internalised structures,schemes of 
perception,conception,and action common to all members of 
the same group or class and constituting the precondition 
for all objectification and apperception".8
The habitus is one of the primary "objectifications" of 
history:
"To the dualistic vision that recognises only the self­
transparent act of consciousness or the externally deter-
6. OTP,pp.3-4
7. OTP,p.72
8. OTP,p.86
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mined thing we have to oppose the real logic of ac­
tion,which brings together two objectifications of his­
tory, objectification in bodies and objectification in 
institutions9 ... an institution is complete and fully viable 
only if it is durably objectified not only in things,that 
is,in the logic,transcending individual agents,of a par­
ticular field,but also in the bodies,in durable disposi­
tions to recognise and comply with the demands immanent in 
the field.10"
Only if these "durable dispositions" of the habitus exist 
can the agents "inhabit institutions,appropriate them prac­
tically, and so keep them in activity,continuously pulling 
them from the state of dead letters".11
The habitus,as internalised dispositions and as a set of 
principles of structuration,is a central determinant in the 
context of practice."It produces practices which tend to 
reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective condi­
tions of the production of their generative principle11.12.
The homogeneity of a group,a class,a "society",can be ac­
counted for as the result of the structured character of 
these dispositions:"The objective homogenising of group or 
class habitus which results from the homogeneity of the 
conditions of existence,is what enables practices to be ob­
jectively harmonised without any intentional calculation or 
conscious reference to a norm and mutually adjusted in the 
absence of any direct interaction or,a fortiori,explicit 
co-ordination".13
9. P.Bourdieu.The logic of practice (1980).Cambridge:Polity Press, 
1990, p.57.Thereafter LP.
10. LP,p.58
11. LP,p.57
12. OTP,p.89
13. OTP,p.80
147
The production of habitus 
The "durable dispositions" that constitute a habitus are 
gradually acquired as the child grows up within a par­
ticular environment:
"The structures characteristic of a determinate type of 
conditions of existence,through the economic and social 
necessity which they bring to bear to the relatively 
autonomous universe of family relationships,or more 
precisely,through the mediation of the specifically 
familial manifestations of this external necessity (sexual 
division of labour,domestic morality,cares,strife,tastes, 
etc.) produce the structures of the habitus which become in 
turn the basis of perception and appreciation of all sub­
sequent experience14... the habitus acquired in the family 
underlies the structuring of school experiences (in par­
ticular the reception and assimilation of the specifically 
pedagogic message) and the habitus transformed by school­
ing, itself diversified,in turn underlies the structuring of 
all subsequent experiences,..and so on, from restructuring 
to restructuring".15
Earlier experiences structure to a degree the acquisition 
of later ones:
"Early experiences have particular weight because the 
habitus tends to ensure its own constancy and its defence 
against change trough the selection it makes within new in­
formation by rejecting information capable of calling into 
question its accumulated information,if exposed to it ac­
cidentally or by force,and especially by avoiding exposure 
to such information".16
A habitus is the product of the simultaneous effect of 
many "structures".Indeed the habitus is the "space" within
14. OTP,p.78
15. OTP,p.87
16. LP,p.61
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which different structures co-exist and articulate with 
each other."The unifying principle of practices in dif­
ferent domains which objectivist analysis would assign to 
separate "sub-systems" such as matrimonial
strategies, fertility strategies,is nothing other than the 
habitus,the locus of practical realisation of the
"articulation" of fields which objectivism lays out side by
side"17.
The modality of habitus
The habitus does not consist of a system of ideas that a
person "internalises",but rather of a series of identities 
the person acquires and "embodies".
For example,"the sexual identity is constructed at the
same time as the image of the division of work between the 
sexes"18.This identity is both perceived and expressed in 
an embodied form:"The opposition between male and female is 
realised in posture,in the gestures and movements of the 
body,in the form of the opposition between the straight and 
the bent,between firmness,uprightness and direct­
ness , and ... on the other side,restraint,reserve and 
flexibility".19
The habitus exists thus in an embodied form,as "a bodily 
hexis":
"Bodily hexis is political mythology realised,em­
bodied, turned into a permanent dispositions durable way of 
standing,speaking,walking,and,thereby of feeling and 
thinking"20...Every successfully socialised agent thus pos­
sesses, in their incorporated state,the instruments of an 
ordering of the world,a system of classifying schemes which
17. OTP,p.83
18. OTP,p.93
19. LP,p.70
20. ibid.
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organises all practices,and of which the linguistic schemes 
(to which the neo-Kantian tradition -and the eth- 
nomethodological school nowadays- attribute unjustified 
autonomy and importance) are only one aspect".21
It is this em-bodied modality of habitus that accounts for 
its "durability":
"The principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond 
the grasp of consciousness,and hence cannot be touched by 
voluntary,deliberate transformation,cannot even be made 
explicit;nothing seems more ineffable,more incom­
municable, more inimitable,and,therefore,more precious,than 
the values given body,made body by the transubstantiation 
achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit peda­
gogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology,an ethic,a 
metaphysic,a political philosophy through injunctions as 
insignificant as "stand up straight" or "don't hold your 
knife in your left hand".22
Thus the habitus is "not something that one has,as a 
knowledge that one can keep in front of him, but something 
that one is".23
Bourdieu provides also empirical illustrations of his no­
tion of habitus.For example in "Distinction"24 he analyses 
the class differences in "taste" as precisely an indication 
of the deep individual differences differential (class) 
positions entail.Individuals belonging to the different 
classes are not simply endowed with different quantities of 
capital or power; they are different in their most 
"personal","intimate" characteristics: their tastes,their
likes and dislikes,conceptions and beliefs.
21. OTP,p.123
22. OTP,p.94
23. LP,p.73
24. P.Bourdieu.Distinctions social critique of the judgement of taste 
(1979) ,London:Routledge,1984
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The crucial difference between Bourdieu on the one hand 
and Giddens and the whole of the individualist tradition of 
the other is now obvious:Bourdieu really accepts the con­
structed nature of the "person",the "subject",the "agent" 
and his/hers determination by the structure.Bourdieu 
stresses the durable,unconscious and embodied character of 
this construction as oppossed to "ideas" or "rules" the 
person internalises.In accounting for the mode of existence 
of these structural determinations within the in­
dividual , moreover, Bourdieu advances over purely structural 
positions as well.
Bourdieu's notion of habitus should be seen as closing the 
possibility of a retreat to subjectivist/individualistic 
positions as a response to the impasses of 
structural/objectivist ones.
However,the question may arise,does not the notion of 
habitus negate any activeness and autonomy from the part of 
the actor?
"STRATEGIES" INSTEAD OF "RULES": THE ACTIVE SIDE OF AGENCY 
The notion of rule presents,for Bourdieu,in its vague­
n e s s ^  convenient solution "to the contradictions and dif­
ficulties to which the researcher is condemned by an in­
adequate or -which amounts to the same thing- an implicit 
"theory of practice".25
However,the concept becomes "the obstacle par excellence 
to the construction of an adequate theory of practice:by 
falsely occupying the place of two fundamental notions,the 
theoretical matrix and the practical matrix,it makes it im­
possible to raise the question of their relationship".26
For Bourdieu the notion of rule within structural ap­
proaches conceals the active role of the agent on the level
25. OTP,p.22
26. LP,p.103
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of practice:
"It is necessary,to abandon all theories which explicitly 
or implicitly treat practice as a mechanical reac­
tion, directly determined by the antecedent conditions and 
entirely reducible to the mechanical functioning of pre- 
established assemblies,"models" or "roles" which we 
would,moreover,have to postulate in infinite number".2'7
For Bourdieu,the actor in the context of practice does not 
follow rules but s/he actually invents directions of action 
which are in no way reducible to a set of rules.Practice 
has always a temporal dimension within which the activeness 
of the actors is manifested and which cannot be captured in 
the "spatial" representations of objectivist approaches.
As an example,Bourdieu cites Mauss1 theory of the gift as 
exchange,a theory taken up by Levi-Strauss.Bourdieu ob­
serves that if the relations of exchange are simply mapped 
in a spatial sense as in Levi-Strauss,what escapes the 
analysis is the (temporal) specificity of the time of the
counter gift alongside the content of it.The timing of the
counter gift is as important as its content.The gift ex­
change cannot be simply represented as a mathematical 
structure of exchange.What has to be incorporated in it is 
the notion of time and of the possible variations that may 
appear,which are not reducible to a formal underlying 
model.
But the timing rests entirely with the actor.It is the ac­
tor that has to decide the time of the exchange (as well as
its content).The temporal dimension,therefore,a dimension 
not taken into account by formal structural models is an 
indication of the active role the subject has to play for 
any "rules" to actually operate in practice.
Another example for Bourdieu is his analysis of the way 
kinship rules are used by the Kabyles in Algeria.The 
genealogical rules (of parallel-cousin marriage) do not
27. OTP,p.73
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operate neither as judicial rules nor as norms.These 
"rules" are simply elements within a complex strategy the 
actors use,for example to enhance their position within the 
group.In fact these rules cannot be approached in any 
"objective" way.They are presented in different ways by 
different actors.Depending on the point a genealogical 
lineage is taken to begin and on which relations are taken 
into account,as oppossed to those that are omitted,the per­
missible or not marriages can vary.The information obtained 
is always tied with the view the informant wants to present 
about a marriage:
"Informants constantly remind us by their very in­
coherences and contradictions that marriage can never be 
fully defined in genealogical terms,and that it make take 
on different,even opposite meanings and functions,according 
to its determining conditions".28
Genealogical rules are never fixed rules but rather ele­
ments in an overall strategy,a term Bourdieu considers that 
can take into account the active role of the actor:
"To substitute strategy for the rule is to reintroduce 
time,with its rhythm, its orientation, its
irreversibility. "2S*
Bourdieu affirms,consequently,both a social construction 
of the person -through the "structured dispositions" of the 
habitus and a certain activeness from the part of this per­
son in the context of social practice -the possibility of 
the deployment of "strategies" instead of the determination 
of structural rules.
This activeness,however,is a limited one.Bourdieu rejects 
approaches like Sartre's that "make each action a sort of 
unprecedented confrontation between the subject and the 
world": "Because the habitus is an endless capacity to en­
28. OTP,p.49
29. OTP,p.9
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gender products -thoughts,perceptions,expressions,actions- 
whose limits are set by the historically and socially 
situated conditions of its production,the conditioned and 
conditional freedom it secures is as remote from a creation 
of unpredictable novelty as it is from a simple mechanical 
reproduction of the initial conditionings11.30
Thus the habitus forms,in a way,the boundaries within 
which the actor can deploy strategies and pursue "aims",the 
limits of the activeness and autonomy of the actor.
HABITUS AND AUTONOMY: AN APPRAISAL
Though Bourdieu does not use the term,his notion of 
"habitus" fulfils the basic requirements of a theory of 
structuration.lt allows the theorisation of structural ele­
ments internalised in the subject -and "constructing" the 
subject- in a durable way as "structured dispositions" and 
ensuring the reproduction of the structures through the 
(inter)action of the individuals.The habitus is the actor 
himself,produced in determined conditions and embodying 
structured and durable dispositions.
Unlike structuralism,though,the "habitus" does not imply a 
passive subject that is simply a bearer of a structure.For 
Bourdieu the assertion that the actor is constructed within 
a set of structures is separate from the assertion that 
-therefore- his actions can be derived in a mechanistic 
way from these structures.The actors do not follow 
rules,they deploy strategies.
Thus Bourdieu seems to both accept the structural deter­
mination of the subject and to avoid falling into a 
mechanistic theorisation of action.
However,it is obvious that the notion of habitus is a 
generic one.It indicates the requirements of a theorisation 
of the structural construction of the individual 
-permanence,unconscious and non-ideal level of opera­
30. OTP,p.73
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tion,relevance to the motivational sphere,production trough 
the acquisition of a series of identities,etc.But it does 
not provide a proper and extensive theorisation that would 
support these requirements.
The attributes of the habitus are simply evoked,in an ad­
ditive way,without for that being properly related to one 
another, without their level of operation within the in­
dividual being clarified and without the mechanism of their 
production being sufficiently theorised.Moreover the ques­
tion of whether theoretical knowledge can provide a satis­
factory account of the non ideal but "embodied" principles 
that constitute a habitus is not addressed at all.
Bourdieu's empirical illustrations of the relevance of the 
notion of habitus,although extremely useful in order to es­
tablish the need of such a concept,confuse rather than help 
towards a proper theorisation:
The notion is used to cover both fundamentally defining 
characteristics and dispositions (as the analysis of 
taste,for ex.,in "Distinction") but also more superficial 
and "external" to the individual elements (as when Bourdieu 
refers to an "academic habitus" in Homo Academicus31).
In fact Bourdieu uses habitus as a convenient vehicle to 
account for a number of assertions.Moreover,as DiMaggio 
remarks:
"We are told that the initial habitus (inculcated 
primarily by early childhood experience) is
durable,but,since it is also transformable,we are never 
sure just what difference this durability makes,or under 
what circumstances it makes a difference for what 
phenomena.This question,that of the stability and plas­
ticity of personality,is one about which Bourdieu has 
little concrete to say".32
31. P.Bourdieu.Homo Academicus (1984).Cambridge:Polity Press,1988, 
p.143
32. P.DiMaggio,"Review essay on P. Bourdieu".American Journal of 
Sociology.V.84-6.(1979),p.1468
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Bourdieu has "little concrete to say about personality" 
because in fact he does not have a theory of personality 
proper.The notion of habitus is evoked in lieu of such a 
theory but evidently this is not enough.
The insufficiency of the theorisation of habitus becomes 
pronounced when Bourdieu simultaneously asserts the pos­
sibility of active agency.
Bourdieu's empirical illustrations of his concept of 
"strategy" as a way to assert the -limited- autonomy of the 
individual they cannot,by themselves do more than indicate 
that indeed a certain autonomy does exist.The theorisation 
of this autonomy,however, remains to be elaborated.
How is it possible to have within the subject and side by 
side both the structured dispositions of the habitus and 
the locus of an active agency? Do these two requirements 
refer to the same level within the individual or to dif­
ferent ones? How can the limits of active agency vis-a-vis 
the habitus be drawn? In what sense the structured disposi­
tions are more "permanent" than the "reasoning" subject?
The habitus refers to the socially constructed in­
dividual. To assert a certain autonomy,as Bourdieu 
does,however bounded,a socially irreducible part of the 
person has to be assumed.For the "structured dispositions" 
to produce "strategies",they have to be supported by a cer­
tain individuality outside and non-reducible to the 
habitus.Bourdieu1s theorisation of the habitus does not al­
low us to locate this "irreducible" individuality,its 
level,or its limits.
All these problems and questions cannot be overcome or 
answered unless the generic notion of habitus is supported 
with a more precise and detailed theorisation of the in­
dividual .
Bourdieu is indeed charting the necessary features of such 
a theorisation that would allow a move beyond objectivism 
and subjectivism.His evocative remarks,however,need further 
elaboration to become convincing.
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THE MODALITY OF PRACTICE
AND THE "OBJECTIVITY" OF THE SOCIAL 
Bourdieu proceeds further than his notion of habitus,in 
order to provide a "theory of practice":
The habitus,as internalised dispositions and as a set of 
principles of structuration,is a central determinant in the 
context of practice.The conceptual schemes it incorporates 
are "immanent in practice,organising not only the percep­
tion of objects,but also the production of practices".33The 
habitus "produces practices which tend to reproduce the 
regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the 
production of their generative principle".34
The structured dispositions of the habitus,as "schemes of 
perception,appreciation and action,which are acquired 
through practice and applied in their practical state 
without acceding to explicit representation,function as 
practical operators"35.These "practical operators" are ac­
tivated within the specific context of practice:
"An agent who possesses a practical mastery,an 
art,whatever it may be,is capable of applying in his action 
the disposition that appears to him only in action,in the 
relationship with a situation."36
This "practical mastery" is quite different from a 
theoretical account of it:
"Reflective explication converts a practical succession 
into a represented succession,an action oriented in rela­
tion to a space objectively constituted as a structure of 
demands (things "to be done") into a reversible operation 
performed in a continuous,homogeneous space.This inevitable 
transformation is inscribed in the fact that agents can
33. OTP,p.118
34. OTP,p.78
35. OTP,p.97
36. LP,p.90,emphasis added.
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adequately master the mondus operanti that enables them to 
generate correctly formed ritual practices,only by making 
it work practically,in a real situation,in relation to 
practical functions."3v
A theoretical account of practice neutralises the practi­
cal functions by presenting a synchronic model that denies 
the temporal specificity of practice:
"Practice unfolds in time and has all the correlative 
properties,such as irreversibility,that synchronisation 
destroys.Its temporal structure.that is,its rhythm,its 
tempo,and above all its directionality,is constitutive of 
its meaning...In short,because it is entirely immersed in 
the current of time,practice is inseparable from tem­
porality, not only because it is played out in time,but also 
because it uses strategically time and tempo in 
particular".38
Thus the modality of practice is always different from a 
theoretical account of it,irrespective of whether it is the 
agent himself that gives this account or an external 
observer:
"As soon as he reflects on his practice,adopting a quasi 
theoretical posture,the agent loses any chance of express­
ing the truth of his practice,and especially the truth of 
the practical relation to practice...he cannot communicate 
the essential point which is that the very nature of prac­
tice is that it excludes this question (of its theoretical 
elaboration)".39
What is required,therefore,is a break with the whole 
rationalistic tradition which sees social practice as the 
product of ideal entities -norms,rules,or individual 
meanings- and hence as directly amenable to a theoretical
37. ibid.
38. LP,p.81
39. LP,p.91
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knowledge.Practice is not reducible to (objectivist) 
theoretical schemata.
For Bourdieu practice has a specific modality that cannot 
be theoretically represented and understood without a 
transformation,an interpretation that transforms it to a 
discourse.Practice as such does not have the modality of 
discourse.
This specific modality of practice Bourdieu indicates as 
"logic of practice",as "sens pratique",remarking at the 
same time that "The idea of practical logic,a logic in it­
self, without conscious reflection or logical control,is a 
contradiction in terms,which defies logical logic.This 
paradoxical logic is that of all practice,or,better,of all 
sens pratique".40
How are we,then to theorise this "practical logic"? Bour­
dieu analyses it further:
"Practical logic is able to organise the totality of an 
agent's thoughts,perceptions,and actions by means of a few 
generative principles,themselves reducible in the last 
analysis to a fundamental dichotomy".41
This organisation,which implies a loss of rigour for the 
sake of greater simplicity and generality,is the mode of 
operation of practical condition in general.Practical logic 
functions "as an analogical sense,a sort of "sense of the 
contrary" which gives rise to the countless applications 
of the few basic contrasts capable of providing a minimum 
of determination (a man is not a woman-a toad is not a 
frog) and cannot give any information about the relations 
it relates,because it is precisely their indeterminacy and 
fuzziness that permit it to operate".42
This "indeterminacy or fuzziness" can account,for ex.,for
40. LP,p.92
41. OTP,p.110
42. OTP,p.113
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"the application to the same objects or practices of dif­
ferent schemes (such as opening/closing,going in/coming 
out,going up/going down,etc.) which,at the degree of preci­
sion (i.e. of imprecision) with which they are defined,are 
all practically equivalent,is the source of the polysemy
characterising the fundamental relationships in the sym­
bolic system".43
Similarly,because practical logic functions through a 
simple generative scheme of oppositions,it is the specific 
universe of practice relevant each time that determines the 
meaning of a term:The house in the Kabyles,for ex.,"is
globally defined as female,damp,etc.,when conceived from 
the outside,from the male point of view,i.e in opposition 
to the external world,but it can be divided into a male- 
female part and a female-female part when is treated in­
stead as a universe -of practice and discourse- on its own 
right".44
A rite is an example par excellence of practical
logic:"a rite,a performative practice that strives to bring 
about,is often simply a practical mimesis of the natural 
process that is to be facilitated.As opposed to explicit 
metaphor and analogy,mimetic representation links phenomena 
as different as the swelling of grain in the cooking 
pot,the swelling of a pregnant woman's belly and the 
sprouting of wheat in the ground,in a relationship that im­
plies no spelling-out of the properties of the terms thus 
related or the principles applied in relating them".45
Levi-Strauss and others,who have noted this reliance on 
simple pairs of opposites which function in an analogical 
way have failed to note that it does not correspond so much 
to a different "mode" of thought,but rather to the modality
43. OTP,p.Ill
44. OTP.p.110
45. LP,p.92
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of practical logic,immanent in practice.They have passed 
"in silence the transformation leading from operations 
mastered in their practical state to the formal operations 
isomorphic to them,failing by the same token to inquire 
into the social conditions of production of their 
transformation".46
However,the analysis of practical logic in terms of oppos­
ing concepts, seems to remain very much under the spell of 
Levi-Strauss.This account of practice does in fact what 
Bourdieu claims to avoid:it reduces practice to con­
cepts, its only difference from theoretical/formal logic 
being the use of the same oppositions in a variety of cir­
cumstances and its less developed form.The
female/damp,male/female notions in the above example,are 
presented as concepts,only operating,in the case of prac­
tice, in a less explicit and less developed mode.Still they 
remain "objectively" knowable.
Moreover,Bourdieu in his more empirical analyses often
presents schemata for the social in a purely objectivist 
way,completely disregarding the level of practice and its 
specificity.
An example is his definition of a social "field" as a 
"multidimensional space":
"The social field can be described as a multidimensional 
space of positions such that every actual position can be 
defined in terms of a multidimensional system of co­
ordinates .Thus agents are distributed within it,in the 
first dimension,according to the overall volume of the
capital they possess and,in the second dimension,according 
to the composition of their capital (Bourdieu distinguishes 
different forms of capital:economic,cultural,social and 
symbolic capital47) i.e according to the relative weight of
46. OTP,p.117
47. for example,P.Bourdieu,"Social space and symbolic power” ,
Sociological Theory.V.7-1 (1986),p.17
161
the different kinds of assets within their total assets"48.
According to this two-dimensional space,Bourdieu in his 
analysis in "Distinction" considers the different habituses 
that characterise classes as attributable,in the last in­
stance, to the different quantities and compositions of 
capital,i.e to the different positions within this objec­
tive space the actors occupy.49
Within such a given "field" the agents are seen as trying 
to maximise their total capital or specific forms of it in 
constant power struggles.(This principle is used by Bour­
dieu whenever he attempts a "dynamic" analysis,as for ex. 
in his discussion of education50 and of the May 1968 
events51).
What we are faced with here is a type of analysis that 
combines a structuralist conception of the structure as an 
objective entity -the social space appears as immediately 
and unproblematically accessible to scientific
knowledge,measurable and even graphically representable- 
and a utilitarian principle of motivation of agents,a 
motivation considered to be of the same kind in a number of 
different fields.On these grounds it is possible to comment 
both that "the utilitarian concept of social action is at 
the basis of Bourdieu's social theory and analysis of 
culture"52 and that "the relationship Bourdieu eventually 
poses between "objective structures",the habitus and social 
practice becomes one of determination.The analytical em­
48. P.Bourdieu,"The social space and the genesis of groups".Theory and 
Society.V.14-6.(1985),p.724
49. see,for ex.,the tables in "Distinction",op.cit.,pp.262,266,340,452
50. P.Bourdieu & J.C.Passeron.Reproduction in education.society and 
culture (1970).London:Sage.1977
51. P.Bourdieu,"Homo academicus",op.cit.
52. A.Honneth,"The fragmented world of symbolic forms:reflections on
P.Bourdieu's sociology of culture".Theory.culture and society.V.3-3 
(1986),p.58
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phasis falls upon causes rather than reasons.Structures 
produce the habitus,which generates practice,which 
reproduces the structures,and so on."53
Thus Bourdieu not only does not provide a satisfactory 
theorisation of the "logic of practice" he introduces,but 
he completely disregards any relevance of such a "logic" in 
his empirical studies.In particular,it seems difficult for 
him to escape from some version of objectivism,despite his 
willingness to do so.54
A theorisation of practice that would support the differen­
tial modality Bourdieu attributes to it,therefore,and that 
would clarify its relationship with the agent,still remains 
to be elaborated.Only through such a theorisation the 
specificity of the level of practice and the irreducibility 
of this level either to ideal entities or to fully deter­
mined individuals can be fully supported.
BEYOND BOURDIEU
Bourdieu shares with Giddens the aim to transcend 
"subjectivism" and "objectivism".Unlike Giddens,he does of­
fer certain promising steps towards this direction.
For the theorisation of the mode of existence of struc­
tural elements within the individual,he proposes the notion 
of habitus as "structured dispositions" that constitute the 
subject,"embodied" rather than "known",created out of par­
ticipating in a given social environment is suggestive.
However,Bourdieu does not sufficiently elaborate the no­
tion of habitus to provide a satisfactory theorisation of
53. R.Jenkins,"Pierre Bourdieu and the reproduction of determinism", 
Sociology.V.31 (1982),p.273
54. Moreover,Bourdieu does not sufficiently clarify the relation be­
tween "practice", "habitus" and "strategies".If the specific modality 
of practice to which Bourdieu refers is the result of the manifesta­
tion of the "practical operators" of habitus then what is the connec­
tion of practice with the "strategies" agents employ? Do we have to 
distinguish two kinds of practice to take account of the two levels?
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the individual.Thus,for example,he cannot really support 
his assertion for an activeness from the part of the agent 
beyond the structural determinations of the habitus.
Bourdieu also indicates the specificity of social practice 
-which he terms "logic of practice" ,"sens pratique"- as 
oppossed to theoretical schemes accounting for it and he 
stresses the irreducibility of practice to such schemes.Yet 
he does not provide a theorisation that could support this 
specificity,while in his more empirical studies he often 
uses the same type of objectivist theorisation he 
denounces.
Bourdieu,therefore,is suggestive but his concepts require 
further elaboration to become instrumental towards his aim.
164
(B).OPENNESS AND THE MODALITY OF THE SOCIAL
We identified a turn from "structure" to "structuration" 
-the theorisation of existence "within" and reproduction of 
social structures through the individual and his actions- 
which also wanted to affirm a certain activeness/autonomy 
from the part of the social actor.
Giddens,in his willingness to portray the actor as ac­
tive, simply reverts to an individualism: he endows the in­
dividual with an externality to the social and an axiomatic 
independence from any structural determination.The ques­
tion, however, is to both accept such structural determina­
tions as operating and to assert a certain autonomy of the 
actor.
Bourdieu,rejecting any individualism,recognises the real 
problem,but does not offer any theorisation that would sup­
port the activeness he also claims for social actors.
None of these authors,however,indicated any connection be­
tween this activeness and the modality attributed to the 
social.However,the earlier discussion of structural/ objec­
tivist approaches had indicated the close connection be­
tween a full determination of the actor and the modality 
attributed to social structures.Once these structures are 
seen as fully closed,determinable entities,and the actor as 
determined by them,then no autonomy of the actor can be 
claimed to exist.(The same holds about the possibility of 
conceptualising the emergence of the new in history).
It was precisely the assumption of full determination and 
closure,characterising structural approaches,that was chal­
lenged by a number of "post-structuralist" authors.
We shall discuss J.Derrida as exemplifying this approach 
in its general form before moving to accounts specifically 
addressing the modality of the social in the work of 
E.Laclau (& C.Mouffe) and,more significantly,C.Castoriadis.
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These authors aim to theorise an alternative,"open" 
modality of the social that allows the conceptualisation of 
both the emergence of the new and of a certain autonomy of 
the social actor(s).
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(V). J.DERRIDA AND DIFFERANCE
DERRIDA'S CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS
AND THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL THEORY
Derrida summarises his critical account of philosophy as a 
critique of the "metaphysics of presence" that have 
dominated Western thought.1The metaphysics of presence rep­
resent "the historical determination of the meaning of 
being in general as presence,with all the subdeterminations 
which depend on this generic form and which organise within 
it their system and their historical sequence:presence of 
the thing to the sight as eidos,presence as 
substance/essence/existence (ousia),temporal presence as 
point (stigme) of the now or of the moment (nun),the self­
presence of the cogito,consciousness,subjectivity,the co­
presence of the other and of the self,intersubjectivity as 
the intentional phenomenon of the ego,and so forth"2 .It is 
this whole tradition that Derrida characterises as 
phonocentrism or logocentrism (phonocentrism because 
phonetic writing considers words themselves as endowed with 
a meaning,referring to a signified outside any context,in 
opposition to writing modes,as ideograms or 
hieroglyphics,which acquire a specific meaning only within 
the context placed each time) :
"Logocentrism would thus support the determination of the
1. We focus here on Derrida's earlier and more path-breaking work -up 
to the early seventies- which introduces his central concepts (we 
refer mainly to "Of Grammatology",the collections of articles in 
"Writing and difference" and "Margins of philosophy" and his inter­
views in "Positions").His later work does not introduce any sig­
nificant differentiation in these concepts and becomes more esoteric 
in nature.
2. J.Derrida.Of Grammatology (1967).Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University 
Press,1976,p.12.Thereafter Gram.
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being of the entity as presence.1'3
In the history of this "logocentrism","the most decisive 
separation appears at the moment when,at the same time as 
the science of nature,the determination of the absolute 
presence is constituted as self-presence,as subjectivity".4
Even when a naive anthropologism is criticised,as in 
Hegel,Husserl or Heidegger,the logocentrism remains.In 
Hegel and Husserl "the critique of empirical anthropologism 
is only the affirmation of a transcendental humanism"5 with 
a transcendental telos: "The end of man (as a factual 
anthropological limit) is announced to thought from the 
vantage of the end of man (as a determined opening or the 
infinity of a telos)"6 .Even in Heidegger,"Dasein,though not 
man,is nevertheless nothing other than man.It is a repeti­
tion of the essence of man permitting a return to what is 
before the metaphysical concepts of humanitas"'7.
Within his critique,Derrida explicitly addresses the ques­
tions posed by structuralism,considering that it affords a 
first step towards a way out of this "logocentrism".
For Derrida a "structuralist method" is defined as "a 
method for which everything within the structural totality 
is interdependent and circular".What constitutes the 
decisive rupture is exactly this interdependence,i.e the 
relational character of the structure.
Although "structure -or rather the structurality of 
structure- has always been at work,it has always been 
neutralised or reduced,and this by a process of giving it a 
center or by referring it to a point of presence,a fixed
3. ibid.
4. Gram,p.16
5. J.Derrida,"The Ends of Man" (1968) (thereafter EM),in Margins of 
philosophy.Brighton:Harvester Press,1982,p.123
6. ibid.
7. EM,p.127
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origin"8 .This centre -an arche or a telos - has been the 
expression of the metaphysics of presence within structural 
thought.lt was through this "centre",at once inside and 
outside the structure,that the structure was ordered by 
"telos,aletheia or ousia",or that a meaning was attributed 
to it.
The relational definition of the structure,in con­
trast , allowed the "determination of the possibility of 
meaning on the basis of a "formal" organisation which in 
itself has no meaning,which does not mean that it is either 
the non-sense or the anguishing absurdity which haunt 
metaphysical humanism"9 .
However this definition of structure as a relational one 
is in itself insufficient.As Derrida remarks a propos of 
Levi-Strauss,it is accompanied by a denial of time and 
history:"the respect for structurality,for the internal 
originality of the structure,compels a neutralisation of 
time and history"10.The appearance of a new structure can be - 
described only "by omitting to posit the problem of the 
transition from one structure to another,by putting history 
between brackets"11.
Derrida's -more general- critique of metaphysics can be 
seen as having many points of contact with a critique in­
ternal to social thought.Indeed social theorists can be 
seen as a specific instance of the "metaphysics of
8. J.Derrida,"Structure,Sign and Play in the discourse of the human 
sciences" (1966) (thereafter SSP),in Writing and difference.London: 
Routledge,1978,p.278.
9. EM,p.134
10. SSP,p.291
11. ibid.Moreover,Levi-Strauss still aspires,for Derrida,in a roman­
tic, Rousseaunist way,to a possible totalisation,to an absolute dis­
course, to a primal innocence,to "a sort of ethic of presence,an ethic 
of nostalgia for origins,an ethic of archaic and natural innocence,of 
a purity of presence and self-presence in speech" (SSP,p.292. Also in 
"Grammatology",p.97 ff).
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presence" Derrida refers to:
The traditional individualistic paradigms are a direct 
continuation of the "great rationalisms of the 17th century 
in which the determination of absolute presence is con­
stituted as self-presence,as subjectivity"12.
Their opposing structural approaches substitute for the 
self-presence of subjectivity,society as the subject of 
history,a history determined and determinable,with a begin­
ning and/or an end.It is the case of structural totalities 
neutralised by their reference to an outside centre that 
Derrida notes.
This "outside",being itself transhistorical,structures the 
successive structural totalities of the social: this is the 
case with Marx's forces-relations scheme as well as with 
evolutionary/functionalist accounts based on necessary so­
cial functions,such as late Parson's,as also with Weber's 
"categories".Moreover,this "outside" is directly accessible 
to reason:the real is considered to be fundamentally ra­
tional. We can justifiably define,along with Derrida,these 
approaches as "logocentric".
With structuralism and its presentation of a social struc­
ture as a system of differences which does not refer to an 
outside "centre",a beginning of a break with a metaphysics 
of presence is made.A "beginning" not only because Levi- 
Strauss1 reference to elementary structures,for example,re­
establishes a "centre" and an "outside",but also because a 
rationalism and objectivism remain,as we noted,even when 
such a "centre" is rejected as in Althusser.
Derrida locates also,as remarked,one of the principal 
problems of such a structuralism:the absolute denial of 
history that any definition of structure as fully closed to 
itself entails.
Thus Derrida's critique,although not specifically related 
to a theory of the social is directly relevant to
12. Gram,p.16
170
it.Does,however,Derrida1s alternative to the "metaphysics 
of presence" offer an alternative for social theory as 
well?
THE NOTION OF DIFFERANCE
The question of "openness”,of alterity,is a central one for 
Derrida.Through the affirmation of a necessary openness,a 
totalising theory,a metaphysics of presence,can be 
rejected.
The possibility of openness exists,for ex.,in Husserl,as 
genesis.But this genesis is "logos produced in history 
which it differs from itself in order to re-appropriate 
itself"13,it is the "infinite opening of what is ex­
perienced, which is designated at several moments of Husser- 
lian analysis by reference to an Idea in the Kantian 
sense,that is,the irruption of the infinite into 
consciousness"14.
What Derrida aims at is retaining this infinite opening 
without,however,accepting a metaphysics of atemporal and
transcendental reason.
The notion of "differance" (a neologism in French coined 
by Derrida to indicate simultaneously in one term the
double meaning of differing and deferring) is such an at­
tempt. A structural totality is presented not only as a sys­
tem of differences but as,at the same time,deferring it­
self, opening itself in time:
"Differance will be the playing moment that "produces" -by 
means of something that is not simply an activity- these 
differences,these effects of difference"15
Differance is not to be seen as a new expression of an es­
13. J.Derrida,"Genesis and structure" and phenomenology" (1959),in 
"Writing and difference",op.cit.,p.166
14. ibid.,p.162
15. J.Derrida,"Differance"(1968),in "Margins...",op.cit.,p.ll
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sence,reintroducing a new metaphysics of presence: "The 
differance that produces differences is not somehow before 
them,in a simple and unmodified -in-different- 
present .Dif ferance is the non-full,non-simple,structured 
and differentiating origin of differences.Thus the name 
"origin" no longer suits it"16.It has rather to be seen as 
a movement:"We will designate by differance the movement 
according to which language,or any code,any system of 
referral in general,is constituted "historically" as a 
weave of differences".17
"Differance" is "neither a word nor a concept",it does not 
have the modality of "being",but it is rather the "pre­
opening of the ontico-ontological difference"18.Differance 
is "the non-full,non-simple,structured and differentiating 
origin of differences.Thus the name "origin" no longer 
suits it".19
Derrida also uses the terms "trace" or "archi-trace" to 
indicate the modality of differance.This "trace" is one 
that does not lead anywhere,it is an "archi-trace" without 
any presence in its end:
"The (pure) trace is differance.lt does not depend on any 
sensible plentitude,audible or visible,phonic or graphic.lt 
is,on the contrary,the condition of such a plen­
titude. Although it does not exist,although it is never a 
being present outside of all plentitude,its possibility is 
by rights anterior to all that one calls 
sign(signified/signifier,content,express i on,etc.),concept 
or operation,motor or sensory".20
16. ibid.
17. "Differance",p.12
18. J.Derrida,"Freud and the scene of writing" (1966),in "Writing and 
difference",p.198
19. "Differance",p.11
20. Gram.,p.62
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Trace,differance has to be "thought before the opposition 
between nature and culture,animality and humanity,inside 
and outside: The outside,"spatial" and "objective" ex­
teriority which we believe we know as the most familiar 
thing in the world,as familiarity itself,would not appear 
without the gramme,without differance as temporaliza- 
tion,without the nonpresence of the other inscribed within 
the sense of the present,without the relationship with 
death as the concrete structure of the living present".21
"Differance",the subject,writing,the unconscious 
The opening differance designates cannot be seen as the 
result of a "need" or a "desire" within a consciousness be­
cause "the speaking or signifying subject could not be 
present to itself,as speaking,or signifying without the 
play of linguistic or semiological differance...The subject 
as consciousness has never manifested itself except as 
self-presence".It is this self-presence that presupposes 
differance:"thus one comes to posit presence -and specifi­
cally consciousness,the being beside itself of 
consciousness- no longer as the absolutely central form of 
Being but as a "determination" and as an "effect".22
In fact,"without differance there would be neither 
"subject", nor "history",nor the "symbolic"".23 
"Differance" is manifested par excellence in "writing":
"If writing is no longer understood in the narrow sense of 
linear and phonetic notation,it should be possible to say 
that all societies capable of producing,that is to say of 
obliterating,their proper names,and of bringing class- 
ificatory difference into play,practice writing in 
general.No reality or concept would therefore correspond to
21. Gram,p.71
22. "Differance” ,p.16
23. J.Derrida.Positions (1972),London:The Athlone Press,1987,p.88
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the expression "society without writing1124. "Writing" for 
Derrida indicates the very possibility for signification's 
another expression of differance,and as such behind the ex­
istence of language as such.
However,writing in the usual sense,in the sense of the 
text,is also the field par excellence of differance:the 
text is never closed,it always defers itself,it incor­
porates its "outside" as the limits of its "inside".The 
principle of differance consequently can also be used as a 
tool of textual analysis:this is what Derrida has called 
the deconstructive method.
The modality Freud attributes to the unconscious indicates 
also,for Derrida,the "existence" and function of 
"differance":
"A certain alterity -to which Freud gives the metaphysical 
name of the unconscious- is definitely exempt from every 
process of presentation by means of which we would call 
upon it to show itself in person.In this context,and 
beneath this guise,the unconscious is not,as we know,a hid­
den, virtual , or potential self-presence.It differs from,and 
defers,itself;which doubtless means that it is woven of 
differences,and also that it sends out
delegates,representatives,proxies;but without that the 
giver of proxies might "exist",might be present,be "itself" 
somewhere,and with even less chance that it might become 
conscious."25
"There is no unconscious truth to be rediscovered by 
virtue of having been written elsewhere.There is no text 
written and present elsewhere which would then be sub­
jected, without being changed in the process,to an operation 
and a temporalization (the latter belonging to conscious­
ness if we follow Freud literally) which would be external
24. Gram,p.109
25. "Differance",p.21
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to it,floating on its surface...The unconscious is already 
a weave of pure traces,differences in which meaning and 
force are united - a text nowhere present,consisting of ar­
chives which are always already transcriptions'1.26
Thus,by introducing the concept of differance,Derrida 
wants to affirm an always/already (the Heideggerian 
ja/schon) existing openness in any system of differences,an 
openness that is,moreover,the constituting possibility of 
the existence of any such system,without itself referring 
to a presence,or an essence.
"DIFFERANCE" AND THE THEORY OF THE SOCIAL
How,at what "level" of operation,are we to understand 
"differance"? Moreover,since Derrida's critique of a 
metaphysics of presence has a relevance to a critique in­
ternal to social theory,has the concept of "differance" 
anything to offer to a theory of the social?
A certain interpretation and appropriation of Derrida's 
work has been through his "deconstructive"
method,indicating the openness of any "text",the play of 
differance within any "writing".
Derrida himself orients his work towards such a critical 
reading of major -philosophical mainly but also literary- 
figures both in the. context of a critique of "metaphysics 
of presence" and in order to establish the concept of dif­
ferance. Since it is through a reading of texts that he 
proceeds and since "the text" is for him the example par 
excellence of the intrusion of the "outside"(what is not 
said or written) to the inside (what is said or 
written),textual analysis -as "deconstruction"- occupies a 
central role in his work,which more and more has been 
oriented towards literary texts.The considerable influence 
deconstruction has had,especially in the U.S.,as a method 
of literary analysis is not without a firm grounding in
26. "Freud and the scene of writing",p.211
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Derrida's own work and project.
Within this context,Derrida is seen as primarily estab­
lishing the impossibility of any ultimate truth and as in­
dicating the necessary and unavoidable relativity of 
knowledge and truth.As such,Derrida1s work has been con­
sidered as a theory of knowledge, close to Godel's 
theorem27 and running a parallel course to Gadamer's her­
meneutics .
However,as P.Dews remarks,Derrida1s account,taken at its 
word,does not imply a relativisation of meaning,but its 
destruction:"Just as the regress of reflection renders the 
phenomenon of consciousness inexplicable,so -on Derrida's 
account- there would never be an emergence of meaning:there 
would be nothing but an unstoppable mediation of signs by 
other signs...not the volatization of meaning,but its 
destruction."2S
Even if seen as only introducing a relativistic 
framework,the relevance of Derrida's work and of his con­
cept of "differance" to a theory of the social is 
limited.lt may be seen either in indicating a general 
theory of knowledge to which social theory is (also) in­
scribed or as a tool for a "deconstructive" analysis of 
ideologies29.
However,to indicate the openness or the lack of any final 
closure of scientific thought does not imply anything about 
the content of this thought and the assumptions it makes
27. for example.M.Ryan.Marxism and deconstruction.Baltimore:Johns Hop­
kins University Press,1982,p.17 ff.
A similar interpretation is offered by R.Gashe.who sees Derrida as ad­
dressing the ultimate foundations of reflection and 
reflexivity,"engaged in the construction of the "quasi-synthetic 
concepts" which account for the economy of the conditions of pos­
sibility and impossibility of the basic philosophemes"(R .Gashe.The 
tain of the mirror.Cambridge.Mass: Harvard University Press,1986,p.7)
28. P .Dews.Logics of disintegration.London:Verso,1987,p .30
29. As M.Ryan asserts,op.cit.
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about its object -in our case the "social".
On the other hand,as a tool for a "deconstructive" 
analysis of ideologies,Derrida's theorisation does not of­
fer much more than traditional critical analyses of these 
"ideologies".It can only assert the relativity of any 
"ideology" without specifying the source and origin of this 
relativity.30
Precisely regarding the source and origin of any 
relativity his theory indicates,Derrida has insisted that 
"differance" should be seen as "the pre-opening of the 
ontico-ontological difference",as the "primordial non self­
presence" .
Differance operates for Derrida at a more "fundamental" 
level,in the same manner,one could claim31,as the Heideg- 
gerian "Dasein" (though differance does not,of course,refer 
to the subject in any way): not as an "essence" since it 
precisely denies any essentialism and yet -to play with 
Derrida's own words- as nothing more than a (negative) es­
sence. Dif ferance is supposed to negate essentialism and 
yet simultaneously to organise the whole question of being 
through its (non self-)presence.
What we have is a negation of traditional metaphysics 
while retaining a discourse and concepts that continue to 
function on the same level and with the same ambitions.In 
fact,the notion of differance (and all the other notions 
Derrida introduces to indicate the same) neutralises the 
radicalism Derrida's own critique of traditional 
metaphysics had entailed by re-establishing,albeit in an 
oblique way,precisely such a metaphysics.Derrida,in
30. Derrida himself,when pressed on the relation of his approach to a 
theory of the social and especially his relation to Marxism,he 
referred to a "reading" of "the Marxist text",that is "still to come" 
("Positions",p.62).But what would such a "reading" offer social 
thought?
31. as Habermas,for example,acknowledges in The philosophical dis­
course of modernity (1985).Cambridge:Polity press,1990,p.161 ff.
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fact,reflects a nostalgia for an all encompassing 
philosophical discourse he started from criticising.
Adorno's criticism of Heidegger is here pertinent:
"Whatever praises itself for reaching behind the concepts 
of reflection -subject and object- in order to grasp some­
thing substantial,does nothing but reify the irresol- 
vability of the concepts of reflection.lt reifies the im­
possibility of reducing one into the other,into the in- 
itself...It vindicates without authority and without theol­
ogy, maintaining that what is of essence is real,and,by the 
same token,that the existent is essential,meaningful,and 
justified.1132
In this context,Derrida's theorisation has nothing to of­
fer to social theory since the latter refers to a level of 
"positive" science,a positive science the "pre-opening of 
the ontico-ontological difference" differance refers 
to,pre-exists and defines.33
At the same time Derrida's theory implies an irrelevance 
of history and society for the actual movement of 
thought.As Habermas remarks: "He (Derrida),too (like
Heidegger),degrades politics and contemporary history to 
the status of the ontic and the foregroung,so as to romp 
all the more freely,and with a greater wealth of associa­
tions, in the sphere of the ontological and the 
archewriting"34.
32. T.Adorno.The Jargon of Authenticity (1964).London:Routledge.1973, 
p.121.Adorno's critique poses directly the connection between reflec­
tion and the thinking subject,with all his/hers socio-historical 
determinations and hence the connection with a theory of the social 
that would allow us to theorise these determinations.
33. Derrida indicates the need for a '’deconstruction of the greatest 
totality -the concept of episteme and logocentric metaphysics- within 
which are produced,without ever posing the question of writing,all the 
Western methods of analysis,explication,or interpretation"(Gram,p.46)
34. J.Habermas,op.cit.,p.181.Also Dews:"When Derrida speaks of the 
"historico-transcendental scene of writing",he continues -like Husserl 
and Heidegger before him- to erase the contingency of the historical 
process"(Dews,op.cit.,p.43)
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Yet,the insights of Derrida's work,and specifically the 
affirmation of a radical and necessary openness,seem too im­
portant to be lost in such an obscure metaphysics (as also 
in a sterile relativism).
We saw that Derrida himself considered structuralism as a 
starting point.But structuralism,in either the linguistic 
or its social theoretic versions,was referring to posi­
tive (though not positivistic) sciences and to a 
theorisation of their objects (language or the social).He 
also indicates the relevance of the openness "differance" 
refers to for a theorisation of the uncon­
scious .Moreover, his critique of metaphysics parallels an 
internal critique of social thought referring to the social 
as a positive object of study.
The possibility exists then,that the openness differance 
refers to can be located not on the "pre-opening of the 
ontico-ontological field" but within the level of the so­
cial in all its empirical/concrete nature.It could offer a 
way to reintroduce history in otherwise immobile structural 
theories.And it is such a possibility we shall investigate.
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(VI). E.LACLAU & C ,MOUFFE:
MEANINGFULNESS AND OPENNESSOF THE SOCIAL
LACLAU AND MOUFFE1 S THEORISATION OF THE SOCIAL
Unlike Derrida,Laclau and Mouffe1 affirm a necessary open­
ness within a theorisation of the social,an openness refer­
ring to social structural totalities.
Laclau and Mouffe want to assert the relativisation of 
"the ethical,political and intellectual values of 
modernity"2 ,to go beyond any "eschatological conceptions of 
history"3,without,for that,"dismantling the ground on which 
a radical and progressive politics could be built"4 .
A starting point for Laclau and Mouffe is Marxism,as "one 
of the traditions through which it becomes possible to for­
mulate a new conception of politics"5 .Within Marxism they 
reject the determinant role of the economy or of any 
"objective interests" and "objective destiny" of the work­
ing class,an objectivity that can be supported only within 
a teleological conception of history.Instead they want to 
stress "the logic of hegemony,as a logic of articulation 
and cont i ngency"6 .
1. We refer mainly to E.Laclau and C.Mouffe.Hegemony and socialist 
strategy.London:Verso.1985 (thereafter HSS) as also to their ’’Post 
Marxism without apologies” (1987) (thereafter PM).New Left Review 
166.Laclau's own "New Reflections on the Revolution of our time" 
(1990) in E.Laclau.New reflections on the Revolution of our 
time.London:Verso.1990 (thereafter NR) further advances the argu­
ment. (In the same volume is collected the NLR article.The references 
will be,however,to the original publication of the article.)
2. NR,p.4
3. PM,p.84
4. NR,p.4
5. HSS,p.3
6. HSS,p.85
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Laclau and Mouffe's project is ultimately a political 
one,i.e to present a new theorisation of politics based on 
the notion of "hegemony" as well as a project for "radical 
democracy".To do so,however,they have to propose a basic 
conceptualisation of the social,a theorisation in which 
"there is no sutured space peculiar to "society",since the 
social itself has no essence".'7
They reject a simple "logical deconstruction of the Al- 
thusserian totality" (like Hindess1 and Hirst's critique of 
Althusser) which "can only be implemented if the discon­
nected "elements" have a full and unequivocal identity at­
tributed to them"8 .Instead they claim that the critique has 
to be directed against "every type of fixity,through an af­
firmation of the incomplete,open and politically negotiable 
character of every identity"9 .
Consequently,Laclau and Mouffe see a structural totality 
as established through an "articulation":articulation is 
"any practice establishing a relation among elements such 
that their identity is modified as a result of the ar­
ticulatory practice.The structured totality resulting from 
the articulatory practice,we will call discourse.The dif­
ferential positions,insofar as they appear articulated 
within a discourse,we will call moments.By contrast,we will 
call element any difference that is not discursively 
articulated."10
A discursive articulation has the modality Foucault at­
tributes to his "discursive formations",namely "regularity 
in dispersion".For Laclau and Mouffe an articulation has to 
be thought as "an ensemble of differential positions 
(which)...is not the expression of any underlying principle
7. HSS,p.96
8. HSS,p.104
9. ibid.
10. HSS,p.105
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external to itself -it cannot,for instance,be apprehended 
either by a hermeneutic reading or by a structuralist 
combinatory".11
In a "discursive articulation,as a systematic structural 
ensemble,the relations are unable to absorb the 
identities;but as the identities are purely relational,this 
is but another way of saying that there is no identity 
which can be fully constituted".Every ensemble of differen­
tial entities is constantly subverted by the "surplus of 
meaning".This "surplus" is "the necessary terrain for the 
constitution of every social practice.We will call it the 
field of discursivity"12.
The distinction between "elements" and "moments" cor­
responds to the distinction between the "field of 
discursivity" and its partial closures that are the discur­
sive articulations.Within this field,and prior to their ar­
ticulation within a discourse,"the status of elements is 
that of floating signifiers,incapable of being wholly ar­
ticulated to a discursive chain"13.As floating signifiers 
the elements have no real identity.Any identity,always par­
ti a l i s  constructed when they become moments,i.e when they 
form part "of a totality resulting from an articulatory 
practice".
Despite the terminology,Laclau and Mouffe do not see their 
theorisation as referring to "discourse" in the limited 
sense,i.e. to ideas or ideologies.They explicitly reject 
"the distinction between discursive and non-discursive 
practices" and they affirm "(a) that every object is con­
stituted as an object of discourse,insofar as no object is 
given outside every discursive condition of emergence;and 
(b) that any distinction between what are usually called
11. HSS,p.106
12. HSS,p.Ill
13. ibid.
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the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social prac­
t i c e ' s  either an incorrect distinction or ought to find 
its place as a differentiation within the social production 
of meaning,which is structured under the form of discursive 
totalities"14.
Accordingly,Laclau and Mouffe use the term discourse "to 
emphasise that every social configuration is meaning­
ful...by discourse we do not mean a combination of speech 
and writing,but rather that speech and writing are them­
selves but internal components of discursive totalities"15.
Laclau and Mouffe denounce both the determinance of "an 
objective field constituted outside of any discursive 
intervention"(as is the case with the economy or the mode 
of production in Marxism) and a "discourse consisting of 
the pure expression of thought"16.What a "discursive 
articulation" refers to,therefore,is to the social in 
general and not only to the (limited) field of language and 
thought.
THE SUBJECT AND "HEGEMONY"
Within these structural wholes "subjects" are defined: 
"Whenever we use the category of "subject" in this text,we 
will do so in the sense of "subject positions" within a 
discursive structure.Subjects cannot,therefore,be the 
origin of social relations"17.
However,precisely because the "structure" is always open 
and never fully constituted,the subject is also never fully 
determined: "every subject position,as a discursive posi­
tion, it partakes of the open character of every 
discourse"18.
14. HSS,p.107
15. PM,p.82
16. HSS,p.108
17. HSS,p.115
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Laclau is to further amplify in his later "Reflections": 
"The field of social identities is not one of full iden­
tities, but of their ultimate failure to be constituted19 
...the location of the subject is that of dislocation.Far 
from being a moment of the structure,the subject is the 
result of the impossibility of constituting the structure 
as such -that is as a self-sufficient object".20
Thus the "openness" of the structure lies behind the lack 
of a "full" identity from the part of the subject.This lack 
seems to justify a certain degree of autonomy from the part 
of the subject.lt is this autonomy that -presumably- allows 
the emergence of a "hegemonic subject".
Hegemony,for Laclau and Mouffe,is an articulatory practice 
that uses "elements" not yet crystallised into "moments" to 
form a new "discursive articulation".
Laclau has been proposing a theory of hegemony -mainly 
following Gramsci- in his previous work21.In that work
hegemony appeared as the result of a class -defined as a 
class in the field of production- manipulation and or­
ganisation of different ideological elements to form a 
unity that would allow this class a hegemonic position on 
the political/ideological field.Through a hegemonic ar­
ticulation demands from other classes can be channelled in 
ways compatible with the interests of the hegemonic class.
A distinction was therefore made between relations of 
production which determine class relations and the
ideological and political levels which are not reducible to 
class relations.In "HSS" hegemony continues to play a
18. ibid.
19. NR,p.38
20. NR,p.41
21. E.Laclau.Politics and ideology in Marxist Theory.London:New Left 
Books,1977
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central role.It still refers to political discourse,only 
now is not seen any more as determined in the last instance 
by the relations of production.lt is not only classes with 
defined interests on the level of production that can 
hegemonise.A hegemonic agent can be defined in another 
sphere of the social:
"The hegemonic subject,as the subject of any articulatory 
practice,must be partially exterior to what it articulates 
-otherwise there would be no articulation at all.On the 
other hand,however,such exteriority cannot be conceived as 
that existing between two different ontological 
levels...both the hegemonic force and the ensemble of 
hegemonised elements would constitute themselves on the 
same plane- the general field of discursivity"22.
However,"in order to speak of hegemony,the articulatory 
moment is not sufficient.lt is also necessary that the ar­
ticulation should take place through a confrontation with 
antagonistic articulatory practices -in other words,that 
hegemony should emerge in a field criss-crossed by 
antagonisms".23
The term "antagonism" retains,in Laclau and Mouffe the 
usual connotations of two antagonistic sides (classes or 
persons).An antagonism appears as such in a full sense only 
when it is articulated to a discursive articulation within 
a hegemonic project:
"Every antagonism,left free to itself,is a floating sig- 
nifier,a "wild" antagonism which does not predetermine the 
form in which it can be articulated to other elements in a 
social formation".24Thus antagonisms can be articulated to 
different hegemonic projects and to different discourses.
22. HSS,p.135
23. HSS,p.135
24. HSS,p.171
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LACLAU AND MOUFFE: AN APPRAISAL
Laclau and Mouffe introduce,as necessary and inescapable,a 
lack of fixity -an openness,indeterminacy,lack of closure- 
of the social structural entities ("discursive 
articulations").These "discursive articulations" never 
manage to be "objectively" constituted and,therefore,"all 
social relations are always contigent relations"2 5 .The 
"openness1 is introduced not as operating at a level beyond 
and "outside" of the social -as Derrida's differance does- 
but as existing within the social.
Thus the central assumption of rationalist/objectivist 
structural approaches,that of closed and fully determinable 
social structural entities is challenged.
Consequently,it seems that the problem of alterity and 
change that these approaches faced,can be overcome.A non 
fully constituted,open structure,can always alter it­
self, and hence "becoming" can be introduced.
In addition,as a consequence of this openness the "subject" 
can be seen as structurally determined but never fully 
so,as never having a full identity.A political project of 
hegemony,based on a certain autonomy from the part of the 
subject,becomes thus possible.The other great problem of 
structural approaches, therefore,that of the conceptualisa­
tion of some form of active agency,seems that it is also 
overcome.
Thus,by theorising the social as necessarily open and in­
determinate, Laclau and Mouffe can provide an alternative to 
the modality of the social that structural/objectivist ap­
proaches asserted and hence provide answers to the two 
central problems these approaches faced,the question of 
agency and the question of history.
However,while the general direction of their argument in­
dicates a new path,the specific aspects of the argument are 
not properly worked out.
25. NR,p.31
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The autonomy of the subject 
Laclau and Mouffe,operating on the level of a theory of 
the social,cannot avoid,as Derrida for example does,the 
necessity for a theorisation of the subject.
They justifiably assert that although they continue to 
see the subject as always created through a structure 
-through "subject positions"- the openness social structures 
("articulations") exhibit,allows a non full determination 
of the subject -the lack of any "full" identity (something 
the structuralist definition of structure as fully deter­
minable and closed did not allow).
Thus it is possible,first of all,to theorise the deter­
mination of the subject by many structures,of a fusion be­
tween them.They indicate that "overdetermination" should 
refer to its original meaning in Freud as "no ordinary 
process of "fusion" or "merger",bur rather a "very precise 
type of fusion entailing a symbolic dimension and a 
plurality of meanings".26
But they assert that the subject has a specificity over 
and beyond what a multiple determination would allow and 
hence a certain autonomy: "to insist on the dispersion of 
the positions from which "man" has been
produced,constitutes only a first moment;in a second 
stage,it is necessary to show the relations of overdeter­
mination and totalisation that are established among 
these.The non fixation or openness of the system of discur­
sive differences is what makes possible these effects of 
analogy and interpretation"2'7.
However,this autonomy is not unlimited:"the degree of 
autonomy may vary,but the concept of total autonomy is 
devoid of all meaning".28
26. HSS,p.97
27. HSS,p.117
28. NR,p.38
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What exactly this autonomy consists of,however,or what are 
its limits,is not clarified.At times Laclau and Mouffe 
refer simply to the contradiction generated by a simul­
taneous determination by more than one structures:"A fall 
in a worker's wage,for example,denies his identity as a 
consumer.There is therefore a "social objectivity" -the 
logic of profit- which denies another objectivity -the 
consumer's identity.But the denial of an identity means 
preventing its constitution as an objectivity".29The lack 
of a "full" identity in this case -and any subsequent 
"autonomy"- is simply due to the simultaneous determina­
tions the worker is subjected to.
In other instances Laclau and Mouffe tend to imply an ab­
solute rather than a "relative" autonomy,as in their dis­
cussion of hegemony.While a certain autonomy has to charac­
terise any "hegemonic subject",the way this subject is 
presented seems to be beyond any structural limitations and 
constrains."Who" is the hegemonic subject and "why" it 
could pursue such a project are never clarified.
In fact Laclau and Mouffe's account of the subject,though 
suggestive,is very limited.They do not provide any 
theorisation proper of subjectivity,of the way the struc­
ture operates within the individual,or of social ac­
tion. Consequently, they cannot adequately support their 
claims for the specificity and consequent autonomy of the 
subject.A more detailed theorisation of the subject would 
be the only way to properly delineate the meaning of
autonomy and its limits.
The "meaningfulness" of the social and its "openness”
Let us focus now on the central element of Laclau and 
Mouffe's argument:the non-closure,the openness,the indeter­
minacy of the structural entities,the "discursive 
articulations".Their argument runs roughly as follows:
29. NR,p.16
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(i) The social is always "meaningful".Drawing particularly 
from Wittgenstein,Laclau and Mouffe consider that the 
totality of social practice includes both linguistic and 
non-linguistic elements ("the totality which includes 
within itself the linguistic and the non linguistic is what 
we call discourse"30) which cannot be separated:
"It has become increasingly accepted that the meaning of a 
word is entirely context-dependent"31.Hence the two kinds 
of elements of a "discourse" cannot be separated and "the 
distinction between linguistic and non linguistic elements 
does not overlap with the distinction between "meaningful" 
and "not meaningful"."32
Moreover, (ii) "A number of contemporary currents of 
thought -from Heidegger to Wittgenstein- have insisted on 
the impossibility of fixing ultimate meanings"33.To these 
currents Laclau and Mouffe include Derrida who "generalises 
the concept of discourse in a sense coincidental with that 
of our text"34.There is then,an impossibility for any ul­
timate fixity of meaning -meaning is "open".
Since,therefore,meaning is "open" and the social is always 
"meaningful", the social is also necessarily open.The argu­
ment seems clear and persuasive.However:
(i) Laclau and Mouffe do not sufficiently clarify in what 
sense the social can be seen as "meaningful", except through 
a reference to thought and language.That the meaning of a 
"word" or a "rule" is context dependent does not alter the 
fact that it is the word or the rule that carry the meaning 
and not the "context".
30. PM,p.82
31. PM,p.83
32. ibid.
33. HSS,p.Ill
34. HSS,p.112
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They assert the "material character" of discourse in the 
sense of a "progressive affirmation...of the material 
character of ideologies,inasmuch as these are not simple 
systems of ideas but are embodied in institutions,rituals 
and so forth".35However,the "embodiment" of these systems 
of ideas to institutions or rituals does not change the 
fact that they are primarily "ideas" and it is as such that 
we should approach them.
Moreover,since Laclau and Mouffe do not offer any account 
of the interface between the "subject" and the "structure" 
-any theory,that is,of subjectivity- they cannot lo­
cate, within the individual,a level of "meaning" different 
from thought.As it is,their theorisation seems perfectly 
compatible with a scheme of action such as early Parsons'.
Finally,the political project of hegemony,referring,as it 
does,to political discourse in the narrow sense -even 
though the economy is not accorded any primordial role in 
determining the hegemonic subjects- is not helpful in 
locating any alternative level of meaning.
We saw that a number of authors,including Marx,can be seen 
as invoking a level of meaning beyond "nature" and yet not 
reducible to thought.Laclau and Mouffe also denounce 
"discourse" as consisting of the "pure expression of
thought",but fail to specify such a level in any sig­
nificant way.Unless,however,a level distinct from ideas and 
yet meaningful is conceptualised,any affirmation of meaning 
beyond ideas or ideologies cannot but ultimately refer back 
to these ideas.This is exactly what happens with Laclau and 
Mouffe's analysis.They can be,therefore,despite their in­
tentions, justifiably accused of idealism.36
In addition,within their theorisation,any differentiation 
between "material" institutions or practices and purely
35. HSS,p.109
36. as,for example,by N.Geras,"Post Marxism?".New Left Review.163 
(1987) or E.M.Wood.The retreat from class.London:Verso.1986
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ideal or ideological elements,any differentiation,that 
is,"within the social production of meaning",cannot be 
taken account of. Thus while it may be that "if the so- 
called non-discursive complexes (institutions, tech­
niques, productive organisation,and so on) are analysed,we 
will find more or less complex forms of differential posi­
tions among objects,which do not arise from a necessity ex­
ternal to the system structuring them and which can there­
fore be conceived as discursive articulations"37,the fact 
remains that these "complex forms of differential 
positions" are different,even if not "ontologically" 
so,from the "discursive"complexes in the narrow 
sense."Capitalism",to put it crudely,is a different kind of 
discursive articulation than,for e x .,populism.
Laclau and Mouffe do recognise the existence of the dif­
ference's when they see capitalism engendering new forms 
of social protest: "Structural transformations of
capitalism that have led to the decline of the classical 
working class,...the increasingly profound penetration of 
capitalist relations of production in areas of social life 
whose dislocatory effects -concurrent with those deriving 
from the forms of bureaucratisation which have charac­
terised the Welfare State- have generated new forms of so­
cial protest"38. "Capitalism" in this case is to differen­
tiated from the forms of social protest it has created and 
their corresponding "ideologies".
However,they do not provide any concepts that could be 
used to distinguish these different types.Thus,the fact 
that a difference between these levels is recognised,just 
as the non-reductionism of the social to the ideal is af­
firmed, is not enough to provide an alternative theorisation 
for the way the social is "meaningful".
37. HSS,p.107
38. PM,p.80
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(ii) If the 1 meaningfillness" of the social is not suffi­
ciently clarified,the actual way the social can be seen as 
non closed,as open and indeterminate,necessarily remains 
also unclarified.
The authors Laclau and Mouffe cite have all specifically 
referred to the the lack of ultimate fixity in the meaning 
of thought or language.Moreover,this openness was always as­
serted through a reference to "something" beyond thought:to 
the motivations lying behind a perlocutionary act 
(Austin),to the practice of application of the rule 
(Wittgenstein),39 or even to a pre ontico/ontological level 
as that on which Heidegger's "Dasein" or Derrida's 
"differance" are seen as operating.Thus,this "something" 
either relates to a social or psychological datum or to the 
postulation of an arch-level beyond the positivity of 
"ontic" -as opposed to ontologic- being.
However,if we lack a theorisation of the way the social 
can be seen as meaningful,except as a reduction to thought 
(and it is difficult,if not impossible for such an account 
to avoid a theorisation of the way a subject is constructed 
and acts) how can we conceive the openness of the social? 
One is only left to imagine it.40
Moreover,even if we do accept an openness through an anal­
ogy or even a reduction of the social to thought or lan­
guage, the "openness” assigned to these by the authors Laclau 
and Mouffe appeal to cannot be transported,unchanged,to the 
level of the social in its empirical specificity.
No empirical/concrete "outside" (of the type Austin or
39. as also,though Laclau and Mouffe do not refer to it,to the 
"subject" and its socio-historical determinations (Horkheimer's criti­
cal theory)
40. This unclarified nature of openess has led commentators to see it 
as implying that "everything is an undifferentiated flux...and (hence) 
is not clear how anything could be heuristically treated as more fixed 
or determinate" (A.Hunter,"Post-Marxism and the new social 
movements".Theory and society.No 17,1988,p.894),or as creating the im­
possibility to conceptualise durable institutions (N.Mouzelis,"Marxism 
or Post-Marxism?".New Left Review 167 (1988),p.113-4).
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Wittgenstein refer to) supporting this openness can be 
claimed.On the other hand Laclau and Mouffe do not indicate 
that they accept Heidegger's or Derrida's 
metaphysics.Instead,they seem to consider that the asser­
tion of the openness of meaning as for example Derrida 
presents it is enough.However,the simple reference to 
developments within a theory of knowledge is not enough to 
make these developments directly applicable to a theorisa­
tion of the social.
In his later "Reflections",Laclau advances somewhat on the 
clarification of the lack of closure he attributes to the 
social.He considers it to refer to a "radical 
indeterminacy":
"Radical indeterminacy does not manifest itself through a 
cancellation of all determinations -this would consist of 
an operation that could only be conceivable on the basis of 
the fullness of the category of "determination" and would 
thus leave the latter intact- but through a subversion of 
all determination,that is through the assertion of its 
presence in a context that destroys its own pos­
sibility . That is precisely what we have termed 
dislocation"41 .
While the reference to a radical indeterminacy is more 
precise than a simple reference to "lack of fixity",the 
question of the way this indeterminacy emerges remains.What 
is its connection with the meaningful character of the 
social? More importantly,why this indeterminacy exists?
As to this "why",Laclau advances a theorisation of 
"antagonism" as the "outside" that subverts any fixity and 
as an alternative to the simple reference to a "surplus of 
meaning" in "Hegemony".
As we have seen the notion of antagonism had already been 
proposed as the necessary precondition for an hegemonic 
practice to be possible.Already it was seen as something
41. NR,p.79
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more than a "floating signifier": "antagonism constitutes
the limits of every objectivity".42
In "Reflections"fantagonism becomes the principal deter­
minant of the openness of the social:"The crucial point is 
that antagonism is the limit of all objectivity.This should 
be understood in its most literal sense:as the assertion 
that antagonism does not have an objective meaning,but is 
that which prevents the constitution of objectivity it­
self.The Hegelian conception of contradiction subsumed 
within it both social antagonisms and the process of 
natural change.This was possible insofar as contradiction 
was conceived as an internal moment of the concept;the 
rationality of the real was the rationality of the sys­
tem, with any "outside" excluded by definition.In our con­
ception of antagonism,on the other hand,we are faced with a 
"constitutive outside".It is an "outside" which blocks the 
identity of the "inside" (and is,nonetheless,the prerequi­
site for its constitution at the same time).With an­
tagonism, denial does not originate from the "inside" of 
identity but,in its most radical sense,from outside:it is 
pure facticity which cannot be referred back to any under­
lying rationality".43
What is this "pure facticity" of antagonism? Laclau ad­
vances through a discussion of the Marxist theory: "the 
contradiction between productive forces and relation of 
production is a contradiction without antagonism" while 
"class struggle is an antagonism without contradiction"44It 
is class struggle that presents the "constitutive outside" 
which "cannot be reintegrated into the forces and relations 
of production schema"45:
42. HSS,p.125
43. NR,p.17
44. NR,p.7
45. NR,p.11
194
"The more the dogmatic rationalism of the primacy of the 
productive forces is abandoned and the more the conduct and 
abilities of the social agents become dependent on concrete 
circumstances and contexts which they have not deter­
mined, the more the effort to determine rational identifi­
able "interests" outside of those circumstances and con­
texts ends up being inconsistent."46
What,therefore,the concept of antagonism refers to is a 
certain indeterminacy of the actors -in our case classes- 
from the structure.lt is a reference to the subject as an 
"outside" and to the autonomy of this subject that an­
tagonism relies on.
However,Laclau and Mouffe had asserted that if the subject 
is "something more" than its structural determinations,if 
it has a specificity and autonomy,it is because of the ope- 
ness of the structure.Hence it is not possible to claim
also that the autonomy of the subject is the cause of the 
structure's openness.The argument would be valid only within 
some version of individualism in which the subject can be 
seen as external to the structure and the autonomy of the 
subject would be considered unlimited.4,7
Thus Laclau's reference to "antagonism" does not provide a 
better explanation for the openness the modality of the so­
cial is seen as implying.
Both the way the social is seen as "meaningful" and in­
determinate and the actual explanation of this indeter-
46. NR,p.15
47. S.Zizek tried to relate the "antagonism" Laclau and Mouffe refer 
to with the notion of the "real" in (late) Lacan as a "certain fissure 
which cannot be symbolised"(S.Zizek,"Beyond discourse analysis" in 
NR,p.249).
In what way can "antagonism" be seen as homologous to the Lacanian 
"real" is not clarified by Zizek.lt is obvious,though,that as the no­
tion stands in Laclau's argument it cannot provide the reason of the 
openess of the social.However,the indication of a relationship between 
the (open) modality of the social and the unconscious is important and 
will be examined more fully in the discussion of Castoriadis that fol­
lows .
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minacy,therefore,remain insufficiently clarified.
A DIRECTION OF DEVELOPMENT
Laclau and Mouffe provide very interesting and suggestive 
directions of theorisation:
They assert the meaningful character of the social beyond 
any distinction between "material" and "ideal".
They assert,as a result of this character of the social,a 
necessary and inescapable openness and indeterminacy of so­
cial structural totalities and hence a break with objec- 
tivist accounts of the social.
Consequently,the emergence of the new in history and a 
certain autonomy from the part of the subject can be ac­
counted for.
However,Laclau and Mouffe fail to specify in what sense 
this "meaning" can exist except as a reduction of the so­
cial to thought or ideas.Consequently,they fail to suffi­
ciently clarify how the openness and indeterminacy exist on 
the level of the social.
They also do not provide a theorisation of subjectivity,of 
structuration or of social action that would support their 
claims for the subject.
Thus,while their theorisation is very evocative and in­
spiring, it indicates a direction of development rather than 
a mapping of this development itself.
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(VII). C .CASTORIADIS1 "IMAGINARY INSTITUTION"
THE MODALITY OF "MAGMAS"
AND THE "SOCIAL IMAGINARY SIGNIFICATIONS"
The social-historical has,for Castoriadis1,"always been 
split into a society,related to something other than itself 
and,generally,to a norm,end or telos grounded in something 
else,and a history,considered as something that happens to 
this society,as a disturbance in relation to a given norm 
or as an organic or dialectical development towards this 
norm,end or telos.In this way,the object in question,the 
being proper to the social-historical,is constantly shifted 
towards something other than itself and absorbed in it".2 
Castoriadis wants to think "the being proper to the social- 
historical" in a novel way.To do so he has to break with 
the "inherited logic-ontology" within which the traditional 
conceptualisation of the social has been elaborated:
"For the past 25 centuries Greco-Western thinking has con­
stituted, developed, amplified and refined itself on the
basis of the thesis:being is being something determined 
(einai ti),speaking is saying something determined (ti
legein)".3
For Castoriadis this thesis corresponds to what he terms
ensemblist-identitary logic (logique ensembliste-
1. We refer mainly to the later phase of C.Castoriadis* work,roughly 
from 1965 onwards,which culminates in the "Imaginary institution of 
society” (1975) (Part I,"Marxism and revolutionary theory" written in 
1965) and includes three collections of articles under the general 
heading "Crossroads in the labyrinth".Castoriadis' earlier work,of a 
more Marxist and more grounded nature is by no means incompatible with 
this later phase (Castoriadis himself repeatedly traces the con­
tinuities through references to this earlier work).
2. C.Castoriadis, The imaginary institution of society (1975). 
Cambridge:Polity Press,1987 (thereafter IIS),p.167
3. IIS,p.221
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identitaire4 ): identitary because it posits each thing "as
distinct and definite (which) implies,at the very 
least,that it is posited in its pure self-identity and in 
its pure difference with respect to everything that is not 
itself115 .Within this logic "everything that exists is 
determinable ,in the sense that it possesses an immanent 
potential for being defined and distinguished"6 
The most advanced and the richest achievement of this 
logic is mathematics.The definition of a set (ensemble) in 
its classic form by Cantor,as "a collection into a whole of 
definite and distinct objects of our intuition or of our 
thought" expresses exactly the identitary character of this 
logic that permeates the whole of mathematics.Thus a set 
represents a scheme of union that allows "distinct objects 
to be assembled into a whole,which is itself a distinct 
and definite object of a higher type"7 .
Castoriadis sees this logic as the expression of a neces­
sary and always present modality of every society:
"If society is to exist,if a language is to be established 
and if it is to function,if a thoughtful practice is to 
develop,if people are to be able to relate to one another 
other than through phantasies,then,in one way or another,on 
a certain level,an a certain layer or stratum of social 
doing and representing,everything must be made consequent 
with what Cantor's definition implies...(because)... in or­
der to speak of a set or an ensemble,or to think of one,we 
must be able to distinguish-choose-posit-assemble-count-say 
objects"8 .
4. it has been translated also as set-theoretical/identitary logic in 
Crossroads in the Labyrinth (1978).Brighton:Harvester Press,1984,p.vii
5. IIS,p.224
6. C.Castoriadis,"Modern science and philosophical interrogation" 
(1973),in "Crossroads in the labyrinth",op.cit.,p.210
7. IIS,p.224
8. IIS,p.223
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This identitary dimension of the social is manifested in 
social representing,or "legein" as well as in social 
doing,or "teukhein":
"Legein"(from the Greek logos) is defined as 
"distinguishing- choosing- positing- assembling- counting 
-speaking"9 .The principal manifestation of legein is 
through language.lt refers to the identitary/ensemblist
aspect of language,language as a formal system,"to the ex­
tent that language organises itself in an identitary man­
ner, that is to say,to the extent that it is a system of en­
sembles (or of ensemblisable relations)"10.
Language is both a manifestation of "legein" and the
means for further establishment of sets of significations 
that are subjected to an ensemblist-identitary opera­
tion. "The vast majority of the significations that can be 
termed "rational"("concepts") are constructed by refining 
and developing the elements of this code of significa­
tions, involving exclusively operations of iden­
titary, ensemblist logic".11
At the same time as manifested in social representing and 
particularly in language -as "legein"- the
ensemblist / identitary logic is also manifested in social 
doing,as "teukhein":
"Teukhein"(making/doing in Ancient Greek) is defined by 
Castoriadis as "assembling-adjusting-fabricating-
constructing.lt is,therefore,making (something) to be 
a s ... starting from...in a manner appropriate to..and in 
view o f ...Teukhein separates "elements",fixes them as 
such,orders them,combines them,unites them into totalities 
and organised hierarchies of totalities within the field
9. ibid.
10. IIS,p.238.It is this aspect of language that is analysed by struc­
tural linguistics.
11. IIS,p.243
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of doing"12.
Teukhein and legein are interrelated:"Teukhein intrinsi­
cally implies legein,is in a sense legein and vise 
versa.Legein is not legein if it is not an organised 
totality of efficacious operations with a "material" 
basis.Teukhein is not teukhein if it is not the positing of 
distinct and definite elements involved in functional 
relations"13.
Legein and teukhein are thus the complementary manifesta­
tions of ensemblist-identitary logic: "just as legein in­
carnates and brings into being the enseblist-identitary 
dimension of language,and more generally,of social repre­
senting, so teukhein incarnates and brings into being the 
enseblist-identitary dimension of social doing of 
activity"14.
However,this ensemblist/identitary level of social 
representing/doing refers only to one layer of the so­
cial. It is "surrounded" by/based on/transcended by/limited 
by a layer that cannot be fully subsumed under identitary 
logic,which cannot even be fully grasped since understand­
ing operates through identitary logic.This other layer is 
what Castoriadis calls the"magma of social imaginary 
significations".It is what operates in the imaginary 
dimension,is presupposed by legein and teukhein and in­
stitutes the social.
This imaginary dimension implies a modality that is radi­
cally different from traditional schemata of the social,a 
modality that breaks with ensemblist/identitary logic and 
which is that of "magma":
"A magma is that from which one can extract (or in which 
one can construct) an infinite number of ensemblist or-
12. IIS,p.260
13. IIS,p.261
14. IIS,p.264
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ganisations but which can never be reconstituted (ideally) 
by a (finite or infinite) ensemblist composition of these 
organisations".15
The mode of being of significations is that of magma: "Any 
signification,including those that do refer to the real or 
the rational is essentially indefinite and undermined;when 
we take into consideration the full being of significa­
tion, enseblist-identitary logic has no real hold on 
it... Significations,if grasped in their fullness,are not 
elements and do not compose sets"16.
Thus a signification is "infinitely determinable without 
thereby being determined"17.What escapes determination is 
the flow of meaning that surrounds every signification and 
always allows a different determination to be added 
without,for that,ever exhausting its "meaning".What has 
been traditionally described as connotation (as distinct 
from denotation) was referring to this infinitude of deter­
minations .However, since this distinction was established 
within a traditional-essentialist framework,it introduces a 
definition,an "essence" which can be grasped by 
"denotation",a proper meaning as oppossed to the infinitude 
of connotations.18Indeed an intuitive support for the no­
tion of magma can be "all the significations of the English 
language or all the representations of one's life"19.
15. IIS,p.343.Castoriadis has also proposed a formal definition of 
magma in a logico/mathematical way in ’’Logique des Magmas et Question 
de 1 * Autonomie” (1981) (thereafter LM) in Domaines de l ’homme. 
Paris:Seuil, 1986,p.394-395
16. IIS,p.238
17. IIS,p.346
18. ’’The idea of denotation necessarily implies an ontology of 
substance-essence,of ousia,of a being which in itself is definite and 
distinct outside of language,complete and closed in on itself,to which 
the word would be addressed’’ (IIS,p.347)
19. IIS,p.344
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The social/historical is also,primarily,a magma,that of 
"social imaginary significations":
"The institution of society is the institution of a magma 
of social imaginary significations20... society is not a 
set,neither a structure nor a hierarchy of sets or
structures:it is a magma and a magma of magmas".21
These social imaginary significations are manifested 
through "legein" and "teukhein",they are the "background" 
out of which legein and teukhein may emerge.
"Legein" in language -i.e. language as a code- is based on 
language as "langue,to the extent that it refers to a magma 
of significations"22.
As for "teukhein","ends and significations are posited 
together in and through technique and teukhein -just as
significations are posited in and through legein.In a 
sense,the tools and instruments of a society are
significations;they are the "materialisation" of the imagi­
nary significations of that society in the identitary and 
functional dimension.An assembly line is (and can only ex­
ist as) the "materialisation" of a host of imaginary sig­
nifications central to capitalism".23
Thus the "magma" of social imaginary significations exists 
in the "materiality" of individuals and things:
"The institution of society is what it is and as it is to 
the extent that it "materialises" a magma of social imagi­
nary significations,in reference to which individuals and
objects alone can be grasped and even simply exist.Nor can 
this magma be spoken in isolation from the individuals and 
objects that it brings into being.What we have here are not 
significations that would be "freely detachable" from any
20. IIS,p.359
21. IIS,p.228
22. IIS,p.238
23. IIS,p.361
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material support,purely ideal poles;rather it is in and 
through the being and being-thus of this "support" that 
these significations exist and are such as they are"24.
HISTORY AND RADICAL ALTERITY
The modality of "magma" is correlative,for Cas- 
toriadis,with a denial of any ultimate determination of the 
social,any reduction of it to an "outside".He uses the term 
"institution" (of society) to stress the creative/ undeter­
mined character of the social both in relation to nature 
and in the context of history.
For Castoriadis "society leans on nature.But to say that 
the institution of society leans on the organisation of the 
first natural stratum,means that it does not reproduce or 
reflect this organisation,is not determined by it in any 
way.Instead society finds in it a series of condi­
tions, supports and stimuli,stops and obstacles"25.
The magma of social imaginary significations has always a 
non-necessary character in respect to the
biological/natural stratum.The "natural" fact of being-male 
and being-female is transformed into an "imaginary social 
signification of being-man and being-woman which refers to 
the magma of all the imaginary significations of the 
society considered.Neither this transformation itself nor 
the specific tenor of the signification in question can be 
deduced,produced or derived on the basis of the natural 
fact,which is always and everywhere the same1126.
Thus the social "emerges as the other with respect to na­
t u r e ' s  the creation of the social imaginary"27.
At the same time the modality of magma implies a similar
24. IIS,p.356
25. IIS,p.234
26. IIS,p.229
27. IIS,p.354
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indeterminacy in the emergence of the new in history.
Traditional thought,within an identitary/ensemblist 
framework, has conceived historical time through the 
schemata of "causality,final aim,or logical
consequence".All three imply that "succession can only be 
thought from the point of view of identity (because) 
causality,finality and implication are merely amplified and 
unfolded forms of an enriched identity;they aim at positing 
differences as merely apparent and at finding,at another 
level,the same to which these differences belong"28.
For Castoriadis,on the contrary,"what is given in and 
through history is not the determined sequence of the 
determined but the emergence of radical otherness,immanent 
creation,non-trivial novelty29...History is the emergence 
of the radical otherness or of the absolutely new".30
This "immanent creation and radical otherness" implies a 
different conception of time.If time is seen as a scheme of 
succession between already given entities,"if it is a 
return of the same either as the unalterable cyclicity of 
becoming -as in ancient cosmologies- or simply as repeti­
tion in and through causal determination...(then) the mode 
of co-belonging of its parts or moments is the same as the 
mode of co-belonging of the parts or points of space"31.
This specialisation of time,its reduction to extension,is 
impossible to be transcended as long as one "maintains the 
traditional determinations of being -that is,being as 
determinacy"32.To avoid this reduction what has to be in­
troduced is precisely "radical otherness,that is absolute
28. IIS,p.172
29. IIS,p.184
30. IIS,p.172
31. IIS,pp.188-9
32. IIS,p.192
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creation...What emerges (has to be seen as) not in what ex­
ists, not even "logically" or as an already constituted 
"potentiality"...not as the actualisation of pre-determined 
possibilities (the distinction between power and act is 
only the most subtle and most profound manner of suppress­
ing time)."33
In this way "time is not simply and not only in­
determination but the springing forth of determina­
tions, or, better yet,of other eide -images-figures- 
forms".And it is as "this time,the time of otherness and 
alteration that we have to think of history".34
Thus while "there can be and,in fact,there always is a 
persistence or a subsistence of certain
determinations",there never exists,in history,a
full,principal,or essential determinacy.Historical change 
is characterised -for Castoriadis- by an essential 
indetermination35.
The way this indetermination appears in actual history is 
through the "creative capacity of the anonymous collec­
tivity's it is manifested clearly,for example,in and 
through the creation of language,of family forms,of 
morality,of ideas,etc.1136
SOCIAL IMAGINARY SIGNIFICATIONS
AND THE INDIVIDUAL UNCONSCIOUS 
The question may arise as to whether the social imaginary 
significations Castoriadis refers to exist in any other way 
than through the identitary formations of "legein" or 
"teukhein" they produce.
33. IIS,p.190
34. ibid.
35. IIS,p.199
36. C.Castoriadis,"Psychanalyse et Politique" (1987),in Le Monde mor- 
cele. Paris:Seuil,1990,p.l48
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Castoriadis does indicate a level where these significa­
tions exist "as such".This is the level of the individual 
unconscious which -the unconscious- has moreover the 
modality of a magma:
Castoriadis stresses that for Freud,the unconscious "is 
unaware of time and contradiction:the unconscious con­
stitutes a "place" where (identitary) time -as determined 
by and as itself determining an ordered succession- does 
not exist,where contraries do not exclude one another...on 
the essential stuff of the unconscious,the repre­
sentation, we can say practically nothing if we confine our­
selves to our customary logic.The unconscious exists only 
as an indissociably representative /affective/ intentional 
flux"37.
For Castoriadis the modality of this representative 
flux,has all the qualities he attributes to the modality of 
"magma".(Indeed it could be said thatitis the unconscious 
that primarily serves him as a model for the notion of 
"magma"):
"The a-logic of the unconscious is something quite dif­
ferent from the juxtaposition of several different ex­
emplars of the same logic.The unconscious does not belong 
to the domain of identitary logic and determination.A 
product and continuing manifestation of the radical im­
agination, its mode of being is that of magma".38
Having specified the identity of modalities between the 
Freudian unconscious and his "magma",Castoriadis proceeds 
to present a theorisation -based on Freud- of the develop­
ment of the psyche in the early years of life.
He considers that there is an inherent,and ir­
reducible, ability of the psyche for the creation of 
representations:
37. IIS,p.274
38. IIS,p.281
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"Psychical life can exist only if the psyche is this 
original capacity to make representations arise,and,"at the 
start",a "first" representation which must,in a certain 
manner,contain within itself the possibility of organising 
all representations...hence in as embryonic a form as one 
may like,the organising elements of the psychical world 
that will later develop,with decisive additions coming from 
outside but which are,nevertheless,received and elaborated 
in accordance with the requirements posited by the original 
representation"39.
This capacity to make representations arise,Castoriadis 
terms "radical imagination":"One must admit that originary 
phantasmatisation,which I term the radical imagination,pre­
exists and presides over every organisation of drives,even 
the most primitive one,that it is the condition for the
drive to attain psychical existence"40.
This originary phantasmatisation precedes the emergence of 
an "I":"the unconscious intention is the global situation 
staged by the phantasy in the fundamental modality of the 
lack of distinction between the subject and the non­
subject"41 .
In its initial,monadic state,the psyche is totally
enclosed to itself."Unconscious desire is fulfilled ipso 
facto as soon as it arises,fulfilled on the only level that 
matters,that of the unconscious representation"42.
However,this monadic state is soon breached.The break-up
leans on somatic needs,mainly hunger: "An "outside" is
created so that the psyche can cast off into it whatever it 
does not want,whatever there is no room for in the 
psyche,non-sense or negative meaning,the breast as ab-
39. IIS,p.283
40. IIS,p.287
41. IIS,p.286
42. IIS,p.298
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sent,the bad breast43 ...At the same time,the other side of 
the breast,the present or gratifying breast,continues to 
submit to the schema of inclusion1144.
These two sides are gradually "connected to a third entity 
which is the ground of both of them without being identical 
with either of them"45.This third entity is the other per­
son, usually the mother.
Through the "other",the whole world of social significa­
tions is transmitted to the chiId.The other "speaks to the 
child and speaks of himself both in his words and his be­
haviour, his corporeal manner of being and of doing,of 
touching,of taking and handling the child,he em­
bodies, presentifies, figures the world instituted by society 
and refers to this world in an indefinite diversity of 
ways"46.
At this stage identification "ceases to be autistic iden­
tification and begins to become transitive identifica­
tion, the identification with something or someone 
(generally both at once)"47.
Thus the "private objects" of cathexis of the psyche are 
replaced by socially instituted ones:"For the sub­
ject, "objects" no longer exist,but instead things and 
individuals;no longer private signs and words,but a public 
language"48.The "proto-pleasure of the psychical monad",the 
"erotic" pleasure of the "body",are replaced by a "third 
pleasure",a social one:"the individual can (now) and must 
be able to find pleasure in modifying the "state of
43. IIS,p.303
44. IIS,p.304
45. ibid.
46. IIS,p.306
47. IIS,p.307
48. IIS,p.313
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affairs" outside of himself or in the perception of such a 
"state of affairs".The "nature" of these affairs matters 
little -on the understanding,of course,that these are so­
cial affairs"49.
This process by means of which the psyche is "forced to 
replace its "own" or "private" objects of cathexis 
(including its own "image of itself") by objects which ex­
ist and which have worth in and through their social in­
stitution, and out of these to create for itself
"causes","means" or "supports" of pleasure"50 is that of 
sublimation.
However,the "other" is still seen by the infant as a
projection of the infant's own imaginary scheme of om­
nipotence. It is only when the other ceases to be the 
"origin and master of signification" and is realised that 
no specific person is,that the social reality as such is 
established.
This second break-up corresponds to the Oedipus complex,in 
its most general sense,i.e not only in the form it appears 
in Western familial institutions:"the encounter with the 
Oedipal situation sets before the child the unavoidable 
fact of the institution as the ground of signification and 
vice versa,and forces him to recognise the other and human 
others as subjects of autonomous desires,which can interre­
late with one another independently of him to the point of 
excluding him from this circuit"51.Thus the Oedipus for 
Castoriadis corresponds to the establishment of the social 
origin of meaning.
After Oedipus,sublimation and identification continue the 
socialisation of the psyche:"sublimation is in each case 
specific...the institution of society renders obligatory
49. IIS,p.315
50. IIS,p.312
51. IIS,p.310
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for the innumerable individuals of society particular ob­
jects of sublimation to the exclusion of others,and these 
objects are caught up in relations with one another which 
not only give them their signification but make the life of 
society possible as a relatively coherent and organised 
life"52.
The irreducibility of the social
to the individual and vice versa
The social imaginary significations are incor­
porated, thus, once the initial "monadic core" has been 
breached,within the psyche.However,Castoriadis stresses 
that these significations remain irreducible to the 
individual:
"The world of instituted significations cannot be reduced 
to actual individual representations or to their 
"common","average" or "typical part".Significations are ob­
viously not what individuals represent to them­
selves, consciously or unconsciously,or what they think.They 
are that by means of which and on the basis of which in­
dividuals are formed as social individuals...This entails 
-and,to be sure,even requires- that part of the social im­
aginary significations has an actual "equivalent" in the 
individuals (in their conscious or unconscious repre­
sentation, their behaviour,etc.) and that the other can be 
"translated" into them,either directly or indirectly.But 
this is something quite different from their "actual 
presence" or their existing "in person" in the repre­
sentation of individuals"53.
It is only because of the institution of society that the 
complementarity of the individuals in society can be ac­
counted for:
52. IIS,p.318
53. IIS,p.366
210
"There is no serf without a lord,and vice versa...this 
complementarity can exist only through instituted sig­
nifications (it is an aspect of this signification or 
belongs to it).The instituted signification (here the rela­
tion of serfdom) is not the "sum" of these complementary 
significations;it is because the signification is in­
stituted that these representations exist ...and that they 
are complementary"54.
Thus,though social imaginary significations do exist 
within the individual psyche,they do so only in a frag­
mented way.To become intelligible,to acquire a proper mean­
ing, they have to be posed in their totality,which refers to 
the social as an irreducible level.The social imaginary 
significations therefore,are not reducible to the 
(individual) unconscious.
On the other hand,the construction of a social ego does 
not imply that the individual becomes totally assimilable 
to his/hers social position or role:
"The institution of society can never absorb the psyche in 
so far as it is radical imagination -and,moreover,this is a 
positive condition for the existence and the functioning of 
society.The constitution of the social individual does not 
and cannot abolish the psyche's creativity ,its perpetual 
alteration,the representative flux as the continuous emer­
gence of other representations"55.
The social imposes as an organisations constructions 
structuring within the pre-social flow of repre­
sentations, of a social "ego".Yet the overall structure of 
the psyche remains irreducible to this structuring,and al­
lows the emergence of radical alterity even within the so­
cial significations.
Thus,for Castoriadis,"society and psyche are inseparable
54. IIS,p.367
55. IIS,p.321
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and irreducible one to the other"56.Indeed,the relationship 
between the social and the individual is a complex 
one,"which cannot be thought under the categories of the 
whole and its parts,the set and its elements,the universal 
and the particular,etc.In and through its own crea­
tion, society creates the individual and the individuals in 
and through which alone can actually exist.But society is 
not a property of composition;neither is it a whole con­
taining something more and different from its parts...(it 
is) a type of relationship which has no analogy else­
where, has to be reflected upon for itself,starting from it­
self and as a model of itself."5'7
THE THEORISATION OF AUTONOMY
The above theorisation of the social and the individual is 
complemented by Castoriadis1 theorisation of "autonomy".
"Autonomy" is defined,on the level of the individual,as 
"the possibility that the activity proper to the "subject" 
becomes an "object",as "the possibility of putting oneself 
into question".58"The autonomy of the individual consists 
in the instauration of an other relationship between the 
present and the history which made the individual such as 
it is.This relationship makes it possible for the in­
dividual to ...look back upon himself,to reflect on the 
reason for his thoughts and the motives of his acts guided 
by the elucidation of his desire and aiming at truth".59
This "objectification" and "putting oneself into question" 
represents the specificity of human subjectivity,which has
56. IIS,p.320
57. C.Castoriadis,"Power,Politics,Autonomy"(1988) (thereafter PPA),in 
Philosophy.politics.autonomy.Oxford:Oxford University Press,1990, 
p.145
58. C.Castoriadis,"The state of the subject today"(1986)(thereafter 
SST),translated in Thesis Eleven.No 24,1989,p.26
59. PPA,p.165
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to be distinguished from simple consciousness or self- 
referentiality:"mere "consciousness" is far from being able 
to do (this) on its own:one can perfectly well conceive of 
a consciousness that remains a simple spectator,recording 
the processes that unfold in individual life".60
"Self objectification" can also be translated into action: 
"I call capacity for deliberate activity or will the pos­
sibility for a human being to make the results of his/hers 
reflective processes enter into the relays that condition 
his/her acts"61.
The connection between the mode of being of a "magma" and 
the theorisation of autonomy is that the former provides 
the possibility of the latter:"If ensemblist-identitary 
logic totally exhausted what exists,there could never be 
any question of rupture of any kind,and even more of 
autonomy.Everything would be deductible/producible from the 
"already given"...A subject existing totally within a 
ensemblist-identitary universe,not only it could not change 
anything,it could not even know that it exists with such a 
universe62... It is because the human being is imagination 
(non-functional imagination) that it can posit as an 
"entity" something that is not so:its own process of 
thought".63
But this possibility of individual self-reflexivity is so­
cially and hence historically specific:"Individuals aiming 
at autonomy cannot appear unless the social-historical 
field has already altered itself in such a way that it 
opens a space of interrogation without bounds (without an 
instituted or revealed truth,for example)".64
60. SST,p.37
61. SST,p.28
62. LM,p.412 (my translation)
63. SST,p.27
64. PPA,p.166
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It is only with societies that "put into question their 
proper institutions and significations"65,i.e autonomous 
societies,that autonomous individuals can emerge.
Such societies have appeared only twice in history: "in 
Greece from the eight century B.C. onward and in Western 
Europe from the twelfth to thirteen centuries onward".66
The political project of autonomy,consequently,is for Cas­
toriadis to "create the institutions which,by being inter­
nalised by individuals,facilitate most their accession to 
their individual autonomy and their effective participation 
in all forms of explicit power existing in society".6’7
However,autonomy can never lead -either on an individual 
or a social level- to full transparency: "No society will 
ever be totally transparent,first because the individuals 
that make it will never be transparent to themselves,since 
there can be no question of eliminating the uncon­
scious .Then, because the social element implies not only in­
dividual unconsious,nor even simply mutual intersubjective 
inherencies,(but also) the relationships between per­
sons, both conscious and unconscious,which could never be 
given in its entirety as a content to all,unless we were to 
introduce the double myth of an absolute knowledge 
possessed equally by all:the social implies something that 
can never be given as such".6®
Castoriadis discusses also historical instances when 
autonomy is manifested,through the interrogation of past 
and creation of new institutional features by the com­
munity's the Paris commune,the 1905 creation of Soviets in 
Russia as also the 1917 factory committees,the 1956 Hun­
garian revolution.These new institutional features were
65. LM,p.411
66. PPA,p.167
67. PPA,p.173
68. IIS,p.Ill
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neither theorised "beforehand" nor could have been 
predetermined.69
CASTORIADIS' FUNDAMENTAL CONTRIBUTION
AND QUESTIONS OPENED 
Castoriadis provides an exhaustive theorisation (from a 
formal ontological point of view) of the kind of modality a 
radical openness indeterminacy of the social entails.This is 
the modality of magma allowing the theorisation of the 
emergence of "the radically other,of immanent creation,of 
non-trivial novelty""70 and hence providing an answer to the 
question of history.
The modality of magma allows also the possibility of non 
determined individual agency.Castoriadis provides,in addi­
t i o n ^  specific theorisation of what autonomy would entail 
at both an individual and social level.
Thus Castoriadis challenges the central assumption behind 
rationalist/objectivist structural theories,that of 
closed,fully determinable social structural entities and 
provides an alternative which also answers the questions of 
agency and history.His contribution is,hence,fundamental.71
However,once the general lines of Castoriadis1 theorisa­
tion have been accepted,certain questions emerge.
The question of totality 
Castoriadis continuously refers to a society,considering 
the magma of imaginary significations as determining one 
totality,that of society.
69. Interview in Esprit.Feb. 1977
70. As also the theorisation of time as not reducible to a spatiality.
71. As we saw,Laclau and Mouffe also indicated a similar ap­
proach. However , Castoriadis’ theorisation of the modality of magma is 
much more exhaustive than a simple reference to the "meaningful" na­
ture of the social and its consequent "openness";moreover Castoriadis 
does offer a theorisation of the subject and of "autonomy".
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Although he does not particularly dwell on this point,he 
nowhere recognises a possible existence of different magmas 
of signification within a particular spatiotemporal co­
ordinates, or, to put it differently,he does not consider 
"partial" structures of a "society" to correspond to dis­
tinct "magmas".
For example,the economy in capitalism is seen as 
"representing the economic signification which in certain 
societies had emerged first as important and then as 
central and decisive. "^Capitalism, then, is not a magma of 
significations in its own right,is not a relatively 
autonomous totality but represents the economic significa­
tion of a greater totality,of a society.
However,a "society" can be defined as such only in the 
presence of a degree of closure vis-a-vis "other" 
societies,a closure that cannot be assumed but has to be 
demonstrated.
A "society" can be defined generally,i.e transhistori- 
cally,only in the context of transhistorical constancy of 
certain elements (as the "functions" in functionalist ap­
proaches are,for example) and Castoriadis,as we 
saw,explicitly denies the presence of any such elements.
Moreover,a reference to a society as a general totality 
implies a pre-established harmony between its different 
parts,which makes difficult the conceptualisation of con­
tradictions and conflict (as also the possibility of having 
structures more dominant than others) and Castoriadis would 
be the last to deny their existence.
One of the important contributions of structuralism was 
the emphasis it placed on the possibility of analysing the 
social through a reference to many structures,irreducible 
to one another and not necessarily belonging to a greater 
totality.
Castoriadis does not have to depart from this position but
72. IIS,p.362,emphasis added
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simply to improve it,theorising also,as he does,structures 
as open.
Therefore it may be that particular "segments" of a world 
of significations represent relatively autonomous and self- 
sustainable magmas of significations,not necessarily 
belonging to a greater totality.Indeed,the modality of mag­
mas implies that any cohesiveness and closure has to be es­
tablished in every particular case.
Moreover,the theorisation of magmas and the recognition 
that the unconscious also has such a modality allows 
precisely the possibility of theorising a simultaneous 
determination of the subject by a plurality of magmas.Many 
magmas of social imaginary significations (not necessarily 
in harmony with each other) can be seen to operate on the 
individual psyche and to fuse with one another on the level 
of the unconscious.Such "fusion" becomes possible only be­
cause a magma is never fully closed.
Thus we can consider the magmas of social imaginary sig­
nifications as corresponding to partial social structures 
rather than to an overall "society",without this changing 
anything for the theorisation of a magma of significa­
tions, nor the implications drawn out of it.
The question of the locus
of social imaginary significations
If Castoriadis1 reference to a totality can be seen as a 
simple lack of precision,the case of the level we are to 
understand the magma of social imaginary significations as 
operating is not so straightforward.
Social imaginary significations are presented by Cas­
toriadis as operating behind and beyond the identitary 
aspects of social doing/representing ("legein" and 
"teukhein"),behind and beyond individuals and 
things,assuring the always indeterminate and open nature of 
this doing and representing.
In his discussion of the "institution" of society,
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however,Castoriadis is not very forthcoming about the level 
of operation (of "existence") of these significations as 
such.7 3
The reference to the institution of society,to the in­
stituting instance,could be taken to introduce something 
like Derrida's differance (or the Heideggerian 
Dasein),subverting any closure but as such not existing,a 
kind of negative essence,or,in Derrida's words,as "the pre­
opening of ontico-ontological difference".If so,we are
faced with the application of a transcendental ontology of
the Derridian/Heideggerian type within the field of the so­
cial .
It is doubtful,however,whether Castoriadis would endorse 
an explicitly Derridian stand.Moreover,as we saw he does 
indicate at least one level at which the SIS exist as such
-i.e. as a magma:the level of the (individual) unconscious
which also has the modality of magma74.
Could it be,then,that it is because the social imaginary 
significations exist -in some way- within the unconscious 
and because the unconscious has the modality of magma that 
significations and the social in general also has this 
modality?
Could it be,in other words,that the openness the modality 
of the magma introduces to the social,passes through the 
mode of existence of the social within the individual and 
specifically within the level of the unconscious?
73. For example,Castoriadis writes: "The world of social significa­
tions is to be thought of not as an irreal copy of a real worldjnor as 
formed by that which is "expressible" in individual repre­
sentations. . .not,finally,as a system of relations which would be added 
onto subjects and objects which themselves are given fully and which 
would modify,in this or that historical context,their 
properties,effects or behaviour.We are to think of the world of social 
significations as the primary,inaugural,irreducible positing of the 
social-historical and of the social imaginary as it manifests itself 
in each case in a given society."(IIS,p.368)
74. though,as we saw,Castoriadis insists that "the world of instituted 
significations cannot be reduced to actual individual representations"
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Castoriadis does indicate the possibility of such an in­
terpretation. He does not,however,commit himself to it.
Is the social primarily significations?
Even if this interpretation is accepted,though,further 
questions remain:
Can we confine the indeterminacy and openness the mode of 
being of magma postulates only to "significations"? Cor- 
relatively,is the social "open" only because social imagi­
nary significations have the modality of magma?
Referring to the psyche,Castoriadis recognises that the 
unconscious is an "indissociably representative/ affective/ 
intentional flux" and accepts that "I have spoken mainly 
the language of representation because...it is the aspect 
about which we can more easily and directly speak. "'75Yet he 
does reduce the social determination of the unconscious to 
the incorporation of the social imaginary significations 
alone.
Indeed Castoriadis often gives the impression that for him 
the social is simply the actualisation of some "central im­
aginary significations",which however "imaginary" and 
"materialised" in practice they may be,they remain a kind 
of ideas,a weltanschaung.7e‘
The possibility exists,though,that the social may operate 
on the structuring of the psyche in general and of the un­
conscious in particular in some other way as well.Social 
determinations may exist which,though expressible through
75. C.Castoriadis,"Fait et a faire" in G.Busino et al.Autonomie et 
Autotransformation de la societe:La philosophie militante de 
C.Castoriadis,Geneve:Droz,1989,p.476
76. This for example is the case in his presentation of significations 
"giving a meaning” to the social world,this being the "religious core" 
of institution of society ("Institution de societe et religion" 
(1982),"Domaines de l fhomme",op.cit.,p.369) or his reference to 
capitalism as corresponding to a central core of significations in­
dicating "the unlimited expansion of the "rational" matrix" ("Le 
regime social de la Russie" (1978),"Domaines..,",p.l97).
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representations on the level of the individual psyche,in 
their "social" form do not originate from and are not 
transmitted as representations.
Correlatively,if we want to theorise social practice and 
social action and its specificity -a specificity that Bour- 
dieu,for example,indicates- within Castoriadis1 scheme we 
can only see it as the actualisation of social imaginary 
significations in practice.
Castoriadis does not present a detailed and elaborated ac­
count of the ways in which the social "operates" on the in­
dividual psyche -and hence the ways in which the social is 
reproduced through individual action in practice.He limits 
his analysis to the very first years in life.Beyond these 
he simply refers to the "psyche's capacity of sublimation" 
and its consequent more full socialisation.But whether 
these processes involve something more than simply an in­
ternalisation of social imaginary significations to a 
greater degree is not clarified.
The possibility exists,therefore,that a more detailed 
theorisation of the ways in which the social determines the 
individual and a corresponding theorisation of social prac­
tice and social action could expand Castoriadis' reference 
on significations and allow a more comprehensive theorisa­
tion of practice.
The question of activeness and autonomy
Castoriadis provides a theorisation of autonomy as the 
possibility of "putting oneself into question",a pos­
sibility linked to society itself being able to question 
its "institution".
However,this theorisation of autonomy seems to refer to 
the highest possible degree of self-reflectiveness and 
self-objectification (in the sense that this reflectiveness 
addresses the greatest possible number of determinations) 
both at an individual and at a social level.
The "activeness" of the social actor which hermeneutically
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oriented micro sociology highlights (and which Giddens and 
Bourdieu have tried to theorise) seems to refer rather to a 
self-reflexivity of a more instrumental type,one that does 
not imply any "putting into question" but rather the 
successful use of the existing norms or rules.Castoriadis1 
own earlier work repeatedly focuses on creativity at a 
"micro" level,as for example in the case of the workers in 
a factory creating new forms of organisation or resis­
tance.This "creation",though it presupposes some degree of 
"putting into question",it doesn't obviously refer to a 
questioning of the totality of instituted society.
Thus we have to distinguish "degrees of autonomy",besides 
autonomy in the strict sense that Castoriadis theorises,and 
to theorise these degrees,something that remains to be 
elaborated.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Castoriadis theorises in an exhaustive way a modality of 
the social, alternative to fully determined,closed struc­
tural entities.He indicates the consequences of this 
theorisation for the conceptualisation of the emergence of 
the new in history and for the theorisation of 
autonomy,which he also provides.
Thus the move beyond structural/objectivist accounts of 
the social that Derrida may be seen as indicating and 
Laclau and Mouffe are also proposing in a less developed 
way,is further advanced.
However,the mode of existence of the "magmas of social im­
aginary significations" and the limitation of the social to 
these significations remain problematic.How do social im­
aginary significations exist if not as a kind of negative 
essence behind the possibility of the social? In addi­
t i o n ' s  the openness of the social limited to the mode of 
being of these significations?
Moreover,a full account of the ways the social determines 
the individual; a theorisation of social action that would
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allow to conceptualise how the openness the modality of 
magma implies is manifested; and a theorisation of active­
ness -i.e. not of autonomy in the strict sense- from the 
part of the actors,all these remain to be further 
elaborated.
Regarding the way the magmas of social imaginary sig­
nifications exist,Castoriadis himself offers a possible in­
terpretation in his recognition that the individual uncon­
scious also has the modality of magma.It could be 
argued,then,that it is because the social exists on this 
unconscious level that it can be said to have this 
modality,thus avoiding any transcendentalism.
It is possible then,that,if we explore more fully the ways 
in which the social interacts with the individual uncon­
scious, we could both support this interpretation and 
address also the other questions Castoriadis' theory gen­
erates.
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A DIRECTION FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
The path from Derrida to Laclau & Mouffe to Castoriadis 
indicates a move from a general theorisation of openness" 
and indeterminacy to the affirmation that it is the social 
as such that is characterised by this openness.This affirma­
tion corresponds to a theorisation of the modality of the 
social as different from that of fully determined and 
closed structural entities.
Once such an alternative modality has been theorised -in 
its most developed form by Castoriadis- and its necessary 
implications for the emergence of the new in history and 
the autonomy of the subject have been recognised,the break 
with structural/objectivist theories of the social and 
their problems can be considered as complete.(Structuration 
theories which identified the problems but did not address 
the question of the modality of the social have been unable 
to effect this break.)
However,the authors we refer to have neglected somewhat 
the theorisation of the ways in which the social determines 
the individual and is reproduced by individual (social) ac­
tion, i.e. precisely these aspects the theories of struc­
turation have focused on.
Moreover,the way in which this alternative modality is to 
be seen to operate -to "exist"- in "reality",remains un­
clarified. How is the social to be seen as "meaningful" as 
Laclau and Mouffe assert or as "a magma of imaginary 
significations" as Castoriadis asserts,without its reduc­
tion to ideas? How can the openness",the "radical 
indeterminacy" be seen to operate if not at some transcen­
dental level,behind the positivity of social phenomena and 
yet somehow determining these phenomena?
If a resort to a transcendental level is to be avoided as 
also any reification of the social and if the social is 
seen as primarily existing within and through the in-
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dividuals,then maybe the above questions can be answered 
precisely through a more detailed elaboration of a theory 
of structuration,i.e. of the modalities of production and 
reproduction of the social through the individuals.If we 
want to theorise a certain "openness” and indeterminacy in a 
non transcendental way,it has to be located within the 
reproduction of the social through individual action.
Obviously,such a theory of structuration cannot be like 
Giddens': it has to acknowledge the social construction of
the individual.More importantly,it has also to be oriented 
towards the conceptualisation of the modality of the social 
as "open".
Castoriadis indicates a possible path such a theory may 
follow:it is by addressing the question of the uncon­
scious, its modality and its social -or not- nature.
To pursue this path,we turn to the actual psychoanalytic 
theorisation of the psyche in general and of the uncon­
scious in particular,from Freud's original formulations to 
later developments.
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PART III: FREUD AND PSYCHOANALYSIS:
FROM A THEORY OF THE PSYCHE TO A THEORY OF THE SOCIAL
The psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche has,as we 
will argue,specific insights to offer to a theorisation of 
the interface between the individual psyche and the social.
This is not an uncontroversial assertion: psychoanalysis
has repeatedly proclaimed its uniqueness,its irreducibility 
to a sociology and its indissociable link with analytic 
practice.However,if the psychoanalytic approach allows a 
theorisation of the psyche in general,as it claims,it can­
not avoid facing,sooner or later,the question of the social 
(no doubt within analytic practice as well).
In what follows we shall concentrate on these elements of 
psychoanalytic theory that are of interest in the context 
of the interface of the individual and the social (before 
proceeding to theorise precisely this interface).The ac­
count of psychoanalysis presented is,therefore, a limited 
and partial one,geared to a particular aim.
Freud's own writings will be used as the base reference 
throughout not only because of his being the founder of 
psychoanalytic discourse -of an immense "field of 
discursivity" in Foucault's words- but also because his 
work remains the most comprehensive and profound account of 
psychoanalytic theory and its implications.While others 
have made important contributions to particular areas (and 
we will refer to such contributions that are of interest to 
the present analysis) none has matched the amazing 
breadth,insight and profundity of Freud's own work.
225
(VIII). ELEMENTS FROM THE PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORISATION OF THE PSYCHE
(A). THE SPECIFICITY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
If we were to indicate in one word Freud's most important 
contribution,this word would undoubtedly be the
"unconscious"1.
The notion of "something" beyond consciousness,of an un­
conscious's not alien to the history of Western
thought.Specifically in the modern period,from the 18th
century onwards,many references to an unconscious can be 
found2 .Indeed,we noted above that the modern notion of the 
social necessarily introduces a level of phenomena 
that,though produced by individuals,are nonetheless to a 
certain extent opaque to them.The modern notion of the so­
cial necessitates,therefore,a certain notion of the 
unconscious.3
However,Freud sees the unconscious as a specific and ir­
reducible level of human psychical functioning.lt is the
theorisation of this specificity and irreducibility that 
forms Freud's particular contribution.
1.THE PSYCHE AS ALWAYS REPRESENTED
Freud introduces the unconscious as one of three levels of 
psychical functioning,the other two being the Preconscious 
and Consciousness or the Conscious (Ucs,Pcs,Cs).This dis­
tinction came to be known as the first Freudian topography
1. J.Laplanche & J.B.Pontalis.The Language of Psychoanalysis (1967). 
London:Karnac Books,1988 (Thereafter LP),p.474
2. a detailed account can be found in L.Whyte.The unconscious before 
Freud.London:Tavistock,1962
3. Foucault has remarked that "the unconscious and the human sciences
are,at an archaeological level contemporaries" (M.Foucault.The Order
of things.London:Tavistock.1974.p.326).
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of the psyche.
The central distinction,however,is between the Unconscious 
and the Conscious,the Preconscious "sharing the charac­
teristics of the system Cs"4.
Consciousness
For Freud "the process of something becoming conscious is 
above all linked with the perceptions which our sense- 
organs receive from the external world"5.But "in men inter­
nal processes in the ego also acquire the quality of con­
sciousness .This is the work of the function of speech,which 
brings material in the ego into a firm connection with 
mnemic residues of visual,but more particularly of auditory 
perceptions"6 .
Hence consciousness is necessarily linked with percep­
tion, either external or internal and the residues of per­
ception. Consciousness is always connected,in other words,to 
a certain kind of "representatives".
The unconscious
The unconscious is presented by Freud as primarily a field 
of energy in continuous movement,a field of force.It is the 
field of the energy of the instincts,of the drives 
(triebe): "The chief characteristic of these processes (of 
the primary process in the dreamwork) is that the whole 
stress is laid upon making the cathecting energy mobile and 
capable of discharge;the content and the proper meaning of 
psychical elements,to which the cathexes are attached are
4. S.Freud.The Unconscious (1915) .Penguin Freud Library (P.F.L.) 11, 
Harmondsworth:Penguin,1984 (thereafter Unc),p.l75. Edition used for 
Freud's works:Penguin/Pelican Freud Library (P.F.L.),fifteen volumes, 
which reprints the Standard edition in a paperback form.
5. S.Freud.An outline of psychoanalysis (1938).(thereafter Outline), 
P.F.L. 15,Harmondsworth:Penguin,1986 ,p.395
6. ibid.
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treated as of little consequence.1 v
Even this field of energy,however,Freud insists that 
should be always seen as connected with
"representations".He uses the term "Reprasentanz" 
(representative/representation) and the term "besetz" (to 
cathect;literally to occupy,with a connotation of force,as 
in military occupation) to indicate that the instinctual 
energy is always connected with "ideas,objects",that it 
employs "presentations" deriving from memory traces,as its 
"inhibited energy strives to find an outlet"8 :
"An instinct can never become the object of consciousness 
-only the idea that represents the instinct can.Even in the 
unconsious,an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than 
by an idea.If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea 
or manifest itself as an affective state,we could know 
nothing about it.When we nevertheless speak of a repressed 
instinctual impulse,the looseness of the phraseology is a 
harmless one.We can only mean an instinctual impulse the 
ideational representative of which ("den Trieb reprasen- 
tierende Vorstellung") is unconscious,for nothing else 
comes into consideration".9
Thus,despite the fact that the unconscious is energy,it 
operates always through a connection with "representatives" 
(reprasentanz).As Ricoeur remarks:
"At a certain point the question of force and the question 
of meaning coincide;that point is where instincts are indi­
cated, are made manifest,are given in a psychical repre­
sentative,!^. in something psychical that "stands for" 
them;all the derivatives in consciousness are merely trans­
formations of this psychical representative,of this primal
7. S.Freud.The interpretation of Dreams (1900).P.F.L. 4,Harmondsworth: 
Penguin,1976 (thereafter Dreams),p.765
8. Dreams,p.765
9. Unc,p.l79
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"standing for".To designate this point,Freud coined the ex­
cellent expression Reprasentanz.Instincts,which are 
energy,are "represented" by something psychical.But we must 
not speak of representation in the sense of Vorstel- 
lung,i.e. an "idea" of something,for an idea is itself 
derived from this "representative" which,before repre­
senting things -the world,one's own body,the unreal- stands 
for instincts as such,presents them purely and simply."10
Castoriadis,as we saw,also stresses this point:"the uncon­
scious exists only as an indissociably representative/ 
affective/ intentional flux"11
Affects
There is,however, a case in which psychical energy seems 
to appear as such,i.e. without a "representative".It is the 
case of "emotions","feelings","affects" which are 
manifested in consciousness.
These affective states are manifestations of the instincts 
in the same way that "ideational representatives" are,the 
difference being that "ideas are cathexes -basically of 
memory traces- whilst affects and emotions correspond to 
processes of discharge,the final manifestations of which 
are perceived as feelings"12.
However,even in the case of affects Freud refers to
10. P.Ricoeur.Freud and philosophy.New Haven:Yale University Press, 
1970,p.135
The term Reprasentanz -which has been translated as "representative" 
or "presentation" - indicates precisely this necessary representation 
of an instinct in the psyche,even in the unconscious.The term Vorstel- 
lung -a term with a philosophical past,for example in Kant or Schopen­
hauer ,usually rendered as "ideational" or "idea" - is reserved for 
elements derived from memory traces,i.e from perception, elements 
which can also form the representatives of the instincts.As Ricoeur 
indicates,however,the instinct,even in the absence of such a Vorstel- 
lung cannot be present as such but only through a Reprasentanz.
11. C.Castoriadis,"The imaginary institution of society" (IIS), 
op.cit.,p.274
12. Unc,p.l81
229
"representatives" connected to them.Affects are connected 
to representatives in both consciousness and the uncon­
scious (though in a different way than ideas being directly 
cathected).Indeed one possible difference between conscious 
and unconscious affects is the repression of the "proper 
representative" of an affect and the connection of the af­
fect to another "idea" in order to become conscious.
We can conclude that the psyche,both on the level of con­
sciousness but also -and more importantly- on the level of 
the unconscious,is always -and unavoidably- represented.
The origin of representations
Where do representations come from? Where does psychical 
energy find the "representatives" it employs?
We saw that Freud uses the term "Reprasentanz" to denote 
representation in general.He uses,however,also the term 
"Vorstellung",which he reserves for "ideas" derived from 
memory traces.He distinguishes further between "sach- 
vorstellung" and "wort-vorstellung",rendered as thing 
presentation and word presentation respectively.Both are 
seen as originating out of cathexis of memory traces 
(erinerungsspuren) which in turn originate from percep­
tion. In the case of word presentations these traces are 
connected with words as well as with "images" of ob­
jects, while thing presentations are connected only with 
"images".
Freud is not explicit about the nature of the perceptual 
engraving on the surface of the memory.It seems that there 
are grounds to suggest,though,that even in the case of 
thing presentations he does not uphold an empiricist notion 
of direct,immediate and unproblematic engraving of outside 
"objects" on the "inside" of the psyche13.
13. Laplanche and Pontalis,for ex.,argue that for Freud,"the memory 
trace is simply a particular arrangement of facilitations,so organised 
that one route is followed in preference to another"(LP,p.248)
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However unclarified the actual mechanism of creation of 
memory traces or the precise form of a "sach-vorstellung" 
may be,it is clear that for Freud both thing and word 
presentations come from the "outside" of the psyche through 
perception,even when they refer to the unconscious.
Do we have to infer that,consequently,at the begin­
ning, before any Vorstellungen can be supplied by memory,the 
unconscious and psychical energy in general exist in a 
state of pure energy,as a "pure" field of energy?
The same question about the original state of the uncon­
scious faced Freud regarding repression.For repression to 
operate,"something" to attract the contents of conscious­
ness which are to be repressed is needed.Therefore the un­
conscious has to be already "there" before any operation of 
repression.
Freud considers,therefore,that in order to make subsequent 
repressions possible,there has to exist "a primal repres­
sion^ first phase of repression,which consists in the 
psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct being 
denied entrance into the conscious."14
In this primal repression "we are dealing with an uncon­
scious idea which has as yet received no cathexis from the 
Pcs. and therefore cannot have that cathexis withdrawn from 
it".It is "an anticathexis by means of which the system Pcs 
protects itself from the pressure upon it of the uncon­
scious idea"15.
Thus the possibility of an "unconscious idea" which does 
not originate in consciousness,but it is already there in 
the beginning is introduced.Indeed the notion of primal 
repression has no other function in Freudian theory than to 
denote precisely this fact.In itself it caries no ex­
planatory content other than to indicate that the uncon­
14. S.Freud.Repression (1915).P.F.L. 11,p.147
15. ibid.,p.184
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scious exists as repressed before any elements perceived 
through consciousness are repressed.
Therefore the unconscious can be said to be "represented" 
in the psyche even before memory traces are cathected to 
provide thing or word presentations.As Ricoeur 
remarks:"primal repression means that we are always in the 
mediate,in the already expressed,the already said"16.
The same assumption is made by Freud when he refers to 
primal phantasies (primal scene,castration, intra-uterine 
existence) as phantasies operating "regardless of the per­
sonal experience of different subjects".
Thus we are faced with two kinds of "representatives" in 
the unconscious.On the one hand the ones deriving from 
memory traces,either sach or wort vorstellungen.On the 
other the "primal" representatives,those operating in the 
origin,the very beginning,manifested in primal phantasies 
or primal repression.
Yet within Freud's discussion of the representatives of 
the instincts there is nowhere established a distinction in 
quality between representatives operating through memory 
and the ones "already there".It is as if the innate 
"representatives" of the psyche are of the same nature as 
the ones acquired through memory traces.If the two 
categories can be distinguished, is not because of a 
qualitative difference but because of a difference in 
origins.
In fact we are nowhere faced with any primal repre­
sentatives as such.The representatives of the instincts as 
manifested through consciousness can almost always be seen 
as coming through memory traces,attributable to some past 
experience,however early.Even the case of primal phantasies 
can be seen as referring more to a specific structure or­
ganising the contents of the unconscious,rather as having 
specific contents17.
16. Ricoeur,"Freud and Philosophy",op.cit.,p.141
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Jung,Klein,Lacan,Castoriadis on representations 
To further clarify the question of primal representatives 
we shall briefly refer to the contributions of Jung,Klein 
and Lacan and Castoriadis in this respect.
Jung takes up this primal stratum and accords it a much 
more extended role.He considers it a "collective 
unconscious" beneath the personal unconscious,in which past 
experiences of the human race are "stored".The collective 
unconscious is the source of the "archetypes","inborn forms 
of intuition,of perception and apprehension,which are the 
necessary a priori determinants of all psychic processes"18 
These archetypes are connected with the instincts,they 
are "simply the forms which the instincts assume"19.
For Jung these archetypes continue to have the structural 
character that can be attributed to Freud's primal phan­
tasies. They define the structure of representations rather 
than the representations themselves:
"The archetypal representations (images and ideas) 
mediated to us by the unconscious should not be confused 
with the archetype as such.They are very varied structures 
which all point to one essentially "irrepresentable" basic 
form.The latter is characterised by certain formal elements 
and by certain fundamental meanings,although they can be 
grasped only approximately"20 
Jung,however,extends the scope of these archetypes to 
cover almost the totality of the psychic dispositions,the
17. J.Laplanche & J.B.Pontalis,"Fantasy and the origins of sexuality” , 
The international journal of psychoanalysis.V.49 (1968),p.17
18. C.G.Jung,"Instinct and the Unconscious"(1919) in Collected Works 
V.8 . London:Routledge,1960,p.133
19. ibid.,p.157
20. C.G.Jung,"On the nature of the psyche"(1947) in "Collected Works" 
V.8,op.cit.,p.213
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development of the sexes (in his concept of the "anima"), 
birth,death,parenthood,God,as well as conceptual elements 
such as "chaotic multiplicity and order","duality",the op­
position of light and dark,upper and lower,right and 
left,the union of opposites in a third, the quaternity 
(square,cross), rotation (circle,sphere) and finally the 
centring process and a radial arrangement"21.In fact,in his 
own words,"there is not a single important idea or view 
that does not possess historical antecedents.Ultimately 
they are all formed on primordial archetypal forms whose 
concreteness dates from a time when consciousness did not 
think,but only perceived"22.
Obviously,this assertion is far removed from Freud's 
own,who even in the case of primal phantasies was reluctant 
to assume an outright pre-perception origin.It provides a 
conception of human psyche as predetermined in its essen­
tials and its development which contradicts the plasticity 
Freud saw the drives as having,as well as the importance of 
acquired presentations for the representatives of the in­
stincts .Yet , it rests on enough material to emphasise the 
existence of certain innate structures and symbolic 
predispositions of the psyche.
M.Klein,investigating the very first years of 
life,indicates that there may be "private symbols",before 
the actual acquisition of socially derived ones.The infant 
is seen as having an innate capacity to produce unconscious 
phantasies,related both to external situations (the 
breast,the mother,etc.) and to internal ones coming from 
the function of the organism.These phantasies form the 
basis on which symbol formation develops as the child grows 
up.Externally acquired symbols gradually take the place of 
the earlier,"private" symbols of the phantasies.Even these
21. ibid.,p.203
22. C.G.Jung,"Archetypes of the collective unconscious” (1954) in Col­
lected Works V.9.Part I,London:Routledge,1959,p .33
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earlier symbols,though,are not entirely arbitrary from in­
dividual to individual since they relate to essentially the 
same type of experiences.
In an attempt to systematise the position of the Kleinian 
School,S .Isaacs considers phantasy to be in general "the 
mental corollary,the psychic representative of in­
stinct. There is no impulse,no instinctual urge or response 
which is not experienced as unconscious phantasy".23
Initially phantasy is not derived from reality but "enters 
into the earliest development of the ego in its relation to 
reality and supports the testing of reality and the
development of knowledge of the external world".24 
Gradually,however, the material of phantasy does become 
derived from reality:At the beginning the reality elements 
are visual ones25, to be later expanded to symbols of all 
kinds.
Symbol formation is for Klein a fundamental step in the
development of the human child:"Symbolism is the foundation 
of all sublimation and of every talent,since it is by way 
of symbolic equation that things,activities and interests 
become the subject of libidinal phantasies"26.
Klein and her followers,therefore,attribute a greater im­
portance to innate,primal capabilities of symbol/phantasy 
formation as the psychical representative of the instinct 
than Freud does.Along with Freud,though,they see the con­
tent of these phantasies as being smoothly replaced by ex­
ternal elements,symbols or representatives in general.
The distinction between the two levels of representation
23. S. Isaacs,’’The nature and function of phantasy" (1948) in Klein et 
al.Developments in Psychoanalysis.London:Hogarth Press,1952,p.83
24. ibid.,p.107
25. ibid.,p.105
26. M.Klein,’’The importance of symbol-formation in the development of
the ego" (1930),in M.Klein.Love.guilt and reparationrworks 1921-
1945.London:Virago.1988.p.220
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has been presented by J.Lacan as that between the imaginary 
and the symbolic.The imaginary refers to primary 1 images" 
and specifically to the imago of the self which the child 
recognises "from the sixth month in its encounter with his 
image in the mirror"2'7.This marks the "mirror stage" at 
which a pre-verbal,pre-symbolic individuality is con­
stituted. To this primary "I"("Moi") operates subsequently 
the "symbolic" -the symbolic order mediated through 
language- through the "discourse of the other" and creates 
a "subject".
Lacan sees the imaginary order as having certain common 
elements with processes of identification with a Gestalt in 
animals (to which ethological studies refer); yet at the 
same time he considers this order as having a specificity,a 
"prematuration11, in human beings: "the gap opened up by this 
prematuration of the imaginary and in which the effects of 
the mirror stage proliferate...(allows)... the symbiosis 
with the symbolic to occur"28.
For Lacan the symbolic order is mediated through lan­
guage . Language is not seen as a code but as evoking sub­
jects through meaning:"The function of language is not to 
inform but to evoke.What I seek in speech is the response 
of the other.What constitutes me as subject is my 
question"29.Language totally shapes the unconscious so 
that,for Lacan,the unconscious has the structure of 
language: "(for interpretation is based on the fact that) 
the unconscious is structured in the most radical way like 
a language,that a material operates in it according to cer­
tain laws,which are the same laws as those discovered in
27. J.Lacan,"Aggresivity in psychoanalysis" (1948) in Ecrits: A selec­
tion (thereafter Ecrits).London:Tavistock,1977,p.18
28. J.Lacan "On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of 
psychosis"(1958),Ecrits,p.196
29. J.Lacan,"The function and field of speech and language in 
psychoanalysis"(1953),Ecrits,p.86
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the study of actual languages"30.
Lacan is thus the first to draw specific attention to the 
non-natural but social origin of the externally acquired 
symbols,i.e to the fact that these symbols do not naturally 
exist embedded in "things" but that they are constructed 
within the human community and primarily expressed as lan­
guage (his attention only to language to the exclusion of 
other possible symbolic systems does not invalidate this 
fundamental insight).
It is the symbolic order,therefore,acquired through lan­
guage, that actually structures the unconscious.The imagi­
nary origins of representations give their place to so­
cially constructed symbolic systems.This transition is,as 
with the Kleinians,in principle smooth and
unproblematic.Despite the difference in names,the two or­
ders, the imaginary and the symbolic,do not represent for 
Lacan different modalities.
Castoriadis also insists on a primary,innate "capacity to 
make representations arise",an "originary phantasmatisation 
(which)...pre-exists and presides over every organisation 
of drives,even the most primitive one,that it is the condi­
tion for the drive to attain psychical existence"31.This 
capacity predates therefore also the emergence of an 
"I",however elementary.Thus it cannot be attributed to a 
"lack" (against Lacan) or "desire" (against Deleuze and 
Guattari) since any lack or desire presupposes precisely a 
subject.Even Freud's primal phantasies,remarks Cas­
toriadis, cannot be really "primary" in the sense that they 
already presuppose a certain organisation and the distinc­
tion between "contents","characters" and "acts" to 
operate.32
30. J.Lacan,"The direction of treatment and the principles of its 
power"(1958),Ecrits,p.234
31. Castoriadis,IIS,p.287
32. IIS,p.286
237
As we saw,Castoriadis also stresses that the repre­
sentations which replace these original ones are the
"social imaginary significations",socially constructed and 
originating ones.33
Freud's reference to primal repression and primal phan­
tasies, Jung' s archetypes,Klein1s and her follower's primal 
phantasies,Lacan's imaginary,Castoriadis' original phantas- 
matisation,all indicate that certain primal representatives 
of the instincts,lying beyond individual experience and 
perception do exist.They also indicate that even in the
most original,primary state,the field of energy of the 
(unconscious) psyche is presented through representatives 
and never "as such".
These primal representatives though,are seen (with the ex­
ception of Jung who gives them greater weight) as readily 
being replaced by ones acquired through perception and the 
(external) environment.The two levels of representatives 
are considered as sharing essentially the same modality.As 
Lacan and Castoriadis have noted,moreover,the environment
at the origin of the second category of representatives is 
not a natural one,but a humanly constructed,a social one.34
It can be safely considered,therefore,that
(i) the field of force of the unconscious is always,even
in the earliest stages of development,represented in the
33. For Lacan and Castoriadis the passage from the early,innate repre­
sentations to the later,socially originating ones,is associated with 
the Oedipus complex which acquires thus a more general meaning.
Lacan,drawing upon Levi-Strauss* "universal law" of the prohibition of 
incest,sees the Oedipal crisis as lying "at the origin of the whole 
process of the cultural subordination of man"(Ecrits,p.24).Similarly 
Castoriadis considers that "the encounter with the Oedipal situation 
sets before the child the unavoidable fact of the institution as the 
ground of signification and vice-versa"(IIS,p.310).
34. It is not possible,outside analytic practice or specific re­
search, to actually delineate the limits of primal versus acquired rep­
resentatives .Yet it is indicative that Freud himself did not place too 
much weight on the primal phantasies while most of his followers con­
sider the early,"innate",representatives as being almost wholly su­
perseded by the externally acquired ones.
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psyche.There is no -original or otherwise- state of "pure 
energy".We could say that the unconscious is always/already 
represented.
and also that (ii) the representatives of the drives 
gradually come to be almost totally derived from the out­
side environment.Freud,Klein,Lacan and Castoriadis are all 
in agreement at this point,while Lacan and Castoriadis em­
phasise also the human/social nature of this environment.
2.THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
If the unconscious can be seen as psychical energy tied to 
"representatives" what then is the distinction between 
these representatives and those of consciousness (which can 
also be assumed to be connected with some form of psychical 
energy) ? More generally,what is the specificity of the un­
conscious as a level within the psyche?
Repression
The unconscious is introduced by Freud as repressed,i.e. 
as separated from consciousness by a barrier that has to be 
lifted in order for the unconscious representatives to be 
able to become conscious.The lifting of repression is in 
principle possible:indeed this is the task of analysis.Thus 
repression does not indicate an impassable barrier,only a 
removable one.
However,the repressed is not to be equated with the uncon­
scious in general.Initially Freud held this view,but he was 
forced to admit that "the unconscious has the wider 
compass:the repressed is part of the unconscious".35 
Thus,while the repressed is necessarily unconscious,the un­
conscious as a level of the psyche is not necessarily 
repressed.
35. Unc,p.167
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Type of representatives 
Freud tried also to differentiate the kind of repre­
sentatives consciousness and the unconscious use.He con­
siders that the distinction between thing and word presen­
tations corresponds to the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious.
For a "representative" to advance to consciousness,it has 
necessarily to be a "wort vorstellung", i.e. it has to be 
connected with words.This connection usually happens in the 
Preconscious.On the contrary,on the level of the uncon­
scious the instinct is represented usually by thing 
presentations:
"The conscious presentation comprises the presentation of 
the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to 
it,while the unconscious presentation is the presentation 
of the thing alone.The system Ucs. contains the thing- 
cathexes of the objects,the first and true object-
cathexes;the system Pcs comes about by this thing-
presentation being hypercathected through being linked with 
the word-presentations corresponding to it"36.
However,thing presentations are not restricted to the 
unconscious:Preconscious phantasies,preconscious "thinking 
in pictures"37,for example,use also "images" rather than 
word presentations.On the other hand,the unconscious can 
also use word presentations as is the case in
schizophrenics:
"In schizophrenia words are subjected to the same process 
as that which makes the dream-images out of latent dream- 
thoughts -to what we have called the primary psychical 
process"38.In dreams,also,"we find associations based on 
homonyms and verbal similarities treated as equal in value
36. Unc,p.207
37. S.Freud.The Ego and the Id (1923) (thereafter El),P.F.L. 11,p.359
38. Unc.,p.204
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to the rest"39.
Freud insists that consciousness is necessarily linked 
with word presentations and that any presentation coming 
from the unconscious to consciousness has,in the precon­
scious, to be "brought into connection with word 
presentations"40.Yet it seems that there is no specifically 
unconscious presentation.In later writings,indeed,Freud 
refers to an idea carried out in the unconscious "on some 
material which remains unknown"41.
Thus the distinction between thing and word presentation 
is only partly useful to differentiate between the con­
scious and the unconscious.
The mode of functioning of the unconscious:
the primary process 
While neither repression nor the limitation to thing 
presentations are sufficient criteria of differentiation of 
the unconscious,there is another difference between the two 
levels as the examples of unconscious use of words 
indicate:even when the "presentations" used are of the same 
kind,within the unconscious they are subjected to a 
specific way of operating,different from (conscious/ 
rational) thought.The analysis of dreams confirms this: Due 
to the relaxation of overimposed logical functions during 
sleep,dreams allow the specific way of unconscious opera­
tion to appear,in the "dream work",characterised by 
"condensation,displacement,absence of contradiction".
It is worth,at this point,quoting Freud in full:
"The nucleus of the Ucs. consists of instinctual repre­
sentatives which seek to discharge their cathexis;that is 
to say,it consists of wishful impulses.These instinctual
391. Dreams,p.755
40. El,px358
41. ibid.
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impulses are co-ordinate with one another,exist side by 
side,without being influenced by one another,and are exempt 
from mutual contradiction...
In this system there is no negation,no doubt,no degrees of 
certainty...
The cathectic intensities (in the Ucs.) are much more
mobile.By the process of displacement one idea may sur­
render to another its whole quota of cathexis;by the 
process of condensation it may appropriate the whole
cathexis of several other ideas.I have proposed to regard
these two processes as distinguishing marks of the so- 
called primary psychical process.In the system Pcs. the 
secondary process is dominant...
The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless;i.e they 
are not ordered temporally,are not altered by the passage 
of time;they have no reference to time at all...
The Ucs. processes pay just as little regard to
reality.They are subject to the pleasure principle;their 
fate depends only on how strong they are and on whether 
they fulfil the demands of the pleasure-unpleasure regula­
tion.
To sum up:exception from mutual contradiction,primary 
process(mobility of cathexes),timelessness42,and replace­
ment of external by psychical reality-these are the charac­
teristics which we may expect to find in processes belong­
ing to the system Ucs."43
The unconscious is characterised,therefore,by a number of 
characteristics that indicate a way of psychical function-
42. How are to understand this timelessness? While the other charac­
teristics of the unconscious Freud proposes are relatively clearly 
defined,"timelessness" is not.Derrida proposes that "timelessness is 
no doubt determined only in opposition to a common concept of time,a 
traditional concept,the metaphysical concept:the time of mechanics or 
the time of consciousness"(J.Derrida,"Freud and the scene of writing", 
op.cit.,p.215)
43. Unc,p.190-91
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ing not only different from but even oppossed to that of 
consciousness/ logical thought.Thus, though the unconscious 
operates through representations just as consciousness 
does,the mode of this operation has a specificity.
We can consider this mode of operation,the manner presen­
tations are used,as the primary distinguishing characteris­
tic of the unconscious.Thus the specificity of the Freudian 
notion of the unconscious can now be established: While the 
system Cs comprises all the characteristics that have been 
traditionally attributed to man (rational/logical 
thought,perception,etc.),the unconscious has a completely 
unique mode of functioning.44
3.THE UNCONSCIOUS AND CONSCIOUSNESS: POSSIBILITY OF COM­
MUNICATION AND THE HERMENEUTIC NATURE OF THIS COMMUNICATION
The unconscious is a level of psychical functioning to 
which we have no direct access. "How are we to arrive at a 
knowledge of the unconscious?" Freud asks."It is of course 
only as something conscious that we know it,after it has 
undergone transformation or retranslation into something 
conscious"45
We can recognise the existence of the unconscious in
44. Therefore if Lacan’s argument that "the unconscious is structured 
like a language" is taken to imply that the unconscious can be for­
mally analysed in the way language to a certain extent can,it is 
definitely misplaced.The representatives of the unconscious as such 
are neither formalisable nor indeed are they approachable without 
their being "interpreted" and transposed to consciousness.
As Laplanche and Leclaire remark:"as to the ontological status of the 
unconscious...need we recall that,if that system is linguistic,such a 
language can by no means be assimilated to our "verbal" 
language?"(J.Laplanche & S.Leclaire,"The Unconscious:A psychoanalytic 
study" (1961).Yale French Studies N.48,1972,p.162).Similarly,Ricoeur 
considers "that the universe of discourse appropriate to analytic ex­
perience is not that of language but that of image").And the "image" 
is "semiotic" though not "linguistic" (P.Ricoeur,"Image and language 
in Psychoanalysis" (1976) in J.Smith (ed.) Psychoanalysis and 
language:Psychiatry and the Humanities V.3.New Haven:Yale University 
Press,1978,p.293 & p.311).
45. Unc,p.l67
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everyday life (Freud gives the example of "parapraxes"),in 
analytic practice,or in dreams (the "royal road to the 
unconscious" for Freud since it was the analysis of dreams 
that provided him with an indication of its specific 
modality).Even dreams,however,are not directly observ­
able. They have to be "recalled" and "remembered" 
and,moreover,"translated" in a verbal form,in other 
words,they have to be made conscious.
Thus what Freud and psychoanalysis are offering us are in­
ferences on a level of psychical functioning whose exist­
ence and operation we can recognise in its effects 
only,always mediated through consciousness.
The possibility of this "transformation" or 
"retranslation" to consciousness has been
established:representatives can operate in both the uncon­
scious and consciousness,thing presentations can be con­
nected with word presentations,repression can be 
lifted.Indeed the whole therapeutic structure of 
psychoanalysis rests precisely on the existence of this 
possibility which we can attest -for example- in the 
analysis of dreams,or analytic practice in general.
However,the passage from the unconscious to consciousness 
is not immediate or direct.While the common origin of 
presentations as memory traces and the possibility of them 
being used by both consciousness and the unconscious estab­
lishes a continuity,a possibility of communication between 
the levels of the unconscious and consciousness/ precon­
scious, the different modality of the unconscious implies 
that the way these presentations exist in the two levels is 
radically different.Hence a change of state, a certain 
"translation" is necessary for the unconscious repre­
sentatives to become conscious.(In addition to overcoming 
the barrier of repression,when it exists).
For example,Freud indicates that even for representatives 
that were initially connected with words,once they have 
been incorporated within the unconscious,they cannot simply
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be reconnected with their own word presentations:
"The question might be raised why presentations of objects 
cannot become conscious through the medium of their own 
perceptual residues [instead of requiring word presenta­
tions which are also derived from sense presentations]. 
Probably,however,thought proceeds in systems so far remote 
from the original perceptual residues that they have no 
longer retained anything of the qualities of these 
residues,and,in order to become conscious,need to be rein­
forced by new qualities."46
Despite the existence of their own word presenta­
tions, therefore, unconscious presentations cannot pass 
smoothly into consciousness by simply "recalling" them.They 
have "no longer retained anything of the qualities of these 
residues",they exist in a state where a change of "quality" 
is necessary in order to become conscious again.A 
"retranslation" of these presentations onto conscious 
material is necessary.
The need for a "translation",an "interpretation",is more 
evident when an unconscious "thought" (which,as we saw,is 
subjected to the specific modality of the unconscious: 
primary process,lack of contradiction,timelessness,etc.) is 
to become conscious.Such is the case,for example,of the in­
terpretation of dreams,where a conscious/rational account 
of the dream is sought.
Freud indicates,moreover,that such an interpretation can 
never be final or fully completed: "I have already had oc­
casion to point out that it is in fact never possible to be 
sure that a dream has been completely interpreted.Even if 
the solution seems satisfactory and without gaps the pos­
sibility always remains that the dream may have yet another 
meaning."47
46. Unc.,p.208
47. Dreams,p.383
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Castoriadis remarks that in the 1 Interpretation of 
dreams",Freud "begins by saying that even in dreams that 
are the most completely interpreted,one must frequently 
leave a part obscure,and he concludes by affirming that the 
incompleteness of the interpretation is a universal and es­
sential necessity"40.
The process of analysis itself is also an interpretive 
one.As Castoriadis remarks:"The correspondences established 
by the analysis between the representation and its meaning 
are valid only within the context of analysis;they are 
neither generalizable nor transportable;they are not even 
verifiable in the usual acceptation of this term"49.
In addition to its necessarily partial character,an inter­
pretation does not somehow replace the original 
-unconscious- registration.Freud writes:
"What we have in mind here is not the forming of a second 
thought situated in a new place,like a transcription which 
continues to exist alongside the original;and the notion of 
forcing a way through into consciousness must be kept care­
fully free from any idea of a change of locality."50
The two systems -that of consciousness and that of the un­
conscious have to be thought as standing side-by-side in a 
double inscription:
"An idea may exist simultaneously in two places in the 
mental apparatus and,if not inhibited by the censorship,it 
regularly advances from the one position to the 
other,possibly without losing its first location or 
registration"51.
Laplanche and Leclaire remark:"What is unconscious is in 
relation to the manifest not as a meaning to a letter,but
48. Castoriadis,IIS,p.279
49. ibid.
50. Dreams,p.770
51. Unc,p.177
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on the same level of reality.1152
The necessity of a "change of state" of representatives is 
valid in the case of affects as well.For affects to become 
conscious they have to be connected with "new",conscious 
representatives.In the case of repressed affects the lift­
ing of repression connects them with their "proper 
representatives" which had been repressed.53
Therefore we can say in general that the transition from 
the unconscious to consciousness,though in principle pos­
sible's neither direct,nor immediate.lt necessarily 
requires a certain alteration of modality,a "translation",a 
certain "interpretation".And this interpretation can never 
be a full,final one nor does it replace the unconsious 
transcription.lt represents a "hermeneutic process" in the 
most radical sense of the term.
The always/already represented character of the uncon­
scious, therefore, though it does establish a path of com­
munication with consciousness,it does not annul the 
specificity of this character.The existence of unconscious 
representations does not imply a simple transposition of 
(conscious) symbolic systems within the unconscious.
We have indicated certain elements that establish,within 
the Freudian/psychoanalytic account,the specificity of the 
unconscious as a level of psychical function:
The unconscious is characterised by a specific 
modality,different from and oppossed to that of conscious­
ness. It can be seen as a field of energy,that of drives,yet 
this energy is always/already represented within the
52. Laplanche and Leclaire,"The Unconscious...", o p . c i t p . 126
Of course,a certain alteration of the unconscious content is possible 
when it becomes conscious as well.This is,for ex.,one of the tasks of 
analysis.But this alteration is only that -an alteration- and not an 
effacement of the unconscious transcription.
53. A repressed affect may also have been one one that had been 
prevented from developing.In this case the lifting of repression 
"restores" the affect.
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psyche.These representatives have,after a certain stage of 
psychical development,mainly an external and indeed social 
origin and they allow a line of communication between con­
sciousness and the unconscious.However,within the uncon­
scious these representatives are subjected to its specific 
modality and in order to become conscious they require an 
alteration of modality,a "translation".This translation has 
necessarily a hermeneutic nature,is never complete nor does 
it replace the unconsious transcription.
The above establish a theorisation of the unconscious in 
spatial terms,providing an essentially static descrip­
tion. Freud was,however,to proceed to a theorisation of the 
ways the field of the unconscious is structured,a theorisa­
tion that gradually led him to the presentation of his 
second topography of the psyche.
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(B ).THE STRUCTURING OF THE PSYCHE:
FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND FREUDIAN TOPOGRAPHY
The development of psychical structuring,of the structur­
ing of psychical energy,is approached by Freud in two in­
terlinked ways:initially mainly as the development of the 
drives (triebe) but gradually more and more as the develop­
ment of specific agencies within the psyche.These agencies 
were theorised fully in "The Ego and the Id" (1923) which 
is considered to introduce what was termed the second 
Freudian topography of the psyche.
l.A THEORY OF DRIVES
For Freud the energy of the psyche is that of drives 
("trieb", also translated as "instinct").Freud 's terminol­
ogy is important here.He chooses the term "trieb" and not 
the available "Instinkt", which he reserves for explicit 
references to animal instincts.54The choice of term there­
fore implies an initial attempt to differentiate the energy 
of the human psyche from that of animal in­
stincts .Moreover, the term "trieb" has a connotation of 
forceful pressure well suited to the description of psychi­
cal energy.55
For Freud,drives originate within the organism:the
54. For example:"If inherited mental formations exist in the human 
being -something analogous to instinct ("Instinkt") in animals- these 
constitute the nucleus of the Unconscious".(Unc,p.200)
55. The Standard Edition has translated "trieb" with "instinct" thus 
making Freud’s distinction intranslatable.However,"Trieb" can be
rendered as "drive" in English,retaining some of the connotations of 
the original term,though the long established use of "instinct" makes
it unfamiliar.We shall use "drive" when the specificity of the term 
needs to be emphasised,but "instinct" and its derivatives -e.g.
instinctual- otherwise.All the extracts from Freud,as there are from 
the Standard Edition,use "instinct".
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"source" of a drive is "the somatic process which occurs in 
an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is repre­
sented in mental life by an instinct"56.
While,however,the "source" of the drive is biologically 
given,the "object" of a drive is not:this object,i.e "the 
thing through which the instinct is able to achieve its 
aim" (which is in every instance satisfaction) ...is what 
is most variable about an instinct and is not originally 
connected with it"57.Thus a level of plasticity of the 
drive that would be inconceivable within the traditional 
notion of (animal) instinct is assumed.
The sexual drives 
The sexual drive(s) is the only kind of drive Freud ex­
plicitly theorises as such:
Despite the impression of the given nature of sexual ob­
jects, the "object" of the sexual drive is indeed most vari­
able. Sexuality in the infant may "attach itself to other 
somatic functions"58 before attaching itself to the geni­
tals (thus we can have an oral and then an anal sexual 
organisation).In addition,it has an "external" object 
choice:"the choice of an object,such as we have shown to be 
characteristic of the pubertal phase of development,has al­
ready frequently or habitually been effected during the 
years of childhood:that is to say,the whole of the sexual 
currents have become directed towards a single person".59
After the latency period,puberty brings forcefully again 
the need of an object choice which this time is exclusively
56. S.Freud.Instincts and their vicissitudes (Triebe und triebschick- 
sale.1915).P.F.L. 11,p.119
57. ibid.
58. S.Freud.Three essays on the theory of sexuality (1905).P.F.L. 7, 
Harmondsworth:Penguin,1977 (thereafter TES),p.l02
59. TES,p.118
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a person."The resultants of infantile object choice are 
carried over ..(but)..the object choice of the pubertal 
period is obliged to dispense with the objects of childhood 
and to start afresh ...focusing all desires upon a single 
object".If the "two currents fail to converge,the result is 
often that one of the ideals of sexual life,the focusing of 
all desires upon a single object,will be unattainable"60.
Thus we do have a process of development of the sexual 
drive.However,it does not follow a predetermined path,but 
one at which "every step can become a point of fixa­
tion, every juncture in this involved combination can be an 
occasion for a dissociation of the sexual instinct"61.
Although the type of object choice available to libido and 
the temporal sequence of these types seems to be predeter­
mined (from the early autoerotic and somatic ones to the 
person-objects of infantile sexuality to the person-objects 
of puberty),the actual object choice each time is 
not.Consequently,the actual development of the drive,the 
specific path it has followed,remain non determinable.The 
development of the sexual drive is always "the precarious 
result of a historical evolution"62.
A certain indeterminacy vis-a-vis the biological or­
der, therefore, exists .Moreover, the development of the sexual 
drive presupposses a register onto which object choices are 
engraved and retained.lt is this register that will be 
later theorised as the Ego.
Ego-drives and Ego-libido
To the sexual drives Freud opposed the ego drive(s).The 
postulation of the existence of ego drives is seen as
60. TES,p.119
61. ibid.
62. J.Laplanche.Life and Death in psychoanalysis (1970).Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press,1977,p.15
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necessary "from the study of transference neuroses1163.
Freud initially theorises ego-drives as identical to self­
preservative ones.He recognises though,that this is not a 
deduction from analysis but a biologically oriented 
assertion: "The individual does actually carry on a twofold 
existence rone to serve his own purposes and the other as 
...the mortal vehicle of a (possibly) immortal sub­
stance...The separation of the sexual instincts from the
ego-instincts would simply reflect this twofold function of 
the individual...The hypothesis of separate ego-instincts 
and sexual instincts rests scarcely at all upon psychologi­
cal basis,but derives its support from biology"64.
Freud does not advance further than this preliminary argu­
ment, nor does he distinguish to which actual functions of 
self-preservation he refers to (except passing references 
to "hunger").It has been remarked,moreover,that he never
actually used the notion of ego-instincts qua self preserv­
ative ones in case studies and that the actual analysis of 
transference neuroses justifies nothing more than a certain 
"conflict between the claims of sexuality and that of the 
ego"65,i.e not necessarily a qualitatively different
category of drives.
Already by the time Freud referred to the distinction be­
tween ego and sexual drives,he had proposed the concept of 
ego-libido.Ego libido is distinguished from ego instincts
both in its origin (related to sexual and not self­
preservative functions) and because it pre-exists the 
ego.The ego appears as a "reservoir of libido"66 and it can 
orient this libido to external objects.The object choice
63. "Instincts...",op.cit.,p.120
64. S.Freud.On Narcissism:An introduction (1914).P.F.L. 11,p.71
65. LP,p.148
66. S.Freud.Beyond the pleasure principle (1920).P.F.L. 11(thereafter 
BPP),p .324
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and cathexis,however,depend only on the ego and not on the 
-originally- libidinal nature of this energy:
"We form the idea of there being an original libidinal 
cathexis of the ego,from which some is latter given off to 
objects,but which fundamentally persists and is related to 
the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is re­
lated to the pseudopodia which it puts out"67.
Freud continues to hold to a parallel existence of ego- 
instincts separate from ego-1ibido,but he is obliged to ad­
mit that "psychoanalysis has not enabled us hitherto to 
point out to any [ego] instincts other than the libidinal 
ones.That,however,is no reason for our falling in with the 
conclusion that no others in fact exist"6®.
Gradually the references to non-libidinal ego-instincts 
cease and it is acknowledged that the notion of ego-1ibido 
can satisfactorily accommodate the opposition between ego 
and sexual instincts as a cause of psychoneuroses without 
postulating a qualitatively different origin of psychical 
energy:
"The distinction between the two kinds of instinct which 
was originally regarded as in some sort of way qualita­
tive, must one be characterised differently- namely as being 
topographical"69.
Thus the second great category of drives postulated by 
Freud is eventually admitted to be directly linked and
emanating from the agency of the ego.Freud does not pursue
any theorisation of self-preservative drives as such (he
vaguely considers them as still connected with ego-
1ibido)70.Instead,alongside the introduction of his second 
topography,he introduces a new instinctual dualism:that of
67. Narcissism,op.cit.,p.68
68. BPP,p.326
69. El,p.325
70. LP,p.221
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the life (Eros) / death drives.(It is ironic that just as 
Freud is prepared to accept a certain instinctual monism in 
respect to the ego,he introduces a new dualism!)
The life/death drives dualism.
Death drives are seen as "representing an urge inherent in 
organic life to restore an earlier state of things"71 while 
life drives "work against the death of the living substance 
and preserve life itself for a comparatively long period"72 
The new dualism retains two essentially opposed groups of 
instincts,but this opposition is one between very abstract 
principles of overall orientation and not any more between 
specific groups of drives (as the libido/ego instincts 
dualism was).
The distinction between life/death drives allows Freud a 
satisfactory answer to the question of emotional am­
bivalence, of transformation of love into hate and vise 
versa.He had posed this ambivalence as a characteristic,a 
vicissitude of drives and had given a theorisation of it 
based on the ego73 .
He is now,however,in a position to offer a better 
answer:that of fusion between the two categories of 
instincts:"Both kinds of instinct would be active in every 
particle of living substance,though in unequal propor­
tion, so that some one substance might be the principal rep­
resentative of Eros"74.Such a fusion is possible because 
"for purposes of discharge the instinct of destruction is 
habitually brought into the service of Eros"75.
71. BPP,p.308
72. BPP,p.313
73. In ’’Instincts and their vicissitudes",op.cit.
74. BPP,p.381
75. BPP,p.382
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Ambivalence can be accounted for either as a defu­
sion, or,since it is a "fundamental phenomenon",probably as 
"an instinctual fusion that has not been completed".
Thus the actual manifestation of the death drive,as a 
destructive and aggressive drive,is always tied with the 
life drives.The existence of two classes of drives 
is,therefore,only a postulate for purposes of theoretical 
analysis.The two categories of drives can be conceptualised 
as distinct only "as an extreme situation of which clinical 
experience can furnish merely approximations".76
J.Laplanche has argued that,given the fused nature of 
drives,the death drive should be considered as "not pos­
sessing its own energy",but as being "the constitutive 
principle of libidinal circulation" in the sense that it is 
oppossed to the "bound and binding form" of libido which is 
Eros,the life instinct.77
Thus the opposition between life and death instincts can 
be seen as an opposition between bound and unbound forms of 
psychic energy.Life instincts are destined to create 
bounded forms and to this death instincts are oppossed.76
Even if the precise form of Laplanche's argument is not 
accepted,the necessarily fused nature of the two types of 
drives has to be accepted.Indeed,we can consider the asser­
tion of the fused character of instinctual energy to be the 
most important corollary -and possibly even the justifica­
tion for- the life/death instincts dualism.In any case,this 
dualism,despite its primarily biological justification,does 
not have any implications for the actual structuring of
76. LP,p.181
77. Laplanche,"Life and Death...",op.cit.
78. However,as Laplanche remarks,"This does not mean that we have to 
promote binding,or that we have to conclude that binding always works
to the advantage of biological or even psychical life;extreme binding 
means extreme immobilization" (J.Laplanche.New foundations for 
psychoanalysis. Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1989,p.148)
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psychical energy.It refers to a distinction of kind of such 
energy but not to a path of development or structuring.
We can conclude that in so far as Freud presents a 
theorisation of psychical energy,its development or struc­
turing through a theory of drives,he is limited to a 
theorisation of the sexual drives.These are presented as 
indeed following a path of development though with few con­
stants (namely the type of sexual objects and the temporal 
evolution of these types).
Otherwise,once the notion of ego drives is abandoned,the 
notion of ego libido that replaces it seems to have no 
predeterminations at all apart from the fact that it 
emanates from the ego.
As for the life/death drives distinction,it is primarily 
targeted to indicate the fused nature of instinctual energy 
and does not refer to the actual structuring of psychical 
energy.
It is the ego,therefore,that emerges as a determining fac­
tor in the structuring of psychical energy,which leads us 
to an examination of the second Freudian topography of the 
psyche.
2.THE SECOND FREUDIAN TOPOGRAPHY:THE EGO
AND SUPER-EGO AS ORGANISED PSYCHICAL AGENCIES 
Though the roots of the second topography of the psyche 
go back to the beginning of Freud's writings,it is 
presented as such only relatively late (in 1923).It distin­
guishes between the Ego (Ich),the Super-Ego (Uber-ich),and 
the Id (das Es).
The Id is seen as "chaotic" instinctual energy,"open at 
its end to somatic influences"'79. In the Id the "pleasure 
principle ... reigns unrestrictedly "8°.
79. S.Freud.New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis (1933).P.F.L.
2 ,Harmondsworth:Penguin,1973 (thereafter NIL),p.106
80. El,p.364
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In contrast,the ego is seen as the bearer of the "reality 
principle".The ego operates "by becoming aware of 
stimuli,by storing up experiences about them (in the 
memory),by avoiding excessively strong stimuli (through 
flight),by dealing with moderate stimuli (through 
adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about ex­
pedient changes in the external world to its own advantage 
(through activity)"81.Thus the ego is the bearer of 
rational/conscious processes necessary for the organism.
Finally,in the notion of the Super-ego Freud synthesises 
that of ego-ideal (presented in 1914) and of an aggressive 
agency within the psyche,its aggression directed towards 
the ego.
The construction of the ego and super-ego 
The ego is "constructed" as the "precipitate" of abandoned 
object cathexes:
"When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual ob­
ject, there quite often ensues an alteration of his ego
which can only be described as a setting up of the object
inside the ego,as it occurs in melancholia;the exact nature 
of this substitution is as yet unknown to us.It may be that 
by this introjection,which is a kind of regression to the 
mechanism of the oral phase,the ego makes it easier for the 
object to be given up or renders that process possible.lt
may be that this identification is the sole condition under
which the id can give up its objects.At any rate the 
process,especially in the early phases of development,is a 
very frequent one,and it makes it possible to suppose that 
the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned 
object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those 
object-choices."82.
81. Outline,p.377
82. El,p.368
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Thus the ego constitutes a register within the psyche of 
its own history.83
A similar process constructs the super-ego.It is the out­
come of the Oedipus complex,in which the boy identifies 
with the father while at the same time directs a certain 
aggression towards him as an opponent in his love for the 
mother,with a similar case for the girl.In fact there is a 
double identification involved here,with both parents:
"The broad general outcome of the sexual phase dominated 
by the Oedipus complex may,therefore,be taken to be the 
forming of a precipitate in the ego,consisting of these 
two identifications [with the father and the mother] in 
some way united with each other.This modification of the 
ego retains its special position;it confronts the other 
contents of the ego as an ego ideal or super-ego."84The 
super-ego retains "the character of the father" and 
"dominates the ego".
Thus both the ego and the super-ego appear as registers 
of abandoned object-cathexes.
The ego (and super-ego) as organisation
and source of psychical energy 
The ego and super-ego are not,however,only passive 
agencies.They also function as sources of psychical 
energy.The super ego behaves aggressively towards the 
ego,while the ego itself is a source of psychical energy 
towards external objects:
"Throughout the whole of life the ego remains the great 
reservoir from which libidinal cathexes are sent out to
83. Freud had already made a preliminary reference to such a mechanism 
in a passage of the ’’Three essays’’ added in 1915: ’’The sexual aim (in 
oral pregenital sexual organisation) consists in the incorporation of 
the object -the prototype of a process which,in the form of iden­
tification, is later to play such an important psychological 
part"(TES,p.117)
84. El,p.373
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objects"35.
What is the origin of this energy?
We saw that Freud had introduced the notion of ego 
libido,which he oppossed to sexual drives despite the com­
mon origin of the two.The introduction of his second topog­
raphy was accompanied with a characterisation of this 
energy as "an indifferent and displaceable" one,which can 
be added "to a qualitatively differentiated erotic or 
destructive impulse and augment its total cathexis1,86.This 
energy,since it is "uniting and binding",has the charac­
teristics of Eros and functions "through the mediation of 
the ego"8'7.Hence the ego becomes the locus of an energy 
that has the uniting and binding characteristics of the 
life instincts.
Since the only determinant of this energy seems to be the 
ego itself,we can suppose that its direction,its object 
choices,can only be determined by the past history of the 
ego,i.e by the already internalised abandoned object 
cathexes.
As for the energy of the super-ego,Freud remarks:
"The super-ego arises from an identification with the 
father taken as a model.Every such identification is in the 
nature of a desexualisation or even a sublimation.lt now 
seems as though when a transformation of this kind takes 
place,an instinctual defusion occurs at the same time.After 
sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to 
bind the whole of the destructiveness that was combined 
with it,and this is released in the form of an inclination 
to aggression and destruction"88.In this way the super-ego
85. Outline,p.382.Freud makes this assertion in ’’Beyond the pleasure 
Principle’’ (1920). In ’’the ego and the Id’’ he considers the Id as the 
principal such ’’reservoir”.He insists,though,in his earlier assertion 
as well,as is evident in this extract from the late "Outline" (1938)
86. El,p.385
87. ibid.
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can become the locus of aggression and guilt directed 
towards the ego.In extreme cases,such as melancholia,the 
super-ego can even become "a pure culture of the death 
instinct"89.
Freud's remarks on the super-ego indicate that the aban­
doned object cathexes internalised within the ego and the 
superego are not instinctually neutral but charged with 
psychical energy.The energy investing the internalised ele­
ments within the ego can be considered of an overall 
libidinal nature,while that of the super-ego of an overall 
aggressive nature.
We saw that the life/death drives dualism indicates the 
always fused nature of psychical energy.Usually the erotic 
binding of the energy directed to objects that are later to 
be internalised through identification's such that the ag­
gressive impulses are of no particular importance.In this 
case these elements are internalised within the 
ego.If,however,the aggressive impulses are significant,the 
process of identification can introduce within the ego an 
important aggressive component which results precisely in 
the formation or reinforcement of the super-ego.
Thus the ego in the very process of its "construction" is 
already traversed by the two opposing categories of 
drives,manifested as investing distinct sub-structures,the 
ego proper and the super ego.
We can understand now why the super-ego and the ego itself 
can be seen as sources of psychical energy:it is because 
they represent an organisation of such energy,in the in­
stinctual investment of the internalised ele­
ments .Consequently,the energy emanating from the ego is a 
primarily libidinal one,while that of the super ego a 
primarily aggressive one.90
88. El,p.396
89. El,p.394
90. "Primarily”,because psychical energy has always a "fused" nature
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From the above it is obvious that the introduction of the 
agency of the ego (and of the super-ego),does not refer 
only to the theorisation of a rational/conscious agency 
within the psyche.It has a much more fundamental function.
It complements Freud's theorisation of drives providing an 
account for a structuring of psychical energy.As a con­
sequence the ego and the super-ego function also as a 
source of such energy (towards external objects in the case 
of the ego;towards the ego in the case of the super­
ego).The only determinant of the direction,the intensity 
and the nature (libidinal/aggressive) of this energy 
(emanating from the ego and super-ego) is the actual con­
struction of these agencies,i.e the objects internalised 
and their instinctual investment.
Type of objects internalised and
determinants of their instinctual investment 
We turn now to the kind of object choices that can become 
subsequently internalised within the ego and super-ego.
In the case of the sexual drives we saw that the type of 
objects is partially predetermined:initially the autoerotic 
objects of the oral and anal phases,alongside them a paren­
tal object choice,and,after the latency period,the sexual 
object choice of puberty.
However,other "objects" may be incorporated within the ego 
as well.Even before the introduction of his second psychi­
cal topography,Freud had presented such a case in "Mourning 
and Melancholia"91:the possibility of identification with 
and incorporation of certain characteristics of the loved 
person which are not considered of a directly sexual nature
and can never be "purely" libidinal or aggressive.Thus,when we refer 
to the Ego as a source of instinctual energy,we have to consider this 
energy as a necessarily fused one with the Erotic impulses predominat­
ing. In this way,the ambivalence towards "objects",which Freud em­
phasised,can be taken account of even in the case of an ego originat­
ing psychical energy.
91. S.Freud.Mourning and melancholia (1915).P.F.L. 11,p.257
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is admitted.
Freud does not provide any extensive account of these
other types of objects in respect to the ego.He does 
so,however,for the super-ego:
The super-ego,as the outcome of the "complete" Oedipus 
complex,represents a double identification both to the 
father and to the mother.For both identifications to simul­
taneously exist,though,("in some way united with each
other" as Freud presents it),it is necessarily implied that 
they are identifications not with "complete" persons,or 
simply with the parent's sex,but with elements of behaviour 
related to this sex.
Freud is to further enlarge the "contents" such iden­
tifications may comprise of.Identifications are seen as re­
lated not only to "natural" characteristics related to the 
parent's sex,not only to "natural" positions -as father or 
mother- within the family,but as related to social features 
as well:
"Is not only the personal qualities of these parents that 
is making itself felt,but also everything that had a deter­
mining effect on them themselves,the taste and standards of 
the social class in which they lived and the innate dis­
positions and traditions of the race from which they 
sprang."92These elements are again to be seen as covering a 
variety of modalities,from patterns of behaviour to norms
and rules.
Thus the super-ego is presented as the potential vehicle 
through which a whole host of features,of the most diverse 
nature and including elements of a specifically social 
origin,can be incorporated within the individual.
However,the super-ego is only a part of the ego,a part be­
having aggressively against the ego,being the source of 
guilt and consciousness,the bearer of aggressive impulses 
within the psyche.All the above identifications,therefore,
92. Outline,p.442
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in so far as they are limited to the super-ego,operate in a 
negative,aggressive way within the psyche.There is no 
reason,however,to deny the possibility of similar iden­
tifications operating in a positive way,i.e within the ego 
proper.Indeed the theorisation of ego construction points 
towards this possibility.93
What can be considered the determinants of the instinctual 
investment of internalised elements regarding the type 
(aggressive/1ibidinal) or the intensity of this investment?
Freud had provided an answer relevant to the Oedipus com­
plex and the creation of the super-ego.The strength of the 
aggression of the super-ego against the ego,the strength,in 
other words,of the super ego itself,depends on the actual 
relationship of the child with the parents,the relation be­
tween the relative strength of the aggressive and libidinal 
components simultaneously directed towards the father and 
the strength of the libidinal ties with the mother.94
Therefore the instinctual investment of the elements of 
the super ego depends on the relational context of the 
family,i.e on the child's relational position vis-a-vis his 
parents.
We can generalise these remarks and consider that,in 
general,the child's relationship to the significant others 
is what determines the kind and intensity of instinctual
93. While Freud does not explicitly address the question of the type 
of objects internalised within the ego,his comments on "civilisation" 
indicate that he considers civilisation,i.e society in general,as 
operating primarily through a sense of guilt,i.e primarily through the 
super-ego.Hence his "omission" to extent these elements to the ego it­
self is in accordance to this assumption.However there is nothing in 
the actual theorisation of the ego/super-ego construction that would 
support this assumption.lt appears rather as an axiomatic,aprioristic 
one.(In the next chapter Freud's argument on civilization is examined 
at length).
94. In the case of boys.A similar account is provided for girls.(Cf. 
"The dissolution of the Oedipus complex" (1924) and "Some psychical 
consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes" (1925) 
both in P.F.L. 7)
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investment of the elements internalised within the ego and 
the super ego.
In the above,we have the main lines of Freud's account of 
a certain organisations certain structuring of psychical 
energy that his second topograghy introduces:
It is primarily through the agencies of the ego and the 
super ego that this structuring appears and operates and 
not through biologically determined instinctual paths of 
development.
The actual mechanism of structuring consists of the inter­
nalisation within the ego and super-ego of external objects 
whose instinctual cathexis is abandoned.These objects 
remain instinctually invested and thus the function of the 
ego and of the super-ego as a source of energy (towards ex­
ternal objects and the ego respectively) can be -partly- 
explained.
The kind and intensity of instinctual investment of these 
objects seems to be determined by the relations of the 
child to the significant others.As to the kind of inter­
nalised elements,they cover a variety of modalities and 
types,which have been explored by Freud primarily for the 
super-ego but which seems possible to expand to the ego as 
well.
3.POST-FREUDIAN DEVELOPMENTS
To amplify on Freud's account on psychical agencies,we 
turn to a number of post-Freudian developments on the sub­
ject. The focus will be on authors who emphasised the im­
portance of (external) object relations for the development 
of the psyche and of psychical agencies.
The object choices of sexual drives
M.Balint,already in 1935,noted that analytic practice dis­
proved Freud's assertion that the early autoerotic libido 
choices were (biologically) predetermined.Instead,Balint
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claimed these choices can be traced back to earlier object 
choices external to the psyche:
"Pregenital object-relations,the pregenital forms of 
love...can no longer be explained biologically95... they do 
not succeed one another according to biological condi­
tions, but are to be conceived as relations to actual in­
fluence of the world of objects- above all,to methods of 
upbringing"96. There is only a biological basis for such 
primary object relations,in "the instinctual interdepen­
dence of mother and child"97.
Balint thus undermines the only element in Freud's 
theorisation of drives that could still be seen as biologi­
cally predetermined -the type and sequence of object 
choices of the sexual drives,especially the early ones,and 
indicates the importance of "external" objects even for the 
early psychical development.
The development of the ego:mechanisms and innate dynamic 
Melanie's Klein pioneering work,focused on the early 
months and years of life provided a more detailed account 
of the mechanisms of object internalisation and ego con­
struction than Freud had provided.
Emphasising the anxiety facing the newborn,Klein intro­
duced the notion of splitting of external objects into 
part-objects,"good" or "bad".The "good" part-objects are 
incorporated within the psyche through introjection while 
the neutralisation of the "bad" ones operates through 
projection of them to the "outside" of the ego.(This period 
has been termed the paranoid-schizoid position).
95. M.Balint,"Critical notes on the theory of pregenital organisations 
of the libido" (1935),in Primary Love and psychoanalytic tech­
nique .London:Hogarth Press,1952,p.53
96. Ibid.,p.58
97. M.Balint,"Early Developmental states of the ego.Primary object-
love" (1937),in "Primary love...",p.85
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Gradually,as the infant grows,"the various aspects -loved 
and hated,good and bad- of the objects come close 
together,and these objects are now whole persons"98.The ego 
becomes more integrated and the mother and father can now 
be introjected as "whole" persons.(This is the infantile 
depressive position).
Klein sees the life and death instincts operating from the 
very beginning as independent entities,attached to the good 
or bad objects respectively.Along with the ego developing 
primarily through the introjection of "good" objects,the 
super-ego is seen as having an equally early origin through 
the introjection of the "bad" objects.
Klein enriches the Freudian account of internalisation 
mechanisms and locates these mechanisms at a much earlier 
stage.Her notions of part-objects,splitting,the importance 
of introjective and projective identification have gained 
wide acceptance.
However,her use of the life and death instincts appears 
very inflexible.She considers these two classes of in­
stincts as given,innate ones.Moreover,as has been remarked, 
"the dialectic of good and bad,partial and whole,the intro­
jected and the projected,is inconceivable without the first 
boundary of an ego -however rudimentary it might be- defin­
ing an inside and an outside"99.
As a possible alternative to the Kleinian 
model,R.D.Fairbairn proposed precisely that an ego has to 
be considered as existing in a first,undifferentiated form 
from the very start and that libido,instead of "pleasure 
seeking" has to be seen as "object seeking".
Fairbairn proposes,in accordance with Klein,that the ego 
indeed splits the "figure of his mother into two objects -a 
satisfying("good") one and an unsatisfying("bad") one"100
98. M.Klein,"Some theoretical conclusions regarding the emotional life 
of the infant"(1952),in Envy and gratitude.London:Virago.l988.p.72
99. LP,p.81
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but he adds that it internalises the "bad" object in an at­
tempt to neutralise it,it further splits this internalised 
object into two -an "exciting" and a "rejecting" object- 
and finally represses both objects along with parts of the 
ego that remain attached to them.
Thus "the basic endopsychic structure" includes the 
"central" ego,the "libidinal" ego (attached to the exciting 
object) and the "internal saboteur" (attached to the 
rejecting object).101The role of the "internal saboteur" is 
similar to that of the super-ego.
Fairbairn considers that this theorisation allows him to 
dispense with any pre-given life and death instincts as 
Klein accepts and also to provide an initial existing 
structure in the psyche -in the form of the central ego- 
from which the mechanisms of introjection and splitting can 
emanate.
While both points are valid -the necessity of an initial 
agency and the need to use the life/death instincts in a 
less deterministic way- Fairbairn goes too much on the 
other side.The assumption of an ego existing in some way 
already in the beginning and as not being gradually formed, 
goes against not only Klein but also Freud and is difficult 
to sustain.
Moreover,the Freudian assertion of libido as pleasure 
seeking does not,by itself,imply any biologism.Freud1s 
theory of ego-construction implies precisely that the 
libido is "object" seeking both in the case of sexual 
drives and in the case of ego-1ibido.
Similarly,Fairbairn's criticism of Klein regarding her use 
of life and death instincts cannot be applied to
100. R.D.Fairbairn,"A synopsis of the development of the author's 
views regarding the structure of the personality" (1951) in 
Psychoanalytic studies of the personality.London: Routledge,1952,p.172
101. R.D.Fairbairn,"Object relationships and dynamic structure" (1946) 
in op.cit.,p.147
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Freud.Klein considers the two categories of drives as dif­
ferentiated forces already there in the beginning,which are 
subsequently embodied in the agencies of the ego and the 
super-ego.In contrast,Freud1s use of the life/death dualism 
is -as we saw- intended primarily to indicate the am­
bivalent and fused nature of psychical energy rather than 
to affirm and independent status to these two forms of in­
stincts .
As for the specific mechanisms Fairbairn proposes -a 
series of splittings within the ego- they cannot be 
evaluated outside analytic practice itself.It can be 
remarked,though,that they introduce a divergence from the 
Freudian account that is not justified by Fairbairn1s 
criticisms of Freud and Klein.Unlike Klein's theorisations 
which can be easily appended to Freud's, Fairbairn1s can­
not .
In parallel to attempts such as Klein's and Fairbairn's to 
describe the actual mechanisms of early ego formation,other 
analysts focused more on the independent dynamic of this 
formation:
A certain innate tendency of ego formation,operating from 
the very beginning has been stressed by ego- 
theorists,notably Hartmann,Kris,Lowestein,Rapaport,etc.
For Hartmann "the ego may be more-and very likely is more- 
than a developmental by-product of the influence of reality 
on instinctual drives;it has a partly independent 
origin...we may speak of an autonomous factor in ego- 
development in the same way as we consider the instinctual 
drives autonomous agents of development"102.
It was recognised,though,that this dynamic could not 
operate autonomously within the developing infant,but that 
it had to be seen in relation to the significant
102. H.Hartmann,"Comments on the psychoanalytic theory of the ego"
(1952) in Essays on Ego Psychology.London:Hogarth Press,1964,p.119
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other(s),which in the early stages is primarily the mother: 
D.W.Winnicott stressed the importance of mother-child 
relationship.While he accepted that some form of ego ex­
ists from the very beginning ("there is no id before 
ego"103),he considered that this ego initially exists in an 
undifferentiated relationship with the mother.
Only gradually the infant can conceive of itself as 
separate from the mother and from other "objects",having 
passed through a stage of "transitional" objects.104.The 
"maturational process" of the ego depends on a "good enough 
mother" and a generally facilitating environment.
M.Mahler and her collaborators have specified,through ob­
servation, certain stages in the process of ego develop­
ment, in the process they call the Separation-individuation 
one:
" the initial symbiotic phase (up to 5 months).
the differentiation subphase (dawning awareness of 
separateness,awareness of separateness) 
the practising subphase (attention directed to new motor 
achievements,seemingly to the near exclusion of mother,10 
to 15 months)
the rapprochement subphase (renewed demand upon the mother 
but as separate and continued growth of autonomous ego ap­
paratuses, 15 to 22 months) 
and,finally,consolidation of individuality and gradual at­
tainment of libidinal object constancy (22 to 36 
months)11105
These phases towards individuation are seen as powered by
103. D.W.Winnicott,"Ego integration in child development" (1962) in 
Collected papers II (The maturational process and the facilitating 
environment). London:Hogarth Press,1965,p.56
104. D.W.Winnicott/’Transitional objects and transitional phenomena" 
(1951),in Collected papers I (Through paediatrics to psychoanalysis). 
London:Hogarth Press,1975,p.229
105. M.Mahler et al.The psychological birth of the human infant. 
London:Hutchinson,1975,p.260
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"the drive for and toward individuation (that) in the nor­
mal infant is an innate,powerful given,which,although it 
may be muted by protracted interference,does manifest it­
self all along the separation-individuation process".106
The above developments indicate that a certain innate 
dynamic of ego emergence and development has to be ac­
cepted. This dynamic can be seen as operating alongside 
of,and as complementing the mechanisms of ego construction 
Freud and Klein proposed.Thus the necessity of some form of 
(early) ego for the Kleinian mechanisms to operate can be 
met without a radical revision of the Freudian scheme of 
the type Fairbairn advanced.
The existence of an innate dynamic does not invalidate the 
importance of the environment in the actual make up of the 
ego through the internalisation of external objects.Both 
Winnicott and Mahler see such a dynamic as complementing 
the theorisation of mechanisms of object internalisation,of 
the kind Klein and Freud proposed.Even the ego theorists 
indicate the importance of the environment,though in a more 
general way.Thus the emphasis on the existence of an innate 
dynamic behind the emergence and consolidation of the ego 
has to be seen as complementing the other theorisations and 
not as a reinstation,within psychoanalytic theory,of some 
form of subjectivity independent of the environment.
An attempt to bring these two lines of theorisation 
together in a fruitful synthesis,is exemplified by Edith 
Jacobson's work.
Jacobson accepts the Kleinian mechanisms of ego construc­
tion as gradually building up the ego but she also sees an 
innate dynamic in this gradual emergence:
"Regarding the earliest types of identification I repeat
106. ibid.,p.206
One would have also to mention,in this context,J.Lacan's emphasis on 
an independent dynamic in the emergence of the ego,a dynamic 
manifested in the mirror phase.
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that,magic as they are by nature,they are founded on primi­
tive mechanisms of introjection or projection corresponding 
to fusions of self and object images which disregard the 
realistic differences between the self and the object"107 
Later though,"a concept of the self as an entity that has 
continuity and direction is formed"108.
Jacobson rejects Klein's rigid distinction between life 
and death instincts in favour of a more plastic conception 
of psychic energy while retaining the emphasis on the early 
internalisation of aggressive elements as precursors of the 
super-ego:
"At the very beginning of life,the instinctual energy is 
still in an undifferentiated state;but from birth on it 
develops into two kinds of psychic drives with different 
qualities under the influence of external stimulations"109 
Both the ego and the super-ego are seen as created out of a 
combination of libidinal,aggressive and neutralised 
forces,while the super-ego is considered as slowly emerging 
as a separate structure within the ego through the combina­
tion of earlier disconnected elements (an "archaic imagery 
referring to castration fears,imagery relating to parental 
prohibitions and demands,and imagery derived from the 
child's narcissistic/moral-perfectionist strivings"110).
Jacobson's synthesis incorporates most of the novel 
developments (related mainly to the dynamic and mechanisms 
of early ego-development) in a scheme that does not depart 
much from Freud's own,while she avoids the most challenge- 
able assertions of others (as for example Klein's use of 
life/death drives or Fairbairn's "basic endopsychic
107. E.Jacobson.The self and object world (Thereafter SOW),London: 
Hogarth Press,1964,p.46
108. SOW,p.53
109. SOW,p.13
110. SOW,p.119
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structure").111
Type of objects internalised and
determinants of their instinctual investment
Post Freudian developments allow a greater clarification 
of the type of objects internalised within the ego (and 
super-ego).
The Kleinian school admits a certain immediate capacity of 
perception of objects related to "the child's parents' 
bodies and to his own"112 which can be split and inter­
nalised with no separation between the object and the still 
undeveloped ego,a separation that is only gradually ef­
fected.
These early internalised elements should be considered,as 
Jacobson remarks,as "multiple,rapidly changing and not yet 
clearly distinguished part images of love objects and body 
part images (which) are formed and linked up with the 
memory traces of past pleasure-unpleasure experiences and 
become vested with libidinal and aggressive forces"113.
As the child grows,a separation between the ego and the 
internalised objects is established:
"When the depressive position has been reached,the main 
characteristic of object relations is that the object is 
felt as a whole object.In connection with this there is a 
greater degree of awareness of differentiation and of the 
separateness between the ego and the object"114.
Along with this separation the growing exposure of the 
child to language and other symbolic systems and the in-
111. The example of Jacobson has been followed by others as well,for 
example O.Kernberg who proposes his own series of stages of ego 
development (O.Kernberg.Object relations theory and clinical 
psychoanalysis.New York:Aronson,1976)
112. H.Segal,"Notes on Symbol formation" (1957) in The work of Hanna 
Segal.New York:Aronson,1981,p.51
113. SOW,p.53
114. Segal,op.cit.,p.55
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creased capability of cognitive perception,gradually expand 
the world of objects that can be internalised:
"As the child learns to walk and talk...the object imagery 
gradually extends to the surrounding animate and inanimate 
world...(as the latency period begins)..increasingly 
realistic preconscious representations of the animate and 
inanimate,concrete and abstract object world are formed,and 
can be stabilised by their firm and lasting cathexis with 
libidinal,aggressive and neutralised elements11115.
Thus the early,innate ability of the infant to recog­
nise, however imperfectly,and incorporate by splitting cer­
tain features of bodily parts of himself and the 
parents,accompanied by a the emergence of innate repre­
sentatives in phantasies,is to be contrasted with the later 
phase.In it,a certain cohesiveness of the ego and 
conceptual/perceptual maturation,allow a much greater range 
of objects to be perceived,instinctually cathected and in­
ternalised. It is in this later phase that the mechanism of 
identification proper Freud described can be said to 
operate.
The acquisition from the psyche of an externally 
originating and indeed social corpus of "psychical 
representatives" (to which we referred in the first part of 
the present chapter),has therefore to be seen as coexten­
sive with the transition from early predetermined and 
limited objects to a broader universe of "objects" that can 
be internalised.The existence of a symbolic universe from 
which the child can borrow the means for the perception of 
"objects" is the sina qua non for such a transition,and we 
referred to Lacan's and Castoriadis1s emphasis on the so­
cial character of this universe.The two processes -that of 
acquiring an "external" symbolic universe and that of the 
transition to a wider world of objects cathected and 
internalised- have to be seen as gradually developing
115. SWO,p.53
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together,along with a certain maturation of the 
perceptual/cognitive apparatus which is necessary for both 
processes to evolve.116
The object relations that can be significant for the con­
struction of the ego and the super-ego can be 
said,therefore,to be dependent -after an initial relatively 
predetermined stage- upon:
(i) a satisfactory initial integration of an ego struc­
ture,
(ii) the development of cognitive perception
and (iii) the symbolic/social universe available to the 
child (the acquisition of an "external" universe of sig­
nifications can be seen as simultaneous and interwoven with 
the internalisation of "objects" these significations 
define).
It is the interrelation of all these factors that allows 
the gradual built up of the structures of the ego and 
super-ego.And it can be affirmed that "cognitive develop­
ment , affective development and the development of struc­
tures representing internalised object relations are in­
timately linked"11'7.
As to the type of these objects,Freud1s remarks have been 
amplified and extended:
"Children,at different stages of their development iden­
tify with those part aspects of people by which are most 
immediately affected,whether in reality or phantasy.These 
part aspects are favoured not because of their social ac­
ceptability (they often are everything but the parent's 
most adjusted attributes) but by the nature of infantile 
phantasy which only gradually gives way to a more realistic 
anticipation of social reality"118.
116. J.Piaget and his school have theorised the stages of development 
of this perceptual/cognitive apparatus.These theorisations,far from 
being oppossed to the psychoanalytic one,actually complement it.
117. Kernberg,op.cit.,p.69
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Thus we move from the early 1 introjection of an object, an 
act modelled on a bodily process" to "identifications with 
character traits,or even with a particular flash of per­
sonality, which is quite localised in time or space and of­
ten caught in flight,as it were,precisely because of its 
artificial and bizare character" or "partial identifica­
tions with an act of speech,notably an interdiction" 
(mainly for super-ego identifications) or "a type of iden­
tification referring explicitly to structure:an identifica­
tion with the position of the other,which consequently 
presupposes an interpersonal interplay of relations and,as 
a rule,at least two other positions coinciding with the 
vestiges of a triangle:clearly,such would be the case for 
Oedipal identifications"119.
At an even later stage we can have identifications with 
explicit social norms or rules,identifications which 
presuppose the ability to perceive them as such an ability 
that only gradually appears (as Piaget remarks,concepts 
such as "native land","social justice" and rational aes­
thetic or social ideals do not acquire adequate affective 
value until the age of twelve or over120).
A certain growing complexity is revealed,therefore,to 
characterise the possible internalised elements:from part 
objects to whole objects to patterns of behaviour and ele­
ments of character to interpersonal relations to norms and 
ideas.
In all the above discussion there was no distinction be­
tween the objects that can be internalised within the ego 
and those within the super-ego.Indeed an important con­
118. E.Erikson,"The problem of ego identity"(1956) in Identity and the 
life cycle.New YorkrNorton,1980,p.121
119. Laplanche,"Life and death...",op.cit.,p.80
120. J.Piaget & B.Inhelder.The psychology of the child (1966),London: 
Routledge,1969,p.l51
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tribution of all these post Freudian developments is the 
extension of the diverse nature of possible objects of in­
ternalisation -including "social" objects- to the ego.Thus 
Freud's limitation of certain (primarily social) elements 
only to the super-ego can be discarded and these elements 
can be considered as operating positively -through 
libidinal identifications within the ego- as well as nega­
tively -through aggressive identifications- within the 
super-ego.
Regarding the dynamic aspect of the internalised ele­
ments, the above developments affirm that internalised ob­
jects are instinctually invested with either predominantly 
libidinal or predominantly aggressive energy already in the 
very early processes of introjection and projection.
As for the determinants of the kind and strength of in­
stinctual investment of internalised objects it is con­
firmed that even in the early years it depends on the 
relationship of the child with the significant other(s).
At the beginning,this relationship cannot be properly 
called an interpersonal one,the ego not having developed 
enough.It is only gradually that the child begins to ex­
perience the others as separate and to direct to them
libidinal or aggressive impulses which influence the in­
vestment of elements s/he internalises from these 
others.The case of the Oedipus complex that Freud had ana­
lysed, therefore, can be considered to be only one stage in 
a series of similar processes.
Thus Freud's theorisation of a certain organisations cer­
tain structuring of psychical energy his second topography 
refers to,is amplified and enriched by the Post Freudian 
developments we referred to.121
121. Of course,differences between the authors discussed do 
remain.Outside analytic practice it is not possible to decide for or 
against a certain author.There are,however,certain commonly accepted 
elements and it is to these we refer.In the context of the present 
analysis this level of generality has to be considered as acceptable.
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The importance of (external) object relations for the 
development of sexual drives is recognised,against Freud's 
account of early autoerotic choices.
An innate dynamic of ego development (implicitly present 
in Freud's theorisation) is explicitly theorised.
New mechanisms of object internalisation (splitting of ob­
jects, projective,introjective identification of part ob­
jects,etc.) at the early stages of ego and super-ego crea­
tion are introduced.These complement the central mechanism 
of identification that Freud had proposed122 and confirm 
the instinctual investment of internalised elements,even at 
the very early stages.
It is also confirmed that this instinctual investment (its 
kind and intensity) depends on the relationship of the 
child to significant other(s).
A much earlier origin of super-ego components is recog­
nised (though in Jacobson's view the super-ego as a struc­
ture emerges at the stage Freud had proposed).
The type of objects that can be internalised is more ex­
tensively theorised:from early relatively predetermined
It has also to be remarked that the authors we refer to (usually 
identified,in different combinations,as "object relations” theorists) 
do not present a "non-biologistic” version of psychoanalysis as op- 
possed to the Freudian one.(This is the opinion,for example,of 
H.Gunthrip opposing Freud and Klein to Fairbairn (H.Gunthrip, Per­
sonality structure and human interaction.LondonrHogarth.1961) or 
N.Chodorow who shares Gunthrip*s views (N.Chodorow,"Beyond drive 
theory:object relations and the limits of radical 
individualism".Theory and society 14 (1985),p.306).
The only such case is Balint's attribution of early libidinal object 
choices to the relation with the mother which removes the given nature 
of autoerotic object choices Freud postulated.Otherwise,Freud*s ac­
count is,as we saw,as free of biologism as any of the above 
authors.This is because Freud does not,at least since the introduction 
of his second topography,base his theorisation of psychical structur­
ing on (biologically predetermined) drives but rather on the agencies 
of the ego and the super-ego.
122. The connection of the processes of identification with the inter­
nalisation of a social symbolic system is also noted
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bodily parts/part objects to whole objects,patterns of be­
haviour, elements of character,etc.Thus Freud's limitation 
of "social" elements internalised only to the super ego -as 
was already obvious from Freud's own account- cannot be 
maintained.
In the light of the above,we can consider that we have a 
quite detailed theorisation of the development and 
mechanisms of construction of the agencies of the ego and 
super-ego.These agencies correspond to an organisations 
structuring of psychical energy.It is,therefore,a theory of 
psychical structuring that we refer to.In what follows we 
shall focus on certain aspects of this theory.
4.PSYCHICAL STRUCTURING AS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS
Psychoanalysis,Freud included,has traditionally paid 
little attention to post-Oedipal,adolescent or adult 
processes of psychical structuring relating to the ego or 
super-ego.Within the purposes of analytic practice,emphasis 
on the early years may be justified,since most neuroses can 
be traced back to these years and thus successfully 
treated.Psychoses also seem to require a return to even 
earlier formative stages of the ego.It can be said that for 
analytic/clinical practice in general it is the early years 
that are the most significant ones.
However,the mechanisms postulated in ego and super-ego 
construction are not in some way limited to the early years 
but they appear to have a certain generality.Freud himself 
accounted for group ties by postulating the existence of 
"partial identifications",based on the perception of a com­
mon quality shared with some other person who is not an ob­
ject of the sexual instinct"123.These partial identifica­
tions, functioning in a positive way and employing libidinal 
impulses,provide the main mechanism of group ties.
123. S.Freud.Group psychology and the analysis of the ego (1921). 
P .F .L . 12,Harmondsworth:Penguin,1985,p .137
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We have to accept,obviously,that earlier identifications 
are more formative since they create the basic structures 
of the ego and super-ego and thus that the impact of any 
later structuring on the economy of the psyche is rela­
tively smaller.Also,that "after adolescence,ego development 
proceeds less and less along the lines of identification 
and grants increasing room to independent critical and 
self-critical judgement and to the individual,autonomous 
trends of the ego and its Anlage"124.This does not 
imply,however,that the process of identification ceases to 
operate after adolescence.This process has to be seen as 
continuing throughout life.
There is an obvious need for further theorisation of 
psychical structuring through identification in adul­
thood. As it is,psychoanalysis does not offer any theorisa­
tion specifically oriented to these processes (with the 
exception of sexual maturity at adolescence and the estab­
lishment of a final sexual identity),that would -for 
example- allow us to infer the relative weight of such 
identifications vis-a-vis the "critical and self-critical 
judgement" of the ego.
5.THE PARTIAL CLOSURE OF PSYCHICAL AGENCIES
The inherent anthropomorhism in the notions of ego and 
super-ego may be taken to imply that these agencies are 
fully delimited and homogeneous ones.This is not the 
case,though.
The ego and super-ego are never fully distinguishable from 
each other and from the id.The lines of demarcation are 
never fully drawn:
"The ego is not sharply separated from the id;its lower 
portion merges into it...[the super ego] is a grade in the 
ego,a differentiation within the ego,...a part of the 
ego."12 5
124. Jacobson,SWO,p.194
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Moreover,even within a single agency,that of the ego,we do 
not have a homogeneous and consistent structure.Freud 
recognises "contrary attitudes" existing within the ego.126
Hartmann,generalising the remark,considers that "the many 
ego functions not only they have different strengths but 
they actually oppose each other"127.
It is not only in respect to attitudes and functions that 
the ego is not a homogeneous structure.We already stressed 
that although the distinction between the ego and the 
super-ego is the great dividing line within the psyche be­
tween libidinal and aggressive instinctual investment of 
internalised elements,the ego is never purely libidinal and 
the super-ego never purely aggressive.Due to the always 
fused nature of the instinctual energy investing any inter­
nalised element,this element is invested also with a cer­
tain degree of the opposing kind of psychical energy.Thus 
the ego and super-ego are not homogeneous structures from 
an instinctual/dynamic point of view as well.
The same lack of homogeneity exists in relation to the ob­
jects internalised.Freud had remarked,a propos the ego- 
ideal, the precursor of the super-ego within which it was to 
be subsequently located:
"Each individual is a component part of numerous groups,he 
is bound by ties of identification in many directions,and 
he has built up his ego ideal upon the most various 
models128.
Certain writers had tried to impose a coherence on the 
diverse identifications of the ego,such as Erikson claiming 
that in adolescence an integration of past identifications
125. El,p.367
126. Outline,p.440
127. Hartmann,op.cit.,p.139
128. "Group Psychology...",op.cit.,p.161
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is effected:"a fixed identity is superordinated to any 
single identification with individuals of the past:it in­
cludes all significant identifications,but it also alters 
them in order to make a unique and a reasonable coherent 
whole of them".129
However much a certain cohesion between these identifica­
tions is needed in order for them to coexist within the 
ego,their fusion into "a unique and coherent whole" has to 
be seen as an ideal rather than as the norm.130
We can conclude that while the broad labels of ego and 
super-ego do represent a structuring and organisation of 
psychical energy,this structuring should not be taken as 
producing fully homogeneous and closed wholes.Rather the 
ago and super-ego are composed by potentially or actually 
contradicting elements,contradicting impulses,and they may 
pursue contradicting functions.Moreover they are never 
fully distinguishable from one another and from the id.
Since the self as a whole ,the individual as such,is com­
posed by these agencies as well as from the Id,we can 
easily see the deconstructing effect psychoanalytic theory 
has to any claim for the individual as a 
homogeneous,coherent entity.Although we have to accept a 
certain closure and cohesiveness within the psychic struc­
ture, we have also to consider any such closure as repre­
senting a multiplicity of entities in dynamic equilibrium 
rather than an autonomous single agency.Hence 
psychoanalytic theory is radically different from any at­
tribution of an "essence" to the individual.
129. Erikson,op.cit.,p.121
130. We have to distinguish any psychologically necessary closure of 
the ego as a structure from the historically specific notion of the 
person as a self-sufficient entity (for example see M.Mauss "A 
category of the human mind:the notion of person;the notion of self" 
(1938) in M.Carrithers et al (eds).The category of the per­
son. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1985).It has also to be 
recognised that the actual closure of the ego may vary historically 
through more or less intense processes of individuation.
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6.THE EGO AND SUPER-EGO AS ALSO UNCONSCIOUS:THE RELATION 
BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE SECOND FREUDIAN TOPOGRAPHIES 
The theorisation of certain organised,structured agencies 
within the psyche invariably poses the question of the 
relation between this theorisation -of the whole of the 
second topograghy- to the first topography,and specifically 
to the fundamental Freudian concept,that of the uncon­
scious. Freud has been ambiguous as to the exact connection 
of his second topography with his first one.
In the second topography,the id is presented as "open at 
its end to somatic influences... filled with energy reaching 
it from the instincts..striving to bring about the in­
stinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure 
principle"131 and as following the specific modality pre­
viously attributed to the unconscious (primary 
process,timelessness,etc.).The id is "a chaos [and] has no 
organisation"132.Thus the id could be easily identified 
with the unconscious tout court.
Is it the case,then,that the agencies of the ego and the 
super-ego fall wholly within consciousness? If so,given the 
important functions assumed by these agencies,the notion of 
the unconscious becomes a marginal one and the specificity 
of the unconscious the first topograghy focused on becomes 
unimportant.
However,this is not so.
The unconscious function of the ego and super-ego 
In fact the ego and the super-ego straddle the conscious/ 
unconscious distinction,operating at both levels:
We saw above that Freud considers the super-ego as 
"merging" with the id: "the super-ego merges into the
131. NIL,p.106
132. NIL,p.100
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id;indeed,as heir to the Oedipus complex it has intimate 
relations with the id;it is more remote than the ego from 
the perceptual system".133Freud notes also that the dream- 
censorship attributed to the super-ego operates uncon­
sciously. The same can be said for the sense of quilt in ob­
sessional neurotics: "We may say that the sufferer from 
compulsions and prohibitions behaves as if he were 
dominated by a sense of guilt,of which,however,he knows 
nothing,so that we must call it an unconsious sense of 
guilt"134.
Thus the super-ego can be seen as operating unconsciously 
(as well as consciously).
The case of the ego is more complicated.The ego is the 
agency that includes the conscious/rational functions of 
the organism: "The ego can be seen as what may be called
reason and common sense,in contrast to the Id,which con­
tains the passions"135.In contrast to the id which has "no 
organisation",the ego is "organisation"136.In contrast to 
the unbound and freely mobile energy of the Id the ego rep­
resents bound energy137.In contrast to the Id's following 
the "pleasure" principle and the primary process,the ego is 
seen as functioning through the reality principle and as 
following the secondary process.Indeed,in his late 
"Outline" Freud considers that the ego functions primarily 
on a preconscious level.
However,the ego does not cease to be a "part" of the 
id:13e"the ego is not sharply separated from the id;its
133. NIL,p.Ill
134. S.Freud.Obsessive actions and religious practices (1907).P.F.L. 
13,Harmondsworth:Penguin,1985,p.37
135. El,p.364
136. S.Freud.Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety (1926).P.F.L. 10, 
Harmondsworth:Penguin,1979,p .250
137. Outline,p.395
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lower portion merges with the id"139.
Moreover,in his sketch of the "mental personality" Freud 
presents the ego as extending within the unconscious.140 
Part of the ego is considered,therefore,as uncon­
scious. Freud explicitly recognises this: "large portions of 
the ego,and particularly the super-ego,which cannot be 
denied the characteristics of preconsciousness,none the 
less remain for the most part unconscious in the 
phenomenological sense of the word"141.
But it is not only in the "phenomenological sense" that 
the ego is unconscious.lt operates at an unconscious level 
as well.This is the case of the ego-defence mechanisms: "We 
have come upon something in the ego itself which is also
unconscious,which behaves exactly like the repressed -that 
is,which produces powerful effects without itself being 
conscious and which requires special work before it can be 
made conscious".142
As has been remarked,these mechanisms "are not just uncon­
scious in the sense that the subject is ignorant of their 
motive and mechanism,but more profoundly so in that they 
present a compulsive,repetitive and unrealistic aspect
which makes them comparable to the very repressed against
which they are struggling"143.More generally,it has been 
remarked that the ego can follow the primary process144.
138. A part "which has been modified by the direct influence of the 
external world through the medium of Perception/consciousness" 
(El,363)
139. El,p.367
140. NIL,p.Ill
141. Outline,p.394
142. El,p.356
143. LP,p.139
144. Hartmann,op.cit.,p.131
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The make up of the ego and super-ego as unconscious 
The mechanisms of ego (and super-ego) construction,i.e. 
identification and the other internalisation
processes,operate unconsciously.Indeed at the early stages 
of ego construction there is no ego that could become 
"conscious" of these mechanisms.Even in the case of later 
identifications,however,the process of identification 
remains an unconscious one (adult identifications of the 
type Freud describes in group formation,for example,are 
also unconscious).
As for the actual configuration of the ego and the super­
ego, i.e. the objects internalised and their instinctual in­
vestment, we have no direct access to them.We can deduce 
this configuration from endopsychic operation,from manifes­
tations in consciousness as thoughts or affects (or from 
consequent manifestations in behaviour) but we cannot ap­
proach in any direct or unmediated way the ego and the 
super-ego.
That the origin of identifications are external "objects" 
does not imply that these objects are replicated within the 
ego or the super-ego as such.However,we cannot know exactly 
"how" identifications exist within these agencies.Do they 
retain,and to what extent their perceptual characteristics? 
How do they coexist with each other? We cannot offer an 
answer to these questions any more we can for unconscious 
processes in general.In fact we cannot really theorise the 
mode of being of internalised elements as they exist within 
the agencies of the ego and the super-ego.Only after the 
identifications constructing the ego have been manifested 
-in one way or another- on the level of consciousness can 
we identify their existence.
It is not only,therefore,the operation of the ego and su­
per ego as endopsychic agencies that can be described as 
unconscious.The actual make up,the configuration of these 
agencies have also to be seen as unconscious.Not only is 
produced unconsciously,but is also inaccessible to con­
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sciousness as such.
Thus (parts of) the ego merge with the id,operate on an 
unconscious level,and exhibit features (primary 
process,source of psychical energy) that have been ex­
plicitly attributed to the unconscious in Freud's first 
topography.Moreover,the actual construction of the ego is 
unconsciously produced,remains unconscious and can only be 
indirectly deduced.lt can be concluded,therefore,that the 
ego is -also- unconscious.
Hence a simple contrast between the Id as uncon­
scious, referring to unbound energy,primary
process,irrationality and passions and the ego as 
preconscious/conscious following the secondary process and 
being the embodiment of reason cannot be sustained.Rather 
the ego (and the super-ego) should be seen as straddling 
the previous dichotomy of conscious/unconscious and as ex­
isting in both these "areas".
On its "upper" regions the ego includes consciousness and 
rational thought while its "lower" ones participate in the 
modality of the unconscious.The unconscious/conscious 
polarity is not replicated as the Id/Ego one but it exists 
within the ego.The ego has to be seen as covering the whole 
spectrum from consciousness to the unconscious and the 
same,to a lesser degree,can be said for the super-ego.
The unconscious as structurable
But if so,the difference between the unconscious ego and 
the unconscious Id can be none else than a difference be­
tween unstructured unconscious and structured unconscious 
respectively.A difference between bound energy and unbound 
one is not to be seen as referring only to the unconscious 
and the conscious,but as existing also within the same 
level,that of the unconscious.The unconscious itself is 
also structurable.
Thus it could be argued that the second Freudian topog­
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raphy introduces the concept of structured psychical energy 
within the field defined as unconscious in the first 
topograghy.
The actual "construction" of the ego and the super-ego can 
be seen as "the synthesis in the course of which free 
energy is transformed into bounded energy"145.The emergence 
of these agencies corresponds to a structuring of part of 
the undifferentiated instinctual energy of the id,without 
this structuring implying an ipso facto change of register.
Freud's ambivalence over the exact location of the ego 
could be indicative of the difficulty he had to acknowledge 
the full implications his later phase of thinking (the one 
roughly starting with "Beyond the pleasure principle") for 
his earlier notion of the unconscious.Yet the admission of 
the possibility of structuring within the unconscious is 
unmistakeably present in this later phase.
In the light of the above,Lacan1s famous remark that the 
"unconscious is structured like a language" can be seen 
with the emphasis on the "structured" rather than on 
"language",i.e precisely as an affirmation of the struc­
tured character of the unconscious.
As O.Kernberg remarks:"The repressed portion of the id 
would possess an internal organisation as well as specific 
structures composed of self-image,object image and unaccep­
table impulse components"and V.der Waals:"we would have to 
conclude that the repressed portion of the id is not pure 
id,but an ego id"146.
However,as we saw,this structuring does not produce fully 
closed,fully homogeneous entities.Since the elements inter­
nalised within the ego and the super-ego are invested with 
psychical energy (primarily libidinal in the ego and 
primarily aggressive in the super-ego) the lack of
145. Outline,p.395
146. Kernberg,op.cit.,p.43
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homogeneity implies that these agencies are to be seen as 
dynamic equilibria in flux in which conflicting, con­
tradicting impulses coexist in a precarious balance rather 
than as unitary entities.
Moreover,as we noted,the ego and the super-ego are not 
fully distinguishable from the id and cannot be fully dif­
ferentiated between them,either.
Thus the "structuring" of the unconscious the agencies of 
the ego and super-ego represent has to be conceived as a 
partial and never fully completed one.It could be said that 
the ego and super-ego are only lines of partial differen­
tiation and organisation,dynamic equilibria in
flux,surrounded by and merging with the "mass" of chaotic 
instinctual energy of the Id from which they can never be 
fully distinguish.
The partial and incomplete nature of structuring seems to 
be in accordance with the chaotic modality attributed to 
the id and the unconscious in general.Even though it does 
admit a certain structuring,unconscious psychical energy is 
not amenable to a full organisations full structuring,a 
complete "binding".
The psychoanalytic theorisation of psychical structur­
ing, therefore, corresponding to Freud's second topog­
raphy, can be considered as an affirmation of the struc­
turable nature of the unconscious,and hence as further ad­
vancing the theorisation of this fundamental concept.lt is 
an extension and enrichment of the first topography rather 
than a substitute for it.
7.INDETERMINACY AND OPENNESSIN THE PROCESS OF STRUCTURING
The process of structuring of psychical energy that the 
emergence of the ego and super-ego represent,has to be con­
sidered to exhibit,to a significant extent,elements of in­
determinacy.
(a) The construction of the ego and super-ego depends on 
the internalisation of elements from the significant en­
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vironment.The type of objects internalised becomes more and 
more indeterminate encompassing a growing variety of ob­
jects as the child grows.
However,even if the general type of possible inter- 
nalisable objects is known, the actual choice of object and 
hence the actual configuration of the agencies cannot be 
deduced from their general type (and this is true even in 
the earlier stages of psychical development).
Consequently the history of object choices as it is inter­
nalised in the ego and super-ego,and hence the actual make 
up of these agencies can be said to be non deducible in any 
mechanical way from the significant environment.The actual 
objects internalised are always individually 
specific,constituting,in this way,the individuality of the 
person.
This indeterminacy holds,in a more pronounced way,for the 
investment of these objects with instinctual energy.The 
level of this investment as well as the degree of 
aggressive/libidinal elements it incorporates are in­
fluenced by the relationship of the child to the sig­
nificant environment (the significant other(s)).Thus the 
instinctual investment of these elements depends on a 
dynamic process of interaction.
Even at early stages when the significant environment is 
limited to the mother and the type of object choice is 
limited,the actual investment of these objects -as "good" 
or "bad"- and the level of this investment,cannot be 
deduced from the mother's behaviour (as Mahler's study 
indicates).
At later stages,once the basic ego-structure has been 
developed,the interpersonal processes of interaction be­
tween the child and the significant others are the deter­
minants of the instinctual investment on internalised ele­
ment s. Thus it is not the case of a simple reproduction of 
the significant environment within the psyche.
Freud's remarks on the severity of the super-ego are here
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pertinent:"the original severity of the super-ego does not 
-or does not so much- represent the severity which one has 
experienced from it [the object],or which one attributes to 
it;the severity of the former seems to be independent of 
that of the latter"147.The strength of the super-ego is 
not,then,a replica of the environment facing the chiId,but 
it is only influenced in an indeterminable degree by this 
environment.lt cannot be deduced in any immediate way from 
thi s envi ronment.
Thus the actual make-up,the specific configuration of the 
ego,regarding both the type of internalised objects and the 
type and level of instinctual investment is not deducible 
in any mechanical way from the significant environment.Even 
when growing up in the same environment,every person 
remains unique because different "objects" and in different 
ways are internalised.
This assertion is not invalidated by a parallel affirma­
tion of an innate dynamic in the development of the ego,a 
dynamic that can be considered to include given stages in a 
fixed sequence (of the type Mahler or Kernberg propose).The 
fixed sequence regards only the necessary and gradual emer­
gence of the ego and super-ego as agencies but not the ac­
tual objects internalised nor their psychical investment.
The agencies of the ego and super-ego are the same for 
every individual and define the individual as a 
specific,separate entity.However,the actual configuration 
of these agencies is not universal but personal and it is 
this configuration that gives to every individual his/hers 
individuality.
(b)Besides the indeterminacy arising from the impos­
sibility to decide which elements from a given environment 
will become important for the psyche,there is another,more 
radical,level of indeterminacy.lt stems from the partial
147. S.Freud.Civilization and its discontents (1929) (thereafter 
CD),P .F .L . 12,p.323
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closure of psychical agencies and from the unconscious 
level the construction and the configuration of the ego and 
the super-ego operate on.
The internalisation of external objects in the process of 
ego and super-ego construction is definitely not the 
reproduction of these objects within the psyche (as is true 
of any unconscious element).
Moreover,the actual configuration and make up of these 
agencies as it exists within the unconscious is not ap­
proachable in any direct or unmediated way.Representatives, 
ideas and affects originating within the ego and the super­
ego have to be -and always are- subjected to a change of 
state to become conscious.
Since,however,these psychical agencies represent dynamic 
equilibria in flux,and not unitary and homogeneous 
agencies,even these manifestations in consciousness are 
never unidimensional.Conflicting affects or ideas -which 
may also change over time- can stem from the (same) ego.Yet 
these manifestations are all we have to deduce the exist­
ence and actual make up of the ego and super-ego.
Thus even if we knew (which of course we don't) the ob­
jects that have been internalised within the ego and the 
super-ego as well as their instinctual investment,we would 
not be able to know how these objects exist within the un­
conscious or deduce the way they may appear in conscious­
ness. We cannot know as what thoughts or affects the ego or 
super ego may manifest themselves.
We cannot,therefore,consider that any causal lines of 
determination can be drawn as to the actual configuration 
of these agencies or the manifestation of this configura­
tion. Given a specific environment,the configuration of the 
endopsychic agencies of the ego and the super-ego cannot be 
determined.Not only because the actual objects that will be 
internalised and their instinctual investment is not 
deducible from this environment,but also,and more impor­
tantly, because these agencies are never fully
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closed,determined or homogeneous ones:they are rather lines 
of partial structuring surrounded by and merging with the 
mass of the chaotic instinctual energy of the
id.Moreover,since they operate on the unconscious,they are 
never fully approachable as such.
We are faced here with a strange phenomenon: a theory of 
psychical determination that retains a radical indeter­
minacy so that we can never say what exactly the results of 
this determination are.Indeed there are no "results" in any 
strict sense:only a certain fluid and never fully delimited 
structuring of a flow of psychical energy.
Psychoanalytic theorisation reaches its limits at this 
point (as also in the attempt to present a theoretical ac­
count of the unconscious).It pursues a theory of deter- 
minacy and a rational account of endopsychic agencies as 
far as it can go.But it cannot fail to admit that the ob­
jects analysed ultimately escape any full account of 
them;they are not fully analysable in any coherent and ra­
tional way.And this is because they operate on the level 
that precisely escapes any full rational account: the level 
of the unconscious.
In this context,we can admit Castoriadis' claim of 
"radical imagination": "The representative flux is,makes 
itself,as self alteration,the incessant emergence of the 
other in and through the positing of images or figures"148
In other words,radically new images or representations can 
emerge within the psyche,despite the fact that both the 
initial origin of representations the psyche uses and the 
internalised objects within the ego and the super-ego are 
determined by the environment.The indeterminacy that 
characterises the conditioning of the psyche from the part 
of the environment is such that a radical creativity within 
the psyche can be admitted.149
148. Castoriadis,IIS,p.329
149. A note may be added here concerning Lacan's theorisation related
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8.SUMMARY
Freud's second topography of the psyche and the post- 
Freudian developments we referred to present a theorisation 
of structuring of psychical energy through the agencies of 
the ego and the super-ego.
The emergence and early development of these agencies 
seems predetermined and can be said to follow certain 
stages.However it is the incorporation of "external" ob­
jects within them that actually "constructs" these 
agencies.
The mechanisms of internalisation are those of introjec-
to the indeterminacy noted above.
Lacan refers to "orders",the imaginary and the symbolic,through which 
the psyche operates.For the symbolic order to become internalised,a 
certain breach in the imaginary order is required, a "gap opened by a 
prematuration of the imaginary".This gap signifies a lack - the 
"manque-a-etre" (J.Lacan,"Remarque sur le rapport de 
D.Lagache"(1961).Ecrits.Paris:Editions du Seuil,1966,p.655)- travers­
ing the imaginary and -presumably- the symbolic order as well.The 
"manque-a-etre" inhibits any full closure of the psyche.
The "manque-a-etre" can be considered to refer precisely to the im­
possibility of full structuring of the unconscious and hence to the 
necessary openess of the psyche.However,the way the impossibility is 
presented is different,and this difference is a significant one.
For the psyche to require the assumption of a "lack" to denote its 
openess,the implication is that it could otherwise be conceived as a 
closed entity that only the existence of this "manque" prevents from 
being fully closed.
(The very reference to "orders" -the imaginary and the symbolic- has 
also an implied connotation of closed universes,which,in principle,can 
be seen as self-enclosed,self-sustainable ones,unless something exter­
nal inhibits this closure)
The "I"("Moi") is correlatively seen as it could have been a 
closed,homogeneous entity if only the lack("manque") didn't exist.The 
"manque" functions like a kind of negative essence that inhibits the 
full closure of the self.Thus while we have the denial of a 
closed,self-sustainable I,this denial is effected only through the 
postulation of the mysterious "manque" qua essence,operating on the 
otherwise closed entity of the psyche and the self.
Lacan's account therefore retains a kind of metaphysics,even if it is 
in a negative form.On the contrary,Freud's account and the implica­
tions we have derived from it do not,nor do they need to:
The unconscious is not originally,or even potentially,a closed en­
tity. It is simply an entity that is never fully structurable.Hence,a 
certain necessary openess of the psyche is implied.
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tion,projection and -at a later stage- identification.
At the early stages the type of these objects is limited 
and apparently predetermined to bodily parts of self and 
parents.The establishment of a primary ego-structure along 
with a cognitive maturation that allows the gradual inter­
nalisation of an externally provided -and social in origin- 
universe of representations,mark the transition from these 
limited objects to a vast array of elements,including pat­
terns of behaviour,elements of character,social norms, in­
terpersonal relations,etc.
These elements retain an instinctual investment as they 
become internalised.This investment is principally of a 
libidinal/Erotic nature for the elements internalised 
within the ego and of an aggressive nature -related to the 
death drives- within the super-ego.The determinants of the 
kind and intensity of this energy is the relationship of 
the child to significant other(s) (initially the 
mother).These relationships become more and more interper­
sonal ones as the child's ego develops and "whole persons" 
are conceived as such.
The ego and super-ego represent therefore a certain or­
ganisation of instinctual energy.But they are more than 
that: they behave as sources of instinctual energy as 
well,the super ego of a predominantly aggressive one 
directed towards the ego and the ego of a libidinal one 
directed to external objects (and of course the ego is also 
the bearer of conscious/rational thought).
Thus the development of the agencies of the ego and super­
ego can be considered as a structuring of instinctual 
energy,a structuring interwoven with cognitive and affec­
tive development and necessitating a facilitating and sup­
portive external environment.However,the mechanisms of this 
development and primarily that of identification,have to be 
seen as continuing throughout life,though with a decreasing 
importance (alongside adaptation processes through the 
conscious/ rational ego).
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However,the agencies of the ego and the super-ego are not 
fully delimited and homogeneous ones.They merge with the id 
and with each other,and they may contain contradicting ele­
ments .Moreover , both the construction of these agencies and 
part of their operation remains unconscious and there is no 
direct access to their actual configuration.Thus the second 
Freudian topography can be considered as introducing the 
possibility of a -partial- structuring of the unconscious,a 
structuring represented precisely by these agencies.
As a consequence,points of indeterminacy are introduced 
within the theorisation of psychical structuring.Given a 
specific environment,the actual objects that will be inter­
nalised within the ego and super-ego and their instinctual 
investment are not deducible from this environment in a 
mechanical way.Besides,because these elements exist within 
the unconscious,they can never be directly ap­
proached. Finally, since the ego and super-ego are never 
fully closed or homogeneous agencies their manifestations 
in consciousness are not unidimensional.
Thus no fully causal theory of psychical structuring can 
be advanced.As a corollary,the possibility of the emergence 
of the non determined,of the radically new,within the 
psyche has to be admitted.
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(IX). FROM A THEORY OF THE PSYCHE
TO A THEORY OF THE SOCIAL
The elements of psychoanalytic theorisation indicated 
above,however limited in respect to the whole of 
psychoanalytic theory,are enough to allow us to pose the 
question of the relationship between the psychical and the 
social.
1.HUMAN AND ANIMAL PSYCHICAL DEVELOPMENT
The above outline of psychical structuring that 
psychoanalytic theory introduces allows a brief note on the 
relationship between human and animal psychic development.
It has to be admitted that much within the human psyche 
have to be seen as operating on the same level as that of 
higher animals.This is,primarily,the case of self­
preservative instincts that Freud never really occupied 
himself with.Of course these instincts have to be seen (as 
recent research,mainly in the field of ethology and neurop­
sychology, has indicated) not any more as "givens changed by 
the environment",but as "organisations which,through learn­
ing, integrate various inborn patterns ("building blocks") 
into flexible overall plans".1
Even a certain form of "ego" and mechanisms of ego forma­
tion through identification and similar processes are 
likely to exist in higher mammals.2
The particularity of the human psychical structuring 
through ego development seems to lie in the plasticity and 
indeterminacy the process exhibits.
Ego development in humans has very few biologically
1. Kernberg,op.cit.,p.86
2. One can recall,in this context,Lorenz *s mechanism of "imprinting” 
relative for even "lower" animals (for example K.Lorenz.On Aggres­
sion. London: Methuen. 1976) .
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predetermined constants.These (stages of ego development,of 
ego development,type of early internalisable elements) are 
very few and limited to the early years of life.As the 
child grows up,the importance of the environment as the 
source of internalised objects and their instinctual in­
vestment becomes predominant.Even within this environ­
ment, though, -an environment which is a specifically 
human/social one- the actual path of psychic development 
exhibits an extraordinary plasticity and indeterminacy.
Thus an extraordinary variety of objects can be inter­
nalised within the ego,a variety connected also with the 
superior cognitive and rational capabilities of the human 
mind (capabilities which,for example,after a certain stage 
of psychical development allow the internalisation of ele­
ments of a purely conceptual or ideal nature).
Thus,while we should speak of a continuum rather than a 
sharp differentiation between the "animal" and the 
"human",there is a certain specificity that characterises 
human psychical development.And psychoanalytic theory al­
lows us to theorise precisely this specificity.
2.THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL
If such a specificity of the human psyche ex­
ists, however, it is closely connected with the origin of the 
internalised within the psyche elements and the type of the 
significant environment.Any analysis of either cannot fail 
to reveal that we are referring to social objects and to a 
social significant environment.
(a) THE UNCONSCIOUS INTERFACE
BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL 
The deep,foundational level
of social environmental influence
We can distinguish three ways in which the environment in­
fluences the psyche in the early,formative stages of self­
development :
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(i) As the origin of the representations the psyche -both 
on the conscious and unconscious level- gradually comes to 
use,abandoning any inborn or "private" earlier ones.On the 
level of the unconscious,there is a continuity in modality 
between the early and the externally acquired repre­
sentations but the latter are not predetermined as to their 
content,uniike the earlier ones which indicate certain com­
mon themes (Jung's archetypes,Klein1s representations of 
bodily parts or Freud's primal phantasies).
The externally acquired representations depend on and are 
intelligible only within the symbolic/meaningful universe 
the child is gradually enmeshed at,the human universe of 
meanings and significations.This universe is the "symbolic 
order" Lacan refers to or the "world of representations" of 
Castoriadis'.These representations can only be described as 
"social".
It has to be noted here that in so far as representations 
or symbols enter the unconscious we do not have a simple 
transposition within the psyche of a system of symbols or 
representations.The socially originating representations 
are subjected to the specific modality of the unconscious 
and they need a change of state to become conscious 
again.They do not exist,therefore,as systems amenable to 
full formalisation within the psyche,as Lacan's theorisa­
tion may be taken to indicate.lt is primarily Cas­
toriadis, as we saw,who stressed the non-logical^on- 
rational modality of social representations within the un­
conscious .
At a different level,the social symbolic universe supports 
also the cognitive development of the psyche,operating 
through the conscious ego (Piaget and his school have ana­
lysed the stages of this development).Once the cognitive 
maturation has reached a certain stage,explicit social 
values and norms can be internalised either at an uncon­
scious, or at a conscious/preconscious level.
(ii).Concurrently with the "representations",the sig­
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nificant environment is the source of objects of iden­
tification or of internalisation in general within the 
agencies of the ego and super-ego.
In early phases of ego development the type of objects 
that are internalised is,as noted,restricted and predeter­
mined (referring mainly to child's own and to parent's 
bodily parts and functions,passing gradually from part ob­
jects to whole objects and to whole persons).
Even at these stages,though,at which the biological 
predeterminations seem most important,the "source" of these 
objects -the parents and especially the mother- do not 
cease to be overdetermined as persons by social factors 
which,though not directly perceivable by the infant,have a 
certain influence on the features and objects the infant 
does conceive.
As Mahler remarks (and it has to be remembered that these 
remarks are to be found within a work primarily oriented 
towards the affirmation of innate givens in ego 
development):
"Three variables involving the mother are of particular 
importance in shaping,promoting,or hindering the individual 
child's adaptability,drive,and ego,development and the 
beginning structuralisation of precursors of his super-ego:
1.The mother's personality structure.
2.The developmental process of her parental function
3.The mother's conscious,but particularly uncon­
scious, fantasy regarding the individual child."3
We could say that even the early,semi-biological,"objects" 
of identification are overdetermined by a series of 
"social" factors through the medium of the mother.
At a later stage,with the broadening of the type of ob­
jects internalised,character traits,personality
flashes,behaviour patterns,interdictions and moral 
values,"elements of class,race,nation",and later abstract
3. Mahler,op.cit.,p.202
299
concepts and ideologies,are internalised.
Most of these "objects" of identification refer to greater 
social structural wholes within which they become intel­
ligible. Some of these,indeed,can only be described through 
the reference to such a greater whole,as for example 
Freud's "elements of class,race,etc.".
Even when the internalised objects are character 
traits,behaviour patterns and the like,these traits and 
patterns are themselves the result of (i) a similar 
process of psychical structuring of the significant 
other(s) and (ii) of the current position and function of 
these others within social networks.To a significant ex­
tent , therefore, they are also social ones.
The internalised elements,therefore, may be transmitted 
through the individuals more close to the child -initially 
the parents,later other significant individuals- but they 
refer not only to these individuals or only to the contexts 
within which the growing child actually encounters them,but 
to broader contexts.Only within these latter can some of 
the internalised elements become intelligible.They 
are,therefore,inescapably social.
It has to be remembered that,as with representations,the 
internalisation of elements within the ego and super-ego 
does not imply a replication of them within the psyche,but 
the production of certain bounded lines of instinctual 
energy,of a certain instinctual structuring,that somehow 
corresponds to these objects.As Adorno remarks:"If there is 
any truth in Freud's notion of the archaic and indeed 
"timeless" nature of the unconscious,the concrete social 
circumstances and motivations cannot enter it without been 
altered and "reduced"4 .
(iii).Finally the relationship of the growing infant and 
child with its significant environment (a relationship that 
can be called "interpersonal" only after the ego has
4. T.Adorno,"Sociology and psychology".New Left Review.47 (1968),p.80
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developed to a certain degree of cohesiveness) in­
fluences, as we saw,the level and kind of instinctual energy 
directed to cathected objects and,correspondingly,the 
strength and kind of instinctual investment of internalised 
elements (or of whole agencies as the ego and super-ego).
Obviously the form of both early and later such sig­
nificant environments (the nuclear or extended family or 
its absence in the case of primitive societies,the modes of 
education,etc.) are historically specific and socially 
determined.
Besides,the psychical make up of the persons that form 
these environments and enter into relationship with the 
child,a make up that is bound to influence the relationship 
itself,is the result of these persons' own psychical 
development which had also been socially influenced.
It is not only,therefore,the type of objects internalised 
but also the actual dynamics of instinctual energy invest­
ing these objects (and,at a larger scale,the agencies of 
ego and super-ego themselves) that is socially influenced.
These three "modes" of environmental (social) influence on 
the functioning,development and structuring of the in­
dividual psyche obviously operate in a simultaneous and in­
termeshed way and it is only for analytic purposes that we 
distinguish them as such.
They reveal,though,referring as they do to a deep, founda­
tional, and mostly unconscious level of environmental in­
fluence on the psyche,that the very constitution of the 
psyche is a function of elements and influences that can 
only be described as social.
The objects which are at the origin of internalised ele­
ments, the representations that the psyche uses,the sig­
nificant environments which influence the instinctual in­
vestment of endopsychic elements and structures,all depend 
-to a great extent- on specific social context(s).
In its contents,therefore,in its dynamics,in its way of
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"expression",the psyche is inconceivable without a 
reference to such context(s).
The continuous character of this influence
The modes of social environmental influence we referred to 
are not limited to the early years of life.
As noted in the previous chapter,symbol internalisation 
depends on cognitive maturation which is a long process 
(stretching at least to adolescence) and object inter­
nalisation through identification continues throughout 
life.
Though we can expect that the role of the 
rational/cognitive apparatus and of critical and self- 
critical judgement increases as the child enters into 
adolescence and adulthood,unconscious identification 
processes never cease to operate.
Naturally,the early influences are the most significant in 
terms of psychical economy.Later influences,though,may be 
equally significant within a theorisation of the social in­
dividual and his actions.
For post-oedipal stages,the correlation of the modes of 
social influence we referred to with theories of education 
is obvious.However,the actual connection between the two 
remains to be worked out.5
5. To give an example:I.Illich,among others,has remarked that the par­
ticipation of a child in the everyday practice of the -modern- 
school,makes the child internalise and accept certain values, ir­
respective of the content of what is actually taught:
"School initiates young people into a world where everything can be 
measured,including their imagination,and indeed,man himself".Knowledge 
and values are presented as "institutionalised, measured,packaged". 
Progress also is seen as "measured by the degree of consumption of 
services" (I.Illich, Deschooling society (1971).Harmondsworth:Penguin. 
1976,p.45).
All these the child comes to "know" not as explicit values but as im­
plicit ones,incorporated within the very organisational order of the 
school into which the child is enmeshed and within the practice of the 
school that he follows.We cannot refer to this "knowledge" as a 
conscious/cognitive development,but we don’t know either how 
mechanisms of identification or unconscious symbol internalisation 
could be used to explain it.
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As for adulthood,many authors have referred to operations 
of the social within the individual which function uncon­
sciously -at least in the phenomenological sense- and which 
do seem to have an effect in influencing the structure of 
the psyche in a relatively permanent way (as it can be 
judged from subsequent behaviour or thought).
To give some examples: Such a case is Foucault's reference 
to "disciplines",as "the methods which made possible the 
meticulous control of the operations of the body,which as­
sured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed 
upon them a relation of docility-utility"6,methods operat­
ing through a "meticulous control of activity in space and 
time" and which are evident in the army,the school,the 
hospital and the prison as they become organised at the end 
of the 18th century.
Foucault indicates the analogy between these "disciplines" 
and the capitalist organisation of work in modern fac­
tories, an analogy already stressed by Marx.
What we have here is a series of techniques that are aimed 
in changing the individual's behaviour,techniques operating 
on the body and its activities,without apparently passing 
through a cognitive operation.The only way these techniques 
could have an effect on behaviour as they seem to do would 
be if,in psychodynamic terms,they effected a certain struc­
turing of the psyche.This structuring is effected and 
operates at an unconscious level,at least in the 
phenomenological/descriptive sense.
We cannot really say what is the connection between these 
"disciplines" and the processes of social environmental in­
fluence on the psyche we referred to above.How,for ex­
ample, can the function of the "disciplines" be assimilated 
through the identification processes?
In a more generalising vein,Althusser remarks that
6. M.Foucault.Discipline and punish (1975).Harmondsworth:Penguin.1979. 
p.137
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"ideology" is the "imaginary relationship of individuals to 
their real conditions of existence"-7. Ideology exists 
"always in an apparatus,and its practice,or practices",i.e 
in a "material" way:
The participation of the subject in certain practices 
("material practices governed by material rituals",just as 
Pascal's advice to the unfaithful :"kneel down,move your 
lips in prayer,and you will believe"8) has a certain effect 
on the individual,an effect manifested on the "imaginary" 
sphere and only subsequently on the cognitive sphere.
S.Zizek takes up Althusser's point in referring to 
"ideological phantasy" as the "illusion which is structur­
ing our real,effective relationship to reality"9 .He further 
refers to A.Sohn-Rethel who has insisted that certain con­
cepts of abstract thought (for example solipsism,abstract 
quantity,abstract time and space) have originated not in 
thought itself but in the realm of social practice and par­
ticularly in the exchange through money in the market.
Althusser,Zizek and Sohn-Rethel refer to certain struc­
tural effects the participation in specific social prac­
tices has,effects that can be manifested in "phantasy",in 
the "imaginary dimension",and be at the origin of conscious 
thought.
Zizek remarks that when Sohn-Rethel claims "the exchange 
abstraction is not thought,but it has the form of thought 
(before it can be transformed to actual thought) he indi­
cates precisely the level of the unconscious,as that "form 
of thought whose ontological status is not that of 
thought"10.
7. L.Althusser,"Ideology and ideological state apparatuses",op.cit., 
p.153
8. ibid.,p.158
9. S.Zizek.The sublime object of ideology.London:Verso.1989.p.33
10. ibid.,p.19
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The "phantasy" or the "imaginary dimension",then,can be 
taken to refer to the unconscious itself,and hence to a 
certain structurings certain influence of the unconscious 
through the participation in social practices.This struc­
turing may,subsequently and as would be expected,manifested 
as conscious thought.Though no specific indication of the 
actual endopsychic processes this structuring operates 
through is made,the existence of this structuring,its level 
(that of the unconscious,and not only in the phenomenologi­
cal sense) and its origin (through participation in social 
practices) are persuasively asserted.
These examples -among many other possible ones- indicate 
that social influences on the level of the adult individual 
unconscious do exist.The unconscious of the adult is not 
only,therefore,populated by infantile remnants but it is 
also an active layer of functioning of the mind into which 
the social environment can operate.
No theorisations have been advanced as to the mode of en­
dopsychic operation of this structuring and its relation to 
the earlier modes we referred to,though the relevance of 
the participation in social practices has been indi­
cated. Explicit and detailed links between the social in­
fluences these studies indicate and the mechanisms 
psychoanalysis theorises remain to be elaborated (Freud's 
pioneering work on group identifications is one of the few 
studies that have addressed this question).11
However,there can be no doubt about the existence of 
these social influences operating on the unconscious of 
adults nor about their importance from the point of view of 
a theory of both the individual psyche and the social.
11. The relevance of "practice" should not be taken as annulling the 
importance of other ways the social influences psychical structur­
ing,Freud's "partial identifications" being a case.Indeed a question 
arising is whether there can be a case of unconscious -and not 
cognitive- influence of systems of ideas/symbols (The questions 
Barthes' "Mythologies" raise,for example. R.Barthes.Mythologies 
(1957).London:Paladin.1973.p .117ff.)
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(b) THE CONSCIOUS/RATIONAL ADAPTATION
TO THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Alongside the deep and/or unconscious processes we 
referred to above,psychoanalytic theorisation allows us to 
distinguish one more: that referring to a
conscious/rational adaptation to the social.
This is,in a sense,the most obvious level,being theorised 
long before psychoanalysis.The important in the present 
context is that it does not get dissolved once the exist­
ence of deeper unconscious processes of social operation on 
the individual have been asserted.lt retains its 
specificity and significance.
It is the conscious/rational ego -as the bearer of the 
reality principle- that functions as the agent for this 
adaptation.
This adaptation refers to specific ways the individual 
consciously and rationally adapts to the environment.To do 
so,the individual needs a certain "knowledge",a system of 
concepts and ideas that he/she can use to rationally con­
ceive his situation,aims and means.This system is itself a 
social/historical creation,the accumulation of past 
knowledge.Moreover,the individual also needs a system of 
norms and values to evaluate aims and choose means to at­
tain these aims.These norms and values are obviously also 
social ones.12
Thus in a conscious/rational adaptation to the social en­
vironment the social is the objective environment itself 
while at the same time it provides the (intellectual) means 
by which the process can be accomplished.
Since in a significant development of the conscious/ cog­
nitive apparatuses is necessary before these processes can 
operate,it is only at a relatively late stage that they be­
12. It is to this adaptation that the early Parsonian model in 
"Structure" refers to.Giddens’s model is also -at least to a large 
extent- a similar one.
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come significant.Their significance grows in adolescence 
and adulthood.
It has to be remembered,therefore,that even before this 
kind of adaptation to the social environment becomes sig­
nificant, the individual is already socially "adapted" 
through the processes of "deep" structuring of the 
psyche.Moreover,the maturing of the individual,while allow­
ing an increased role to rational/conscious adaptation,does 
not make the other -unconscious- modes of adaptation cease 
to operate parallely.
To summarise: The social operates on the psyche on a
variety of levels:
(i) at a deep,foundational level of psychic structuring 
referring mainly to early years.We distinguished three dif­
ferent , though interrelated,modes of this operation,the in­
ternalisation of social representations and symbols,the in­
ternalisation of "objects" of identification and the inter­
nalisation of the instinctual investment of the latter.
(ii) in processes identical or similar to the above which 
continue,with diminishing importance,throughout the 
individual's life.
These two cases refer primarily to an unconscious 
level,both in the "phenomenological" and in the "dynamic" 
sense.
(iii) in a cognitive/rational way both by determining the 
symbolic universe the individual has access to and by 
providing an "objective" environment to which the in­
dividual consciously and rationally adapts.
We can agree,therefore,with Hartmann that "the crucial 
adaptation man has to make is to the social structure".13It 
has to be emphasised,however,that this "adaptation" is to 
be seen as referring to all the three above levels.To ig­
13. H.Hartmann.Ego psychology and the problem of adaptation (1938).New 
York:International Universities Press,1958,p.31
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nore any of these levels,or to present an one-sided account 
of any of them can only present a limited view of both the 
individual and the social.
3.AGAINST MISINTERPRETATIONS 
At this point,we can address a number of interpretations 
of psychoanalytic theory relevant to a theory of the social 
-including Freud's own- which are different from or op- 
possed to the one presented above.
On the fallacy of the pre-social individual (and on the 
romantic opposition between happiness and civilisation)
The impossibility to conceive the individual psyche 
without a reference to social contexts is one of the most 
profound insights of psychoanalysis.Yet,though as we saw,it 
is necessarily derived from the psychoanalytic theorisation 
of the psyche,it has not been articulated,or even accepted 
by most psychoanalysts,Freud included.
Very few of Freud's followers and successors posed the 
question of the "origin" of the elements "discovered" 
within the psyche through analytic practice,being content 
with taking these elements as given and historically con­
stant (and/or as referring to contexts -for ex.the family- 
that could also be taken as given).
Though it is possibly not necessary to pose such questions 
within the limits of analytic practice,it becomes so when 
we consider psychoanalysis as not only a theory of a tech­
nique -that of analysis- but,in addition,of a theory of the 
psyche in general.
Yet,even when such questions have been posed,the social 
origin of the elements of the psyche has been discounted 
and the assertion that the individual psyche is conceivable 
outside the social has been -implicitly or explicitly- ad­
vanced .
This is most obvious in Freud himself,despite the profun­
dity of his -own- theorisation.And is nowhere more evident
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than in his attempt to oppose the individual to 
"civilisation".
Such references indicate a kind of Rousseaunesque 
romanticism for the pre-civilisation state of nature when 
man was "free" without burden:
"Every individual is virtually an enemy of civilisa­
tion, though civilisation is supposed to be an object of 
universal human interest."14
or "The liberty of the individual is no gift of civilisa­
tion. It was greater before there was any civilisa­
tion, though then,it is true,it had for the most part no 
value,since the individual was scarcely in a position to 
defend it."15
Indeed Freud advances ways of psychically "binding 
together" already formed individuals which thus come 
together to form a society.These ways operate through both 
the libidinal and the aggressive impulses:
"[Civilisation] favours every path by which strong iden­
tifications can be established between the members of the 
community,and it summons up aim inhibited libido on the 
largest scale so as to strengthen the communal bond by 
relations of friendship."16
and "It is always possible to bind together a considerable 
number of people in love,so long as there are other people 
left over to receive the manifestations of their 
aggressiveness"17.
These processes are,of course,important ones and their 
significance for the social cannot be denied.Freud him­
self , though, is not considering them as the only ones
14. S.Freud.The future of an illusion (1927).P.F.L. 12 (thereafter 
FI), p.184
15. CD,p.284
16. CD,p.299.Here Freud draws on his argument in ’’Group psychology"
17. CD,p.305
309
"binding" individuals together.As we saw,he considers also 
a deeper level of social formation of the individual:the 
one operating though the super-ego,which is seen as the 
specific vehicle of civilisation:
"As a child grows up,the role of the father is carried on 
by teachers and others in authority;their injunction and 
prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and con­
tinue, in the form of conscience,to exercise the moral 
censorship.1118
The aggresivity of the super-ego towards the ego is equiv­
alent with the "sense of guilt",with conscience:
"If civilisation is a necessary course of development from 
the family to humanity as a whole then...there is inex­
tricably bound up with it an increase of the sense of 
guilt."19
Thus Freud can argue,in agreement with a Rousseaunist view 
of civilisation:
"The sense of guilt (is) the most important problem in the 
development of civilisation and... the price we pay for our 
advance in civilisation is a loss of happiness through the 
heightening of the sense of guilt"20.
Yet,once "civilisation" is seen to operate within the 
psyche -in the super-ego- Freud's assertion for a pre­
civilisation "happiness" or "freedom" can be sustained only 
if it is possible not to have the super-ego as a psychical 
agency.Indeed this is what Freud argues:
"External coercion gradually becomes internalised;for a 
special mental agency,man's super-ego,takes it over and in­
cludes it among its commandments"21.So,for Freud it is pos­
sible to refer to an emergence of the super-ego.
18. El,p.377
19. CD,p.326
20. CD,p.327
21. FI,p.190
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However,as Freud had to admit in "Totem and Taboo",the 
super-ego does exist in primitive societies,though or­
ganised alongside totemic lines and not familial ones.Freud 
attempted in fact to attribute the similarity between the 
ambivalent relationship to the totemic animal and that 
towards the father,to an actual killing of the father in 
the primal horde,"a memorable and criminal deed which was 
the beginning of so many things -of social organisation,of 
moral restrictions and of religion"22.
Thus the "pre civilization state of happiness" does not 
exist in actual primitive societies but in a supposed 
"primal horde".
However,the mechanism Freud himself had advanced for the 
emergence of the super-ego (the ambivalent attitude towards 
the father during the Oedipus complex:the identification 
with the father is accompanied by a defusion of instincts 
and the internalisation of the aggressive component within 
the super-ego) would hold in any form of familial set­
ting, even in the "primal horde".
It is inconceivable to imagine any way of developing of an 
individual that would not involve a certain relationship to 
other(s).And it is equally inconceivable,given the Freudian 
theorisation of the fused nature of instinctual energy,to 
consider that any such relationship would not produce,at 
one stage or another,an aggressive agency within the 
psyche,even if this agency does not have the cohesiveness 
Freud attributes to the super-ego.
Freud himself is obliged to remark that "the mere hostile 
impulse against the father,the mere existence of a wishful 
phantasy of killing and devouring him,would have been 
enough to produce the moral reaction that created totemism 
and taboo"23.It is not possible to think of a course of
22. S.Freud.Totem and Taboo (1913).P.F.L. 13,Harmondsworth:Penguin, 
1990,p.203
23. ibid.,p.222
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human psychical development that would not include the ex­
istence of such impulses -at least within the Freudian 
theorisation- and thus that could avoid the emergence of an 
agency like the super-ego.
Even if the problematic existence -an existence no eth­
nographic material corroborates- of a "primal horde" is 
granted, therefore,it would be impossible to sustain that 
it could consist of individuals without a psychic agency 
comparable to the super-ego.
Thus the existence of a stage of primitive happiness,of no 
aggressive agency within the psyche,seems hardly sus­
tainable in the context of Freud's own theorisations.Such a 
stage would be tantamount to a denial of the fused nature 
of instinctual energy,the life/death drives dualism and 
indeed any existence of aggressive elements.
Freud's Rousseaunist/Romantic view of civilisation, there­
fore, cannot be supported by his own theory of the psyche 
which points to the opposite direction.Post-Freudian 
developments,by indicating the early origin of super-ego 
components and the composite character of the super-ego 
-instead of seeing it solely as the result of the Oedipal 
phase- further exposed the arbitrary and unsustainable 
claim of a "pre-civilisation happiness" through the absence 
of the super-ego.
If such a possibility is excluded,what remains of Freud's 
"Rousseaunist" argument is that civilisation does indeed 
function oppressively,i.e only through the medium of the 
super-ego and that the advance in "civilisation" is marked 
by an increased "sense of guilt".
Freud nowhere actually offers an argument to support this 
thesis.He retains it axiomatically and at the cost of not 
specifying the type of ego-identifications (such iden­
tifications would have to be shown to be of a non-social 
kind to support his thesis).
As remarked in the previous chapter it is not consistent 
to consider socially relevant identifications as operating
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only "prohibitively" through the super-ego and not also 
"positively" through similar identifications within the ego 
itself.Indeed,post-Freudian research shows that the same 
kind of identifications operate in the ego and the super­
ego, though of course charged with different kinds of 
psychical energy.
As for the actual severity of the super-ego,Freud himself 
had remarked that there is no necessary connection between 
a specific pattern of upbringing and the "sense of guilt" 
one feels:
"The original severity of the super-ego does not so much 
represent the severity which one has experienced from it 
[the object] or which one attributes to it...the severity 
of the former seems to be independent to that of the 
latter."24
Indeed,as C.Lasch has shown,modern day "permissive" 
upbringing often results in a much more severe super-ego 
than the traditional authoritarian one.25
Thus not only the notion of a non social and pre social 
individual is a fallacy.But,in addition,the social func­
tions positively as well as negatively within the psyche 
-i.e through the ego as well as through the super-ego; and 
there is no evidence that advance in civilisation indeed 
produces and/or requires more "guilt" or a stronger super­
ego.A pre-civilisation state of happiness or 
freedom,therefore,is also to be rejected.
All these are conclusions that,for the most part,can be 
drawn directly from Freud's own work.We could say that it 
is only his implicit -and axiomatic- alliance to a 
Rousseaunist/Romantic view that inhibited Freud from ac­
tually drawing them himself.
24. CD,p.323
25. C.Lasch.Heaven in a heartless worldrthe family besieged.New York: 
Basic books,1977.Also The culture of narcissism.New York:Norton, 
1979
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If Freud's own attempt to retain a pre-social or a-social
individual and to oppose him to civilisation fails within
the context of the theorisation of the psyche he himself 
had proposed -and which he does not disavow to advance his 
argument on civilisation- interpretations of Freud of a 
much more rigid -and questionable- nature are even less 
capable to sustain a similar argument.
At the extreme,we have interpretations based on a primary 
-and biological- incompatibility between civilisation and 
the development of libido such as a main thread of 
W.Reich's thought is.The argument is that libido,seen as
limited to the sexual function,needs to be liberated from 
constrains upon it in order for the individual to become
really emancipated.
Such a view loses all the complexity of Freud's theorisa­
tion on both sexuality and civilisation,reducing the in­
dividual to a biological being,against which his social ex­
istence operates.26
Equally misguided are approaches such as E.Fromm's or 
K.Horney's -labelled,along with others,as "culturalists"- 
which are in fact attempts to reintroduce a kind of 
"essence" of the individual,an "essence" which becomes 
"lost" or "alienated" by modern society.We argued above 
that the Freudian account stands in sharp contrast to any 
such "essentialism" of the psyche.While the social 
criticism of these authors may be perfectly justifiable,its 
ontological basis as it is presented,requires a kind of ex­
istentialist psychology from which the Freudian account is 
radically different.There is no way to determine,through a 
reference to the psyche's "true being",a "sane" from an 
"non-sane" society27.
26. The same could be said for biologistic interpretations of opposing 
aims,that use Freud as a vehicle for the reduction of the social to 
biological and through this reduction to affirm the 
natural/unalterable character of the social.
27. The reference is to E.Fromm.The sane society.London:Routledge.1956
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What remains are approaches of a more sophisticated na­
ture, such as,for example,Marcuse1s who does accept the so­
cially constructed nature of the psyche but considers that 
apart from unavoidable repression proper,there is also 
"surplus repression" supporting and instilled by social 
domination.He argues that this repression can be removed 
and thus a non-repressive civilisation can exist.28
Marcuse considers Freud's account of the primal horde as 
one of actual domination by the father that was trans­
formed to repression,i.e to a suppression of the libidinal 
drive by the sons.He further argues that repres­
sion, supported by actual domination,has been a central fea­
ture of all civilisations,made necessary by scarcity.In 
modern society, however,due to technological advances 
brought about precisely by this domination,scarcity is not 
any more an issue and therefore neither domination nor 
repression are necessary.A "repression free" libido can be 
used for a "transformation of sexuality into eros" for the 
"erotization of the entire personality"29 which could also 
bind the death instinct.
While Freud's view of civilisation rests on the very ex­
istence of the super-ego,Marcuse's position is unclear:If 
surplus repression is removed,will there be a super-ego? If 
no,then we have the original form of Freud's argument which 
we showed to be flawed.If yes,will the severity of the 
super-ego be less? Freud's own remarks do not indicate such 
a possibility.Marcuse himself does not provide any jus­
tification for either position,as he does not provide,in 
the first place,any actual connecting mechanism that would 
"translate" domination on a social scale to a strong super­
ego. Indeed his use of the term "repression" makes it dif-
28. Marcuse uses ’’repression" in a non-technical sense to indicate 
"processes of restraint,constraint and suppression",(H.Marcuse,Eros 
and civilisation (1956) (thereafter EC),London:Routledge,1987,p.8)
29. EC,p.202
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ficult even to refer to the super ego as the vehicle of 
suppression of libido.
In fact,Marcuse works with an implicit theoretical model 
of the psyche of a simplistic nature.He reduces the psyche 
to a simple instinctual drive -the libido- which is 
repressed by civilisation but which can be set again free 
for greater individual happiness and fulfilment.Thus his 
critique of society and utopia are based on assumptions 
that scarcely do justice to Freud's theorisation of the 
psyche.
This is not to imply that Marcuse's critique and ideal are 
to be discounted (though it has been pointed out that his 
utopia is essentially an individualistic one involving only 
individual gratification30).But such a critique and ideal 
cannot be based on the Freudian account of the psyche 
without reducing it to a simplistic opposition between in­
stinct and repression.
Marcuse's theory represents a sophisticated attempt to 
base a critique of society and a possible alternative on 
the demand for greater (individual) happiness.However,only 
if we reduce the Freudian account to a caricature of it­
self, is it possible to have "happiness" as the basis of a 
social critique.
Freud had remarked: "Happiness in the reduced sense in
which we recognise it as possible,is a problem of the 
economics of the individual's libido.There is no golden 
rule which applies to everyone..."31.
Once the social influence on the very construction of the 
psyche has been asserted,this statement can be read in a 
different way than Freud intended it: namely,as indicating
30. N.Chodorow,”Object relations and the limits of radical 
individualism” , Theory and society 14 (1985),pp.271-319
For the individualism that underpins Marcuse’s work in general -as 
well as that of Horkheimer’s- see P.B.Miller.Domination and 
power.London:Routledge,1987
31. CD,p.271
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that there is no way to suppose that within any social or­
der, the possibility of a certain "happiness" does not exist 
(And of course that,since there can be no pre-social or a- 
social individual,no degree of "happiness" or "freedom" 
can exist for such an individual).
An alternative society can offer alternative ways of 
libidinal satisfaction or can offer already existing ways 
to a greater number of people.There is no way,however,to 
judge whether this will produce "happier" individuals in 
general and to base the critique or ideal on a higher level 
of happiness.There is no single measure of happiness which 
could provide an ultimate criterion.Social critique and al­
ternatives can be rationally defended and sought after,but 
not in the name of "happiness" as such.32
Thus,despite Freud's own and later attempts to assert a 
fundamental opposition between the individual and the so­
cial -an opposition that would necessitate the existence of 
a somehow pre-social individual- the very theorisation of 
the psyche psychoanalytic theory offers precludes such an 
opposition,as closer study reveals.On the contrary,it indi­
cates that the social is unavoidably included in any in­
dividual psyche and that it cannot be,in any simple 
way,contrasted with it.
On a certain opposition between
the psychical and the social 
There is a way,however,to preserve Freud's insight of a 
certain opposition between the individual psyche and the 
social,though in a quite different form than Freud
32. All this reference to "happiness" has to be seen as over and above 
a certain integration of the ego and super-ego that would allow a 
"normal" functioning of the psyche.However fuzzy the line of differen­
tiation between "normal" and "in need of therapy" (let alone 
"pathological"),cases usually seen as in need of analytic/clinical at­
tention fall below this minimum requirement for an adequate function 
of the individual.Obviously the above argument does not refer to such 
cases.
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presented it.
The structuring of the unconscious can never,as we saw,be 
considered a full one.It never covers the entirety of the 
(unconscious) psychical energy.The Id remains outside and 
beyond such a structuring,as "the great reservoir of 
psychical energy".
Moreover,we can indicate a certain tension between the 
structured and unstructured parts of the uncon­
scious, precisely the tension between the reality and the 
pleasure principle.The psychical energy as such can be con­
sidered as resisting any structuring.However,this is not to 
say that an individual psychical apparatus can emerge 
without such a structuring.
Freud's references to the unconscious (in his first 
topography) and to the Id (in his second) indicate such a 
tension,though it is presented as one between the 
"irrational" Id and the "rational" ego.It can be under­
stood, though, as one between the structured unconscious and 
the unstructured one,as the resistance of the primary 
psychical energy to any structuring.
In so far as this structuring is a socially influenced one 
we could say that it is only a "part" of the psyche that 
becomes -however indeterminately- "socialised",that the so­
cial never engulfs the psychical and that in a sense the 
social -as referring to the structured agencies of the ego 
and super-ego- is opposed to the "unbound","free" energy of 
the Id.
Freud's opposition between the psyche and civilisation can 
then be understood as indicating not that the psychical is 
not,also,social or that this social operates solely through 
the super-ego,but as simply emphasising the never fully 
structurable nature of the psyche and hence its always in­
herent "opposition" to any such structuring.This opposi­
tion, however, exists not between the individual and 
"civilisation" but within the individual's psychical ap­
paratus and in no way diminishes the inescapably social na­
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ture of the individual.33
Features of the social
corresponding to infantile needs
Since the social is a precondition of psychical develop­
ment, it cannot be derived from a theorisation of this 
development,as the psychoanalytic one,against what Freud 
himself had occasionally asserted: "Sociology...dealing as 
it does with the behaviour of people in society,cannot be 
anything but applied psychology.Strictly speaking there are 
only two sciences:psychology,pure and applied,and natural 
science."34.
However,there is an insight of Freud's that remains 
important:it concerns the persistence of needs primarily 
related to early phases of psychic development into adul­
thood and the correspondence to these needs of societal in­
stitutional features.
This is the case of religion that Freud discusses: animism 
and magic of primitive societies can be seen as reproduc­
ing, at a societal level,the infantile belief in the 
"omnipotence of thoughts" which persists in the uncon­
scious in the adult as well and is manifested in dreams.
Similarly religion at large can be seen as corresponding 
to the infantile psychological needs for protection which 
are "the oldest,strongest and most urgent wishes of 
mankind"35.
It has also been remarked that the attitude to the 
monarch/king has many common features to that towards 
God,the monarch taking the place of (or the earthly incar­
nation of,or the representative of) the God36.The analysis
33. As Castoriadis also remarks: "the institution of the social in­
dividual is the imposition on the psyche of an organisation which is 
essentially heterogeneous with it" (IIS,p.298)
34. NIL,p.216
35. FI,p.212
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of politics,therefore,can be seen as linked with early in­
fantile needs as well.
The fact that these "needs" are "infantile",should not be 
taken as indicating that they correspond to an atavistic 
return to stages long past in the individual's history.As 
Freud had repeatedly emphasised these early stages continue 
to function alongside the later ones,all the more so since 
they do so in the unconscious within which the linear no­
tion of time does not hold.
The importance of the psychical "needs" to which these so­
cial institutions respond and correspond should 
not,therefore,be underestimated,nor should these needs be 
considered as being necessarily "overcome" by societal 
development.lt is most probable that some form of social
institution would always have to take account,in one way or
another,of these needs.
It should be noted,however,that the "correspondence" of 
social institutions/features to early or archaic psychical 
needs and processes does not imply that the former can be 
derived from the latter.They have a considerable degree of 
variation and difference.Moreover,the social institutions/ 
formations to which the above refer represent only a small 
part of an overall society or social formation.The social 
as a whole cannot be seen as necessarily relevant to these 
needs.
On one-sided accounts of social influence
The reference to an a-social individual is the fallacy 
psychoanalytic thought allows us -sometimes despite itself- 
to uncover.However,the acceptance of the foundational role 
of the social in the very construction of the psyche is not 
enough.In so far as some of the modes the social operates
36. For example,G.Deleuze & F.Guattari.Anti-Oedipus (1972). London: 
Athlone Press,1984.
Also C.Lefort,"The image of the body and totalitarianism" (1979) in 
"The political forms of modern society",op.cit.
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on the psyche -principally on the level of the unconscious- 
are emphasised at the expense of others,a one-sided view of 
psychical social influences (and,indirectly,of the social), 
is presented.
Emphasis on representations
One such case is the emphasis on the "symbolic" that 
characterised structuralism and the writers influenced by 
it,an approach that can claim Lacan as its major proponent 
in psychoanalysis.The emphasis is on the representations of 
the psyche,the social origin of which is recognised and 
stressed.The role of the significant environment as a 
source of internalised objects and of their instinctual in­
vestment is sidelined.
Such approaches need not take the "structuralist" line 
that Lacan can be considered as taking,namely the pos­
sibility of a formal approach to the structuring of the un­
conscious. Castoriadis, for example,stresses the open and in­
determinate modality of these representations within the 
unconscious.Yet,as we saw above,though he acknowledges that 
the "unconscious exists as an indissociably representative/ 
affective/intentional flux" he concentrates on the 
"representations" for all his references to the social: the 
social,for Castoriadis,is primarily a "world of 
representations".
That the very conception of the internalisable objects 
passes through "symbols" and representations and hence 
through the "symbolic" or through a "world of 
representations",does not obliterate the fact that the in­
ternalisation of these objects corresponds to a structuring 
of psychical energy through the agencies of the ego and 
super-ego,a structuring that has a permanence and produces 
effects,irrespective of the indeterminacy we associated 
with it.To this dynamic aspect of structuring a preoccupa­
tion with the "symbolic order" alone is completely blind.
Consequently,the social is presented in a one-sided way as
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well,solely as systems or universes of significations.
Emphasis on the (social) environment 
On the other hand,more "sociologically" oriented inter­
pretations of Freud tend to refer only to the influence of 
the environment in respect to the structuring of the in­
dividual psyche.They neglect the importance of the universe 
of (social) representations,symbols and meanings which are 
also internalised within the psyche and which are indis- 
sociably connected with the internalised objects.
Such cases can be considered Parson's appropriation of 
Freud on a general theoretical level and the more specific 
studies of N.Chodorow37,D.Dinnersten38 ,C.Lasch39.The lat­
ter studies concentrate on the influence of the (early) en­
vironment on the dynamic make-up of the psyche and take 
little interest in the symbolic/representational sphere.As 
for Parsons,he limits the social influence on the early 
years which he presents as producing a set of "motivational 
forces" involved in "the maintenance of,and alteration 
of,the structure of a social system"40.The
symbolic/representational universe operates for Parsons 
mainly on the conscious/ cognitive level.
Apart from the one-sided presentation of the influence of 
the social on the psyche,these approaches -especially the 
more theoretically oriented ones such as Parson's- usually 
ignore the specific implications of the psychoanalytic
37. N.Chodorow.The reproduction of mothering.Los Angeles:University of 
California Press,1978
38. D.Dinnerstein."The rocking of the cradle and the ruling of the 
world".London:The Women's Press,1976,(U.S. Title:"The mermaid and the 
minotaur")
39. C.Lasch,"The family besieged","The culture of narcissism",op.cit. 
Also The minimal self.London:Pan.1985
40. T.Parsons,"Psychoanalysis and the social structure" (1948) in Es­
says in sociological theory.New YorkiFree Press,1954,p.340
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theorisation of the psyche for the social,presenting a 
linear causal account of social determination (we shall 
refer to these "specific implications" in part 5 below)
In general,there is nothing that can allow us to give a 
certain priority to one of the modes of social influence on 
the psyche at the expense of the others.They are equally 
necessary for the functioning and structuring of the human 
psychical apparatus and,in fact,cannot be distinguished 
otherwise than in an analytic sense.Hence,only an equi- 
proportional reference to all three modes and a recognition 
of their interlinked nature can offer a balanced account of 
the relationship between the psyche and the social.
On the importance of social structures
corresponding to early psychic development
Some of the theorisations that focus on the importance of 
the social environment,tend to assert also that the social 
organisation(s),agency(ies),structure(s) corresponding to 
earlier,more fundamental levels of psychical structuring 
are also more fundamental on a societal level.
As a hypothesis,one could reasonably state that the more 
entrenched social functions/features are,the more they 
would be expected to operate -directly or indirectly- on 
the deep, fundamental level of psychic development,the one 
related to early years.
Even if this assertion is accepted, -and it needs
evidence to be so- it does not imply that the 
agencies/institutions/features corresponding to social in­
fluence at this fundamental level reflect and are reflected 
on the whole of society.
A usual form this argument has taken is that the mode of 
familial organisation,or the mode of the mothering process, 
can explain the organisation of other spheres of social 
life (politics,for example).
The arguments of certain feminist writers such as 
D.Dinnersten and N.Chodorow41 fall within this
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category.They both consider the mothering relations as 
determinant of the different characterological elements of 
the sexes and hence of the whole of the gender divi­
sions .Dinnersten adds to that the determination of a cer­
tain attitude towards the physical environment and of the 
nature of domination that characterise modern society.
Even if we limit ourselves to the dynamics of the in­
dividual psyche,however,the preceding analysis indicates 
that despite the great emphasis analytic practice places on 
the early developmental stages,there is no claim -in Freud 
or his followers- that these stages determine subsequent 
ones.
Though the past history and configuration of the ego in­
fluence future object choices,they do not determine 
them.The indeterminacy that we have noted with respect to 
the external environment,holds equally for the influence of 
the existing ego at any moment.And though earlier object 
choices and environmental influences play a more important 
role in the economy of the psyche than later ones,it cannot 
be said that the latter are without their own specificity.
If the early structuring of the psyche cannot be con­
sidered determinant for the future development of the 
psyche as such,it can even less be considered determinant 
for complex social phenomena such as
politics,domination,the relation of sexes,or the relation 
to nature.Though a certain correspondence between these 
phenomena and the modes/institutions/ features of early 
societal influence may exist -though not necessarily so- to 
consider them as determined by the latter is a kind of 
psychoanalytic psychologism that cannot be supported in the 
context of psychoanalytic theorisation.
This theorisation does indicate certain levels of social 
structures or agencies,relative to the different stages of
41. Dinnerstein,op.cit.,Chodorow,op.cit.
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psychical development,but it does not privilege any of 
these levels.
4.THE LACK OF FULL DETERMINATION
AND THE SPECIFICITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
The fact that the individual has to be seen as ines­
capably, and in a profound way,socially influenced,should 
not be taken as implying that the individual can be 
"dissolved" within this influence.This is because the so­
cial environment operates in conjunction with other 
factors;and,in addition,because the social determination is 
never a full or complete one.
The social influence as one among many
The social influences on the psyche are limited to the in­
ternalisation of representations and to the construction of 
the ego and super-ego on the level of the unconscious and 
to the internalisation of symbolic systems,"knowledge" and 
norms on the level of consciousness.These in­
fluences, therefore, represent only part of the factors 
determining psychical development.
To begin with,we saw that the emergence of the agencies of 
the ego and super-ego has to be seen as supported by a cer­
tain internal -and biologically given- dynamic which 
gradually creates these agencies.The recognition of the ex­
istence of such a dynamic has been implicit in Freud and 
was explicitly theorised by a number of researchers 
(Hartmann and the ego-psychologists,Mahler and her col­
laborators, Kernberg,etc.).This dynamic produces the in­
dividual as such and assures a certain closure of the 
"self" as a whole.
As it has been stressed above,such a closure does not 
imply either fully homogeneous structures/agencies (the ego 
and super-ego) or lack of internal conflict within these 
agencies and hence is radically opposed to any affirmation 
of an individual "essence".The ego and the super-ego never
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form fully coherent wholes.Yet a certain integration does 
exist,and a certain dynamic pointing towards such an in­
tegration is in operation.
The emergence and relative closure of the agencies of the 
ego and super-ego,therefore,are not a function of the so­
cial environment.
Moreover,the agencies of the ego and super-ego are not the 
only forms of organisation of psychical energy.Other modes 
of such organisation can be considered to exist.The 
development of sexual drives that Freud theorises is such a 
case.We have to add biologically determined instinctual 
modes influencing behaviour,of the type Freud considers 
falling within the "self-preservative" ones.Psychoanalysis 
does not theorise these instincts and their development but 
does not deny their existence,either.
Finally,it has to be remembered that any structuring of 
psychical energy on the level of the unconscious is a par­
tial one.The id remains a reservoir of "free" and unbound 
psychical energy which can never be totally bound.
Thus the social determination of the psyche concerns part 
only of its total organisation and development.
Points of indeterminacy within
the social influence on the unconscious
Even the actual influence of the social on the 
psyche,however,remains precisely always an influence and 
never a determination.The psychoanalytic theorisation of 
social influence indicates points of indeterminacy along 
the processes it theorises.
As we indicated in the previous chapter,a first degree of 
indeterminacy is implied in the impossibility to predefine 
the actual "objects" that are to be cathected/internalised 
out of the available objects within the significant 
(social) environment.Similarly,the intensity and type of 
instinctual investment of these objects cannot be deduced 
in any mechanical way from the social environment.Thus the
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actual configuration and instinctual dynamics of the ego 
and super-ego cannot be predefined,even if all the details 
of the significant environments at all times were given.
The same environment can produce different structural ef­
fects on different individuals according to the choices the 
psychical apparatus may make,and this is true even for the 
early,semi-biological stages of ego-development.
At the stage of adolescence or adulthood the importance of 
the already established ego in determining object choices 
is such that any prediction as to the direction of further 
structuring is,strictly speaking,impossible.
In so far as the internalisation of objects,significations 
and their instinctual investment operate within the uncon­
scious, however, a more fundamental level of indeterminacy 
can be discerned.
We indicated above that the internalisation process refer­
ring to the unconscious is not a replication of the objects 
within the psyche.In fact we cannot know as what the inter­
nalised representatives or objects exist within the uncon­
scious. Thus even if we somehow knew the actual objects 
cathected and internalised -and their instinctual 
investment- it would be impossible to know exactly how they 
"exist" within the unconscious.
We can only consider that the internalisation of these 
elements involves a certain modification within the uncon­
scious^ modification the exact nature of which we do not 
know and which refers to a certain structuring of otherwise 
unbound psychical energy within agencies (ego,super-ego),as 
well to the substitution of socially originating repre­
sentations for the early innate ones.We can also indicate 
the "semiotic" nature of the unconscious as oppossed to the 
"symbolic" one of consciousness (in Ricoeur's 
terminology;42in Freud's terminology,the use of thing 
rather than word presentations),the primary process,the in­
42. P.Ricoeur,"Image and language in psychoanalysis",op.cit.
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stinctual investment of objects internalised within the ego 
and the super-ego,making these agencies dynamic equilibria 
in flux.
However,all these remain approximations,since we cannot 
have any direct or unmediated access to the level of the 
unconscious as such.Only through the manifestation in con­
sciousness as thought,ideas,or affects (or motives guiding 
action) can these elements be "known".Even so,any passage 
from the unconscious to consciousness,even if the origin of 
the representation or the object is an external 
one,involves a change of state,a "translation",an 
"interpretation" that is never final or unidimensional.The 
same unconscious content (or the same ego) can produce dis­
parate or even conflicting thoughts,affects or ideas.
Thus no precise theorisation of the actual impact the so­
cial environment has on the psyche can be aspired to,at 
least in so far as we refer to the unconscious.Only a cer­
tain insight as to the importance of environmental in­
fluences for the construction of the psyche is possible 
-and this is what sustains the field of socio-psychological 
investigation.But a full causal theory of the social con­
struction of the human psyche has to be ruled out.
This level of indeterminacy that is due to the ontological 
status of the unconscious,a radical one,is the specific 
contribution of psychoanalytic theory since it alone 
theorises the modality of the unconscious.
We can consider,as argued also in the previous chap­
ter, that this level of indeterminacy justifies Castoriadis' 
notion of "radical imagination",indicating the possibility 
of the emergence of the radically new,of the non determined 
within the psyche.The psyche,though influenced in a founda­
tional way by the social environment,has to be considered 
as retaining the possibility of the emergence of the radi­
cally new.
Thus,if we consider psychoanalytic theorisation as in­
dicating a process of socialisation,we have to see this
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process as involving,necessarily,points at which no full 
causal theory is possible.We do not have one more variant 
of a socialisation theory in which the individuals appear 
as perfect clones of "roles" or structural positions.While 
these roles and positions do influence the individual at a 
fundamental level of psychical development and opera­
tion, the precise outcome of this influence remains indeter­
minable. To put it differently,there is a wide degree of 
variation over any such influence.
The conscious/rational ego and its autonomy
The conscious'/rational ego has itself an innate dynamic of 
emergence and a certain closure as a psychical agency.It 
retains,moreover,a certain autonomy.
The rational processes of thought are conditioned by the 
unconscious ego and the id as far as motivational forces 
guiding logico/rational operations are concerned.In addi­
tion, the system of concepts and ideas rational thought 
requires,as also the norms and values guiding action are 
also socially determined.
However,the multiplicity of possible motivations coming 
directly from the id and the possibility to have multiple 
and even conflicting motivations coming from the ego 
(because of the indeterminacy that is,as we saw,inherent in 
ego construction),allow a range of possible directions of 
motivation.
Moreover,in so far as the individual "adapts" to the en­
vironment in a conscious/rational manner,the result of this 
adaptation is also indeterminate since there is usually a 
number of alternative ways to rationally/instrumentally 
adapt to the same environment,even given the same 
"knowledge" and "norms" or values.
Thus the conscious/ rational ego retains a certain 
autonomy regarding any instrumental adaptation to a given 
social environment.A social actor is in a position to pose 
aims,to choose means to attain these aims,to deploy
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strategies,to exhibit,in short,all the characteristics the 
traditional means-end model attributes to the in­
dividual.The actor is by no means reduced to a mechanistic 
and passive behaviour determined by his "position".
Finally,there is one further degree of autonomy open to 
the conscious/rational ego: it is that theorised by Cas­
toriadis as "autonomy" in the strict sense,concerning the 
possibility to put oneself and the social into question.
Castoriadis observes that this possibility would be mean­
ingless "if enseblist -identitary logic totally exhausted 
what exists".We can now interpret this assertion: no pos­
sibility of such an autonomy would exist if the underlying 
social influences on the psyche were determining it in a 
full way.It is only because the influences of the social on 
the level of the unconscious entail points of indeter­
minacy, are never final and full,that "autonomy" in this 
sense is really possible.Only if the possibility of the 
emergence of the non-determined,the radically new,within 
the psyche is affirmed,such a level of autonomy can be also 
possible.
Thus the conscious/rational ego can exhibit a level of 
autonomy that is more than simply an instrumental adapta­
tion to the social environment.lt can become the vehicle 
through which the "radical imagination" can be reinforced 
and amplified to orient action and thought.
The actualisation of this possibility,however,remains -as 
Castoriadis remarks- a historically specific event.Autonomy 
in the strict sense remains a potentiality rather than an 
actuality.
Moreover,even this autonomy can never lead to a fully 
transparent individuality (or,correlatively,to a self- 
transparent society) because neither the unconscious can be 
eliminated nor can the totality of (explicit) social 
values,beliefs,norms,etc.,be questioned.The psyche as a 
whole,as also the social will always remain something 
"more" than we can reflexively know,understand or con­
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sciously create.
To conclude:the conscious/rational ego,however conditioned 
it may be by the underlying -unconscious- structure of the 
ego or the id and by the social origin of the symbolic 
universe it uses,retains an important capacity for critical 
function,conducive to an irreducible in­
dividuality .Moreover, the inherent indeterminacy social in­
fluences on the level of the unconscious entail,allow the 
possibility of a potentially even higher degree of indepen­
dence and autonomy.
The question of agency and
the autonomy of the social individual
As the analysis in parts one and two of the present study 
indicates,all of the following assertions have to be seen 
as justified:
(i) the recognition of the necessary and unavoidable so­
cial determination of the individual (emphasised by all 
structural theories of the social).
(ii) the existence of a certain autonomy and activeness 
from the part of the (social) individual (emphasised by the 
individualistic tradition,"micro" theories of interac­
tion's also by Giddens1 and Bourdieu's reference to the 
social actor's "activeness").
and (iii) the necessity of the possibility of an even 
higher level of autonomy,if political action in the broad 
sense was to be theorised (indicated for example by the 
political theorisations within the Marxist tradition).
The problem facing social theory,therefore,is not to 
(re)affirm one of those positions at the expense of the 
others,but to reconcile them to one another,recognising the 
necessity for all of them.
The preceding analysis allows us to affirm that the 
psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche,once its social 
relevance has been recognised,indicates the way precisely 
towards such a reconciliation.
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Psychoanalytic theory indicates,as we saw,the deep, foun­
dational level of social influences on the psyche,both on 
the level of consciousness and,more importantly,on the 
level of the unconscious.The continuation of these in­
fluences throughout the individual's life is also indi­
cated. Thus the central argument of structural theories is 
supported.
However,psychoanalytic theory indicates also the limits of 
this social influence.Limits relating to the unstructured 
unbounded psychical energy or biologically determined in­
stinctual modes that also influence behaviour.Limits due to 
the innate and independent dynamic of ego development and 
ego closure.But also limits due to the essentially indeter­
minate nature of social influence that rules out the pos­
sibility of a fully causal theory of social determination 
of the individual and allows the possibility of the emer­
gence of the new,the non-determined within the psyche.And 
finally limits due to the capacity of rational reflection 
the conscious ego always possesses.
Thus,while it is impossible to conceive of the individual 
psyche outside social context(s),it is equally impossible 
to conceive the individual as simply the reflection of the 
social,or as simply the empty locus of social structural 
wholes.The "self" is indeed such a reflection and such a 
locus;but it is also much more than that.
Consequently,the insight of individualist theories con­
cerning a certain irreducibility of the individual to the 
social can be seen as supported by the closure and internal 
dynamic of the individual ego psychoanalysis affirms.
The corresponding "activeness" of the social actor is sup­
ported by the relative autonomy of the conscious/rational 
ego to instrumentally adapt to a given social environ­
ment, posing ends and choosing means to attain them.
The higher level of autonomy a political project of a 
large scale requires can also be theorised as the pos­
sibility for autonomy in Castoriadis' sense,i.e the pos-
332
Sibility to question the very ends aimed at and to pose 
oneself and the social into question.This is autonomy in 
the strict sense and it is possible only because the social 
influences on the level of the unconscious retain points of 
inescapable indeterminacy.
Thus a certain activeness and autonomy of the individual 
can exist simultaneously with the acceptance of a social 
determination of the individual.Moreover,degrees of 
autonomy can be theorised without be seen as coextensive 
with one another (i.e. without deriving a high level of 
autonomy from the existence of a certain instrumental ac­
tiveness of the social actor).And it is only the specific 
modality of the unconscious as theorised by psychoanalysis 
that allows autonomy in the strict sense to be theorised.
All these levels of autonomy,though,remain bounded.They 
can never lead to a self-transparent individual or an un­
limited capacity for free agency leading to a transparent 
society.Just as we escape from the full determination of 
the individual by the social structural theories claim,we 
also escape from the more extreme claims of the opposing 
theories.The individual cannot be dissolved within the 
social;nor can the social,however,ever be surmounted by a 
sovereign individuality.
5.AN OPEN THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION
A comprehensive theorisation of social reproduction
The psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche provides us 
not only with an account of the unconscious and its 
manifestations in consciousness,but also with an account of 
action and behaviour.
Thoughts,ideas or affects are not only detectible in con­
sciousness as products of psychical/ cognitive function­
ing. They may induce or influence a certain behaviour,a 
course of action from the part of the individual.43 The two
43. That a theory of action is included in psychoanalytic theory is 
not usually emphasised.The focus of psychoanalysis is towards the
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central categories of determinants of such action are:
(i) motives (as affects) and ideas deriving from the un­
conscious and manifested in consciousness.These may 
originate within the agencies of the ego and super-ego but 
they may also originate within the id.
(ii) the conscious/rational ego which,using a stock of 
knowledge and systems of norms and values,determines a way 
of action.
These two categories of determinants may operate in ac­
cordance with each other (for example when the conscious 
ego carries out motivations coming from the unconscious) 
but they may also be contradicting each other: the con­
scious ego,for instance,may be able to resist impulses com­
ing from the unconscious and to influence behaviour in op­
position to internal motivational pressure.
The social influence on the psyche can be manifested on 
the level of consciousness: the unconscious internalisation 
of (socially originating) significations underpins the very 
possibility of thought and operates in conjunction with the 
conscious internalisation of symbolic systems,language, 
knowledge,etc.As for the (unconscious) structuring of the 
ego and super-ego,it can be manifested in thoughts,ideas or 
affects on the level of consciousness.
As the above indicate,though,these social influences can 
be also manifested on the level of (individual) action: as 
motives guiding action and/or as knowledge and values the 
conscious ego uses to monitor action.
Psychoanalytic theorisation,therefore,can be seen as in­
dicating not only the ways in which the social influences 
the individual psyche but also the ways in which these in­
fluences may manifest themselves through the individual's 
products of consciousness and action.
manifestations of the unconscious in consciousness,as revealed mainly 
in analytic practice and not towards the exploration of be­
haviour. However, it is evident that the detailed account of psychical 
functioning we referred to covers also a theory of action/behaviour.
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We have,hence,an analysis of social reproduction on its 
most elementary level,the level of the individual.As the 
multifacity of the social influence on the individual indi­
cates, this process is a complex one.It is also a continuous 
one,never ceasing even for the adult.
If we could present a static snapshot of it,it could have 
the form of the graph below:
S O C I A L  P S Y C H E  S O C I A L
rational
Institu tions  
symbolic ordennorm s
f CONSCIOUS  ^ \
internalised V  
symbolic systems .norms p ro d u c ts  o f consciousness
UNCONSCIOUS 
structured: 
Ifo/Super-efo <
Internalised represents tire* action
unstructured:
SOCIAL
R E P R O D U C T I O N
This is an exhaustive and detailed theory.It provides a 
theorisation of production and reproduction of social 
structures through the individual,a "theory of 
structuration".It accounts for both the irreducibi1ity of 
the individual to the social and for a deep,foundational 
way the social influences the individual.lt
satisfies,therefore,Giddens1 aims without relapsing to an
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individualism as he does.
It allows us to conceptualise what Bourdieu's "habitus" 
and its "structured dispositions","embodied" rather than 
"known",may refer to: the structuring of the unconscious 
through the construction of the agencies of the ego and the 
super-ego and the manifestation of this structuring in so­
cial practice (alongside the incorporation of repre­
sentations on the level of the unconscious and of symbolic 
systems on the level of consciousness Bourdieu does not 
refer to).
It provides a theorisation of the "subject" and of social 
action and reproduction that is lacking in Laclau and 
Mouffe1s account.
It builds upon Castoriadis' emphasis on the unconscious.At 
the same time,it expands his theorisation by indicating 
that the internalisation of social imaginary significations 
is not the only way the social operates on the psyche and 
that social action and reproduction cannot be limited to an 
actualisation of these significations in practice.
The openness of the social and the question of history
This (psychoanalytic) theory of social reproduc­
tion, however, is not only a comprehensive one.As the preced­
ing discussion of the specificity of the individual indi­
cates, it also allows us to theorise the points of indeter­
minacy that exist within this process of social reproduc­
tion, to theorise,in other words,the openness of the social.
We indicated that the factors determining the individual 
and therefore his behaviour and thought are not only social 
ones.There are elements of the psychical make up of the in­
dividual which cannot be traced back to a social influence: 
for example impulses coming from the id,biologically deter­
mined instinctual modes of behaviour,the internal dynamic 
and closure of the ego.
Moreover,even for those determinants that do have a social 
origin,certain points of indeterminacy exist.
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We referred to the impossibility to derive from the 
(social) environment,in a mechanical way,the actual 
"objects" that will be internalised in the process of ego 
and super-ego construction.
In addition,in so far as the social operates on the level 
of the unconscious no possibility to directly approach the 
effects of the social exists.Even we these affects are 
manifested on the level of consciousness and action they 
are never unidimensional and hence they can never indicate 
in any precise way the actual structuring of the uncon­
scious. No fully causal theory of social determinations on 
the level of the unconscious can exist.
Finally,though the conscious ego uses socially originating 
symbolic systems,knowledge and norms and is influenced by 
the unconscious ego and id,it retains a certain,limited 
autonomy in its capability to rationally/ instrumentally 
orient action or thought.
Moreover,there is a further degree of autonomy of the con­
scious ego,the possibility to question the very determina­
tions that shape it.This autonomy,theorised by Cas­
toriadis, can exist only because the modality of the uncon­
scious does not allow any full and final determinations to 
operate.And this autonomy,though not always ac­
tual ised, always remains a potentiality.
Hence there is an inherent "openness" implied in the 
reproduction of the social through individual action and 
thought,an openness due to the lack of full determination of 
the individual and to the plurality of factors influencing 
action and thought.This social reproduction cannot be seen 
as a mechanical,given one.No strict line of causality be­
tween the social environment influencing the individual and 
the individual's actions or thoughts can be established.
Of the factors assuring this openness,the relative 
autonomy of the conscious/ rational ego has been usually 
emphasised by individualistic theories which saw the in­
dividual as "outside" the social and hence as able to
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produce changes within the social.As for the importance of 
biologically given elements of human behaviour it has been 
emphasised by biologically influenced accounts of the so­
cial .
The psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche allows the 
recognition of these two factors,but it adds one more: the 
indeterminacy relating to the specificity of the level of 
the (individual) unconscious,a radical indeterminacy that 
cannot be reduced to the other two factors (and 
thus,also,the possibility of an autonomy in Castoriadis1s 
sense).The addition of this last factor and the possibility 
it offers to theorise it alongside the other two,represents 
the specific contribution of psychoanalytic theory to a 
theory of social reproduction.
It is primarily as connected to this last level of in­
determinacy, related to the unconscious,that we can see 
Laclau & Mouffe's and Castoriadis' theorisations of the 
openness of the social.
Since the unconscious is always represented and hence 
meaningful,we can justify Laclau's connection between the 
"meaningfulness" of the social and its openness while 
providing a full theorisation of it.
Castoriadis has already indicated,as we saw,that the 
(individual) unconscious has the modality of magma that the 
social imaginary significations also have.We can now 
slightly modify his argument: It is because the social ex­
ists on the level of the unconscious and because the uncon­
scious has the specific modality it has,that the social can 
be conceived as open.The openness of the social is due to 
its existence and reproduction through the individual un­
conscious .Thus we avoid any recourse to a transcendental 
level to theorise the openness of the social.44
44. The same assertion is valid for attempts to transpose a Lacanian 
theorisation of the openess and indeterminacy of the unconscious 
directly on the level of the social.
This is,for example,the case in S.Zizek’s affirmation of a radical 
openess of the social as "symbolic order" due to the operation of a
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Once the openness of the social has been theorised,the 
question of the emergence of "radical otherness,non-trivial 
novelty",of the "absolutely new",the "non determined" in 
history can be addressed.
This emergence may be the result of conscious action 
specifically aiming at social transformation.Such ac­
tion, connected with autonomy in the strict sense,is pos­
sible's we saw above,at least potentially.
However,such action is not always present.Castoriadis in­
dicated the historical specificity of autonomy in the 
strict sense.Similarly,P.Anderson has remarked, "public 
goals...in their overwhelming majority have not aimed to 
transform social relations as such...collective projects 
which have sought to render their initiators authors of 
their collective mode of existence,in a conscious programme 
aimed at creating or remodelling whole social structures 
are relatively recent..."45
Even in the absence of this type of action,though,the 
emergence of the new in history can be theorised.Since the 
reproduction of the social through the individual is never 
fully determined,it always carries the possibility of a 
smaller or larger change.The "creative capacity of the
lack (Lacan's "manque-a-etre"): "The most radical dimension of
Lacanian theory lies ...in realising that the ..symbolic order itself 
is also barre,crossed-out,by a fundamental impossibility,structured 
around an impossible/traumatic kernel,around a central lack" 
(S.Zizek,"The sublime object of ideology",op.cit.,p.122)
If the openess of the unconsious the Lacanian concept of lack refers 
to (and we argued in the previous chapter against this way of concep­
tualising the openess of the unconscious) is simply transposed to the 
social without any connecting mechanism,it introduces a metaphysical 
concept,that of "lack",which is misleading.
To assert the openess of the social,the postulation of a "lack" is not 
necessary.The reproduction of the social through the individual un­
avoidably poses such an openess and at many levels,including the radi­
cal openess stemming from the unconscious.
45. P.Anderson.Arguments within English marxism.London;New Left Books, 
1980,p.20
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anonymous collectivity,as is manifested in and through the 
creation of language,family forms,morality,ideas,etc."46 
that Castoriadis refers to,is manifested in precisely this 
way.
Thus the emergence of the new in history ceases to be 
necessarily linked with human action specifically aimed at 
its emergence,without for that ceasing to be linked with 
the necessary indeterminacy the social influence on the in­
dividual entails.
It has to be noted that the above remarks refer to the 
mechanism of the emergence of the new in his­
tory .However, the theorisation of how new forms (for example 
the state and class societies or capitalism) may 
emerge,does not imply anything about the ability of these 
forms to historically survive and/or become significant.We 
cannot deduce from the above theorisation why certain such 
forms retain a permanence while others do not.This would 
require a specific enquiry.
Similarly,the recognition of the always present pos­
sibility of change does not imply anything about the rate 
of this change,which can vary significantly.The dif­
ference, for example,between "primitive" and modern
societies,is precisely a difference in rate,not a dif­
ference in modalities.
6.THE UNCONSCIOUS AS A LEVEL OF SOCIAL OPERATION
Since the level of the unconscious is,to an significant 
extent influenced by the social (as we saw,in the inter­
nalisation of representations and the elements that con­
struct the agencies of the ego and super-ego) and in turn 
lies behind the individual's products of consciousness and 
action,it can be considered as a level at which the social
"exists" and through which it is necessarily reproduced.We
can refer,hence,to an unconscious dimension of the social.
46. C.Castoriadis,"Psychanalyse et Politique",op.cit.,p.148
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The question emerges what is the extent of this 
"unconscious dimension",in other words to what extent can 
we consider the social as "existing" and being reproduced 
through the level of the (individual) unconscious.
From the point of view of a psychoanalytically influenced 
theorisation of the social as the one we have referred 
to,we can only attest the social origin of the repre­
sentations the psyche uses or of the elements used in the 
construction of the ego and super-ego and of their in­
stinctual investment, i.e. the social origin of a certain 
organisation of the unconscious.
Since the psyche cannot develop without these social ele­
ments and the corresponding social environment,the uncon­
scious "dimension" is a necessary and inescapable one.
However,this does not imply that the level of the uncon­
scious is exclusively social (we indicated that social 
determinations on the unconscious are just one level of in­
fluences among many).
Moreover,the affirmation of the necessity of this level 
does not imply that the social does not operate on the 
level of consciousness as well.It is possible that there 
are functions or structures of the social that operate 
wholly on the unconscious level and others wholly on the 
level of consciousness (in the latter case,though,they 
would still have to be supported by a certain 
-unconsciously formed and operating- motivational matrix).
To indicate which social structural wholes can be con­
sidered as operating on the one level and which on the 
other specific studies are necessary.In the context of a 
general theorisation like the present one we can only af­
firm the relevance of the level of the unconscious for the 
social as a whole.
This affirmation introduces a new level of social opera­
tion.Outside psychoanalysis,the only way to conceptualise 
"meaning" has been that of conscious
meaning:ideas,thoughts, conscious representations,products
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of consciousness in general.The non "meaningful" could be 
attributed to a "nature" or to "biology" and analysed in 
the manner of the natural sciences.
The psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche,however, in­
troduced the level of the unconscious as neither conscious­
ness and yet nor as pure psychical energy.We saw that the 
unconscious has to be seen as always/already represented 
and hence as always carrying a "meaning" of some sort.Thus 
the level of the unconscious is reducible neither to biol­
ogy nor to consciousness and,as always "represented",is al­
ways "meaningful".It allows thus a possible theorisation 
of a level of the social that has been repeatedly indicated 
in the history of social thought without ever been fully 
theorised.To provide just a few examples:
The concept of the unconscious allows a possible concep­
tualisation of the "material" level Marx refers to,a level 
that is neither nature nor thought,but it determines the 
"forms of consciousness",that is specifically human and 
connected to social action,without any recourse to a tran- 
shistorical human essence as Marx does.
Late Durkheim's "social life" that can generate 
ideas,concepts,categories without being coextensive with 
them,or Pareto's residues can also be seen as connected to 
the level of the unconscious,as also Weber's "affective" 
and "traditional" action which can thus be theorised dif­
ferently than as deviations of rational action.
Moreover,the "meaningfulness" of the social the her­
meneutic tradition refers to can be theorised without a 
reduction to conscious ideas and thought.And so on.
Thus the theorisation of the unconscious as socially 
relevant corresponds to a long standing open question 
within social theory.The importance of this theorisa­
tion, however, depends on the specific insights it can al­
low. We indicated above the relevance of the unconscious to 
the question of the autonomy of the social individual and 
to the openness of social reproduction.We shall focus now on
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the question of the knowledge of the social and on the 
question of the meaningfulness of social practice.
The question of objective knowledge
We already indicated the radical indeterminacy the uncon­
scious level of social reproduction implies.This indeter­
minacy is due to the impossibility to directly approach 
the unconscious and hence to know as what the social ele­
ments internalised exist there; also to the lack of any 
unidimensionality in the manifestations of the unconscious 
in consciousness.
Within this assertion are obvious implications for a 
theory of the social "knowledge".When we refer to conscious 
thoughts,ideas, representations or affects as manifesta­
tions of a certain unconscious structuring,these manifesta­
tions are only one possible expression of the unconscious 
content.Variable thoughts,ideas, or actions,possibly con­
flicting between them,may originate from the same uncon­
scious content.Moreover,these elements do not represent a 
transposition of this content in consciousness,merely a 
manifestation of it.
It is only an interpretive procedure of these products of 
consciousness or actions,therefore,that provides a way of 
approximating the unconscious content.But these interpreta­
tions are never final or complete.Many interpretations of 
the same elements can exist,depending on one's starting 
point and intention.The "meaning" of the uncon­
scious, therefore, is not coextensive with a conscious/ ra­
tional meaning.47
Thus any "knowledge" of the social,to the extent that it 
refers to the unconscious,can only have a specifically her­
47. Thus Castoriadis’ attribution to the unconscious of the modality 
of "magma" as "that from which one can extract an infinite number of 
enseblist organisations but which can never be reconstituted by an en- 
seblist composition of these organisations" (IIS,p.238) can be seen as 
fully justified.
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meneutic character.
This hermeneutics,however,has to be distinguished from any 
subjectivism.The social elements that can be located within 
the (individual) unconscious are intelligible and meaning­
ful only within larger structural entities of a social na­
ture. By themselves,they usually do not "mean" anything.The 
complementarity of the "serf" and the "lord",for example,is 
not to be found in the serf and the lord as such,but in 
their complementary behaviour in a context of practice 
-that of "feudalism"- which is not reducible to individual 
serfs and lords.
It is not,therefore,an "empathy" to a subject enclosed to 
itself we refer to,but a procedure of locating elements of 
social structure operating within the individual uncon­
scious, but being meaningful (as manifestations of this un­
conscious in consciousness or action) only within a social 
context.lt is a structural and social,rather than a subjec­
tivist hermeneutics we indicate.
On the other hand,we have to distinguish this hermeneutic 
procedure from a type of "hermeneutics",that of late Schutz 
for example,which reduce the interpreted elements to the 
order of ideas,thoughts,etc.,as "first order" concepts.This 
approach ultimately leads to an objectivism since there is 
nothing that inhibits the "first order" concepts from 
being,at least in principle,fully accessible to 
knowledge.There is no "change of state" involved,since both 
"first" and "second order" concepts refer to conscious 
thought.
Unlike this type of hermeneutics,the interpretation of the 
unconscious can never lead to any final or full theorisa­
tion of the unconscious content,as it remains always at a 
different level not directly approachable nor fully deter­
minable. In so far as the unconscious content is con­
cerned, even "first order" concepts are already an inter­
pretation.
We refer,therefore,to a hermeneutics in the radical
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sense,a "true" hermeneutics.Sinee the social can be said to 
include the level of the unconscious,therefore -and there 
is no way to avoid either the existence of the unconscious 
nor the social influence on its structuring- the social 
cannot be claimed to be fully,objectively knowable.lt has 
to be seen as including a level of operation that neces­
sarily escapes any full theorisation and can only be ap­
proached hermeneutically.
Consequently,objectivist accounts of the social that claim 
the possibility of a full knowledge of the social cannot be 
sustained.In order to theorise the social we can -and we 
cannot avoid doing so- refer to logically constructed sys­
tems of concepts but we cannot assume an identity between 
this theoretical model and its "object".We cannot,in 
Bourdieu's words,substitute the "reality of the model for 
the model of the reality".Vico's "verum et factum 
convertuntur" ("truth and (human) deeds/facts are 
interchangeable",or,in Castoriadis' rendering, "only that 
we have done is intelligible and everything that we have 
done is intelligible"48 has to be seen as applying only 
partially to the social world.49
Thus social structural entities that can be seen to 
"exist" within the (individual) unconscious,can never be 
fully determined or objectively known.Hence these struc­
tures,even if seen in a "static" way,they can never be con­
sidered as closed or fully determined ones.To the "dynamic"
48. C.Castoriadis, "Individual, society, rationality, history" (1988) 
in "Philosophy,polltics,autonomy",op.cit.,p.56
49. Thus interpretations of psychoanalytic theory that integrate it 
within an overall objectivist account simply ignore the specificity of 
the former.
In Parsons' interpretation,for example,the indeterminacy inherent in 
the social structuring of the psyche is simply ignored.Indeed,the un­
conscious is for Parsons a purely descriptive category.The socialisa­
tion of the individual through the creation of "need-dispositions" and 
"motivational forces" appropriate to the social system is considered 
straightforward,passing through no register with the specificity of 
the Freudian unconscious.
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openness the points of indeterminacy in the process of so­
cial reproduction imply,therefore,a "static" one has to be 
added,an openness due solely to the modality of the uncon­
scious .
The meaningfulness of social practice
Since the unconscious is always represented and hence 
"meaningful", and since the unconscious content can be 
manifested in action as well as in consciousness,even in 
the absence of a rational/conscious monitoring of one's ac­
tion, this action cannot be considered as "meaningless".
Outside psychoanalysis,action that appeared as not guided 
by explicit,conscious meaning -a meaning that the in­
dividual could identify as such- was considered as 
"meaningless",guided perhaps by intentions or motives of a 
pure (psycho)dynamic nature.
Once,however,the psychical is seen,even on the level of 
the unconscious,as always/already represented,any
"motivation" or "intention" necessarily is also a carrier 
of meaning,in the sense that it refers to a psychical 
structuring that is always "meaningful".Hence any action is 
also meaningful.
This "meaning",though,in so far as it refers directly to 
the unconscious,is never directly knowable and can only be 
approached in a hermeneutic way.The impossibility of objec­
tive or direct knowledge of any unconscious content and the 
necessity of a hermeneutic procedure to approach this con­
tent applies to (social) action as well as to products of 
consciousness.To the interpretation of the "text" (of ex­
plicit ideas,thoughts,products of consciousness) the inter­
pretation of action and practice can be added.
Thus a specific theorisation of social practice,as always 
meaningful,even when not guided by explicit thoughts or 
ideas,but also as only hermeneutically approachable (in so 
far as this "meaning" refers to an unconscious content), 
becomes possible.
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The possibility of theorising practice without reducing 
it to a cognitive model of the actor and the means-end 
scheme is important.We can consider that it is towards such 
a theorisation that Giddens's "practical consciousness" was 
oriented.
It was mainly Bourdieu,though,that explicitly aimed his 
"theory of practice" towards such an alternative.He indi­
cated, as we saw,the specificity of the level of practice 
and its irreducibility to "formal operations".He remarked 
that to pass from practice to a theoretical account of it 
constitutes an operation of knowledge that transforms its 
object to theoretical concepts.However,Bourdieu ultimately 
reduced the "logic of practice" to an imperfect variant of 
full/discursive logic.Thus a theorisation of practice that 
would indeed satisfy his aims was lacking.
The psychoanalytic account of the unconscious provides 
precisely this theorisation.Practice can be seen as refer­
ring to a "field of meaning",that of the unconscious,and 
both its irreducibility to concepts and its 
"translatability" to them can be accounted for.Thus prac­
tice can be meaningful without necessarily implying a 
discursive/cognitive operation from the part of the ac­
tors, yet as never being totally outside such an operation.
Similarly,the problem of the distinction between 
"discursive" and "non-discursive" structures that we en­
countered in Laclau and Mouffe can be fruitfully 
addressed.We can conceptualise the "so called non- 
discursive structures" as corresponding to the level of 
practice and as indeed different from discourse in the 
limited sense (as "concepts" or"ideas"); and yet as not im­
plying a reduction to an ontologically privileged level.The 
"differentiation within the social production of meaning" 
which Laclau and Mouffe are unable to actually concep­
tualise, becomes possible.Social structures can be seen as 
existing in "practice" without assimilating the modality of 
these structures to that of ideas.
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7.CONCLUDING REMARKS
The psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche,if inter­
preted in a non-biologistic way as we indicated it can 
be,offers valuable insights for a theory of the social.To 
summarise the main points of these insights:
- The individual is inconceivable as an entity outside a 
social environment.
This environment operates both
at (i) a deep,unconscious level,producing a structuring of 
the unconscious through the agencies of ego and super­
ego. The elements these psychical agencies are made of and 
the instinctual investment of these elements are linked 
with the social environment.The social provides also the 
"representations" the psyche uses,even on the level of the 
unconscious.
and at (ii) the level of consciousness,providing the cog­
nitive systems of concepts ,symbols and norms conscious 
thought uses,as well as the objective environment to which 
the individual can rationally adapt.
The social influence,on both levels,is not limited to 
childhood,but continues throughout the individual's life.
However,the individual is not reducible to these so­
cial determinations.
There are,besides the social ones,other influences deter­
mining the structure and make up of the psyche,as for ex­
ample a certain innate dynamic and closure of the ego (both 
conscious and unconscious),or biologically given in­
stinctual modes of behaviour.
Moreover,the influence the social exerts is characterised 
by points of indeterminacy: the actual choice and the in­
stinctual investment of objects internalised within the ego 
and the super-ego cannot be mechanically deduced from the 
(social) environment.
More importantly,the fact that the internalisation of
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these objects (as well as of representations) operates at 
an unconscious level,implies that it is impossible to 
directly approach or objectively know how these elements 
exist within the unconscious.They are recognisable only 
through their effects in consciousness or action but even 
these are not unidimensional (these assertions derive from 
the psychoanalytic theorisation of the modality of the 
unconscious).
Therefore,even when the social environment is given,we 
cannot have a fully causal theory of the effects it will 
produce on the individual.
Finally,the conscious/rational ego,though conditioned by 
unconscious motives and by the social origin of the sym­
bolic universes it uses,exhibits levels of autonomy. 
Indeed,the points of indeterminacy within the social in­
fluences allow the possibility of autonomy in the strict 
sense (as theorised by Castoriadis).
Hence,while accepting the inescapably social nature of the 
individual,we can theorise the autonomy of the social actor 
as well as its limits.We can address,therefore,the question 
of agency,a central one in social theory.
Since the social determinations on the individual are 
manifested as products of consciousness and as action,the 
above theorisation introduces also a theory of social 
reproduct i on.
Due to other factors influencing individual behaviour be­
sides social influences and also due to the points of in­
determinacy within these influences,this reproduction is 
never fully determined.
This theory of reproduction allows,therefore,the theorisa­
tion of the emergence of the new,of the non determined,in 
history as always implied in social reproduction and not 
only as a possible result of intentional action specifi­
cally aimed at social transformation.A central problem 
faced by theories based on a conceptualisation of the so­
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cial as fully closed structural entities can thus be 
addressed fruitfully.
Since the social is reproduced through the individual 
and part of this reproduction functions through the uncon­
scious, it can be claimed that the (individual) unconscious 
is also a level of social operation and existence.Thus a 
level of social operation reducible neither to nature nor 
to consciousness can be introduced.
However,the unconscious is not directly accessible.Its 
modality necessitates a change of state,a radical her­
meneutics, for any "content" or structuring to be manifested 
as such.Even so,these manifestations are never unidimen­
sional .Hence, there can be never be a fully objective 
knowledge of the social influence on the uncon­
scious. Correspondingly, we could say that the social can 
never be fully objectively knowable.
Thus the possibility of a radical hermeneutics related to 
the knowledge of the social elements existing within the 
unconscious is introduced.
- Unconscious motivations can be manifested in ac­
tion, i.e in social practice rather than as products of con­
sciousness .The always meaningful nature of the unconscious 
implies that such practice,even when not directly as­
sociated with conscious thoughts or ideas,is always 
"meaningful".This meaning,however,has to be approached,as 
all unconscious contents,in a hermeneutic rather than in 
any direct way.A direction for a "theory of practice" 
is,therefore,indicated.
Certain of the above assertions (namely the impos­
sibility of objective knowledge,a certain type of indeter­
minacy and openness in social reproduction,the meaningful­
ness of practice) concern the reproduction of the social 
through the level of the (individual) unconscious and hence
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are valid only for those social structural entities that do 
operate on this level (though exactly which structures are 
such cannot be indicated within a general study as the 
present one).Other assertions,however,(as a level of in­
determinacy and openness in social reproduction due to the 
autonomy of the conscious ego) are valid for social opera­
tion through the level of consciousness as well.
To conclude: the psychoanalytic theorisation of the psyche 
can be seen as offering a theorisation of the autonomy of 
the social individual and thus a way of addressing the 
question of agency; as offering a theorisation of the open­
ness of social reproduction and thus a way of addressing 
the question of history; as offering a way of addressing 
the question of the knowledge of the social and of affirm­
ing the necessity of a radical hermeneutics; and finally a 
way of asserting the meaningfulness of social practice.
All these questions,of course,are far from being 
"solved".Simply a more fruitful way of posing them and 
hence of exploring them,is indicated.
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